Tyrell J. Beavers v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 21, 2017
• Docket: 20A03-1612-CR-2867
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing Jun 21 2017, 9:01 am

the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK Indiana Supreme Court estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Marielena Duerring Curtis T. Hill, Jr. South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

Michael Gene Worden Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Tyrell J. Beavers, June 21, 2017 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 20A03-1612-CR-2867 v. Appeal from the Elkhart Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Terry C. Appellee-Plaintiff Shewmaker, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 20C01-1607-MR-4

Altice, Judge.

Case Summary

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1612-CR-2867 | June 21, 2017 Page 1 of 5 [1] Tyrell J. Beavers appeals the trial court’s denial of his pro-se request to

withdraw his guilty plea. He contends the trial court abused its discretion

because he presented sound reasons in support of withdrawing his plea and the

State did not oppose the request.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] On July 6, 2016, the State charged Beavers with murder. Counsel appeared on

his behalf the following week. On October 7, 2016, the parties entered into a

written plea agreement pursuant to which Beavers agreed to plead guilty as

charged and the State agreed to a sentence of forty-five years in prison – the

minimum sentence for murder. At a plea hearing on October 10, 2016, the trial

court accepted Beavers’ guilty plea and entered a judgment of conviction for

murder. The court then scheduled sentencing for November 17, 2016.

[4] While awaiting sentencing, Beavers sent letters to the trial court on or about

October 22 and November 7, 2016, requesting to withdraw his guilty plea. At

the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the trial court addressed with Beavers

this request, which was unverified and not filed by counsel. Beavers

complained that counsel failed to advise that he could have a bench trial rather

than a jury trial. Upon further questioning by the court, Beavers stated that he

did not agree with the plea agreement and felt as though he was signing his life

away. The court then sought comments from defense counsel, who

thoughtfully noted his client’s young age of nineteen and the minimum

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1612-CR-2867 | June 21, 2017 Page 2 of 5 sentence obtained by the plea agreement. Similarly, the prosecutor observed

that “defense counsel ha[d] negotiated with the state for the least possible

sentence that he could get under the circumstances.” Transcript at 24. The

prosecutor noted that this was “one of the strangest situations” and that

withdrawal was not in the young defendant’s best interest. Id. Further, the

prosecutor observed that Beavers had “acknowledged his guilt on multiple

occasions” and had been “very detailed about that guilt.” Id. at 25.

[5] The trial court denied the request to withdraw the guilty plea. Specifically, the

court concluded that it was not required to act on a pro-se filing by a defendant

represented by counsel and that withdrawal was clearly not in Beavers’ best

interest. The court then proceeded to sentence Beavers to forty-five years in

prison as required by the plea agreement. Beavers appeals the denial of his pro-

se request to withdraw his guilty plea.

Discussion & Decision

[6] A trial court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea “arrives in this court

with a presumption in favor of the ruling.” Brightman v. State, 758 N.E.2d 41,

44 (Ind. 2001). We will reverse such a ruling only for an abuse of discretion.

Jeffries v. State, 966 N.E.2d 773, 777 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.

[7] After a defendant pleads guilty but before a sentence is imposed, a defendant

may file a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty. Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(b). The

motion “shall be in writing and verified.” Id. The trial court may grant the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1612-CR-2867 | June 21, 2017 Page 3 of 5 motion to withdraw “for any fair and just reason unless the state has been

substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant’s plea.”1 Id.

[8] In the instant case, Beavers did not file a verified, written motion to withdraw

his guilty plea. Accordingly, his argument that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying his pro-se requests to withdraw – made via letter and

orally at sentencing – has been waived. See Peel v. State, 951 N.E.2d 269, 272

(Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“A defendant’s failure to submit a verified, written

motion to withdraw a guilty plea generally results in waiver of the issue of

wrongful denial of the request.”) (quoting Carter v. State, 739 N.E.2d 126, 128 n.

3 (Ind. 2000)). Further, the trial court properly observed that it was not

required to consider the pro-se request because Beavers was represented by

counsel. See Black v. State, 7 N.E.3d 333, 338 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[9] Waiver notwithstanding, we conclude that Beavers has failed to present any

grounds compelling the grant of his request to withdraw his guilty plea. The

record establishes that his plea was freely and voluntarily made and that the

plea resulted in an extremely beneficial sentence – the minimum sentence.

Beavers argues that his reasons for wanting to withdraw the plea were “well

articulated and sound”. Appellants’ Brief at 7. Defense counsel, the prosecutor,

and the trial court all felt otherwise (that is, withdrawal was not in Beavers’ best

1 The statute also provides that the court shall grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea “whenever the defendant proves that withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Id. Beavers, however, does not claim that a manifest injustice resulted from the plea agreement.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1612-CR-2867 | June 21, 2017 Page 4 of 5 interest). On review, we discern an exercise of discretion by the trial court, not

an abuse of it.

[10] Judgment affirmed.

[11] Kirsch, J. and Mathias, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1612-CR-2867 | June 21, 2017 Page 5 of 5