Uninsured Employers’ Fund v. Tyson Farms, Inc., et al. Case No. 1057, September Term, 2018 Opinion by J. Wright
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – NATURE AND GROUNDS OF EMPLOYER’S LIABILITY – IN GENERAL – In a case where a party is employed by a landowner to manage his property, the landowner’s status as an employer may be coextensive with another person or entity, if such person or entity exercises an appropriate degree of control over the party. Relevant to the determination of co-employment is the degree of control exercised by the landowner over the employee relative to that of the other person or entity. Where, as here, a landowner exercises minimal control over an employee, and a separate person or entity maintains substantial control over the day-to-day functions of that employee, that other person or entity may be properly determined to be a co- employer, and consequently falls subject to the level of legal responsibility commensurate with that designation. Circuit Court for Worcester County Case No. 23-C-16-0233
REPORTED
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 1057
September Term, 2018 ______________________________________
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS’ FUND
v.
TYSON FARMS, INC., et al. ______________________________________
*Wright, Gould, Harrell, Glenn T., Jr., (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned)
JJ. ______________________________________
Opinion by Wright, J. Dissenting Opinion by Gould, J. ______________________________________
Filed: November 22, 2019
*Wright, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of the Court; after being recalled Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act pursuant to Maryland Constitution, Article IV, (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. Section 3A, he also participated in the decision 2019-11-22 11:16-05:00 and adoption of this Opinion.
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk On April 15, 2014, Mauro Jimenez Garcia suffered an “occupational disease
disablement” to his lungs, arising out of his work raising chickens on a farm owned by
Dai K. Nguyen. The chickens on Mr. Nguyen’s farm were raised for, and owned by,
Tyson Farms, Inc. (“Tyson”), appellee. Mr. Garcia filed a claim against Mr. Nguyen
under the Workers’ Compensation Act1 on June 27, 2014. The Uninsured Employers’
Fund (“UEF”),2 appellant, was made a party to the claim when it became clear that Mr.
Nguyen did not possess workers’ compensation insurance. Mr. Garcia and UEF then
impleaded Tyson into the claim.
After a hearing on March 3, 2016, the Workers’ Compensation Commission
(“Commission”) declared that Mr. Garcia’s injuries arose out of the course of his
employment, and that both Mr. Nguyen and Tyson were co-employers of Mr. Garcia at
the time of his injuries. Tyson appealed the Commission’s decision to the Circuit Court
for Worcester County.
A two-day jury trial took place on June 19 and 20, 2018; the sole issue for the jury
was whether Tyson was a co-employer of Mr. Garcia. After the presentation of evidence,
UEF and Tyson made motions for judgment. The circuit court denied both motions. The
jury, after being instructed in the applicable law (without objection), returned a verdict
1 The Workers’ Compensation Act is contained in Md. Code (1991, 2016 Repl. Vol.), Labor & Employment Article (“LE”) §§ 9-101 to 9-1201. 2 The purpose of the UEF, “pursuant to [LE] § 9-1002 of the [Workers’ Compensation] Act, is . . . benevolent and remedial, that being to protect injured workers whose employers failed, either willfully or negligently, to carry workers’ compensation insurance for them.” W.M. Schlosser Co. v. Uninsured Employers’ Fund, 414 Md. 95, 210-11 (2010) (quotations and citations omitted). finding that Tyson was not a co-employer at the time of Mr. Garcia’s injuries. UEF
challenged the circuit court’s ruling on its motion for judgment and presents a single
question for our review, which we have reworded as follows:3
1. Did the circuit court err in denying UEF’s motion for judgment?
For the reasons presented below, we answer this question in the affirmative and
reverse the circuit court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
The Farm & Mr. Garcia’s Hiring
Tyson, the largest chicken producer in the country, does not own a single chicken
farm. Rather, the company contracts with individual farmers to raise its chickens; the
farmers own and operate the farms, while chickens are raised by the farmer according to
Tyson’s guidelines and best practices.
In 2009, Mr. Garcia was hired to work at a chicken farm where Tyson’s chickens
were being raised. The farm was owned by Terry Ung at the time. When Mr. Garcia was
first hired, he performed routine maintenance, such as removing dead chickens, cutting
the grass, and changing the lights. When Mr. Ung became ill toward the end of 2009,
3 UEF presented its question to the Court as follows:
1. Was it error for the circuit court to deny the UEF’s motion for judgment when the uncontroverted evidence established [that] Tyson exerted sufficient control over Mr. Garcia’s performance of his job to make Tyson Mr. Garcia’s employer as a matter of law?
2 Mr. Garcia began managing the farm. Upon Mr. Ung’s death at the end of 2009, his
wife, Lee Ung, became the owner of the farm.
Because Mrs. Ung was unfamiliar with raising chickens, Tyson representatives
taught Mr. Garcia how to operate the farm. During this period, Tyson employees came to
the farm between two and four times a week “to teach Mr. Garcia how to maintain the
farm and raise the chickens.” According to Mr. Garcia, “[the Tyson’s employees] taught
[him] everything. They showed [him] how the system worked, how to check the water
levels, the feeding, temperature, fans, how [all of the systems] would work properly,
[and] how to turn them on and off automatically.” In addition to assuming day-to-day
responsibility for the chickens, Mr. Garcia also began residing at the farm after Mr. Ung
passed away, as Tyson required someone to be present 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to
ensure proper operation of the farm.
Mrs. Ung sold the farm to Dai K. Nguyen in 2013. Mr. Nguyen, who lived and
worked in northern Virginia, did not know how to operate a chicken farm either and
purchased the farm as an investment. Thus, Mr. Nguyen contracted with Tyson to raise
its chickens on the farm in June of 2013 as an “absentee owner.” Tyson will generally
contract with an absentee owner if someone is on the farm 24 hours a day, 7 days a week,
to respond to any emergencies that may arise with the chickens. Based on Mr. Nguyen’s
status, “Tyson and Mr. Nguyen agreed that the contract would only be approved if [Mr.
Nguyen] agreed to keep Mr. Garcia on as the resident manager of the farm.”
Broiler Production Contract
3 Mr. Nguyen and Tyson entered into a “Broiler Production Contract”4 (“the
Contract”). Under the Contract, Tyson was required to:
(1) “[R]etain title and ownership to chickens, feed, and medication[,] . . . [and] determine the amount, type, frequency, and time of delivery to and pick-up from [Mr. Nguyen] of chickens, feed, and medication[;]”5
(2) “[P]rovide veterinary services and technical advice” to assist in raising the chickens; and
(3) “[C]omply with all applicable federal, state, and local statutes, rules, regulations, and ordinances in performance of [the] Contract.”
In return, Mr. Nguyen was obligated to:
(1) “[F]urnish labor, materials, and utilities necessary for” raising the chickens and, when necessary, “seek [Tyson’s] technical advice[;]”
(2) “[M]aintain biosecure housing for [Tyson’s] chickens, feed, and medication[;]”
(3) “[I]mplement [Tyson’s] recommended best animal management practices, including recommendations regarding lighting, brooding, watering, ventilation, and bedding[;]” and
(4) “[C]omply with all applicable federal, state, and local statutes, rules, regulations, and ordinances in performance of [the] Contract[.]”
The Contract also gave Tyson the unilateral right to terminate the relationship
upon default by Mr. Nguyen. Under the termination clause, a “default” occurs upon:
Failure to comply with any provision of [the] Contract, including but not limited to compliance with all applicable environmental and litter
4 Tyson refers to the chickens that are raised for meat as “broilers.” The term does not refer to the manner in which the chickens are cooked. 5 During the duration of the Contract, signs bearing the Tyson logo were placed at the farm. A Tyson employee testified at trial that the signs were there (1) so that delivery drivers would “be able to find the locations,” and (2) to alert others that the farm was a “biosecure environment.”
4 management laws, rules, regulations, and ordinances, and all requirements and programs contained in the attached Schedules.6
In the event of a default, Tyson had the right to “take immediate possession of
[their] chickens, feed, and medication without further notice[.]” Tyson was further
permitted to “utilize [Mr. Nguyen’s facilities] . . . to complete the production of [the
chickens] at [Mr. Nguyen’s] expense.”
The Contract also included various addenda that set out how chickens were to be
raised on the farm. As an example, one 18-page document titled “Broiler Growing
Guide,” gave detailed instructions for raising a flock of chickens. These instructions
began at the stage of preparing the facilities for a new flock through the chickens’ seven-
week life cycle, giving specific instructions on how to manage the flock’s temperature,
ventilation, water, food, and light exposure for each week. The guide also included
requirements for the operation of various equipment and procedures involved in raising
the chickens. According to Ronald Watkins, a Senior Manager of Live Production at
Tyson, if failure to comply with “programs [such as those in the Broiler Growing Guide]
leads to animal welfare issues or poor performance,” such a failure could result in the
termination of the Contract.
Tyson’s Oversight of the Farm
Tyson engaged in a continual oversight process to verify that the farm was being
operated in compliance with the Contract. To ensure that conditions were adequate for
6 In addition to the above, the Contract contained three other scenarios that give rise to a default. As those scenarios are not relevant to this case, they will not be discussed here. 5 chickens to be placed on the farm, Tyson employees completed a 25-item “Broiler
Placement Checklist” before each flock of chickens was placed. The checklist was
reviewed with Mr. Garcia, as he was the “resident manager of the farm.”
Tyson also had the right to visit the farm during the lifecycle of each flock of
chickens to “evaluate animal [health] and welfare, and [to] provide any technical advice
based on the current conditions of the farm[.]” Tyson employees visited the farm one to
three times a week to assess the chickens’ well-being. During these visits, Tyson
employees completed a series of forms and checklists to evaluate the flock’s quality of
life. The “Flock Visitation Summary,” for example, was completed at least weekly
throughout the flock’s life cycle and included various metrics to evaluate the chickens’
feed, water, temperature, ventilation, and lighting. As Mr. Garcia lived and worked on
the farm 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, Tyson would speak directly to him if anything
needed to be adjusted. Mr. Garcia then carried out any necessary adjustments throughout
the flock’s lifecycle.
Mr. Garcia’s Injury and Subsequent Litigation
Mr. Garcia was found to be occupationally disabled on April 15, 2014; he suffered
from hypersensitivity pneumonitis and interstitial disease. On June 27, 2014, Mr. Garcia
filed a claim against Mr. Nguyen under the Workers’ Compensation Act. After it became
clear that Mr. Nguyen did not have Workers’ Compensation insurance, UEF was added
as a party. Mr. Garcia and UEF then impleaded Tyson into the claim.
A hearing before the Commission took place on March 3, 2016. As Mr. Garcia
states in his brief, “[t]here [was] no dispute that Mr. Nguyen was an employer of Mr.
6 Garcia at the time of [Mr. Garcia’s] date of disablement for his occupational disease.”
Rather, the key issue was whether Tyson was also an employer of Mr. Garcia at the time
he became disabled. After the hearing, the Commission declared: (1) that Mr. Garcia’s
occupational disease “[arose] out of and in the course of employment;” (2) that “[Mr.]
Nguyen . . . and Tyson . . . were co-employers at the time of the aforesaid occupational
disease[;]” and (3) that Mr. Nguyen and Tyson were liable to Mr. Garcia for his injuries.
Tyson appealed the Commission’s findings to the circuit court on March 26, 2016,
and challenged the Commission’s determination that it was a co-employer of Mr. Garcia.
After all the evidence was presented in the two-day jury trial that followed, both the UEF
and Tyson made motions for judgment on the issue of Tyson’s status as a co-employer.
The circuit court rejected both motions and sent the matter to the jury; the jury returned a
verdict that Tyson was not a co-employer of Mr. Garcia at the time he sustained his
injuries. UEF subsequently filed this appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Any party “aggrieved by a decision of the [Workers’ Compensation] Commission”
may seek judicial review of that decision in the circuit court. Md. Code (1991, 2016
Repl. Vol.), Labor & Employment Article (“LE”) § 9-737. On appeal to the circuit court,
the “decision of the Commission is presumed to be prima facie correct[,] . . . and the
party challenging the decision has the burden of proof.” LE § 9-745(b). “On a motion of
any party . . . , the court shall submit to a jury any question of fact involved in the case.”
LE § 9-745(d). This Court has explained the standard for reviewing a circuit court’s
decision on a motion for judgment as follows:
7 Pursuant to Md. Rule 2-519(a), a party may move for judgment on any or all of the issues in any action at the close of the evidence offered by an opposing party, and in a jury trial at the close of all of the evidence. The moving party shall state with particularity all reasons why the motion should be granted. The trial judge must consider the evidence, including the inferences reasonably and logically drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made. If there is any evidence, no matter how slight, legally sufficient to generate a jury question, the motion must be denied.
We review a trial court’s grant of a motion for judgment under the same analysis used by the trial court. In other words, we assume the truth of all credible evidence on the issue, and all fairly debatable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made.
Barrett v. Nwaba, 165 Md. App. 281, 289-90 (2005) (emphasis in original) (cleaned up).7
DISCUSSION
The sole issue on appeal is whether the circuit court erred in rejecting UEF’s
motion for judgment. In Whitehead v. Safway Steel Products, Inc., 304 Md. 67, 76
(1985), the Court of Appeals explained the process for “distinguishing questions of law
from matters of fact in the employment field.” It stated that “whenever evidence in a
labor case is disputed, and differing inferences from the evidence are possible, a jury
must determine the underlying employment issues.” Id. (emphasis in original). On the
other hand, “where the evidence on an issue is uncontradicted, ordinarily a court may
7 The Court of Appeals recently explained the recent increase in use of “cleaned up” as a parenthetical. The parenthetical “signals that the current author has sought to improve readability by removing extraneous, non-substantive clutter (such as brackets, quotations marks, ellipses, footnote signals, internal citations, or made un-bracketed changes to capitalization) without altering the substance of the quotation.” Lopez v. State, 458 Md. 164, 195 n.13 (2018).
8 decide the issue as one of law.” Id.8 Furthermore, “[i]t is well established that ‘where the
essential terms and manner of employment are undisputed, the issue as to the relation
between the parties and the nature of the employment is one for the [c]ourt.’” Elms v.
Renewal by Andersen, 439 Md. 381, 394-95 (2014) (quoting McElroy Truck Lines, Inc. v.
Pohopek, 375 Md. 574, 585 n.6 (2003)).
Bearing those standards in mind, our task is to determine whether the evidence
related to Tyson’s status as a co-employer was disputed and gave rise to “differing
inferences” or whether the evidence was “uncontradicted.” If the former is the case, then
the circuit court properly denied UEF’s motion for judgment and sent the question to the
jury; if the latter is true, then the court erred in failing to treat the issue as a matter of law.
UEF contends that “the inescapable conclusion is that [Mr.] Garcia submitted to
[Tyson’s] control in the course of employment and [that] therefore Tyson was his
employer for these purposes as a matter of law.” To support their argument, UEF points
to Tyson’s: (1) training of Mr. Garcia; (2) sending a representative to review farm
operations one to three times a week; (3) informing “Mr. Garcia of the tasks that needed
to be done[;]” and (4) having the right to take control of its chickens and terminate the
contract upon failure to comply with the conditions in the Contract.
In response, Tyson avers that its “minimal contact” with Mr. Garcia did not
establish an “employment” relationship. Tyson specifically argues that Mr. Nguyen, the
8 In Whitehead, 304 Md. at 76, the Court went on to explain that “[w]hile the trial court should take some pains to ensure that conflicting inferences are not possible on the presented evidence, something more than conjecture of a party is necessary to establish that ‘conflicting inferences’ are possible in a given case.” (cleaned up). 9 owner of the farm, was an independent contractor for Tyson, and that “[t]he fact that
Tyson had the right to inspect its flock . . . does not mean that they were in ‘control’ of
[Mr. Nguyen’s] employee,” such that an employment relationship can be said to have
existed. Tyson further supports its argument by noting the ability of Mr. Nguyen alone to
hire, pay, and terminate Mr. Garcia, as well as the right to terminate the contract at will.
The Court of Appeals has established five criteria “[t]o determine whether the
employer-employee relationship exists[.]” Mackall v. Zayre Corp., 293 Md. 221, 230
(1982). Those factors include: “(1) the power to select and hire the employee, (2) the
payment of wages, (3) the power to discharge, (4) the power to control the employee’s
conduct, and (5) whether the work is part of the regular business of the employer.” Id.
The Court of Appeals explained the relationship between the factors as follows:
Of the five factors, the factor of control stands out as the most important. We have said, for example, that whether the employer has the right to control and direct the employee in the performance of the work and in the manner in which the work is to be done is the ‘decisive,” or ‘controlling’ test. We have also recognized, in speaking to the interrelationship of the factors, that standing alone, none of these indicia, excepting . . . the factor of control, seems controlling in the determination as to whether such a relationship exists. Thus, for our purposes, ‘decisive,’ besides ‘controlling,’ means ‘conclusive,’ ‘determinative,’ and ‘definitive.’ This view is consistent with that expressed in other jurisdictions, where control has been variously described as ‘the most vital factor,’ ‘the most important factor,’ ‘the most significant factor in all cases,’ ‘the most stressed element,’ ‘the final test,’ and ‘the crucial test,’ when determining whether the employer/employee relationship exists.
Whitehead, 304 Md. at 78 (first emphasis added) (cleaned up).
Here, Tyson’s control over Mr. Garcia’s work was more than sufficient to
establish an employment relationship as a matter of law. Specifically, as a condition of
10 its contract with Mr. Nguyen, Tyson required that Mr. Garcia remain on the farm 24
hours a day, 7 days a week, to manage its operation. In the contract itself, Tyson’s 18-
page Broiler Growing Guide detailed instructions and requirements for how to raise the
chickens at each stage of their life cycle. This Guide included detailed instructions on
how Mr. Garcia should adjust various factors such as the chickens’ food intake, light
exposure, and ventilation, on a weekly, if not daily, basis.
Further, Tyson’s employees taught Mr. Garcia everything he needed to know
about raising the chickens, including how to operate the various systems involved in the
process. Tyson’s employees inspected the farm before every new flock of chickens was
delivered, came to the farm one to three times a week to evaluate how Mr. Garcia was
raising the chickens, and subsequently informed Mr. Garcia of the tasks that he needed to
complete to improve his performance. Importantly, Tyson held the unilateral ability to
terminate its relationship with Mr. Nguyen if Mr. Garcia did not comply with the
requirements in the Contract or those given to him by Tyson employees. Finally, Tyson
posted its own signage at the farm, provided the feed that Mr. Garcia was to give to the
chickens, contracted for the treatment of litter, and provided veterinary services to the
chickens that were placed on the farm. Taken in sum, Tyson’s extensive involvement in,
and control over, Mr. Garcia’s day-to-day operation of the farm gave rise to an
employment relationship as a matter of law.
Tyson asserts that the other four factors in the test for determining whether an
employment relationship exists “weigh heavily in favor of the conclusion that [it] is not
an ‘employer.’” Even assuming arguendo that this is the case, our conclusion does not
11 change. As we explained above, the factor of control “stands out as the most
important[,]” and is the only factor that is “‘decisive’ or ‘controlling.’” Whitehead, 304
Md. at 78.
The fact that Mr. Garcia was also an employee of Mr. Nguyen at the time he was
injured does not alter our conclusion that Tyson was a co-employer. In Whitehead, 304
Md. at 79, the Court of Appeals explained that “[a] worker may simultaneously be the
employee of two employers.” See also Mackall, 293 Md. at 229 (“This Court has
repeatedly recognized that, under certain circumstances, a person performing a given
function simultaneously may be the employee of two employers.”). This was exactly the
case here, where Mr. Garcia was an employee of both Mr. Nguyen and Tyson at the time
of his injuries.
Comparing this case to Marcus v. Eastern Agricultural Association, Inc., 32 N.J.
460 (1960), provides additional support for our holding. In Marcus, appellant, an
experienced chicken farmer, raised eggs for appellee, a company in the business of
“producing and selling eggs, and in raising laying chickens.” Marcus v. Eastern
Agricultural Association, Inc., 58 N.J. Super. 584, 588 (1959). At the time appellant was
injured, he was typically raising about 7,500 to 8,000 chicks at a time for the appellee.
Id. Under the agreement, appellee provided feed for the chicks, instructed appellant on
how to feed the chicks, advised appellant on the provision of medication, and called in a
veterinarian when required. Id. One of appellee’s employees would visit “on an average
of once a month” to review conditions on the farm. Id.
12 In reversing the Superior Court’s Appellate Division judgment that there was not
an employer-employee relationship, the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the
reasoning in Judge Conford’s dissenting opinion from the decision below. Marcus, 32
N.J. at 247. Judge Conford explained that the control test was not the “dispositive factor”
where the nature of the work “require[d] little supervision over details” and where the
appellant was “so experienced that instructions concerning such details would be
superfluous.” Marcus, 58 N.J. Super. at 597. In other words, because the “day-by-day
performance of [appellant’s] work” was “dictated by the requirements of the work” and
“left little room for variation or discretion,” the Court would have to go beyond the
control test to determine whether appellant was employed by appellee. Id. at 598.
Judge Conford focused on the purpose of workers’ compensation legislation and
analyzed “the extent of the economic dependence of the worker upon the business he
serves and the relationship of the nature of his work to the operation of that business.”
Id. at 603. Judge Conford concluded that appellant was an employee deserving of
protection under the [Workers’] Compensation Act. The New Jersey Supreme Court
adopted that conclusion as its holding. Marcus, 32 N.J. at 247.
Here, the level of control that Tyson had over Mr. Garcia far exceeded the level of
control that the appellee in Marcus had over the appellant. Not only were Mr. Garcia’s
day-to-day activities “dictated by the requirements of the work,” see Marcus, 58 N.J.
Super. at 598, but they were also “dictated” by the specific requirements that Tyson
relayed to him through the contract with Mr. Nguyen and through its constant inspections
and visits. While the facts in Marcus forced Judge Conford to look beyond control to
13 determine whether the appellant was an employee of the appellee, the circumstances here
allow us to conclude that based on the level of control that Tyson had over how and when
Mr. Garcia completed his work, Tyson was a co-employer of Mr. Garcia.
In the face of what we consider overwhelming support for our conclusion in this
case, we turn to the other arguments Tyson made to suggest that it was not a co-employer
of Mr. Garcia. Specifically, Tyson relies on North Chesapeake Beach Land & Imp. Co.
v. Cochran, 156 Md. 524 (1929), to support its argument that it should not be held liable
for merely “supervising” its independent contractor to ensure compliance with the
contract. Despite Tyson’s attempt to argue the contrary, Cochran supports our holding
that Tyson was a co-employer of Mr. Garcia at the time he was injured.
In Cochran, 156 Md. at 526, appellant entered into a contract to drive piles for
appellee and was severely injured while performing the task. The key issue on appeal
was whether appellant was an “employee” of appellee for the purposes of workers’
compensation liability. Id. at 526-27. While completing the job, appellant received
intermittent feedback, as well as a request to alter the construction plans, from the
president of the company. Id. at 527-28. At trial, the sixth prayer instructed the jury that
“if they found ‘that . . . [the president of the company] retained control and supervision of
the work, then these facts tend to show that [appellant] was . . . an employee.” Id. at 533.
In concluding that such a jury instruction should not have been given, the Court of
Appeals stated that:
[T]he mere fact that the employer reserves a right to supervise or inspect the work during its performance does not make the contractor a mere servant, where the mode and means of performance are within control of
14 such contractor. The right of the employer to go upon the premises and see that the work is being done according to the specifications of the contract does not affect the relations of the parties so as to constitute the employee a mere servant. If the contract provides that the work shall be done ‘under the direction’ and subject to the approval of the employer, a closer question is presented[.]
Id. at 534 (emphasis added).
Applying the reasoning from Cochran here, we conclude that Tyson’s relationship
with Mr. Garcia went well beyond “mere supervision.” Far from allowing Mr. Garcia to
control the “mode and means of [the] performance” of his responsibilities, Cochran, 156
Md. at 534, Tyson was intimately involved in nearly every aspect of the work that Mr.
Garcia did at the farm, providing Mr. Garcia with specific instructions on how and when
to perform certain tasks and to dictate specifically those responsibilities. Though we
agree with Tyson’s general proposition that mere supervision is insufficient to establish
an employment relationship, the company’s conduct here went well beyond that modest
level of interaction. As such, applying Cochran to this case supports the conclusion that
Tyson was a co-employer of Mr. Garcia at the time of his injuries.
As a final point, we will address Tyson’s attempt to distinguish this case from
Whitehead, supra. In Whitehead, appellant was a temporary worker supplied to appellee
by a temporary help agency. 304 Md. at 70-71. When appellant was injured on the job,
he filed a workers’ compensation claim against the agency, and a negligence suit against
the appellee. Id. at 71. At trial, the circuit court granted appellee’s motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, thereby declaring that “[appellant] was [appellee’s]
15 employee and that his exclusive remedy was under the [W]orkmens’ [C]ompensation
laws.” Id. at 71. Appellant appealed the judgment to this Court.
In holding that the appellant was appellee’s employee at the time he was injured,
this Court explained that:
[Appellee] had the right to instruct [appellant] on the tasks to be performed, had the power to reassign him to a different job within the plant, and supervised and directed his actions and rate of work. [Appellee] could have discharged the employee from its premises if [appellant’s] work was unsatisfactory.
Id.. at 81-82.
Tyson relies on this language, and argues that the appellee in Whitehead claimed
that appellant was its employee, to suggest that this case should come to a different
outcome than in Whitehead. We do not agree. Most importantly, there is simply nothing
in Whitehead to suggest that only a specific set of circumstances must be present to find
sufficient control for an employment relationship. Despite any factual differences that
may exist between this case and Whitehead, we have concluded that here, Tyson
exercised extensive control over Mr. Garcia’s work at the farm, such that Mr. Garcia was
an employee of Tyson for workers’ compensation purposes.
Even comparing the facts of this case to those in Whitehead, as Tyson would have
us do, does not alter our conclusion. As was the case in Whitehead, Tyson directed Mr.
Garcia’s tasks at the farm, and it had the power to instruct Mr. Garcia to alter his
performance in doing those tasks to be in compliance with Tyson’s requirements.
Though Tyson did not have the express authority to discharge Mr. Garcia, it had the
power to terminate its contract with Mr. Nguyen if Mr. Garcia was not in compliance
16 with Tyson’s requirements. And as Mr. Nguyen testified at trial, if the contract had been
terminated, he would not have been able to keep Mr. Garcia as an employee. Finally,
though the appellee in Whitehead argued that the appellant was its employee, while
Tyson now argues the opposite as to Mr. Garcia, that has no bearing on the outcome of
this case. It is only the circumstances of the relationship that determine the outcome, and
those circumstances demonstrate that Mr. Garcia was an employee of Tyson’s at the time
he suffered his disability.
CONCLUSION
At the end of the two-day jury trial, both Tyson and Mr. Garcia moved for
judgment, thereby signaling their common understanding that Tyson’s status as a co-
employer should be decided as a matter of law. As the evidence here demonstrates that
“differing inferences” from the evidence are not possible, see Whitehead, 304 Md. at 76,
we agree with the parties’ common understanding that there was no material factual
dispute and that the outcome depended solely on the application of the law to the
undisputed facts. Thus, because Tyson was a co-employer of Mr. Garcia at the time he
was injured, we further hold that the circuit court erred in not granting UEF’s motion for
judgment and reverse the judgment of the circuit court.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR WORCESTER COUNTY REVERSED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.
17 REPORTED
TYSON FARMS, INC., et al.
______________________________________
*Wright, Gould, Harrell, Glenn T., Jr., (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned)
JJ. _____________________________________
Dissenting Opinion by Gould, J. _________________________________
*Wright, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of the Court; after being recalled pursuant to Maryland Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this Opinion. I respectfully dissent. In my view, there are sufficient facts in the record to allow
a reasonable jury to determine, as it in fact did here, that Tyson was not Mr. Garcia’s co-
employer.
As the majority notes, the governing legal principles come from the Court of
Appeals’ decision in Whitehead v. Safway Steel Prod., Inc., 304 Md. 67 (1985). In
Whitehead, the Court explained the standard for determining whether a party’s status as
an employer may be determined as a matter of law:
First, the decisions of this Court make clear that whenever evidence in a labor case is disputed, and differing inferences from the evidence are possible, a jury must determine the underlying employment issues. Both of the cases which the parties cite for our perusal support this point.
Second, where the evidence on an issue is uncontradicted, ordinarily a court may decide the issue as one of law. While the trial court should take some pains to ensure that conflicting inferences are not possible on the presented evidence, something more than conjecture of a party is necessary to establish that “conflicting inferences” are possible in a given case. At the very least, a party must point to evidence in the case that control of a given function is vested in more than one person.
Id. at 76 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted) (cleaned up).1
The majority opinion does not discuss Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Imbraguglio,
346 Md. 573 (1997), where the Court of Appeals applied the principles enunciated in
Whitehead. There, the trial court determined at the summary judgment stage that, as a
1 The root of my disagreement with the majority is, I believe, found in our respective interpretations of this passage from Whitehead. It appears that the majority sees “differing inferences” and “uncontradicted evidence” as mutually exclusive, and if the evidence is uncontradicted, the issue is one of law for the court to decide. In my view, the evidence may be both uncontradicted and susceptible to differing inferences, in which case the issue should go to the jury. As explained below, this is one such case. 1 matter of law, the parent and sister companies of the plaintiff’s direct employer were co-
employers. Relying on Whitehead, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court
and explained the demarcation between issues of fact or law:
Ordinarily, the existence of the employer/employee relationship is a question reserved for the fact finder. Mackall v. Zayre Corp., 293 Md. 221, 230, 443 A.2d 98, 103 (1982). When, however, the existence of the relationship is undisputed, or the evidence on the issue is uncontroverted, unless conflicting inferences can be drawn from that evidence, the trial court is entitled to treat the matter as a question of law. Whitehead v. Safway Steel Products, 304 Md. 67, 76, 497 A.2d 803, 808 (1985). Imbraguglio, 346 Md. at 590 (emphasis added).2 Based on these principles, the Court
held:
There is no evidence from which the trial court could have concluded, as a matter of law, that (1) [the parent or sister corporation] possessed the power to select and hire the decedent, or that (2) someone other than [the direct employer] paid his wages, (3) had the power to discharge him, or (4) had the power to control his conduct. See Whitehead, 304 Md. at 77-78, 497 A.2d at 808. At best, the record evidence cuts both ways.
Id. at 593.
In my view, based on the evidence before the jury, the instant case more closely
aligns with Imbraguglio than with Whitehead. For example, Tyson’s representative
testified at trial that: (1) Tyson did not select or hire Mr. Garcia; (2) Mr. Nguyen, not
Tyson, set and paid Mr. Garcia’s wages; (3) Tyson had no ability to fire Mr. Garcia; (4)
2 Further, the Court in Imbraguglio stated, again relying on Whitehead: “Because of the increasing complexity of the employer/employee relationship, we believe that in multi- party cases, the employer/employee relationship will most often be a question of fact, not of law.” 346 Md. at 593 n.13.
2 Tyson had no ability to set Mr. Garcia’s work hours; and (5) Tyson would communicate
with Mr. Nguyen about changes in practices for raising chickens.
In addition, Mr. Nguyen testified that: (1) he authorized Mr. Garcia to act on Mr.
Nguyen’s behalf in running the farm, from which a jury could reasonably have concluded
that Tyson’s interactions with Mr. Garcia were in Mr. Garcia’s capacity as Mr. Nguyen’s
agent, not as Tyson’s employee; (2) it was Mr. Nguyen’s obligation to take care of his
employees and service the contract with Tyson; (3) only Mr. Nguyen had the power to
terminate Mr. Garcia’s employment; and (4) Mr. Nguyen had the contractual ability to
terminate his grower contract with Tyson and enter into a contract with another poultry
company, suggesting that Mr. Nguyen, rather than Tyson, had ultimate control over
whether Mr. Garcia continued to have a job raising chickens.
The Court of Appeals in Imbraguglio reminded us not to “confuse control of the
workplace with control of the worker.” 346 Md. at 592. With that in mind, in my view
the evidence in this case allowed for the reasonable inference that, notwithstanding the
specificity in Tyson’s contractually-required procedures and practices for raising
chickens, Tyson did not have the requisite control over Mr. Garcia to be considered his
employer. At a minimum, as the Court of Appeals found in Imbraguglio, the evidence
“cut both ways.” Id. at 593. I would, therefore, affirm the judgment of the circuit court.