TXI Operations, LP v. McKinney, Texas City of

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Texas
DecidedDecember 9, 2021
Docket4:20-cv-00353
StatusUnknown

This text of TXI Operations, LP v. McKinney, Texas City of (TXI Operations, LP v. McKinney, Texas City of) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
TXI Operations, LP v. McKinney, Texas City of, (E.D. Tex. 2021).

Opinion

United States District Court EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SHERMAN DIVISION TXI OPERATIONS, LP, § Plaintiff, § § v. § § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:20-CV-00353 CITY OF MCKINNEY, TEXAS, § JUDGE MAZZANT Defendant. § § TXI OPERATIONS, LP, §§ Plaintiff, §§ §§ v. §§ C IVIL ACTION. 4:20-CV-609 §§ JUCDIVGIEL MAACZTZIOANN TN O . 4:20-CV-00353-ALM CITY OF MCKINNEY, TEXAS, and the §§ BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT FOR THE §§ CITY OF MCKINNEY, TEXAS §§ Defendants. §§ §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff TXI Operations, LP’s Motion for Leave to File Consolidated Amended Complaint (Dkt. #42). Having considered the motion and the relevant pleadings, the Court finds that the motion should be GRANTED. BACKGROUND This case is a consolidation of two previously filed lawsuits. On April 27, 2020, Plaintiff TXI Operations, LP (“TXI”) filed the first lawsuit against the City of McKinney, Texas challenging the City’s rezoning and enforcement actions against TXI’s concrete plant (Dkt. #1) (Case No. 4:20-cv-353). On August 7, 2020, TXI filed the second lawsuit against the City of McKinney, Texas and the Board of Adjustment of the City of McKinney (collectively the “City”) challenging the City’s actions taken in connection with amortizing TXI’s purported non- conforming use of its plant (Dkt. #1) (Case No. 4:20-cv-609). Thereafter, the parties filed an Agreed Motion to Consolidate, and the two cases were consolidated on November 10, 2020 (Dkt. #10). On January 13, 2021, a Consolidated Scheduling Order was entered pursuant to the parties’ request (Dkt. #35). In April 2021, the parties requested, and the Court granted, a stay of the case to allow for settlement negotiations between the parties (Dkt. #37). After settlement discussions were

unsuccessful, the Court lifted the stay and entered a new, amended Scheduling Order (the “Scheduling Order”) to govern the consolidated lawsuit moving forward (Dkt. #41). The Scheduling Order established a November 5, 2021 deadline for TXI to file any amended pleadings (Dkt. #41). On November 5, 2021, TXI filed the present motion (Dkt. #42). On November 19, 2021, the City filed a response (Dkt. #44). On November 26, 2021, TXI filed a reply (Dkt. #45). LEGAL STANDARD “When a trial court imposes a scheduling order, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15 and 16 operate together to govern the amendment of pleadings.” Tex. Indigenous Council v. Simpkins,

544 F. App’x. 418, 420 (5th Cir. 2013). Rule 15(a) governs a party’s request to amend its pleading before a scheduling order’s deadline to amend passes. See id. Rule 16(b)(4) governs a party’s request to amend its pleading after the deadline to amend passes. Sapp v. Mem’l Hermann Healthcare Sys., 406 F. App’x. 866, 868 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing S&W Enters., L.L.C. v. SouthTrust Bank of Ala., NA, 315 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003)). Rule 15(a) provides that a party may amend its pleading once without seeking leave of court or the consent of the adverse party at any time before a responsive pleading is served. After a responsive pleading is served, “a party may amend only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Id. Rule 15(a) instructs the court to “freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. The rule “‘evinces a bias in favor of granting leave to amend.’” Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp., L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 994 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Lyn–Lea Travel Corp. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 283 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 2002)). But leave to amend “is not automatic.” Matagorda Ventures, Inc. v. Travelers Lloyds Ins. Co., 203 F. Supp. 2d 704, 718 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (citing Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir. 1981)). Whether to grant leave to

amend “lies within the sound discretion of the district court.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 952 F.2d 841, 845–46 (5th Cir. 1992). A district court reviewing a motion to amend pleadings under Rule 15(a) considers five factors: (1) undue delay; (2) bad faith or dilatory motive; (3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments; (4) undue prejudice to the opposing party; and (5) futility of amendment. Smith v. EMC, 393 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). Rule 16(b)(4) provides that a scheduling order issued by the Court “may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” See Agredano v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 5:15-CV- 1067-DAE, 2017 WL 5203046, at *1 (W.D. Tex. July 26, 2017) (citing E.E.O.C. v. Serv. Temps

Inc., 679 F.3d 323, 333–34 (5th Cir. 2012)) (stating, “a party seeking leave to amend its pleadings after a deadline has passed must demonstrate good cause for needing an extension.”). “The good cause standard requires the ‘party seeking relief to show that the deadlines cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party needing the extension.’” S&W Enters., L.L.C., 315 F.3d at 535 (quoting 6A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1522.1 (2d ed. 1990)). In determining whether good cause exists, courts consider a four-part test: “(1) the explanation for the failure to [timely move for leave to amend]; (2) the importance of the [amendment]; (3) potential prejudice in allowing the [amendment]; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice.” Id. (quoting Reliance Ins. Co. v. La. Land & Expl. Co., 110 F.3d 253, 257 (5th Cir. 1997)). Only after the movant demonstrates good cause under Rule 16(b)(4) does “the more liberal standard of Rule 15(a)” apply to a party’s request for leave to amend. Id. ANALYSIS TXI seeks to leave to file a consolidated amended complaint (Dkt. #42). TXI states the

amended complaint will combine the allegations and causes of action from the two lawsuits into one governing complaint (Dkt. #42 at pp. 1–2). Additionally, TXI alleges that the consolidated amended complaint “will allow TXI to address additional facts that have developed since TXI filed its two lawsuits” (Dkt. #42 at p. 2). In particular, TXI seeks to add an additional cause of action based on a new, “backup” property that TXI purchased in January of 2021 in response to the City’s enforcement actions (Dkt. 43 at p. 16). The new property is purportedly subject to a non- annexation development agreement between the City and the prior owner of the property that TXI alleges is void and unenforceable (Dkt. #43 at p. 17). The City does not oppose the amendment as it relates to TXI’s consolidation of the two

lawsuits into one governing complaint (Dkt. #44 at p. 2). However, the City opposes the inclusion of the additional facts relating to the new property and the development agreement—and thus objects to paragraphs 4.51–4.5.8, 5.6.3, 5.9.1, section 7(i), and Exhibit X of the consolidated amended complaint (Dkt. #44 at p. 2).

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Related

Lyn-Lea Travel Corp. v. American Airlines, Inc.
283 F.3d 282 (Fifth Circuit, 2002)
Smith v. EMC Corporation
393 F.3d 590 (Fifth Circuit, 2004)
Jones v. Robinson Property Group, L.P.
427 F.3d 987 (Fifth Circuit, 2005)
Foman v. Davis
371 U.S. 178 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Matagorda Ventures, Inc. v. Travelers Lloyds Insurance
203 F. Supp. 2d 704 (S.D. Texas, 2001)
Little v. Liquid Air Corp.
952 F.2d 841 (Fifth Circuit, 1992)

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TXI Operations, LP v. McKinney, Texas City of, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/txi-operations-lp-v-mckinney-texas-city-of-txed-2021.