Uhlig, LLC v. PropLogix, LLC

CourtDistrict Court, D. Kansas
DecidedMarch 5, 2024
Docket2:22-cv-02475
StatusUnknown

This text of Uhlig, LLC v. PropLogix, LLC (Uhlig, LLC v. PropLogix, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Uhlig, LLC v. PropLogix, LLC, (D. Kan. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

UHLIG, LLC d/b/a CONDOCERTSTM and ) WELCOMELINK®, ) ) Plaintiff, ) CIVIL ACTION v. ) ) No. 22-2475-KHV PROPLOGIX, LLC, ) ) Defendant. ) ____________________________________________)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Uhlig LLC d/b/a CondoCertsTM and d/b/a WelcomeLink® brings suit against PropLogix, LLC. Uhlig seeks leave to amend its complaint to add a claim that PropLogix misappropriated trade secrets. Plaintiff’s Motion For Leave To File Third Amended Complaint To Add New Claim And Facts Based On Newly Discovered Evidence (Doc. #149) filed October 10, 2023. On December 20, 2023, Magistrate Judge Angel D. Mitchell recommended that the Court deny Uhlig’s motion as futile. Memorandum & Order And Report & Recommendation Nunc Pro Tunc (Doc. #210). On de novo review, for substantially the reasons stated in Judge Mitchell’s Memorandum & Order And Report & Recommendation Nunc Pro Tunc (Doc. #210) and in PropLogix’s Suggestions In Opposition To Uhlig’s Objections To Magistrate Judge Mitchell’s December 19, 2023 Order (Doc. #226) filed January 16, 2024, and as further explained below, the Court adopts Judge Mitchell’s recommendation and overrules plaintiff’s motion to amend.1

1 PropLogix seeks to strike Uhlig’s reply brief in support of its objections to the magistrate’s recommendation. PropLogix’s Motion To Strike Uhlig’s Unauthorized Reply In Support Of Its Objections To Magistrate Report (Doc. #246) filed February 6, 2024. Even if the Court considers Uhlig’s reply, however, it declines to grant Uhlig leave to amend. The Court therefore overrules PropLogix’s motion to strike as moot. Legal Standards The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation on plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend, which arguably involves a dispositive ruling. The Court therefore reviews de novo whether to grant leave to amend. Cf. Birch v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 812 F.3d 1238, 1246 (10th Cir.

2015) (declining to decide whether magistrate judge order denying motion to amend should be reviewed de novo or under clearly erroneous or contrary to law standard). After the scheduling order deadline has expired, a party seeking leave to amend must demonstrate (1) good cause to modify the scheduling order under Rule 16(b)(4), Fed. R. Civ. P., and (2) that amendment is proper under Rule 15(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. Gorsuch, Ltd., B.C. v. Wells Fargo Nat’l Bank Ass’n, 771 F.3d 1230, 1240 (10th Cir. 2014). To show “good cause” to modify the scheduling order under Rule 16, the proponent of an untimely amendment must show it could not have met the deadline even if it had acted with due diligence. Denmon v. Runyon, 151 F.R.D. 404, 407 (D. Kan. 1993). Lack of prejudice to the nonmovant does not demonstrate good cause. Monge v. St. Francis Health Ctr., Inc., No. 12-2269-

EFM, 2013 WL 328957, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 10, 2013). If a party establishes good cause under Rule 16, it must next establish that the proposed amendment is proper under Rule 15. Under that rule, the Court must freely give leave to amend “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Whether to grant leave to amend is a matter of discretion for the trial court. See Woolsey v. Marion Labs., Inc., 934 F.2d 1452, 1462 (10th Cir. 1991). The Court should normally refuse to grant leave to amend only upon a showing of futility, undue delay, undue prejudice to the non-moving party or bad faith of the moving party. See Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1365 (10th Cir. 1993). A district court may deny a motion to amend as futile if the proposed amendment would not withstand a motion to dismiss or

-2- otherwise fails to state a claim. See Ketchum v. Cruz, 961 F.2d 916, 920 (10th Cir. 1992). To determine whether the complaint states a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court assumes as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and determines whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss,

a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim which is plausible—and not merely conceivable—on its face. Id. at 679–80; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief, the Court draws on its judicial experience and common sense. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The Court need not accept as true those allegations which state only legal conclusions. See id.; United States v. Herring, 935 F.3d 1102, 1110 (10th Cir. 2019). Plaintiff bears the burden of framing its claims with enough factual matter to suggest that it is entitled to relief; it is not enough to make threadbare recitals of a cause of action accompanied by conclusory statements. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Plaintiff makes a facially plausible claim by pleading factual content from which the Court can reasonably infer that defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff must show more than a sheer possibility that defendant has acted unlawfully—it is not enough to plead facts that are “merely consistent” with defendant’s liability. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). A pleading which offers labels and conclusions, a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement will not stand. Id. Similarly, where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the Court to infer more than mere possibility of misconduct, the pleading has alleged—but has not “shown”—that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679. Factual And Procedural Background In a common interest residential community (“CIC”) such as a homeowner association,

-3- condominium or co-op, real property deeds may be encumbered by obligations to the CIC. When a property owner sells or refinances a property, the owner, buyer, lender, title company or real estate attorney must often obtain an “estoppel certificate,” which indicates any outstanding monetary obligation to the CIC. In Florida, within ten days of a request from an owner, mortgagee

(i.e. lender) or designee of the owner or lender, the CIC or its authorized agent must provide an estoppel certificate. See Fla. Stat. §§ 718.116(8), 720.30851. Uhlig clients include various CICs in Florida. On request, Uhlig provides estoppel certificates for client properties to property buyers, lenders, title companies and real estate due diligence service companies. PropLogix is a real estate due diligence service company. Its customers are primarily title companies and real estate attorneys. Since at least 2016, PropLogix has used online platforms, including Uhlig web sites, to obtain estoppel certificates for its customers. When PropLogix obtains an estoppel certificate for a customer, it fronts the fee which Uhlig or another supplier charges. PropLogix passes on that charge to its customer and also charges for its services in

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Birch v. Polaris Industries, Inc.
812 F.3d 1238 (Tenth Circuit, 2015)
United States v. Herring
935 F.3d 1102 (Tenth Circuit, 2019)
Denmon v. Runyon
151 F.R.D. 404 (D. Kansas, 1993)

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Bluebook (online)
Uhlig, LLC v. PropLogix, LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/uhlig-llc-v-proplogix-llc-ksd-2024.