UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA UDAY VEER SINGH, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) Case No. CIV-26-1574-SLP ) WARDEN OF DIAMONDBACK ) CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, et al., ) ) Respondents. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Petitioner Uday Veer Singh, a noncitizen1 and Indian national proceeding with counsel, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), Doc. 1, challenging under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 his detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). United States Chief District Judge Scott L. Palk referred this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). Because Petitioner is no longer in ICE custody and this Court can grant no relief to him, the undersigned recommends the Court dismiss the Petition as moot. I. Background and Motion to Dismiss On June 25, 2026, Petitioner filed his Petition alleging, among other things, that ICE violated his due process and the Immigration and Nationality Act through his unlawful re- detention and continued detention in immigration custody without a bond hearing. Doc. 1
1 Unless quoting, this Report and Recommendation “uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578 n.2 (2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)). at 14-22. When he filed his Petition, Petitioner was detained at the Diamondback Correctional Facility in Watonga, Oklahoma. Id. at 4. The Court ordered Respondents to
respond. Doc. 7. Respondents timely filed a Response, Doc. 13, and Petitioner filed a Reply, Doc. 14. On August 20, 2026, after noting Petitioner’s location did not appear on ICE's Online Detainee Locator and his EOIR Automated Case Information online indicated his “case is pending,” the undersigned ordered the parties to provide a status report about
Petitioner’s custody and immigration proceedings. Doc. 15. The same day, Petitioner’s counsel filed a Status Report and advised “Petitioner has been released from immigration custody after posting the $30,000 bond ordered by the Immigration Judge and is no longer detained by Respondents.” Doc. 16 at 1. “In light of Petitioner’s release from immigration custody, Petitioner no longer seeks the habeas relief requested in the Petition.” Id.2
II. Standard of Review To obtain habeas corpus relief, Petitioner must show he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001)).
2 Given the status report from Petitioner’s counsel and this Report and Recommendation, counsel for Respondents is excused from providing a status report pursuant to the Order from August 20, 2026. “Mootness is a threshold issue because the existence of a live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction.” McClendon v. City of
Albuquerque, 100 F.3d 863, 867 (10th Cir. 1996). “Because mootness is a matter of jurisdiction, a court may raise the issue sua sponte.” Id. III. Analysis Petitioner properly filed his Petition in this district because he was detained here at the time of filing. Doc. 1 at 4; see also Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting a § 2241 petition “must be filed in the district where the prisoner is
confined”). Petitioner satisfied the “in custody” requirement under § 2241 “at the time the petition was filed.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); see also Riley v. I.N.S., 310 F.3d 1253, 1256 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting that petitioner met the “in custody” requirement of § 2241 because he was “in custody at the time of filing” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241)). “The more substantial question, however, is whether petitioner’s subsequent release caused
the petition to be moot because it no longer presented a case or controversy under Article III, § 2, of the Constitution.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. “Article III of the Constitution limits federal-court jurisdiction to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’” Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 160 (2016) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2). “In order to invoke federal-court jurisdiction, a [petitioner] must
demonstrate that he possesses a legally cognizable interest, or personal stake, in the outcome of the action.” Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 71 (2013) (citation modified). This means “an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at time the [petition] is filed.” Arizonans for Off. Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997) (citation modified). “If an intervening circumstance deprives the [petitioner] of a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, at any point during litigation,
the action can no longer proceed and must be dismissed as moot.” Genesis Healthcare Corp., 569 U.S. at 72 (citation modified). “A case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Loc. 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012) (citation modified). Here, Petitioner is no longer in ICE custody and has been released after posting the
bond ordered by the Immigration Judge. Doc. 16 at 1. Though jurisdiction attached in this district when Petitioner filed his Petition, his subsequent release from ICE custody may render his Petition moot. The Petition does not become moot, however, merely because Petitioner has been released from ICE custody. If a petitioner “has been released from custody while his or her habeas petition is pending, a court’s jurisdiction depends upon the existence of ‘collateral consequences . . . adequate to meet Article III’s injury-in-fact
requirement.’” King v. Ciolli, No. 23-1201, 2024 WL 1179908, at *2 (10th Cir. Mar. 19, 2024) (quoting Spencer, 523 U.S. at 14). To overcome mootness after release from custody, a petitioner must show “some concrete and continuing injury” “if the suit is to be maintained.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. Petitioner challenges in his Petition his detention in ICE custody and Respondents’
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA UDAY VEER SINGH, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) Case No. CIV-26-1574-SLP ) WARDEN OF DIAMONDBACK ) CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, et al., ) ) Respondents. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Petitioner Uday Veer Singh, a noncitizen1 and Indian national proceeding with counsel, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), Doc. 1, challenging under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 his detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). United States Chief District Judge Scott L. Palk referred this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). Because Petitioner is no longer in ICE custody and this Court can grant no relief to him, the undersigned recommends the Court dismiss the Petition as moot. I. Background and Motion to Dismiss On June 25, 2026, Petitioner filed his Petition alleging, among other things, that ICE violated his due process and the Immigration and Nationality Act through his unlawful re- detention and continued detention in immigration custody without a bond hearing. Doc. 1
1 Unless quoting, this Report and Recommendation “uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578 n.2 (2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)). at 14-22. When he filed his Petition, Petitioner was detained at the Diamondback Correctional Facility in Watonga, Oklahoma. Id. at 4. The Court ordered Respondents to
respond. Doc. 7. Respondents timely filed a Response, Doc. 13, and Petitioner filed a Reply, Doc. 14. On August 20, 2026, after noting Petitioner’s location did not appear on ICE's Online Detainee Locator and his EOIR Automated Case Information online indicated his “case is pending,” the undersigned ordered the parties to provide a status report about
Petitioner’s custody and immigration proceedings. Doc. 15. The same day, Petitioner’s counsel filed a Status Report and advised “Petitioner has been released from immigration custody after posting the $30,000 bond ordered by the Immigration Judge and is no longer detained by Respondents.” Doc. 16 at 1. “In light of Petitioner’s release from immigration custody, Petitioner no longer seeks the habeas relief requested in the Petition.” Id.2
II. Standard of Review To obtain habeas corpus relief, Petitioner must show he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001)).
2 Given the status report from Petitioner’s counsel and this Report and Recommendation, counsel for Respondents is excused from providing a status report pursuant to the Order from August 20, 2026. “Mootness is a threshold issue because the existence of a live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction.” McClendon v. City of
Albuquerque, 100 F.3d 863, 867 (10th Cir. 1996). “Because mootness is a matter of jurisdiction, a court may raise the issue sua sponte.” Id. III. Analysis Petitioner properly filed his Petition in this district because he was detained here at the time of filing. Doc. 1 at 4; see also Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting a § 2241 petition “must be filed in the district where the prisoner is
confined”). Petitioner satisfied the “in custody” requirement under § 2241 “at the time the petition was filed.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); see also Riley v. I.N.S., 310 F.3d 1253, 1256 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting that petitioner met the “in custody” requirement of § 2241 because he was “in custody at the time of filing” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241)). “The more substantial question, however, is whether petitioner’s subsequent release caused
the petition to be moot because it no longer presented a case or controversy under Article III, § 2, of the Constitution.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. “Article III of the Constitution limits federal-court jurisdiction to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’” Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 160 (2016) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2). “In order to invoke federal-court jurisdiction, a [petitioner] must
demonstrate that he possesses a legally cognizable interest, or personal stake, in the outcome of the action.” Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 71 (2013) (citation modified). This means “an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at time the [petition] is filed.” Arizonans for Off. Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997) (citation modified). “If an intervening circumstance deprives the [petitioner] of a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, at any point during litigation,
the action can no longer proceed and must be dismissed as moot.” Genesis Healthcare Corp., 569 U.S. at 72 (citation modified). “A case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Loc. 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012) (citation modified). Here, Petitioner is no longer in ICE custody and has been released after posting the
bond ordered by the Immigration Judge. Doc. 16 at 1. Though jurisdiction attached in this district when Petitioner filed his Petition, his subsequent release from ICE custody may render his Petition moot. The Petition does not become moot, however, merely because Petitioner has been released from ICE custody. If a petitioner “has been released from custody while his or her habeas petition is pending, a court’s jurisdiction depends upon the existence of ‘collateral consequences . . . adequate to meet Article III’s injury-in-fact
requirement.’” King v. Ciolli, No. 23-1201, 2024 WL 1179908, at *2 (10th Cir. Mar. 19, 2024) (quoting Spencer, 523 U.S. at 14). To overcome mootness after release from custody, a petitioner must show “some concrete and continuing injury” “if the suit is to be maintained.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. Petitioner challenges in his Petition his detention in ICE custody and Respondents’
failure to provide a bond hearing. See generally Doc. 1 at 14-18. In similar circumstances, courts have concluded a petitioner’s release from immigration custody mooted his habeas challenge to the legality of his detention, where the only possible “continuing injury” or collateral consequence “stems from his removal order, not his detention.” Ferry v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 1117, 1132 (10th Cir. 2006). Further, any determination now as to whether Petitioner’s detention violated his due process rights would amount to an advisory
opinion that this Court cannot issue. Id. (declining “to issue an advisory opinion regarding [petitioner’s] entitlement to a bond hearing because a declaratory judgment on that question would have no meaningful effect on the [immigration officials’] future conduct” with him). Petitioner is no longer in ICE custody, and the relief he requests is no longer available and cannot be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Furthermore, Petitioner
“no longer seeks the habeas relief requested in the Petition” and “does not oppose dismissal of this habeas action as moot.” Doc. 16 at 1. The undersigned is not aware from the record of any collateral consequences to Petitioner that would constitute an exception to the mootness doctrine. No concrete or continuing injury to Petitioner appears to remain after his release on bond. As such, Petitioner’s habeas challenge to his detention no longer presents a case or controversy subject to this Court’s jurisdiction, and the Petition should
be dismissed as moot. See, e.g., Suarez-Tejeda v. United States, 85 F. App’x 711, 716 (10th Cir. 2004) (ruling an immigration detainee’s habeas challenge to detention was moot when he was released on conditions and “effectively received the relief he has requested”); Sule v. I.N.S., 189 F.3d 478, 1999 WL 668716, at *1 (10th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision) (concluding an immigration detainee’s release from immigration custody through
deportation “mooted his challenge to the legality of his detention”); Garcia Ramirez v. Chestnut, No. 26-CV-02549, 2026 WL 1374730, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 2026) (recommending dismissal of habeas petition as moot because the petitioner’s “complaints have been addressed” when she “was granted a bond hearing and released”) (R&R); see also Mounivong v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-1483-PRW, 2025 WL 3907008 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2025) (recommending dismissal of habeas petition as moot when petitioner was removed to home country and no longer in ICEcustody) (R&R), adopted, 2026 WL 69364 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 8, 2026). IV. Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object Petitioner’s release from ICE custody renders his Petition moot, as there is no longer an actual case or controversy for the Court to decide. The undersigned therefore recommends that the Court DISMISS the Petition, Doc. 1, as moot. The parties are advised of their right to object to this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. Any objection must be filed not later than September 8, 2026. See id. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Ifa party wishes to respond to the other party’s objections, such response must be filed not later than September 15, 2026. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to object timely waives the right to appellate review of the factual and legal issues addressed in this Report and Recommendation. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in this matter. ENTERED this 25" day of August, 2026.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE