Broadfoot, J.
The sole question before us is the sufficiency of the notice of injury. It is attacked only for the reason that the date of the accident is not specified therein. The defendants contend that the omission of the date is a fatal defect and because thereof it does not comply with the requirements of sec. 330.19 (5), Stats. They rely upon several cases decided by this court which we shall review briefly, in the order they are set out in the brief herein.
In Voss v. Tittel, 219 Wis. 175, 262 N. W. 579, a summons, affidavit, notice of examination, of adverse party, and a subpoena were issued within the two-year period. It was there held that the statute had not been complied with.
In Beyer v. Seymer, 249 Wis. 257, 24 N. W. (2d) 616, there was a letter by plaintiff’s attorney to the defendant in which he stated he was retained by plaintiff relative to the institution of a malpractice action, and there was served on the defendant an affidavit and notice of adverse examination, and said examination was held within the two-year period. That was held not to comply with the statute!
In Brunette v. Brunette, 171 Wis. 366, 177 N. W. 593, the plaintiff was injured while working on his brother’s farm. Defendant received the first notice of injury from plaintiff’s doctor, and defendant then reported the injury to the industrial commission. The plaintiff later filed a claim for workmen’s compensation but the claim was dismissed because the defendant, a farmer, was not under the act. Again it was held this was not a compliance with the statute.
In Lockman v. Steensland, 174 Wis. 570, 183 N. W. 676, there were extended negotiations for settlement of a claim for personal injuries received in an automobile accident. The [202]*202plaintiff there' contended that these negotiations gave the defendant full knowledge of the facts and that this obviated the necessity for a notice. That was held not to comply with the statute.
In Olson v. Stella Cheese Co. 254 Wis. 62, 35 N. W. (2d) 220, plaintiff was injured while riding upon a tractor on the highway. A settlement of his claim for damages was had and he signed a release. It was held that was not a compliance with the statute.
In Staszczuk v. Gilman Mfg. Co. 159 Wis. 615, 150 N. W. 982, the plaintiff, a minor, was injured while working for the defendant. His claim for damages was settled and he signed a release. After he reached the age of twenty-one years, but beyond the time limited by statute, he commenced his action for personal injuries. That was held not to comply with the statute.
In Martin v. Lindner, 258 Wis. 29, 44 N. W. (2d) 558, the plaintiff received personal injuries in an airplane accident. Just prior to the expiration of the two-year period his attorney handed an officer a summons and complaint in the action, which the officer was unable to serve because the defendant was out of the state. That, too, was held not to comply with the statute.
It will be noted that in all of the cases relied upon by the defendants no notice of injury was served nor was a complaint served within the time limited by the statute. In each case the plaintiff was urging that something else be substituted for the requirements of the statute.
We shall next review a few of the cases relied upon by the plaintiffs. In Malloy v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 109 Wis. 29, 85 N. W. 130, the court said (p. 32) :
“The interpretation should lean strongly to avoid absurd consequences. . . . The court should also consider the legislative purpose, and keep steadily in view ‘the mischief to be cured.’ . . . Prior to the enactment of this statute a person [203]*203suffering injury to his person had full six years to commence his action, and he was not required to give any notice of his intention. The necessity of notice arose from the fact that many claims were being prosecuted after long delays, when witnesses had disappeared or the circumstances were forgotten, and the means of evidence had been lost or destroyed. Instances arose when the defendant was put to a great disadvantage by failure to preserve evidence, death of witnesses, or change in the physical features surrounding the accident. This was undoubtedly ‘the mischief to be cured.’ Unquestionably, the legislative purpose was to require the injured party to inform the other within a reasonable time, fixed at one year, of his intention to hold him responsible. If he did so, then he might commence his action any time within six years. If he did not, then his right would be forfeited. The primary purpose seems to have been that notice should be given to afford the defendant an opportunity to investigate the circumstances before they got stale, and to preserve evidence for his defense.”
This decision adequately states the purpose of the requirement that notice be given or the complaint served within the time limited by statute.
In May v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 102 Wis. 673, 79 N. W. 31, the plaintiff sought to recover for the killing of two cows and the serious injury of a third cow which were struck by a train on the defendant’s railway. The incident occurred on August 2, 1897. At that time sec. 1816b of the statutes read as follows:
“No action against any railroad corporation for damages to property occasioned by fire set from a locomotive or for stock killed or injured by such corporation shall be maintained unless within one year after the happening of the event causing such damage notice in writing, signed by the party owning such property or stock, his agent or attorney, shall be given to the corporation against which damage is claimed, stating the time and place where such damage occurred and that satisfaction therefor is claimed of such corporation. Such [204]*204notice may be given in the manner provided for the service of summons upon such corporations in courts of record.”
A notice was served on December 7, 1897, stating that the damages occurred “through the negligence of the Chicago & North Western Railway Company in failing to keep the gate in the fence separating the right of way of said railway company from a portion of the farm of John Walterscheit, in said town of Blooming Grove, closed, . . .” It was contended by the defendant that the notice of injury was insufficient because indefinite as to the place where the accident occurred. In speaking of the notice, this court said (p. 676) :
“Certainly, this seems reasonably definite and certain. If the company did not know where the farm of John Walter-scheit was, it was easily ascertainable. The claim that the place of the injury is not definitely stated is entirely too narrow a construction of language for practical purposes.”
In. Budke v. Holvick, 255 Wis. 293, 38 N. W. (2d) 479, a typewritten notice of injury was served within the time limited by statute. A blank line, intended for signature of the claimant, was typed at the foot of the notice and the name of the claimant was typed beneath that line. The notice was attacked as insufficient because it was not signed as required by statute. Our court there held (pp. 295, 296) :
“The notice of claim may, as appellants contend, be technically defective. Budke did not manually sign the copies of the notice which were delivered to defendants. . . .
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Broadfoot, J.
The sole question before us is the sufficiency of the notice of injury. It is attacked only for the reason that the date of the accident is not specified therein. The defendants contend that the omission of the date is a fatal defect and because thereof it does not comply with the requirements of sec. 330.19 (5), Stats. They rely upon several cases decided by this court which we shall review briefly, in the order they are set out in the brief herein.
In Voss v. Tittel, 219 Wis. 175, 262 N. W. 579, a summons, affidavit, notice of examination, of adverse party, and a subpoena were issued within the two-year period. It was there held that the statute had not been complied with.
In Beyer v. Seymer, 249 Wis. 257, 24 N. W. (2d) 616, there was a letter by plaintiff’s attorney to the defendant in which he stated he was retained by plaintiff relative to the institution of a malpractice action, and there was served on the defendant an affidavit and notice of adverse examination, and said examination was held within the two-year period. That was held not to comply with the statute!
In Brunette v. Brunette, 171 Wis. 366, 177 N. W. 593, the plaintiff was injured while working on his brother’s farm. Defendant received the first notice of injury from plaintiff’s doctor, and defendant then reported the injury to the industrial commission. The plaintiff later filed a claim for workmen’s compensation but the claim was dismissed because the defendant, a farmer, was not under the act. Again it was held this was not a compliance with the statute.
In Lockman v. Steensland, 174 Wis. 570, 183 N. W. 676, there were extended negotiations for settlement of a claim for personal injuries received in an automobile accident. The [202]*202plaintiff there' contended that these negotiations gave the defendant full knowledge of the facts and that this obviated the necessity for a notice. That was held not to comply with the statute.
In Olson v. Stella Cheese Co. 254 Wis. 62, 35 N. W. (2d) 220, plaintiff was injured while riding upon a tractor on the highway. A settlement of his claim for damages was had and he signed a release. It was held that was not a compliance with the statute.
In Staszczuk v. Gilman Mfg. Co. 159 Wis. 615, 150 N. W. 982, the plaintiff, a minor, was injured while working for the defendant. His claim for damages was settled and he signed a release. After he reached the age of twenty-one years, but beyond the time limited by statute, he commenced his action for personal injuries. That was held not to comply with the statute.
In Martin v. Lindner, 258 Wis. 29, 44 N. W. (2d) 558, the plaintiff received personal injuries in an airplane accident. Just prior to the expiration of the two-year period his attorney handed an officer a summons and complaint in the action, which the officer was unable to serve because the defendant was out of the state. That, too, was held not to comply with the statute.
It will be noted that in all of the cases relied upon by the defendants no notice of injury was served nor was a complaint served within the time limited by the statute. In each case the plaintiff was urging that something else be substituted for the requirements of the statute.
We shall next review a few of the cases relied upon by the plaintiffs. In Malloy v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 109 Wis. 29, 85 N. W. 130, the court said (p. 32) :
“The interpretation should lean strongly to avoid absurd consequences. . . . The court should also consider the legislative purpose, and keep steadily in view ‘the mischief to be cured.’ . . . Prior to the enactment of this statute a person [203]*203suffering injury to his person had full six years to commence his action, and he was not required to give any notice of his intention. The necessity of notice arose from the fact that many claims were being prosecuted after long delays, when witnesses had disappeared or the circumstances were forgotten, and the means of evidence had been lost or destroyed. Instances arose when the defendant was put to a great disadvantage by failure to preserve evidence, death of witnesses, or change in the physical features surrounding the accident. This was undoubtedly ‘the mischief to be cured.’ Unquestionably, the legislative purpose was to require the injured party to inform the other within a reasonable time, fixed at one year, of his intention to hold him responsible. If he did so, then he might commence his action any time within six years. If he did not, then his right would be forfeited. The primary purpose seems to have been that notice should be given to afford the defendant an opportunity to investigate the circumstances before they got stale, and to preserve evidence for his defense.”
This decision adequately states the purpose of the requirement that notice be given or the complaint served within the time limited by statute.
In May v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 102 Wis. 673, 79 N. W. 31, the plaintiff sought to recover for the killing of two cows and the serious injury of a third cow which were struck by a train on the defendant’s railway. The incident occurred on August 2, 1897. At that time sec. 1816b of the statutes read as follows:
“No action against any railroad corporation for damages to property occasioned by fire set from a locomotive or for stock killed or injured by such corporation shall be maintained unless within one year after the happening of the event causing such damage notice in writing, signed by the party owning such property or stock, his agent or attorney, shall be given to the corporation against which damage is claimed, stating the time and place where such damage occurred and that satisfaction therefor is claimed of such corporation. Such [204]*204notice may be given in the manner provided for the service of summons upon such corporations in courts of record.”
A notice was served on December 7, 1897, stating that the damages occurred “through the negligence of the Chicago & North Western Railway Company in failing to keep the gate in the fence separating the right of way of said railway company from a portion of the farm of John Walterscheit, in said town of Blooming Grove, closed, . . .” It was contended by the defendant that the notice of injury was insufficient because indefinite as to the place where the accident occurred. In speaking of the notice, this court said (p. 676) :
“Certainly, this seems reasonably definite and certain. If the company did not know where the farm of John Walter-scheit was, it was easily ascertainable. The claim that the place of the injury is not definitely stated is entirely too narrow a construction of language for practical purposes.”
In. Budke v. Holvick, 255 Wis. 293, 38 N. W. (2d) 479, a typewritten notice of injury was served within the time limited by statute. A blank line, intended for signature of the claimant, was typed at the foot of the notice and the name of the claimant was typed beneath that line. The notice was attacked as insufficient because it was not signed as required by statute. Our court there held (pp. 295, 296) :
“The notice of claim may, as appellants contend, be technically defective. Budke did not manually sign the copies of the notice which were delivered to defendants. . . .
“The statute is specific and requires notice to be given in accordance with its terms, as held in the cases cited and others. However, substantial compliance with the statute must be held to be sufficient. To hold that the notice on behalf of Budke was not sufficient would indeed be to hold the plaintiff to a needlessly technical measure of compliance.
“. . . The language of the statute quoted above, however, indicates the legislature intended that a notice should not be deemed insufficient for technical reasons if it gave substan[205]*205tially the information to which the defendant is entitled and was not intended to mislead.”
In Trapino v. Trapino, 260 Wis. 137, 50 N. W. (2d) 467, the wife sought recovery from her husband of damages for personal injuries sustained by her while a passenger in his automobile when it collided with another car in Madison, Wisconsin. The parties lived in St. Louis, Missouri. Within the two-year period a notice of claim for injury was served personally on the defendant in Missouri by a deputy sheriff of Missouri. The notice was attacked because sec. 330.19 (5), Stats., provides that the notice of injury be given in the manner required for the service of summons in courts of record in an action of this type and that our statutes do not authorize personal service outside of the state. The notice was held to be sufficient and the language quoted in Budke v. Holvick, supra, was quoted with approval.
From this review of prior decisions of this court two things are apparent. Where no notice has been served and no attempt has been made to comply with the statutory provisions governing the giving of such notice, knowledge of the facts by the defendant from other sources is not a compliance with the statute. The court has not permitted substitution for the notice. On the other hand, where a notice has actually been served, this court has held that inadvertent inaccuracies or omissions therein are to be disregarded where there was no intention on the part of the claimant to mislead the other party and the other party was not in fact misled thereby. Thus the statutory requirement that notice be signed was held to be complied with where the name of the claimant was typed upon the notice. Service of the notice outside of the state, although not strictly in compliance with the statute, was held to be sufficient. The requirement under a similar statute that the place of the accident be described was held to be sufficient although not stated with exactness.
[206]*206Paraphrasing the language in the case of May v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., supra, it would read as follows:
“If the defendants did not know the date of the accident it was easily ascertainable. The claim that the time of injury is not stated is entirely too narrow a construction of language for practical purposes.”
The omission of the date was inadvertent and it is apparent that there was no intention on the part of the claimant to mislead the defendants, nor do the defendants claim to have been misled thereby. Upon the record before us, the notice was a sufficient compliance with the statutory requirements. The demurrer should have been overruled.
By the Court.- — -Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.