United States ex rel. Taylor v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.

4 F. Supp. 211, 1930 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2228
CourtDistrict Court, D. Idaho
DecidedJanuary 8, 1930
DocketNo. 686
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 4 F. Supp. 211 (United States ex rel. Taylor v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Idaho primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States ex rel. Taylor v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 4 F. Supp. 211, 1930 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2228 (D. Idaho 1930).

Opinion

CAVANAH, District Judge.

This is an action brought against a surety on its bond given under an act of Congress for the benefit of those furnishing labor and materials on public works of the United States. The action as to the claim of plaintiff, Taylor, was dismissed, but it is continued upon the complaint in intervention of Havemann, who alleges that he furnished goods, wares, merchandise, and materials for the performance of the work to be done under the contract, covering section 3, Salmon-Montana Line National Forest Road, between station 1002 — 50 and station 1340 — 00. The statute (40 USCA § 270) provides that any contractor upon public work of the United States must give a bond “with the additional obligation that such contractor or contractors shall promptly make payments to all persons supplying him or them with labor and materials in the prosecution of the work provided for in such contract.” The bond provides that there shall be no liability if the contractor “shall well and truly pay aíl and every person furnishing material or performing labor in and about the improvement of said highway all and every sum or sums of money due him, them or any of them, for all such labor and materials for which the contractor is liable.”

The statute and similar bonds have been before the federal courts often for interpretation, and they have been given a liberal construction in order to effectuate the purpose of Congress as declared in the aet, and to protect those who furnish labor or materials in the prosecution of public works. Illinois Surety Co. v. John Davis Co., 244 U. S. 376, 37 S. Ct. 614, 61 L. Ed. 1206; U. S., for Use of Hill, v. American Surety Co., 200 U. S. 197, 26 S. Ct. 168, 50 L. Ed. 437. And in so [213]*213interpreting the act, and a bond issued thereunder, the Supreme Court, in the case of Brogan v. National Surety Company, 246 U. S. 257, 38 S. Ct. 250, 251, 62 L. Ed. 703, L. R. A. 1918D, 776, has taken into consideration special circumstances • under which the supplies were furnished, and has not limited the application of the act to labor and materials directly incorporated into the public work. Brogan v. National Surety Co., supra; Title Guaranty & Trust Co. v. Crane Co., 219 U. S. 24, 31 S. Ct. 140, 55 L. Ed. 72; U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. U. S. ex rel. Bartlett, 231 U. S. 237, 34 S. Ct. 88, 58 L. Ed. 200. In the Brogan Case, the court said that “the Standard Contracting Company undertook to deepen the channel in a portion of St. Mary’s river, Michigan, located 'in a comparative wilderness at some distance from any settlement. There were no hotels or boarding houses’ and the contractor 'was compelled to provide board and lodging for its laborers.’ * * * The Circuit Court of Appeals [228 F. 577, L. R. A. 1917A, 336] deemed immaterial the special circumstances under which the supplies were furnished and the findings of fact by the trial court that they were necessary to and wholly consumed in the prosecution of the work provided for in the contract and bond. In our ^opinion these facts are not only material, but decisive.”

Approaching then a consideration of the present case, with the views in mind as expressed by the Supreme Court, the evidence shows that section 3 of the highway, covered by the contract and bond, is located in the mountains at some distance from any place where supplies, blaeksmithing and repairs to equipment, or facilities for boarding the men, could be secured, and that they had to be transported a long distance after the construction of a road oh the mountainside where the work was being done. In that regard the situation is in some respects similar to those in the Brogan Case. Intervener now seeks a recovery of $2,805.41 of his alleged claim of $2,967.17, after allowing certain credits admitted by him, upon the contention that materials to that amount were furnished to the subcontractor of Craven & Co. The defendant surety company admits that intervener is entitled to recover the sum of $400, leaving then $2,405.41 of intervener’s claim in dispute.

Upon the evidence there are two disputed questions involved: First, are the items of such a character as to come within the meaning of the word “materials,” and the term “in the improving of the highway”, used in the bond, and under the statute “in the prosecution of the work?” And, second, were they used in the improving of the highway and in the prosecution of the work provided for in the contract? In determining what items were used in the improving of the highway and in the prosecution of the work under the statute and contract, we are confronted with the broad interpretation placed upon the statute by the Supreme Court and the consideration given by that court of special circumstances under which the supplies were furnished.

The work here was located some distance from any settlement, and there were no boarding houses, making it necessary for the subcontractors to provide board and lodging for their laborers. Groceries and provisions, feed for horses, blaeksmithing equipment, coal, grease, gas, oil, commissary and office equipment, were used in the prosecution of the work, and freight paid. A summary of the items becomes necessary in order to determine what are allowable and what are not under the statute and bond. For convenience, reference will be made to plaintiff’s exhibits, which contain the different classes of items relied upon by him.

Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 3 covers horse feed used on the work and freight on same. It would seem that these-items are allowable, after deducting $91.41, materials furnished Russell & Cole, and $21.60 hay not used, leaving a balance of $1,013.12.

Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 5 covers equipment for horses used on the work, such as horseshoes, horseshoe nails, calks, and clevises. The items allowed, as shown in this exhibit, and which I think are to be considered as coming within the bond, are:

8/28 10# No. 7 horseshoe nails...............$3.00

1 keg No. 4 horseshoes. .12.50

. 1 keg No. 5 horseshoes. .12.50

15# Ño. 4 calks for horseshoes..........2.62

15#- No. 5 calks for horseshoes.......... 2.62

10/12 25# No. 4 calks fox horseshoes..........4.38

12# No. 5 calks for • horseshoes......... 2.10

10/24 5# horseshoe nails.... 1.50

10/19 5# ” ” .... 1.50

25# No. 5 horseshoe ■ calks...............4.38

1 keg horseshoes.......12.50

9/16 12 large clevises......7.20

Total allowed under this heading.....$66.80

[214]*214The remaining items thereof are disallowed, for I do not think that harness, chains, traces, and equipment for horses are proper charges under the bond. These items are as follows:

8/20 6 No. 20 horse collar pads----$ 5.10

6 No. 22 horse collar pads.... 5.10

100 ft. %" rope for horses... 3.25

1 pr. harness lines........... 7.00

6 single trees............... 10.50

9/8 2 doz.

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Related

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43 F. Supp. 726 (D. Montana, 1941)
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88 F.2d 388 (Fifth Circuit, 1937)

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Bluebook (online)
4 F. Supp. 211, 1930 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2228, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-ex-rel-taylor-v-fidelity-deposit-co-idd-1930.