UFCW Local 1500 Welfare Fund, et al. v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedApril 28, 2026
Docket1:23-cv-10030
StatusUnknown

This text of UFCW Local 1500 Welfare Fund, et al. v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al. (UFCW Local 1500 Welfare Fund, et al. v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
UFCW Local 1500 Welfare Fund, et al. v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al., (S.D.N.Y. 2026).

Opinion

USDC SDNY DOCUMENT UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ELECTRONICALLY FILED SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK | DOC #: UFCW LOCAL 1500 WELFARE FUND, DATE pepe 28/26 et al., Plaintiffs, 23-CV-10030 (JHR) (BCM) -against- OPINION AND ORDER TAKEDA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC., et al., Defendants.

BARBARA MOSES, United States Magistrate Judge. Plaintiffs UFCW Local 1500 Welfare Fund, Uniformed Fire Officers Association Family Protection Plan Local 854, and Uniformed Fire Officers Association for Retired Fire Officers Family Protection Plan (RFOFPP) are employee welfare benefits funds and third-party payors (TPPs) responsible for a significant portion of the cost of drugs prescribed for their members. Plaintiffs allege that defendant Takeda Pharmaceuticals U.S.A., Inc. (Takeda), which sells the name-brand gout medication Colerys, conspired with three generic manufacturers, including defendant Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC (Amneal), to coordinate the timing of the generic manufacturers’ market entry, restrict the supply of generic alternatives, and thereby preserve the drug's high prices. As a result of this alleged anti-competitive scheme, the TPPs paid artificially inflated prices for both the name-brand drug and its generic alternatives. In this action, they seek damages from Takeda and Amneal under the antitrust laws of 32 states and the District of Columbia. Now before the Court is Takeda’s motion (Dkt. 35) to transfer venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (EDPA), where a substantially similar case was litigated from 2021 through 2023. For the reasons that follow, Takeda's motion will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background The active ingredient in Colcrys is colchicine, derived from the autumn crocus plant, which has been used to treat and prevent symptoms of gout for thousands of years. Compl. (Dkt. 1) ¶¶ 1, 38. Colchicine is also used to treat the auto-inflammatory disease familial mediterranean fever

(FMF). Id. ¶ 38. Prior to 2009, "at least 21 companies" marketed and sold single-ingredient colchicine tablets at low prices. See id. ¶ 39 ("a colchicine pill cost just $0.09"). In 2006, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced its Unapproved Drugs Initiative, under which sellers of "old" prescription drugs like colchicine were required, for the first time, to submit New Drug Applications (NDAs) and obtain FDA approval for their products. Compl. ¶ 40. In 2008, Takeda's predecessor Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. (Mutual) filed three NDAs for Colcrys and, in 2009, it obtained FDA approval for Colcrys for the treatment of FMF and the treatment and prophylaxis of gout. Id. ¶ 41. The FDA granted Takeda's branded product "a three-year exclusivity for the treatment of acute gout flares and a seven-year exclusivity for the treatment of FMF." Id. As a result, the 21 existing sellers of colchicine medications "were removed

from the market," and Takeda, which had a temporary monopoly, raised the price of its product dramatically. Id. ¶ 42. By May 2014, Takeda was charging over $5.25 per tablet of Colcrys. Id. The price peaked at $6.73 per tablet in January 2019. Id. Between 2009 and 2012, Takeda also sought and ultimately obtained 17 U.S. patents "cover[ing] several methods of administering colchicine products to treat gout." Compl. ¶¶ 43-44. However, by 2011, Takeda's "fatally weak patents started to attract challenges" from generic drug manufactures, notably Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. (Par), Watson Laboratories, Inc. (Watson), and Amneal (collectively, the Generic Manufacturers). Id. ¶¶ 65-66, 68, 70. Between 2011 and 2013, Par, Watson, and Amneal filed Abbreviated New Drug Applications seeking FDA approval for their generic colchicine tablets, along with so-called "paragraph IV certifications" that Takeda's relevant patents were invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed. Id. ¶¶ 66, 68, 70. In response, Takeda commenced lawsuits against each of the three Generic Manufacturers for patent infringement in the District of Delaware. Id. ¶¶ 67, 69, 71. The assigned judge coordinated the cases and set a joint bench trial for the patent infringement lawsuits to begin in December 2015.

Id. ¶¶ 78, 89, 103. However, on the eve of trial, Takeda settled with each of the three Generic Manufacturers. Id. ¶ 113. These settlements are the foundation of the state antitrust claims alleged in this action. They are also the foundation of the federal antitrust claims alleged by pharmaceutical wholesaler Value Drug Company (Value Drug) in Value Drug. Co. v. Takeda Pharm., U.S.A. Inc., No 2:21-CV-03500 (E.D. Pa.) (hereafter Value Drug), as discussed in more detail below. Meanwhile, between February 2015 and September 2016, the FDA tentatively approved the applications of Par, Watson, and Amneal (in that order) to launch their respective generic versions of Colcrys. Compl. ¶¶ 73-75. As the first generic filer, Par was entitled to launch its generic product as early as July 2016 (when the last of Takeda's regulatory exclusivities expired),

id. ¶ 73, and would thereafter be entitled to an 180-day period of generic exclusivity, "during which the FDA would not approve other generic manufacturers to sell a generic version of Colcrys." Id. ¶ 66. During that 180-day period, "Par would compete with Takeda's authorized generic . . . , which had been distributed by Prasco Laboratories (Prasco) since January 2015." Id. ¶ 106. Assuming that they too received final FDA approval, subsequent generic filers, including Watson and Amneal, would be free to launch their competing generic colchicine products after the expiration of Par's 180-day exclusivity period. Id. ¶¶ 74-75, 110. Plaintiffs allege that, in order to avoid the inevitable price drop that would result from the market entry of multiple generics, "Takeda instead engineered a market allocation scheme through anticompetitive agreements with Par, Watson, and Amneal that would stave off unrestricted competition for as long as possible." Compl. ¶ 112. In relevant part, pursuant to those agreements, Takeda and Par entered a "sham joint venture" whereby "Par would . . . take Prasco's place as the sole distributor of Takeda's authorized generic, and Prasco would exit the market," ensuring that "Par would get 100% of the generic Colcrys market and be able to charge an elevated price as a

result, instead of competing on price with Prasco." Id. ¶¶ 113, 132-33. However, Par agreed to refrain from entering the market for two and a half years, in order to "delay . . . other manufacturers from coming to market" and lengthen the time Takeda enjoyed a market free of competition. Id. ¶¶ 114-115, 117. For their part, Watson and Amneal agreed to delay their entry into the generic colchicine market for nearly five years, thereby artificially extending Takeda and Par's "two-firm arrangement," in exchange for protection from other prospective competitors. Id. ¶¶ 119, 124, 126, 129-30, 134-36, 169. To that end, Takeda entered into licensing agreements with other non-conspiring generic companies to delay their entry until 135 days after Watson and Amneal entered the market. Id. ¶¶ 130, 137-38. Because companies can charge "at least 20% higher" in a

generic market limited to three competitors (compared to a market with additional competitors), this agreement ensured that Amneal and Watson got "a 'better deal' than subsequent [] filers got or could get." Id. ¶¶ 137-38, 170-71. Ultimately, by 2021, multiple non-conspiring competitors were able to enter the market, causing the price of a colchicine pill to drop to $0.1475 (approximately 2% of the January 2019 peak price for name-brand Colcrys tablets). Compl. ¶ 172. B.

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Bluebook (online)
UFCW Local 1500 Welfare Fund, et al. v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ufcw-local-1500-welfare-fund-et-al-v-takeda-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-nysd-2026.