United States ex rel. Bilotta v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.

50 F. Supp. 3d 497, 89 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1447, 2014 WL 4922291, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139072
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedSeptember 30, 2014
DocketNo. 11 Civ. 007(PGG)
StatusPublished
Cited by39 cases

This text of 50 F. Supp. 3d 497 (United States ex rel. Bilotta v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States ex rel. Bilotta v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., 50 F. Supp. 3d 497, 89 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1447, 2014 WL 4922291, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139072 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

PAUL G. GARDEPHE, District Judge:

In this qui tarn action, Relator Oswald Bilotta alleges that Defendant Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation (“Novartis”) violated the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(l)(A)-(B) and related state laws by (1) causing false claims for reimbursement for patient prescriptions— that were written in exchange for kickbacks in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b and related state laws — to be submitted to federal and state health care programs (“the kickback claims”); and (2) promoting the drug Val-turna for off-label use, thereby causing the submission of false claims to federal and state health care programs (“the off-label promotion claims”).1 The United States (the “Government”) and the State of New York (collectively, the “Government Entities” or “Plaintiffs”) have intervened as to the kickback claims.

Novartis has moved to dismiss the Government’s Amended Complaint-in-Intervention, New York’s ComplainL-in-Inter-vention, and the Relator’s Third Amended Complaint. For the reasons stated below, Novartis’s motions will be denied in part and granted in part.

BACKGROUND

I. FACTS2

A. The Alleged Kickback Scheme

Plaintiffs allege that from January 2002 through at least November 2011, Novartis systematically bribed doctors to induce them to prescribe drugs from Novartis’s cardiovascular division for their patients. {See U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 1, 66; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶2, 3, 57) These drugs include Lotrel, Diovan, Diov-an HCT, Tekturna, Tekturna HCT, Ex-[502]*502forge, Exforge HOT, Valturna, Tekamlo, and Starlix.3 (See U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 66; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 57) Novartis sold these drugs through a network of sales representatives who met with health care professionals throughout the United States. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 67; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 58)

Novartis induced doctors to prescribe these drugs primarily through the use of “sham” speaker events. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 1-3; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶ 2^1) According to Novartis’s internal policies, speaker events were intended to be educational programs; Novartis would pay doctors to educate other doctors and health care professionals about Novartis drugs by presenting slides prepared by Novartis. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 2; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 4) These events were organized and conducted by Novartis sales representatives. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 72; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 69) They chose the speaker, topic, and venue for the events, as well as the attendees. (See U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 72-73, 81; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶ 6, 69)

Novartis held thousands of speaker events at which few or no slides were shown, however, and at which the attendees spent little or no time discussing the drugs that were allegedly the focus of the programs. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 2, 95; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶4, 82) These events thus served as little more than upscale social outings designed to induce doctors to write prescriptions for Novartis drugs. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 1, 77, 121, 135-36; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶ 2, 4, 82, 86-87)

According to Plaintiffs, the sham nature of these events was apparent from the attendees, speakers, subject matter, and venues. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 95; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶82) Frequently, groups of the same doctors would repeatedly attend speaker events on the same topic within a short period of time, with the doctors taking turns in the roles of attendees and “speakers.” (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 95-120, 126; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶ 82-85) For example, one doctor attended the same presentation ten times between July 2010 and October 2011, and the same three doctors were consistently present at nine of those events. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 97; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶84) Moreover, Novartis hosted many of its speaker events at high-end restaurants or sports bars without private rooms, making it difficult or impossible to hear the speaker or show slides; it was common for no slides to be shown at such events. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 121, 125-28, 130, 133-34; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶ 86-90) Other venués were similarly inappropriate for the types of “educational” events that Novartis purported to be hosting, such as “round table” programs at Hooters restaurants and fishing trips. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 122-24)

Sales representatives frequently asked speakers who they should invite as attendees to these events, and doctors used this as an opportunity to invite their friends. (Id. ¶ 136; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 91) Often the drug that was supposed to be the subject of the speaker program was [503]*503never discussed. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 137; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 92)

The doctors who Novartis designated as “speakers” for these events were paid “ho-noraria” by Novartis, even though they spent little or no time discussing the drugs that were supposedly the subject of the programs. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 3, 78; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶4, 92) “Speakers” were paid between $750 and $1500 for each event, with some speakers being paid as much as $3000. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 79; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 67) In some instances, speaker events reflected in Novartis records never took place, or doctors recorded as attending were not, in fact, present; nevertheless, the designated “speakers” were compensated for these non-existent events. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 138-44; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 93)

Novartis’s internal analysis showed that its speaker programs had a high “return on investment,” as doctors who attended the events — as either speakers or attendees — wrote an increased number of prescriptions for Novartis drugs. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶3, 145-48; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶ 94-96) Novartis found that the more incentives doctors received in the form of meals, entertainment, and honoraria from these events, the more Novartis prescriptions the doctors would write. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 147; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 95) The highest return on investment came from doctors who were paid to “speak” at the events. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 3) Novartis considered its speaker programs to be a “key component of [Novartis’s] promotional activities aimed at increasing its sales of drugs” from 2002 to at least 2011. (Id. ¶ 71; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 61) Novartis spent more than $65 million for more than 38,000 speaker programs ostensibly about Lotrel, Starlix, and Valturna between January 1, 2002 and November 2011. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 71; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 61)

Novartis intended its speaker programs to increase prescription-writing, and doctors knew this. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 147-50; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No.

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50 F. Supp. 3d 497, 89 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1447, 2014 WL 4922291, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139072, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-ex-rel-bilotta-v-novartis-pharmaceuticals-corp-nysd-2014.