MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Aug 14 2020, 9:06 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Kimberly A. Jackson Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General Samuel J. Dayton Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Tyler Johnson, August 14, 2020 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CR-697 v. Appeal from the Noble Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Michael J. Kramer, Appellee-Plaintiff Judge Trial Court Cause No. 57C01-1809-F6-14
Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-697 | August 14, 2020 Page 1 of 9 Case Summary [1] Tyler Johnson appeals the aggregate two-year sentence imposed by the trial
court after he was terminated from participation in a drug court program
following his guilty plea to four criminal offenses. He contends that the trial
court abused its discretion during sentencing and that his sentence is
inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character. Finding no
abuse of discretion, and further concluding that Johnson has not met his burden
to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] On March 20, 2018, Indiana State Police Trooper Justin Snyder initiated a
traffic stop of a vehicle for committing the traffic offense of following too
closely. Trooper Snyder observed that the driver, Johnson, had bloodshot eyes
and poor manual dexterity. Trooper Snyder believed that Johnson was
intoxicated. Johnson admitted to having marijuana in the vehicle, and when
Trooper Snyder conducted a search of the vehicle, he located marijuana in a
grinder in the center console. Trooper Snyder also discovered a plastic bag
containing cocaine on Johnson’s person. Approximately two hours after the
traffic stop, Johnson tested positive for both cannabinoid and cocaine.
[3] The State subsequently charged Johnson with level 6 felony possession of
cocaine, class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, class C misdemeanor
operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite
in the body, and class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. On October
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-697 | August 14, 2020 Page 2 of 9 10, 2018, Johnson pled guilty to all four charges. In addition to accepting his
plea agreement, the trial court also accepted Johnson’s agreement to participate
in the Noble County Problem-Solving Court (the Drug Court). Johnson
specifically agreed to abide by the conditions of the Drug Court program. The
trial court ordered that sentencing was continued “pending participation in
Drug Court.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 48.
[4] Thereafter, multiple times in 2018, 2019, and 2020, following hearings, the
Drug Court found that Johnson had violated the terms of his participation
agreement. The violations included failing to attend required support group
meetings, operating a vehicle without a license, testing positive for marijuana,
possessing contraband, and violating a no-contact order. On February 19,
2020, the Noble County Probation Department filed a report recommending
that Johnson be terminated from participation in the Drug Court program. The
Drug Court terminated Johnson from participation in the program that same
day.
[5] Accordingly, on March 9, 2020, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The
trial court sentenced Johnson to two years for possession of cocaine, 180 days
for possession of marijuana, sixty days for operating a vehicle with a schedule I
or II controlled substance or its metabolite in the body, and sixty days for
possession of paraphernalia, all to be served concurrently. This appeal ensued.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-697 | August 14, 2020 Page 3 of 9 Section 1 – The trial court did not abuse its discretion during sentencing. [6] Johnson first asserts that the trial court abused its discretion during sentencing.
Specifically, he challenges the trial court’s treatment of aggravating and
mitigating factors. Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the
trial court, and as long as a sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to
review only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490
(Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218. An abuse of discretion occurs
where the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts
and circumstances before it, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions
to be drawn therefrom. Sloan v. State, 16 N.E.3d 1018, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014). When reviewing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances identified
by the trial court in its sentencing statement, we will remand only if “the record
does not support the reasons, or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are
clearly supported by the record, and advanced for consideration, or the reasons
given are improper as a matter of law.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490-91.
[7] During sentencing, the trial court found as an aggravating factor that Johnson
lacked “the desire to comply with any of the terms” of the Drug Court program.
Tr. Vol. 2 at 192. Johnson suggests that this finding is unsupported by the
record and constitutes an abuse of discretion. Johnson concedes that he indeed
violated the rules of the Drug Court program multiple times, but he opines that
his “only significant rule[-]breaking occurred near the end of his Drug Court
Participation,” and the trial court should have found that he complied with the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-697 | August 14, 2020 Page 4 of 9 rules “most” of the time. Appellant’s Br. at 12. It is neither Johnson’s
prerogative nor ours to dictate the significance attached by the trial court to one
type of rule-breaking over another. The record unquestionably supports the
trial court’s finding that Johnson’s multiple violations demonstrated a lack of
desire to comply with the terms of the Drug Court program, and Johnson’s
argument to the contrary is a nonstarter. We find no abuse of discretion in this
regard.
[8] Johnson next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
identify his guilty plea as a mitigating factor. A defendant who alleges that the
trial court failed to identify a mitigating factor has the burden to establish that
the proffered factor is both significant and “clearly supported by the record.”
Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. We will not remand for reconsideration of
alleged mitigating factors that have debatable nature, weight, and significance.
Newsome v. State, 797 N.E.2d 293, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied (2004).
It is well settled that a guilty plea “is not necessarily a mitigating factor where
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MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Aug 14 2020, 9:06 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Kimberly A. Jackson Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General Samuel J. Dayton Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Tyler Johnson, August 14, 2020 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CR-697 v. Appeal from the Noble Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Michael J. Kramer, Appellee-Plaintiff Judge Trial Court Cause No. 57C01-1809-F6-14
Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-697 | August 14, 2020 Page 1 of 9 Case Summary [1] Tyler Johnson appeals the aggregate two-year sentence imposed by the trial
court after he was terminated from participation in a drug court program
following his guilty plea to four criminal offenses. He contends that the trial
court abused its discretion during sentencing and that his sentence is
inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character. Finding no
abuse of discretion, and further concluding that Johnson has not met his burden
to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] On March 20, 2018, Indiana State Police Trooper Justin Snyder initiated a
traffic stop of a vehicle for committing the traffic offense of following too
closely. Trooper Snyder observed that the driver, Johnson, had bloodshot eyes
and poor manual dexterity. Trooper Snyder believed that Johnson was
intoxicated. Johnson admitted to having marijuana in the vehicle, and when
Trooper Snyder conducted a search of the vehicle, he located marijuana in a
grinder in the center console. Trooper Snyder also discovered a plastic bag
containing cocaine on Johnson’s person. Approximately two hours after the
traffic stop, Johnson tested positive for both cannabinoid and cocaine.
[3] The State subsequently charged Johnson with level 6 felony possession of
cocaine, class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, class C misdemeanor
operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite
in the body, and class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. On October
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-697 | August 14, 2020 Page 2 of 9 10, 2018, Johnson pled guilty to all four charges. In addition to accepting his
plea agreement, the trial court also accepted Johnson’s agreement to participate
in the Noble County Problem-Solving Court (the Drug Court). Johnson
specifically agreed to abide by the conditions of the Drug Court program. The
trial court ordered that sentencing was continued “pending participation in
Drug Court.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 48.
[4] Thereafter, multiple times in 2018, 2019, and 2020, following hearings, the
Drug Court found that Johnson had violated the terms of his participation
agreement. The violations included failing to attend required support group
meetings, operating a vehicle without a license, testing positive for marijuana,
possessing contraband, and violating a no-contact order. On February 19,
2020, the Noble County Probation Department filed a report recommending
that Johnson be terminated from participation in the Drug Court program. The
Drug Court terminated Johnson from participation in the program that same
day.
[5] Accordingly, on March 9, 2020, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The
trial court sentenced Johnson to two years for possession of cocaine, 180 days
for possession of marijuana, sixty days for operating a vehicle with a schedule I
or II controlled substance or its metabolite in the body, and sixty days for
possession of paraphernalia, all to be served concurrently. This appeal ensued.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-697 | August 14, 2020 Page 3 of 9 Section 1 – The trial court did not abuse its discretion during sentencing. [6] Johnson first asserts that the trial court abused its discretion during sentencing.
Specifically, he challenges the trial court’s treatment of aggravating and
mitigating factors. Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the
trial court, and as long as a sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to
review only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490
(Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218. An abuse of discretion occurs
where the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts
and circumstances before it, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions
to be drawn therefrom. Sloan v. State, 16 N.E.3d 1018, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014). When reviewing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances identified
by the trial court in its sentencing statement, we will remand only if “the record
does not support the reasons, or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are
clearly supported by the record, and advanced for consideration, or the reasons
given are improper as a matter of law.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490-91.
[7] During sentencing, the trial court found as an aggravating factor that Johnson
lacked “the desire to comply with any of the terms” of the Drug Court program.
Tr. Vol. 2 at 192. Johnson suggests that this finding is unsupported by the
record and constitutes an abuse of discretion. Johnson concedes that he indeed
violated the rules of the Drug Court program multiple times, but he opines that
his “only significant rule[-]breaking occurred near the end of his Drug Court
Participation,” and the trial court should have found that he complied with the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-697 | August 14, 2020 Page 4 of 9 rules “most” of the time. Appellant’s Br. at 12. It is neither Johnson’s
prerogative nor ours to dictate the significance attached by the trial court to one
type of rule-breaking over another. The record unquestionably supports the
trial court’s finding that Johnson’s multiple violations demonstrated a lack of
desire to comply with the terms of the Drug Court program, and Johnson’s
argument to the contrary is a nonstarter. We find no abuse of discretion in this
regard.
[8] Johnson next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
identify his guilty plea as a mitigating factor. A defendant who alleges that the
trial court failed to identify a mitigating factor has the burden to establish that
the proffered factor is both significant and “clearly supported by the record.”
Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. We will not remand for reconsideration of
alleged mitigating factors that have debatable nature, weight, and significance.
Newsome v. State, 797 N.E.2d 293, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied (2004).
It is well settled that a guilty plea “is not necessarily a mitigating factor where
the defendant receives a substantial benefit from the plea or where evidence
against the defendant is so strong that the decision to plead guilty is merely
pragmatic.” Amalfitano v. State, 956 N.E.2d 208, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans.
denied (2012).
[9] Here, the evidence against Johnson was overwhelming, and, in pleading guilty
to his crimes, Johnson received the substantial benefit of being able to
participate in the Drug Court program rather than being incarcerated.
Johnson’s decision to plead guilty was merely pragmatic, and his multiple
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-697 | August 14, 2020 Page 5 of 9 violations of the Drug Court program rules clearly overshadow any initial
acceptance of responsibility demonstrated by his guilty plea. The trial court did
not abuse its discretion in not finding his guilty plea to be a significant
mitigating factor, and Johnson has failed to establish that the trial court abused
its discretion.
Section 2 – Johnson has not met his burden to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate. [10] Johnson requests that we reduce his sentence pursuant to Indiana Appellate
Rule 7(B), which provides that we may revise a sentence authorized by statute
if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, we find that the sentence
“is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender.” The defendant bears the burden to persuade this Court that his or her
sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).
Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate
sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court’s judgment “should
receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind.
2008). The principal role of appellate review is to attempt to “leaven the
outliers.” Id. at 1225. Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end
of the day turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of
the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other facts that come to light
in a given case.” Id. at 1224. “The question under Appellate Rule 7(B) is not
whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether
the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” Fonner v. State, 876 N.E.2d 340, 344
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-697 | August 14, 2020 Page 6 of 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Appellate review “should focus on the forest—the
aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number
of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Cardwell, 895
N.E.2d at 1225.
[11] Regarding the nature of the offense, the advisory sentence is the starting point
that the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime
committed. Fuller v. State, 9 N.E.3d 653, 657 (Ind. 2014). Johnson was
convicted of one level 6 felony, one class B misdemeanor, and two class C
misdemeanors. The sentencing range for a level 6 felony is between “six (6)
months and two and one-half (2½) years, with the advisory sentence being one
(1) year.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b). A person who commits a class B
misdemeanor “shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of not more than one
hundred eighty (180) days[.]” Ind. Code § 35-50-3-3. A person who commits a
class C misdemeanor “shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of not more than
sixty (60) days[.]” Ind. Code § 35-50-3-4. The trial court here imposed a two-
year aggregate sentence, which was well below the maximum allowable
sentence for all four crimes.
[12] When reviewing the nature of the offense, this Court considers “the details and
circumstances of the commission of the offense.” Washington v. State, 940
N.E.2d 1220, 1222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Johnson simply states
that his offenses were “unremarkable,” but he makes no argument as to why he
feels that the less-than-maximum sentence imposed here was still “unduly
harsh.” Appellant’s Br. at 15. The record establishes that Johnson dangerously Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-697 | August 14, 2020 Page 7 of 9 operated a vehicle with both cannabinoid and cocaine in his system, and he was
found in possession of numerous items of contraband. The details and
circumstances of Johnson’s offenses do not persuade us that a sentence
reduction is warranted.
[13] Turning to Johnson’s character, we note that the character of the offender is
found in what we learn of his life and conduct. Croy v. State, 953 N.E.2d 660,
664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Included in that assessment is a review of an
offender’s criminal history. Garcia v. State, 47 N.E.3d 1249, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App.
2015), trans. denied (2016). Johnson notes that he only has one prior
misdemeanor conviction for carrying a handgun without a license. He further
emphasizes that he has generally maintained steady employment and helped
take care of his family. We do not discount any of these things. Nevertheless,
Johnson’s recent behavior in the Drug Court program does not reflect favorably
on his character. As noted by the State, Johnson violated the rules of that
program seven times in just sixteen months. The trial court gave Johnson the
opportunity for rehabilitation outside a jail cell, and Johnson essentially
thumbed his nose at the trial court’s leniency. Johnson has not convinced us
that his aggregate sentence is inappropriate in light of his character.
[14] In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion during sentencing, and
Johnson has not met his burden to demonstrate that his sentence is
inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses or his character.
Accordingly, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-697 | August 14, 2020 Page 8 of 9 [15] Affirmed.
Robb, J., and Brown, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-697 | August 14, 2020 Page 9 of 9