Union Carbide Corp. v. Traver Investments, Inc.

238 F. Supp. 540, 144 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 404, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9730
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Illinois
DecidedJanuary 28, 1965
DocketCiv. A. P-2445
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 238 F. Supp. 540 (Union Carbide Corp. v. Traver Investments, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Union Carbide Corp. v. Traver Investments, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 540, 144 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 404, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9730 (S.D. Ill. 1965).

Opinion

MERCER, Chief Judge.

This suit is prosecuted under 35 U.S.C. § 146 to try the issue of priority of invention between competing patent applications.

THE INVENTION

Prior to 1949 polyethylene film had acquired a prominent place in the market, as a packaging material. A major fault, of the raw film was that the surface was-not ink retentive. Printed matter could be placed thereon, but the ink flaked off and readily washed away when such film was exposed to moisture. The inventive concept involved here is a process to remedy that fault.

The inventive concept in issue is a process for exposing untreated film to high voltage corona discharge of sufficient intensity and duration to achieve the desired result. Specifically, the corona discharge is created by applying voltage of an approximate minimum of 10,000 volts to an Oxy-Dry tube or other conductor element which is spaced approximately one-eighth of an inch above a suitable ground plate. As the voltage approaches 10,000 volts, a corona field is created between the conductor and ground plate. When untreated polyethylene is exposed to that corona by being placed within or passed through the corona field, treatment of the film’s surface is achieved which renders the film readily retentive of inks placed thereon.

The Competing Applications

Plaintiff, Union Carbide, is the assignee of patent application No. 217,144, [542]*542filed March 23,1951, by George A. Adams and Sydney J. Wakefield.

Defendant, DuPont, is the present owner, as successor to defendant, Traver, of patent application No. 345,015, filed March 27, 1953, by George W. Traver.

For convenience, those applications are hereinafter referred to as the Adams and Traver applications, respectively.

In 1954 the Patent Office determined that an interference existed between the Adams Application, the Traver application and an application filed by the predecessors in title of Howard Plastics, Inc. After a hearing before the Patent Office Board of Patent Interferences, that Board ruled, on July 25, 1960, that Traver was the prior inventor of the process and awarded priority of invention to the Traver application. Following the interference, and as a result of the interference, Patent No. 3,018,189 was issued to Traver. That patent is now owned by the defendant, DuPont.

Since Howard abandoned its claim of priority prior to the trial of this case,2 the issue remains only with respect to the competing claims of priority as between the Adams and the Traver applications.

The Issue and Applicable Law

The primary issue raised in this proceeding is the question of priority of invention as between those parties to the interference, namely, Traver on the one hand, and Adams and Wakefield on the other. No other issue can arise in this litigation until and unless it be determined that plaintiff is entitled to prevail. Howard Plasties, Inc. v. Traver Investments, Inc., et al, S.D.Ill., 205 F. Supp. 522. No issue can arise as to the sufficiency of the Traver application or as to the validity of the Traver patent. The scope of the proceeding is limited by the provisions of the statute. Ibid.

This suit is a trial de novo of the interference issue, not an appeal from the Board’s decision. Cf., Globe-Union, Inc. v. Chicago Telephone Supply Co., 7 Cir., 103 F.2d 722, 724. To prevail, plaintiff must carry a heavy burden of proof. In Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U.S. 120, 124, 125, 14 S.Ct. 772, 773, 38 L.Ed. 657, the Court said that a Patent Office decision upon the question of priority must be accepted as controlling upon the question of fact of priority in any subsequent suit between the parties to the interference “unless the contrary is established by testimony which in character and amount carries thorough conviction.” That principle has been restated and followed in enumerable cases subsequent to Morgan. E. g., Globe-Union, Inc. v. Chicago Telephone Supply Co., 7 Cir., 103 F.2d 722, 727; General Motors Corp. v. Bendix Aviation Corp., N.D.Ind., 123 F.Supp. 506, 515-516; United States v. Szuecs, 100 U.S.App. D.C. 24, 240 F.2d 886; Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 97 U.S.App.D.C. 154, 229 F.2d 37, 40.

Upon an interference, the question is which of the competing applicants was the first to conceive and reduce to practice the invention described. The Board resolved that issue in defendants’ favor. Its decision should stand unless plaintiff has proved to the point of thorough conviction that the Board made a mistake.

The Evidence and Facts

Perhaps the most persuasive evidence in plaintiff’s favor is the patent office history of the Traver application. On October 26, 1950, Traver filed his patent application No. 192,313 describing a method for treatment of polyethylene by electrical discharge. The Interference Examiner found, and properly so, that that application did not describe the corona discharge process. That application was followed by a second application filed by Traver on March 18, 1952, as a continuation in part of his 1950 application. Slightly more than one year later, Traver filed his application which was the subject of the interference and involved in this suit.

[543]*543As I have previously noted, the Adams application for the corona discharge process was filed March 23, 1951, a date which preceded the third Traver application by slightly more than two years.

At first blush one wonders why the corona discharge principle was not a part of the first Traver application if, in fact, the process had been conceived and reduced to practice by him. Though that question remains unanswered, I think that plaintiff has failed to prove to a thorough conviction that the Board was wrong.

The testimonial, deposition and documentary evidence before the court is voluminous. The process was demonstrated by experts before the court. Of course, the evidence contains contradictions which I deem it unnecessary to comment upon or resolve. The balance of this section of the opinion will set forth a summary of evidentiary facts which convinces me that defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor.

Since it is necessary to refer to several entities and individuals through whom the interests of the parties are derived, all such are here identified as follows.

At all times material to this suit, Adams and Wakefield were employed by Visking Corporation, (hereinafter Visking), which was the original owner of the Adams application. Visking merged with plaintiff, Carbide,3 and was the source of plaintiff’s ownership of that application.

At all times material to this suit, George W. Traver was an officer and principal stockholder of Traver Corporation to which the Traver application was assigned.

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238 F. Supp. 540, 144 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 404, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9730, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/union-carbide-corp-v-traver-investments-inc-ilsd-1965.