Tyrone Walker v. Judge Thomas J. McAvoy

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK _____________________________________

TYRONE WALKER,

Plaintiff,

-v- 8:26-CV-1125 (AJB/MJK)

JUDGE THOMAS J. MCAVOY,

Defendant. _____________________________________

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

TYRONE WALKER Plaintiff, Pro Se 94-A-5258 Clinton Correctional Facility P.O. Box 2001 Dannemora, NY 12929

Hon. Anthony Brindisi, U.S. District Judge:

ORDER ON REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On May 26, 2026, pro se plaintiff Tyrone Walker, an incarcerated individual in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against U.S. District Judge Thomas J. McAvoy. Dkt. No. 1. According to plaintiff’s 114-page pleading, plaintiff—acting as representative and trustee of the Tyrone Walker Trust—is entitled to, inter alia, a lien valued at $100,000,000 against Judge McAvoy as a result of his judicial involvement in plaintiff’s federal-court prosecution.1 Along with his complaint, plaintiff moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Application”). Dkt. Nos. 2, 3.

1 Plaintiff has made similar filings in his federal criminal case. United States v. Walker, 3:94-CR-328 (DNH). On June 10, 2026, U.S. Magistrate Judge Mitchell J. Katz granted plaintiff’s IFP Applica- tion but, after conducting an initial review of the pleading, advised by Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) that plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed without leave to amend as legally and factually frivolous. Dkt. No. 7. As Judge Katz explained, a federal judge’s adjudication of a criminal matter

over which they presided is not a valid basis on which to maintain a § 1983 claim, since federal judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity for official acts. Id. Further, despite the “robust” nature of plaintiff’s lien-related allegations, Judge Katz determined that no cognizable debtor- creditor relationship (indeed, no cognizable relationship of any kind) exists or existed between plaintiff and Judge McAvoy. See id. Finally, because plaintiff’s complaint was frivolous and could not be cured through better fact pleading, Judge Katz recommended that plaintiff’s com- plaint be dismissed without leave to amend. Id. Plaintiff has not lodged objections. However, he has filed a letter with proposed sum- monses, Dkt. No. 8, offered additional exhibits to his complaint, Dkt. No. 9, and filed an amended civil cover sheet, Dkt. No. 11. Upon de novo review, these filings do not warrant any relief. To

the contrary, the Court agrees with Judge Katz: plaintiff’s civil action lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Accordingly, the R&R is accepted and will be adopted. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Therefore, it is ORDERED that 1. The Report & Recommendation (Dkt. No. 7) is ACCEPTED; 2. Plaintiff’s complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED without leave to amend as FRIVO- LOUS; and 3. The Court CERTIFIES pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of any appeal.” The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the pending motion, enter a judgment ac- cordingly, and close the file. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 23, 2026 Utica, New York. ° Anthony J. Brindisj U.S. District Judg

2 An appellant demonstrates “good faith” for purposes of the in forma pauperis statute when he seeks appellate review of an objectively non-frivolous issue. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). Although Coppedge was a direct criminal appeal, courts in this circuit apply this “objective good faith” standard to good-faith questions in civil matters. See, e.g., Burda Media Inc. v. Blumenberg, 731 F. Supp. 2d 321, 323 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). -3-