WELLIVER, Acting Chief Justice.
Respondents Union Electric Company and James T. Friel, a registered voter in Missouri and a shareholder of Union Electric, filed this suit in the Circuit Court of Cole County challenging the Secretary of State’s certification of an initiative petition popularly called “Proposition B” for inclusion on the ballot for the November 6, 1984 election. The circuit court rendered judgment for respondents and ordered the Secretary to remove the initiative from the ballot. An appeal initially was filed in this Court, but the cause was ordered transferred to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, where jurisdiction was proper. Mo. Const, art. V, § 3. A panel of the court of appeals unanimously affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. Thereafter the Western District, sitting en banc, overruled the motion for rehearing and by a divided vote sustained the Secretary’s motion to transfer to the Supreme Court. Rule 83.02. Due to the limited time remaining for the printing and distribution of ballots, we have considered this appeal on an expedited basis. We reverse and direct that the initiative be placed on the ballot.
A group calling itself the Electric Ratepayers’ Protection Project submitted to the Secretary of State an initiative petition calling for the enactment of a law entitled “A Proposed Act Respecting Electrical Corporations.” The initiative has the stated purpose of “protect[ing] the consumers of electrical energy from unjust and unreasonable rates, and to protect the consumers and the economy from the impact of a sudden large increase in rates.” Among its substantive provisions are measures authorizing deferrals or phase-ins of electric rates, a prohibition against unjustified cost overruns, and the exclusion of the cost of any nuclear fission thermal powerplant from the rate base of any electrical corporation until “there exists a demonstrated technology or means for the disposal of the high-level nuclear waste expected to be generated by the plant, and an acceptable geological medium for such disposal.”
On September 5, 1984, the Secretary certified the initiative petition as having satisfied the pertinent constitutional and statutory requirements for initiation of a law. Immediately thereafter respondents filed a petition in the circuit court pursuant to § 116.200.1, RSMo Cum.Supp.1983, seeking [404]*404a declaration that the initiative petition was insufficient and seeking to enjoin the Secretary from certifying the initiative for inclusion on the ballot. The court allowed the Electric Ratepayers’ Protection Project and one of its members, Steve Sorkin, to intervene as party defendants. Later the court granted leave to intervene as party plaintiffs to the Missouri Public Service Company, the Empire District Electric Company, St. Joseph Power & Light Company, Kansas City Power & Light Company and Arkansas Power & Light Company.
After a hearing, the court ruled that the Secretary had improperly certified the petition and ordered him to remove the initiative petition from the ballot. The court based its decision on two grounds. First, it found that the petition “in fact and legal effect” proposed a constitutional amendment. The court held that the petition was insufficient under article III, § 50 as a constitutional amendment because it lacked the required enacting clause and was not signed by eight percent of the legal voters in each of two-thirds of Missouri’s congressional districts.1 Second, the court held that the title of the initiative petition did not clearly express the subject matter of the proposal, as required by article III, § 50.
I
In affirming the circuit court’s judgment, the Western District relied solely upon the first of the two grounds. The court of appeals held that both the Secretary of State and the courts were obliged to determine whether the initiative satisfied necessary procedural requirements. According to the court of appeals, this entailed, among other things, examining the substance of the proposal to determine whether in fact it proposed a law or a constitutional amendment. The court concluded that since, in its opinion, certain parts of the initiative were incompatible with existing provisions in the Missouri Constitution, the proposal had to be viewed as, and satisfy the requirements for, an initiative proposing a constitutional amendment.
We believe that the process of review undertaken by both the circuit court and the court of appeals fails to recognize the effect of the 1945 Constitution on State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 230 Mo. 408, 130 S.W. 689 (banc 1910). Halliburton involved a constitutional amendment proposing the redistricting of senatorial districts. Id. 130 S.W. at 691. The Court noted that “[t]he mere calling it an amendment to the Constitution unless the subject-matter verifies the correctness of that name is not binding upon the respondent or upon this court.” Id. at 695.
This holding in Halliburton, however, is no longer good law. Under the Constitution as it existed at the time of Halliburton, initiative measures on the ballot were not “readily identifiable as constitutional amendments or statutes.” M. Faust, Constitutional Making In Missouri: The Convention of 1943-1944 72 (1971). As in the Halliburton case, this led people to make' “use of the initiative to write into the Constitution — freeze into the Constitution, provisions which in reality are legislative in their character.” The 1945 Constitution resolved the Halliburton problem by discouraging use of the initiative for constitutional amendments while encouraging use of the [405]*405process for statutes. “[T]he entire theory of the Committee in drafting this section 58 [now Sec. 50, Art. Ill] was to try to make it necessary for those people who want to write legislative matters into the constitution to so announce it by placing an enacting clause that says we are trying to write this matter into the constitution, ...” and getting the additional signatures on the proposed constitutional amendment. Debates of the Missouri Constitution 1945, Vol. 2, at 406. See also id. at 379-448. To this extent, Halliburton should no longer be followed.
We also believe the holdings of the courts below to be contrary to a long line of decisions wherein we have held that, barring exceptional circumstances, we will not look behind the face of the petition to determine its constitutionality prior to its being voted on by the electorate. State ex rel. Dahl v. Lange, 661 S.W.2d 7, 8 (Mo. banc 1983); Moore v. Brown, 350 Mo. 256, 165 S.W.2d 657 (banc 1942); Pitman v. Drabelle, 267 Mo. 78, 183 S.W. 1055, 1057 (1916). We agree that the Secretary of State, and the courts asked to review this decision, may look beyond the face of the petition to the extent necessary to determine whether constitutional and statutory requirements pertaining to the form of the petition have been satisfied. Moore v. Brown, supra; § 116.120, RSMo Cum. Supp.1983; cf. Kansas City v. McGee, 364 Mo. 896, 269 S.W.2d 662 (1954). This limited inquiry, however, does not permit an evaluation of the merits of any constitutional objection to the proposal under the guise of determining whether the initiative petition in fact proposes a constitutional amendment.
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WELLIVER, Acting Chief Justice.
Respondents Union Electric Company and James T. Friel, a registered voter in Missouri and a shareholder of Union Electric, filed this suit in the Circuit Court of Cole County challenging the Secretary of State’s certification of an initiative petition popularly called “Proposition B” for inclusion on the ballot for the November 6, 1984 election. The circuit court rendered judgment for respondents and ordered the Secretary to remove the initiative from the ballot. An appeal initially was filed in this Court, but the cause was ordered transferred to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, where jurisdiction was proper. Mo. Const, art. V, § 3. A panel of the court of appeals unanimously affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. Thereafter the Western District, sitting en banc, overruled the motion for rehearing and by a divided vote sustained the Secretary’s motion to transfer to the Supreme Court. Rule 83.02. Due to the limited time remaining for the printing and distribution of ballots, we have considered this appeal on an expedited basis. We reverse and direct that the initiative be placed on the ballot.
A group calling itself the Electric Ratepayers’ Protection Project submitted to the Secretary of State an initiative petition calling for the enactment of a law entitled “A Proposed Act Respecting Electrical Corporations.” The initiative has the stated purpose of “protect[ing] the consumers of electrical energy from unjust and unreasonable rates, and to protect the consumers and the economy from the impact of a sudden large increase in rates.” Among its substantive provisions are measures authorizing deferrals or phase-ins of electric rates, a prohibition against unjustified cost overruns, and the exclusion of the cost of any nuclear fission thermal powerplant from the rate base of any electrical corporation until “there exists a demonstrated technology or means for the disposal of the high-level nuclear waste expected to be generated by the plant, and an acceptable geological medium for such disposal.”
On September 5, 1984, the Secretary certified the initiative petition as having satisfied the pertinent constitutional and statutory requirements for initiation of a law. Immediately thereafter respondents filed a petition in the circuit court pursuant to § 116.200.1, RSMo Cum.Supp.1983, seeking [404]*404a declaration that the initiative petition was insufficient and seeking to enjoin the Secretary from certifying the initiative for inclusion on the ballot. The court allowed the Electric Ratepayers’ Protection Project and one of its members, Steve Sorkin, to intervene as party defendants. Later the court granted leave to intervene as party plaintiffs to the Missouri Public Service Company, the Empire District Electric Company, St. Joseph Power & Light Company, Kansas City Power & Light Company and Arkansas Power & Light Company.
After a hearing, the court ruled that the Secretary had improperly certified the petition and ordered him to remove the initiative petition from the ballot. The court based its decision on two grounds. First, it found that the petition “in fact and legal effect” proposed a constitutional amendment. The court held that the petition was insufficient under article III, § 50 as a constitutional amendment because it lacked the required enacting clause and was not signed by eight percent of the legal voters in each of two-thirds of Missouri’s congressional districts.1 Second, the court held that the title of the initiative petition did not clearly express the subject matter of the proposal, as required by article III, § 50.
I
In affirming the circuit court’s judgment, the Western District relied solely upon the first of the two grounds. The court of appeals held that both the Secretary of State and the courts were obliged to determine whether the initiative satisfied necessary procedural requirements. According to the court of appeals, this entailed, among other things, examining the substance of the proposal to determine whether in fact it proposed a law or a constitutional amendment. The court concluded that since, in its opinion, certain parts of the initiative were incompatible with existing provisions in the Missouri Constitution, the proposal had to be viewed as, and satisfy the requirements for, an initiative proposing a constitutional amendment.
We believe that the process of review undertaken by both the circuit court and the court of appeals fails to recognize the effect of the 1945 Constitution on State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 230 Mo. 408, 130 S.W. 689 (banc 1910). Halliburton involved a constitutional amendment proposing the redistricting of senatorial districts. Id. 130 S.W. at 691. The Court noted that “[t]he mere calling it an amendment to the Constitution unless the subject-matter verifies the correctness of that name is not binding upon the respondent or upon this court.” Id. at 695.
This holding in Halliburton, however, is no longer good law. Under the Constitution as it existed at the time of Halliburton, initiative measures on the ballot were not “readily identifiable as constitutional amendments or statutes.” M. Faust, Constitutional Making In Missouri: The Convention of 1943-1944 72 (1971). As in the Halliburton case, this led people to make' “use of the initiative to write into the Constitution — freeze into the Constitution, provisions which in reality are legislative in their character.” The 1945 Constitution resolved the Halliburton problem by discouraging use of the initiative for constitutional amendments while encouraging use of the [405]*405process for statutes. “[T]he entire theory of the Committee in drafting this section 58 [now Sec. 50, Art. Ill] was to try to make it necessary for those people who want to write legislative matters into the constitution to so announce it by placing an enacting clause that says we are trying to write this matter into the constitution, ...” and getting the additional signatures on the proposed constitutional amendment. Debates of the Missouri Constitution 1945, Vol. 2, at 406. See also id. at 379-448. To this extent, Halliburton should no longer be followed.
We also believe the holdings of the courts below to be contrary to a long line of decisions wherein we have held that, barring exceptional circumstances, we will not look behind the face of the petition to determine its constitutionality prior to its being voted on by the electorate. State ex rel. Dahl v. Lange, 661 S.W.2d 7, 8 (Mo. banc 1983); Moore v. Brown, 350 Mo. 256, 165 S.W.2d 657 (banc 1942); Pitman v. Drabelle, 267 Mo. 78, 183 S.W. 1055, 1057 (1916). We agree that the Secretary of State, and the courts asked to review this decision, may look beyond the face of the petition to the extent necessary to determine whether constitutional and statutory requirements pertaining to the form of the petition have been satisfied. Moore v. Brown, supra; § 116.120, RSMo Cum. Supp.1983; cf. Kansas City v. McGee, 364 Mo. 896, 269 S.W.2d 662 (1954). This limited inquiry, however, does not permit an evaluation of the merits of any constitutional objection to the proposal under the guise of determining whether the initiative petition in fact proposes a constitutional amendment. This conclusion follows from the fact that even if the law proposed by initiative conflicts with a constitutional provision, it becomes, if adopted by a majority of the voters, a law subject to constitutional challenge and not an amendment to the Constitution. See Labor’s Educational and Political Club-Independent v. Danforth, 561 S.W.2d 339, 343 (Mo. banc 1977). It is not now necessary that we examine the alleged constitutional infirmities of the law proposed by Proposition B. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred in finding that Proposition B was a constitutional amendment and thereby subject to the eight percent signature requirement.
II
The circuit court also held that the title of the initiative proposal did not clearly express the subject matter of the proposal, as is required by Article III, § 50. The Western District, in view of their holding, did not reach the trial court’s second ground.
We believe that the trial court was unduly concerned about the title and content of the circulated petitions. The petitions on their face said “Electric Ratepayers’ Protection Project.” The full act appeared on the back of each petition and was entitled “A Proposed Act Respecting Electrical Corporations.” We cannot see how the signers could have been deceived or misled at this stage of the initiative process. Buchanan v. Kirkpatrick, 615 S.W.2d 6, 14 (Mo. banc 1981); Union Electric Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 606 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Mo. banc 1980). The important title test is whether the official ballot title prepared by the Attorney General pursuant to § 116.160.2, RSMo Cum.Supp.1983, fairly and impartially summarizes the purposes of the measure, so that the voters will not be deceived or misled. See § 116.190, RSMo Cum.Supp.1983. This question is not before us.
Finally, respondents contend that the judgment of the circuit court can be affirmed on the ground that the initiative proposes a law unconstitutional on its face. We have indicated previously that courts have the discretion to consider at least in mandamus actions, allegations that an initiative is facially unconstitutional. State ex rel. Dahl v. Lange, supra, at 8. Respondents claim Proposition B is unconstitutional in that it draws an unreasonable distinction between electrical corporations and other utilities, deprives Union Electric of its right to a just return on its investments without due process of law, is retrospective in effect and impairs existing contract rights, and is preempted by federal legislation. We do not believe that respondents’ allegations rise to the level of facial [406]*406unconstitutionality. Respondents numerous constitutional objections are not ripe for decision and we decline to address them in this proceeding. We will not “sacrifice the democratic process to the interest of judicial economy.” State ex rel. Dahl v. Lange, supra, at 8.
The judgment is reversed with directions.
HIGGINS, GUNN, BLACKMAR and DONNELLY, JJ., concur.
BILLINGS, J., dissents in separate dissenting opinion filed.
MORGAN, Senior Judge, dissents and concurs in dissenting opinion of BILLINGS, J.
RENDLEN, C.J., not sitting.