United States ex rel. Price v. Peters

66 F. Supp. 3d 1141, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189698, 2013 WL 10724730
CourtDistrict Court, C.D. Illinois
DecidedDecember 18, 2013
Docket12-3107
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 66 F. Supp. 3d 1141 (United States ex rel. Price v. Peters) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States ex rel. Price v. Peters, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1141, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189698, 2013 WL 10724730 (C.D. Ill. 2013).

Opinion

OPINION

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:

This cause is before the Court on Relator/Plaintiff Jacqueline Price’s (“Relator”) Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 22) and Defendant Shirley Peters’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 35). This is a qui tarn action brought by Relator on behalf of the United States pursuant to the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. The Court DENIES Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTS Relator’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant knowingly collected excess rent from Relator totaling $2,480. By knowingly collecting excess rent, Defendant violated the terms of the Housing Assistance Payments Contract duly executed by Relator and the Springfield Housing Authority pursuant to the Springfield Housing Authority’s Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program (the “Voucher Program”). This conduct warrants imposing liability on Defendant under the False Claims Act.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This Court has jurisdiction over claims brought pursuant to the False Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1345; see also 31 U.S.C. § 3732(a).

Venue is proper in the Central District of Illinois, Springfield Division, because Defendant resides in this judicial district and division. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Venue is also proper pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3732(a) because Defendant resided, transacted business, and committed the alleged acts at issue in this judicial district and division.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that no genuine dispute exists as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying the evidence the movant believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. [1144]*1144Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 328, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). No genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable jury could not find in favor of the nonmoving party. Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir.2007). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor. Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 550 (7th Cir.2008).

III. BACKGROUND

Pursuant to Section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended, the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“the Department”) distributes federal funds for the Section 8 Voucher Program. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o); 24 C.F.R. Part 982. To assist eligible low income families with obtaining decent, safe, and sanitary housing in the private rental market, the Section 8 Voucher Program provides rental subsidies for dwellings that are chosen by tenants in the private market. The amounts paid by the Voucher Program to a landlord are defined as Housing Assistance Payments.

The Section 8 Voucher Program is administered locally by public housing agencies. The public housing agencies are operated with funds previously allocated through annual contribution contracts by the Department. The Springfield Housing Authority was the area’s public housing agency at all times relevant to Relator’s claims.

Before making Housing Assistance Payments, the local public housing agency enters into a Housing Assistance Payments Contract -with the landlord. The Contracts are executed on forms specified by the Department. Among other things, the Contracts set the amount of monthly rent a landlord is entitled to receive for lease of the dwelling unit. The Voucher Program Housing Assistance Payments and any payments made by a tenant make up the monthly rent amount.

A. Defendant and the Springfield Housing Authority Executed a Contract for the Housing Authority to Make Assistance Payments to Defendant on Relator’s Behalf

In May 2008, Relator, a Section 8 tenant, located a two-bedroom residence to house Relator and her family. The dwelling unit, owned by Defendant, was located at 949 Indiana, Springfield, Illinois 62702. At the time, Defendant owned and leased a total of seven properties all with washers, dryers, and storage sheds. Often times, the storage sheds were detached garages. Defendant rents her properties to Section 8 and non-Section 8 tenants.

On May 21, 2008, Defendant and Relator executed a Request for Tenancy Approval and submitted the Request to the Springfield Housing Authority. The Request included a proposed monthly rental amount of $650 for Defendant’s lease of the dwelling unit to Relator. The Springfield Housing Authority determined that the reasonable rent amount for the dwelling unit was $370 rather than $650. Despite the lower reasonable rent determination, Defendant agreed to rent the dwelling unit to Relator through the Voucher Program.

On or about June 19, 2008, Defendant and the Springfield Housing Authority’s Voucher Program duly executed a Housing Assistance Payments Contract (the “Contract”) identifying Relator as the tenant of the dwelling unit for an initial lease term beginning on June 10, 2008 and ending May 31, 2009. The Contract set the total reasonable monthly rent amount at $370. During the twelve-month lease term, the [1145]*1145Voucher Program paid Defendant the $370 amount eleven times. The other month, February of 2009, the Voucher Program paid $159 and Relator paid the remaining $211. From June 1, 2008 until May 1, 2009, the Springfield Housing Authority Voucher Program made a total of $4,229.00 in Housing Assistance Payments to Defendant pursuant to the Contract. See Director of Springfield Housing Authority Section 8 Debra Hereford Affidavit, d/e 22-5 at 1-2. The Housing Assistance Payments were made contingent upon Defendant complying with the terms of the Contract. See Director of Springfield Housing Authority Section 8 Debra Hereford Affidavit, d/e 22-5 at 2 (“Springfield Housing Authority’s housing assistance payments were contingent on Ms. Peters staying true to the HAP Contract.”).

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Bluebook (online)
66 F. Supp. 3d 1141, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189698, 2013 WL 10724730, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-ex-rel-price-v-peters-ilcd-2013.