MESCHKE, Justice.
United Hospital appealed a judgment dismissing its suit against Grand Forks county for medical care to a prisoner in the county jail. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the Hospital had not timely appealed from denial of the claim by the county commission. We hold that a claimant may sue the county without taking an appeal from a denial by the commission. Therefore, we reverse and remand.
After Barry D’Annunzio attempted suicide while confined in the Grand Forks county jail, he was taken to United Hospital for medical care. The Hospital later submitted a $57,947.41 claim to the county for D’Annunzio’s medical care. See Hospital Services, Inc. v. Dumas, 297 N.W.2d 320 (N.D.1980). The Grand Forks county commission denied the claim, and the Hospital did not appeal from the denial. In[596]*596stead, it sued the county and D’Annunzio for the amount due for his medical care.
D’Annunzio filed bankruptcy, thereby invoking 11 U.S.C. 362(a), the automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy code. The county moved to dismiss the Hospital’s claim against it, contending that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the exclusive procedure for contesting the county commission's denial of the claim was an appeal and the Hospital failed to file a timely appeal. The district court concluded that an appeal was the Hospital’s only recourse and dismissed the Hospital’s suit against the county. United Hospital appealed.
In United Hospital v. D’Annunzio, 462 N.W.2d 652 (N.D.1990), we retained jurisdiction of the appeal, while remanding the record for consideration of a NDRCivP 54(b) certification. The district court returned the record with a proper certification making dismissal of the Hospital’s suit a final and appealable judgment. We now consider the merits of the appeal, reverse, and remand for further proceedings.
The dispositive question is whether United Hospital’s exclusive remedy for contesting the denial of its claim is an appeal. The Hospital contends that an appeal is not an exclusive remedy and that it may maintain an independent action against the county to collect the claim. We agree.
The county’s position is based on a statute “saving” a claimant’s right of appeal. NDCC 21-05-07 says:
Consideration of account — Action thereon. Whenever an account, claim, or demand against any township or county is reviewed in the manner prescribed in section 21-05-01, the board to which the same is presented may receive and consider the same and may allow or disallow the same, in whole or in part, as to the board shall appear just and lawful, saving to such claimant the right of appeal in accordance with the procedure provided in section 28-34-01. Approval by the board must be recorded in the record of its proceedings and this is sufficient to indicate approval without requiring a majority of the members of the board to sign or initial the voucher or order for payment.1
But this “saving” clause does not expressly make an appeal the exclusive remedy.
Furthermore, longstanding precedent contradicts the county’s position. In Spencer v. County of Sully, 4 Dak. 474, 33 N.W. 97 (1887), the Supreme Court of Dakota considered similar provisions in the Revised Codes of the Territory of Dakota.2 [597]*597In that case the county denied the plaintiffs’ contract claim, and they did not appeal. Instead, they sued the county in an independent contract action. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ independent action, concluding that it did not have jurisdiction because the plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy was an appeal from the county’s denial of the claim.
The Territorial Supreme Court reversed and remanded for trial. The Court concluded that the district court’s decision would have construed the statutes to make a county’s denial conclusive, thus precluding an independent contract action against the county, in the same manner as a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction would be conclusive. The Court noted that, by statute, an organized county in Dakota Territory was a body corporate and could sue and be sued in any court in the territory. The Court held that the organic act for Dakota Territory vested judicial power in the courts3 and prevented the territorial legislature from conferring that kind of judicial power on the county commissioners. The Court said
The sections of the statutes relied upon by respondent to make out his position that plaintiffs’ sole remedy lay in an appeal from the order of the board ... may, in so far as applicable to cases like the one at bar, be interpreted as in harmony with the organic act, by holding that they, in effect, give to claimants, at their option, a simpler and sometimes a speedier way to get their rejected claims passed upon by the district courts, than by an original action brought in such courts.
Spencer, 33 N.W. at 99. An appeal and an independent action were thus held alternative remedies.
The statutory and constitutional statements in Spencer’s time are nearly identical to today’s. NDCC 11-10-01 says that “[e]ach organized county is a body corporate for civil and political purposes ... [and] may sue and be sued, contract and be contracted with.” N.D. Const. Art. VI, § 1, says that “[t]he judicial power of the state is vested in a unified judicial system consisting of a supreme court, a district court, and such other courts as may be provided by law.” Spencer, therefore, is persuasive authority for allowing United Hospital to sue Grand Forks county in this case.
Moreover, many other courts have similarly held that a party whose claim against a municipal corporation is denied may sue independently even though a right to appeal from the denial exists. Campbell County v. Overby, 20 S.D. 640, 108 N.W. 247 (1906); Pylant v. Town of Purvis, 87 Miss. 433, 40 So. 7 (1906); Torres v. Bd. of County Commissioners, Socorro County, 23 N.M. 700, 171 P. 510 (1918); West v. Coos County, 115 Or. 409, 237 P. 961 (1925); State ex rel. Robertson Inv. Co. v. Patterson, 47 Wyo. 416, 38 P.2d 617 (1934); Potts v. City of Utica, 86 F.2d 616 (2d Cir.1936); Enterprise Publishing Co. v. Harlan County, 310 S.W.2d 551 (Ky.Ct.App.1958); Concannon v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Linn County, 6 Kan.App.2d 20, 626 P.2d 798 (1981). See also 56 Am. Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, § 829 (1971); 17 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, §§ 49.03, 49.12 (1982). The right to [598]*598appeal from a denial is not a claimant’s exclusive remedy.
The county argues that Spencer
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MESCHKE, Justice.
United Hospital appealed a judgment dismissing its suit against Grand Forks county for medical care to a prisoner in the county jail. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the Hospital had not timely appealed from denial of the claim by the county commission. We hold that a claimant may sue the county without taking an appeal from a denial by the commission. Therefore, we reverse and remand.
After Barry D’Annunzio attempted suicide while confined in the Grand Forks county jail, he was taken to United Hospital for medical care. The Hospital later submitted a $57,947.41 claim to the county for D’Annunzio’s medical care. See Hospital Services, Inc. v. Dumas, 297 N.W.2d 320 (N.D.1980). The Grand Forks county commission denied the claim, and the Hospital did not appeal from the denial. In[596]*596stead, it sued the county and D’Annunzio for the amount due for his medical care.
D’Annunzio filed bankruptcy, thereby invoking 11 U.S.C. 362(a), the automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy code. The county moved to dismiss the Hospital’s claim against it, contending that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the exclusive procedure for contesting the county commission's denial of the claim was an appeal and the Hospital failed to file a timely appeal. The district court concluded that an appeal was the Hospital’s only recourse and dismissed the Hospital’s suit against the county. United Hospital appealed.
In United Hospital v. D’Annunzio, 462 N.W.2d 652 (N.D.1990), we retained jurisdiction of the appeal, while remanding the record for consideration of a NDRCivP 54(b) certification. The district court returned the record with a proper certification making dismissal of the Hospital’s suit a final and appealable judgment. We now consider the merits of the appeal, reverse, and remand for further proceedings.
The dispositive question is whether United Hospital’s exclusive remedy for contesting the denial of its claim is an appeal. The Hospital contends that an appeal is not an exclusive remedy and that it may maintain an independent action against the county to collect the claim. We agree.
The county’s position is based on a statute “saving” a claimant’s right of appeal. NDCC 21-05-07 says:
Consideration of account — Action thereon. Whenever an account, claim, or demand against any township or county is reviewed in the manner prescribed in section 21-05-01, the board to which the same is presented may receive and consider the same and may allow or disallow the same, in whole or in part, as to the board shall appear just and lawful, saving to such claimant the right of appeal in accordance with the procedure provided in section 28-34-01. Approval by the board must be recorded in the record of its proceedings and this is sufficient to indicate approval without requiring a majority of the members of the board to sign or initial the voucher or order for payment.1
But this “saving” clause does not expressly make an appeal the exclusive remedy.
Furthermore, longstanding precedent contradicts the county’s position. In Spencer v. County of Sully, 4 Dak. 474, 33 N.W. 97 (1887), the Supreme Court of Dakota considered similar provisions in the Revised Codes of the Territory of Dakota.2 [597]*597In that case the county denied the plaintiffs’ contract claim, and they did not appeal. Instead, they sued the county in an independent contract action. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ independent action, concluding that it did not have jurisdiction because the plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy was an appeal from the county’s denial of the claim.
The Territorial Supreme Court reversed and remanded for trial. The Court concluded that the district court’s decision would have construed the statutes to make a county’s denial conclusive, thus precluding an independent contract action against the county, in the same manner as a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction would be conclusive. The Court noted that, by statute, an organized county in Dakota Territory was a body corporate and could sue and be sued in any court in the territory. The Court held that the organic act for Dakota Territory vested judicial power in the courts3 and prevented the territorial legislature from conferring that kind of judicial power on the county commissioners. The Court said
The sections of the statutes relied upon by respondent to make out his position that plaintiffs’ sole remedy lay in an appeal from the order of the board ... may, in so far as applicable to cases like the one at bar, be interpreted as in harmony with the organic act, by holding that they, in effect, give to claimants, at their option, a simpler and sometimes a speedier way to get their rejected claims passed upon by the district courts, than by an original action brought in such courts.
Spencer, 33 N.W. at 99. An appeal and an independent action were thus held alternative remedies.
The statutory and constitutional statements in Spencer’s time are nearly identical to today’s. NDCC 11-10-01 says that “[e]ach organized county is a body corporate for civil and political purposes ... [and] may sue and be sued, contract and be contracted with.” N.D. Const. Art. VI, § 1, says that “[t]he judicial power of the state is vested in a unified judicial system consisting of a supreme court, a district court, and such other courts as may be provided by law.” Spencer, therefore, is persuasive authority for allowing United Hospital to sue Grand Forks county in this case.
Moreover, many other courts have similarly held that a party whose claim against a municipal corporation is denied may sue independently even though a right to appeal from the denial exists. Campbell County v. Overby, 20 S.D. 640, 108 N.W. 247 (1906); Pylant v. Town of Purvis, 87 Miss. 433, 40 So. 7 (1906); Torres v. Bd. of County Commissioners, Socorro County, 23 N.M. 700, 171 P. 510 (1918); West v. Coos County, 115 Or. 409, 237 P. 961 (1925); State ex rel. Robertson Inv. Co. v. Patterson, 47 Wyo. 416, 38 P.2d 617 (1934); Potts v. City of Utica, 86 F.2d 616 (2d Cir.1936); Enterprise Publishing Co. v. Harlan County, 310 S.W.2d 551 (Ky.Ct.App.1958); Concannon v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Linn County, 6 Kan.App.2d 20, 626 P.2d 798 (1981). See also 56 Am. Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, § 829 (1971); 17 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, §§ 49.03, 49.12 (1982). The right to [598]*598appeal from a denial is not a claimant’s exclusive remedy.
The county argues that Spencer is not controlling because a 1989 amendment to NDCC 21-05-07 specified a claimant’s right to appeal “in accordance with the procedure provided in section 28-34-01.” 4 NDCC 28-34-01 was enacted to govern the procedures for “any appeal provided by statute from the decision of a local governing body.” However, NDCC 28-34-01 only creates “uniform procedures for appeals from the decisions of local governing bodies” and does not redefine when an appeal must be taken. Report of the North Dakota Legislative Council to the Fifty-first Legislative Assembly, 1989, p. 141. The amendments to NDCC 21-05-07 and 28-34-01 do not say that an appeal is the exclusive remedy for the denial of a claim by a county.
The county nevertheless contends that modern development of the law of administrative res judicata requires a different result from Spencer. We disagree.
The judicial doctrine of res judicata means that a valid, existing, and final judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive against the parties and their privies on issues raised, or those that could have been raised and determined there. Berdahl v. North Dakota State Personnel Board, 447 N.W.2d 300 (N.D.1989). Res judicata and collateral estoppel may be applied to prevent collateral attacks on decisions of administrative agencies, too. State v. Lang, 463 N.W.2d 648 (N.D.1990); Westman v. Dessellier, 459 N.W.2d 545 (N.D.1990); Vanover v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co., 438 N.W.2d 524 (N.D.1989); Berdahl; Amerada Hess Corp. v. Furlong Oil & Minerals Co., 348 N.W.2d 913 (N.D.1984); Transportation Division of Fargo Chamber of Commerce v. Sandstrom, 337 N.W.2d 160 (N.D.1983). Administrative [599]*599res judicata is the judicial doctrine of res judicata applied to an administrative decision. Berdahl. However, use of the doctrine of administrative res judicata is more circumspect. Administrative res judicata depends upon the subject matter decided by the administrative agency, the purpose of the administrative action, and the reasons for the later proceeding.
An illustration of the more cautious application of administrative res judicata is our decision in S. W. v. North Dakota Department of Human Services, 420 N.W.2d 344 (N.D.1988). There, we limited the effect of a determination of paternity by a county social service board because it was incidental to the main purpose of the administrative action to identify eligibility for social service benefits. We directed that the determination of paternity “can have no res judicata effect for any other purpose.”
The preclusive effect of an administrative decision is often hinged to considering the adequacy of a legal remedy before granting equitable relief. In Amerada Hess, for example, the plaintiff sued to enjoin a prior unappealed Industrial Commission decision allowing the defendants to use a well bore that had been drilled and plugged by the plaintiff. We held that an appeal of the administrative decision would have been an adequate legal remedy to contest the Industrial Commission decision. Because there was an adequate legal remedy, we held that the equitable relief of an injunction was inappropriate.
We sometimes give similar preclu-sive effect to decisions by local political subdivisions such as county commissions. See Shark Brothers, Inc. v. Cass County, 256 N.W.2d 701 (N.D.1977); Olson v. Cass County, 253 N.W.2d 179 (N.D.1977). Again, res judicata has only a limited application for these local determinations, depending on similar factors. For example, in Olson, the plaintiffs contested the proposed installation of a culvert next to their land by suing to enjoin an unappealed county commission decision allowing the installation of the culvert. We denied injunctive relief, holding that plaintiffs could not judicially challenge the commission decision because an appeal would have provided an adequate legal remedy to contest the authorization of the culvert. Despite the similarity of the subject matter in the independent action in Olson and in the prior, unap-pealed commission decision, we recognized that if damages could be proved after the culvert was installed, the plaintiffs would be entitled to seek judicial relief in the form of monetary damages. The preclu-sive effect of a local body’s decision, then, also depends on the subject matter, the purpose of the local body’s determination, and the reasons for the later proceeding.
In this case, the commission’s denial of United Hospital’s claim did not impartially determine the county’s legal obligation. Instead, the commission acted as an agent for the county and decided for its principal. There is no reason to give such a determination preclusive effect in a later proceeding.
In Concannon v. Board of County Comm’rs of Linn County, 626 P.2d at 799-800, the Kansas court of appeals quoted from an earlier Kansas supreme court decision that aptly explained this reason:
“ ‘A claim presented to the county commissioners is simply a claim presented to the county, and a refusal by them to pay it is simply a refusal of the county to pay it. And where a county refuses to pay a claim against it there seems to be no good reason why it may not be sued as well as any other corporation, or any individual, under like circumstances. It is true, that the county commissioners in some cases act in a kind of quasi judicial character, and when they do so act their determinations are final unless appealed from. But when they allow or disallow a claim against their county — against their principal — they do not act in a judicial capacity. They are not then a court, acting impartially between two contending parties, but they are simply the agents of one of the parties, and acting for such party.’ ” [Emphasis in original.]
We agree.
A county commission’s refusal to pay a county’s debt does not impartially deter[600]*600mine whether the county is legally obligated any more than the refusal of a corporation to pay a debt determines whether that corporation is legally obligated. A county commission’s refusal to pay a claim is not an impartial adjudication of the county’s legal obligation that should be given any preclusive effect. We conclude that, when a county denies a claim against it, neither the claimant’s failure to appeal from that denial nor administrative res judicata preclude the claimant from suing the county like any other corporation.
In this case, the merits of United Hospital’s claim against the county have not been judicially determined. We therefore reverse the district court judgment and remand.
LEVINE and GIERKE, JJ., concur.