Tyler Joseph Barefield v. Dexter Payne, Director, Arkansas Division of Correction

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS CENTRAL DIVISION

TYLER JOSEPH BAREFIELD PETITIONER

No. 4:25-cv-664-DPM

DEXTER PAYNE, Director, Arkansas Division of Correction RESPONDENT

ORDER On de novo review, the Court adopts the recommendation as supplemented, Doc. 8, and overrules Barefield’s objections, Doc. 9. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Barefield had a constitutional right to present a defense, but that doesn’t mean that Rules of Evidence didn’t apply to him. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326-27 (2006). The exclusion of the “other suspects” evidence was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Armstrong v. Hobbs, 698 F.3d 1063, 1066-67 (8th Cir. 2012). Barefield’s lawyers’ bait-and-switch opening statement, which was done without consulting Barefield, gives the Court pause. But the Arkansas Supreme Court’s finding that their performance wasn’t deficient isn’t contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the Supreme Court's ineffective-assistance precedent. Defense lawyers have a duty to consult with their client on certain important decisions.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). But they do not have a duty to consult their client on every decision. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004). The must-consult category includes “whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.” Ibid. The decision challenged here—saying in opening statement that Barefield might have fired a gun the night of the murders— wasn’t a concession of guilt. Compare McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414, 422 (2018). It was a strategic choice. Barefield isn’t entitled to habeas relief. Barefield’s petition will be dismissed with prejudice. No certificate of appealability will issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)-(2). So Ordered.

D.P. Marshall Jr. United States District Judge Ilo Suly 202

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