Tymchuk v. City of Rochester

43 Misc. 2d 98, 250 N.Y.S.2d 202, 1964 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1792
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedMay 7, 1964
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 43 Misc. 2d 98 (Tymchuk v. City of Rochester) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tymchuk v. City of Rochester, 43 Misc. 2d 98, 250 N.Y.S.2d 202, 1964 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1792 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1964).

Opinion

Charles Lambiase, J.

This is an application by the plaintiff for an injunction pendente lite. The show cause order herein requires defendants to show cause ‘ ‘ why an order should not be made and entered herein, restraining and enjoining the defendants, City of Rochester, Jenkins Hart and W. B. Cooper d/b/a United Labor Supply, and each of them and their agents, servants and employees and all other persons acting under their control and authority, from taking any action or making any repairs to the premises of the plaintiff at Nos. 77 and 77% Joiner Street in the City of Rochester, State of New York, pursuant to a certain contract entered into between the defendants on or about the 6th day of March, 1964 ”. (Order to show cause, dated April 7,1964.)

Said show cause order stays and enjoins and restrains the defendants from taking any action or making any repairs with respect to said property in the meantime and until the argument of the motion brought on thereby and the entry of an order thereon.

The application is incident to the above-entitled action wherein the plaintiff demands judgment:

“ (1) permanently enjoining the defendants and each of them and their agents, servants and employees and all other persons acting under their control and authority, from taking any action or making any repairs to be charged against the plaintiff with respect to her property at No. 77 and No. 77% Joiner Street in the City of Rochester, State of New York, except upon due and sufficient lawful notice.

“ (2) restraining the defendants and each of them and their agents, servants and employees and all other persons acting under their control and authority, during the pendency of this action. .

[100]*100u (3) declaring Chapter 57.1-5 and Chapter 57.1-6 of the Municipal Code of the City of Rochester, or that portion of said Chapters which provides for inadequate notice to property owners, and the contract between the defendants dated March 6, 1964, to be invalid, null and void and in violation of plaintiff’s Constitutional rights.

“ (4) granting to plaintiff such other and further relief, judgment or decree as to the Court may seem just and equitable, together with costs and disbursements of this action.”

In January, 1963 David L. Garratt, Director of Buildings, Rehabilitation and Conservation, Department of Urban Renewal and Economic Development of the City of Rochester, New York, after allegedly attempting to get plaintiff to correct certain violations of law with reference to conditions allegedly existing at properties owned by her at Nos. 77 and 77% Joiner Street, this city, issued two 30-day notices and orders pursuant to section 57.1-5 of Volume II of the Municipal Code of the City of Rochester, covering said alleged violations. In purported compliance with section 57.1-6 of Volume II of the Municipal Code of the City of Rochester, the notice and order in each instance were issued to one Mrs. Ann Plakon, addressed to her at 3544 Dewey Avenue, Rochester, New York, who, the City of Rochester alleges, is the person whose name is on file in the office of the City Treasurer of Rochester, New York, to receive tax bills with reference to No. 77 Joiner Street, Rochester, New York; and all tax bills for said property have been sent to her since 1945 (see affidavit of Isobel M. Powers, City Treasurer). A copy of each notice and order was posted on each of the subject premises and another copy was mailed by certified mail on the same day to said Mrs. Ann Plakon at the address mentioned in said notice and order, she being the person to whom said notice and order in each instance were directed as herein-above noted. Said notice and order in each instance as to each of said properties also states that a hearing concerning the violations could be requested, and notifies and states that if the violations are not removed within 30 days after the service of the order, the Bureau of Buildings will remove or cause the removal of said nuisance and assess the cost to the property owner.

Subsequent to the service of such notices and orders, meetings were held by the city through its representatives, with plaintiff, her husband, and with Mrs. Ann Plakon, on which occasions the matter of the alleged existing violations was gone into; and admittedly in the Spring of 1963 plaintiff and her husband were in conference with representatives of the city on which occasion [101]*101plaintiff’s husband, in the presence of plaintiff, informed said representatives that ‘ ‘ we would make the repairs which he requested us to make.” (Affidavit of Louis Tymehuk.) It is the claim of the defendant city that such violations not having been corrected, requisition orders and specifications were prepared for repairs to be made to each of said properties, and were sent to the purchasing agent. Public bids from private contractors were received for the correction of said violations, and eventually a contract for the making of the required repairs and improvements was awarded to defendants, Jenkins Hart and W. B. Cooper, doing business as United Labor Supply, which contract is now in full force and effect. When defendant contractors attempted to commence work under the terms of said contracts, they were denied admittance to the subject premises by plaintiff and her husband. The above-entitled action for the relief therein set forth was commenced soon thereafter.

It is the contention of the plaintiff that the notice provisions of the ordinance sections 57.1-5 and 57.1-6 are vague, uncertain, indefinite and unreasonable and are, therefore, unconstitutional ; and that if, assuming arguendo, the said sections of the ordinance are held to be constitutional, there has not been compliance therewith in the instant case, and that, therefore, the contracts entered into herein between the city and the other defendants infringe upon plaintiff’s right not to be deprived of property without due process of law, are null and void as to her, and performance thereunder should be enjoined.

On the other hand, it is the position of the defendant, City of Rochester, that the aforesaid sections have been followed by the City of Rochester in this proceeding, and that they are constitutional; that in all events plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law and has failed to demonstrate irreparable harm; and that she should be estopped from seeking equitable relief because she had actual notice of the violations involved.

The Property Rehabilitation and Conservation Code (Municipal Code, City of Rochester, vol. II, ch. 57; Ordinance No. 62-220) has been in effect since September 1, 1962. It appears to have been drafted along lines which broadly parallel the New York Multiple Dwelling Law and the New York Multiple Residence Law; and in section 57-2 thereof, the legislative policy, intent, and purpose of the City of Rochester in enacting it is stated as follows:

“ § 57-2. Policy of city and purpose of chapter. There exists in the City of Rochester residential, non-residential, commercial, industrial buildings, structures or vacant areas and combina[102]*102tions thereof which are slum or blighted or which are becoming slum or blighted because of substandard, insanitary, deteriorated or deteriorating conditions, factors and characteristics. Their existence is injurious to the public safety, health and welfare of the people, which includes the spiritual values as well as physical, aesthetic and monetary values, and constitutes a nuisance.

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Bluebook (online)
43 Misc. 2d 98, 250 N.Y.S.2d 202, 1964 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1792, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tymchuk-v-city-of-rochester-nysupct-1964.