BAKES, Chief Judge.
Defendant appellants Douglas D. Willis and Willis Egg Farm, Inc. (Willis), appeal from the trial court’s judgment on remand awarding the plaintiff respondent Leanne Turner (Turner) attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e).
In May of 1984, defendant Douglas D. Willis, driving a Willis Egg Farm truck, rear-ended plaintiff Leanne Turner’s automobile while she was stopped at a red light. Plaintiff was hospitalized for treatment of injuries to her neck and body. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendants, Willis and his employer, Willis Egg Farm, Inc. The defendants answered, denying liability by claiming contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff. At the commencement of trial the defendants admitted liability and defended the claim solely on the basis that the plaintiff’s damages were not as severe as plaintiff claimed. The trial on the damages issue took five days. The plaintiff’s evidence at trial disclosed injuries to the neck and back. The plaintiff had complaints of ongoing muscular pain, limitation of movement, headaches, sleeplessness and depression. Both the plaintiff and the defendants presented expert medical testimony concerning the nature and extent and degree of plaintiff’s injuries. Plaintiff submitted a substantial amount of claims for medical expense, none of which were contested except a portion of a $7,700 claim for chiropractic treatment. The trial resulted in a jury verdict of $91,-500 in favor of the plaintiff.
After the conclusion of the trial, the trial court awarded costs to the plaintiff, and further awarded attorney fees in the sum of $30,500 against the defendants. The trial court recognized in its memorandum opinion that “there was a genuine issue concerning the amount of damages for the type of injury sustained by the plaintiff.” However, the trial court concluded that under the decision of the Court of Appeals in Sigdestad v. Kent Cyrus Gold, 106 Idaho [1024]*1024693, 682 P.2d 646 (Ct.App.1984), the defendants should pay attorney fees because, while “the defendants admitted at trial that they were liable for the plaintiff’s injuries, [they] never offered to pay any medical costs prior to trial. The acts of the defendants prior to trial show a lack of good faith negotiations to settle the case and following the Court of Appeals in Sigdestad the plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees in prosecuting this case.” The trial court held that the failure to enter into good faith settlement negotiations was “unreasonable” within the meaning of Rule 54(e)(1).
On appeal, this Court reversed the award of attorney fees. Turner v. Willis, 116 Idaho 682, 778 P.2d 804 (1989) {Turner I). While the Court’s opinion criticized the defendants’ failure to admit liability at an earlier stage of the proceedings, and to make advances on plaintiff’s medical bills, we nevertheless reversed the award of attorney fees based upon this Court’s decision in Ross v. Coleman, 114 Idaho 817, 836, 761 P.2d 1169, 1188 (1988), wherein this Court held that, “There is no authority in a trial court to insist upon, oversee, or second guess settlement negotiations, if any, and certainly no authority to impose sanctions for ‘bad faith’ bargaining. Payne v. Foley, supra, 102 Idaho [760] at 763, 639 P.2d [1126] at 1129 [ (1982) ] (Bistline, J., specially concurring).”
On remand the trial court again awarded attorney fees to plaintiff Turner under Rule 54(e)(1). The trial court gave as its two reasons (1) that the defendants again refused to settle in advance of trial the plaintiff’s medical bills which the trial court observed were undisputed “except for certain minor chiropractic bills,” and (2) because the defendants had denied liability and asserted the affirmative defense of comparative negligence up to the beginning of the trial without any factual foundation for that defense. In the course of explaining its second award of $30,499 in attorney fees, the trial court acknowledged that the five-day trial was the result of the contested issue of damages, not liability, and that “the case proceeded through a jury trial and required trial skills in proving the damages from a soft tissue injury.” The court further stated, in justifying the contingency basis in awarding attorney fees, that “the case was undesirable from the standpoint that plaintiff’s counsel bore the risk of an unfavorable jury verdict or a verdict in an amount less than which counsel could have earned performing services on an hourly basis.”
The issue we must address, then, is whether or not attorney fees may be awarded under I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) when there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact to be submitted to a jury, but one (or perhaps both) of the parties assert legal or factual issues which have no support in the law or the facts. Stated another way, will the insertion of a factual or legal issue, which has no foundation in the evidence or in the legal jurisprudence of this state, authorize a trial court to award attorney fees against a party submitting such an unsupported legal or factual claim in a case which does contain a legitimate triable issue of fact or law? If the answer to this first question is “yes,” i.e., if the injection of a foundationless issue will justify the award of attorney fees in a case which involves other legitimate triable issues, then the second question which we must answer is what standard should the trial court apply in determining when to award fees in a case which has both frivolous and meritorious issues. For example, must the frivolous issue or issues preponderate over the legitimate issues either in number or time expended before fees are awarded? The final question is whether the award of attorney fees should be apportioned and based only on the work related to the frivolous issue or issues, or whether the award of fees should be based upon all of the legal work performed, even that part related to the legitimate issues in the case.
In this case, the trial court adopted the rule that, because the defendants asserted the affirmative defense of contributory negligence up to the time of trial, even though there was no factual support for that defense, the trial court was authorized to award attorney fees under Rule 54(e)(1) for the entire amount of the trial, even [1025]*1025though the record demonstrates that most of the trial proceedings involved the issue of damages, which was a legitimate trial issue.1
This Court has addressed this issue on two prior occasions. First, in Payne v. Foley, 102 Idaho 760, 639 P.2d 1126 (1982), we reversed the award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e) in a case where liability issues were raised but not “seriously contested,” but there were legitimate issues as to the extent of damages. In that case we stated:
Insofar as the record indicates, the trial court’s finding of an unreasonable defense by Sampson appears to be predicated on its finding that liability on Sampson’s part was not “seriously contested.” Nevertheless the record indicates that the amount of damages sustained by Martha and Lawrence Payne was clearly at issue as was the apportionment of liability and fault between Sampson and Foley____
...
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
BAKES, Chief Judge.
Defendant appellants Douglas D. Willis and Willis Egg Farm, Inc. (Willis), appeal from the trial court’s judgment on remand awarding the plaintiff respondent Leanne Turner (Turner) attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e).
In May of 1984, defendant Douglas D. Willis, driving a Willis Egg Farm truck, rear-ended plaintiff Leanne Turner’s automobile while she was stopped at a red light. Plaintiff was hospitalized for treatment of injuries to her neck and body. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendants, Willis and his employer, Willis Egg Farm, Inc. The defendants answered, denying liability by claiming contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff. At the commencement of trial the defendants admitted liability and defended the claim solely on the basis that the plaintiff’s damages were not as severe as plaintiff claimed. The trial on the damages issue took five days. The plaintiff’s evidence at trial disclosed injuries to the neck and back. The plaintiff had complaints of ongoing muscular pain, limitation of movement, headaches, sleeplessness and depression. Both the plaintiff and the defendants presented expert medical testimony concerning the nature and extent and degree of plaintiff’s injuries. Plaintiff submitted a substantial amount of claims for medical expense, none of which were contested except a portion of a $7,700 claim for chiropractic treatment. The trial resulted in a jury verdict of $91,-500 in favor of the plaintiff.
After the conclusion of the trial, the trial court awarded costs to the plaintiff, and further awarded attorney fees in the sum of $30,500 against the defendants. The trial court recognized in its memorandum opinion that “there was a genuine issue concerning the amount of damages for the type of injury sustained by the plaintiff.” However, the trial court concluded that under the decision of the Court of Appeals in Sigdestad v. Kent Cyrus Gold, 106 Idaho [1024]*1024693, 682 P.2d 646 (Ct.App.1984), the defendants should pay attorney fees because, while “the defendants admitted at trial that they were liable for the plaintiff’s injuries, [they] never offered to pay any medical costs prior to trial. The acts of the defendants prior to trial show a lack of good faith negotiations to settle the case and following the Court of Appeals in Sigdestad the plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees in prosecuting this case.” The trial court held that the failure to enter into good faith settlement negotiations was “unreasonable” within the meaning of Rule 54(e)(1).
On appeal, this Court reversed the award of attorney fees. Turner v. Willis, 116 Idaho 682, 778 P.2d 804 (1989) {Turner I). While the Court’s opinion criticized the defendants’ failure to admit liability at an earlier stage of the proceedings, and to make advances on plaintiff’s medical bills, we nevertheless reversed the award of attorney fees based upon this Court’s decision in Ross v. Coleman, 114 Idaho 817, 836, 761 P.2d 1169, 1188 (1988), wherein this Court held that, “There is no authority in a trial court to insist upon, oversee, or second guess settlement negotiations, if any, and certainly no authority to impose sanctions for ‘bad faith’ bargaining. Payne v. Foley, supra, 102 Idaho [760] at 763, 639 P.2d [1126] at 1129 [ (1982) ] (Bistline, J., specially concurring).”
On remand the trial court again awarded attorney fees to plaintiff Turner under Rule 54(e)(1). The trial court gave as its two reasons (1) that the defendants again refused to settle in advance of trial the plaintiff’s medical bills which the trial court observed were undisputed “except for certain minor chiropractic bills,” and (2) because the defendants had denied liability and asserted the affirmative defense of comparative negligence up to the beginning of the trial without any factual foundation for that defense. In the course of explaining its second award of $30,499 in attorney fees, the trial court acknowledged that the five-day trial was the result of the contested issue of damages, not liability, and that “the case proceeded through a jury trial and required trial skills in proving the damages from a soft tissue injury.” The court further stated, in justifying the contingency basis in awarding attorney fees, that “the case was undesirable from the standpoint that plaintiff’s counsel bore the risk of an unfavorable jury verdict or a verdict in an amount less than which counsel could have earned performing services on an hourly basis.”
The issue we must address, then, is whether or not attorney fees may be awarded under I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) when there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact to be submitted to a jury, but one (or perhaps both) of the parties assert legal or factual issues which have no support in the law or the facts. Stated another way, will the insertion of a factual or legal issue, which has no foundation in the evidence or in the legal jurisprudence of this state, authorize a trial court to award attorney fees against a party submitting such an unsupported legal or factual claim in a case which does contain a legitimate triable issue of fact or law? If the answer to this first question is “yes,” i.e., if the injection of a foundationless issue will justify the award of attorney fees in a case which involves other legitimate triable issues, then the second question which we must answer is what standard should the trial court apply in determining when to award fees in a case which has both frivolous and meritorious issues. For example, must the frivolous issue or issues preponderate over the legitimate issues either in number or time expended before fees are awarded? The final question is whether the award of attorney fees should be apportioned and based only on the work related to the frivolous issue or issues, or whether the award of fees should be based upon all of the legal work performed, even that part related to the legitimate issues in the case.
In this case, the trial court adopted the rule that, because the defendants asserted the affirmative defense of contributory negligence up to the time of trial, even though there was no factual support for that defense, the trial court was authorized to award attorney fees under Rule 54(e)(1) for the entire amount of the trial, even [1025]*1025though the record demonstrates that most of the trial proceedings involved the issue of damages, which was a legitimate trial issue.1
This Court has addressed this issue on two prior occasions. First, in Payne v. Foley, 102 Idaho 760, 639 P.2d 1126 (1982), we reversed the award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e) in a case where liability issues were raised but not “seriously contested,” but there were legitimate issues as to the extent of damages. In that case we stated:
Insofar as the record indicates, the trial court’s finding of an unreasonable defense by Sampson appears to be predicated on its finding that liability on Sampson’s part was not “seriously contested.” Nevertheless the record indicates that the amount of damages sustained by Martha and Lawrence Payne was clearly at issue as was the apportionment of liability and fault between Sampson and Foley____
... We conclude that Sampson’s defense of the action was not unreasonable, frivolous or without a good faith foundation and the trial court’s finding of such was erroneous.
102 Idaho at 762, 639 P.2d at 1128.
Most recently the Court again addressed this issue in Magic Valley Radiology Associates, P.A. v. Professional Business Services, Inc., 119 Idaho 558, 808 P.2d 1303 (1990). In that case the trial court, in a case involving claims and counterclaims, concluded that Magic Valley Radiology Associates was the overall prevailing party, and “that PBS defended the issues of reconstruction costs and punitive damages unreasonably and without foundation.” The trial court then awarded what it determined to be reasonable attorney fees apportioned “to those issues upon which MVRA prevailed.” On appeal this Court reversed, holding that “[t]he total defense of a party’s proceedings must be unreasonable or frivolous” before an award of attorney fees was justified under I.C. § 12-121 and Rule 54(e)(1). We reversed the trial court’s award of apportioned attorney fees, stating that “it is not appropriate to segregate those claims and defenses to determine which were or were not frivolously defended or pursued.” 119 Idaho at 563, 808 P.2d at 1308.
In this case the trial court, in both its initial opinion and its opinion on remand, recognized that there was a legitimate triable issue over the amount of damages caused by plaintiff’s “soft tissue injury,” and “that plaintiff’s counsel bore the risk of an unfavorable jury verdict,” suggesting that the final result was legitimately debatable. Therefore, the “total defense” of this case was not unreasonable or frivolous, and, accordingly, pursuant to our holding in Magic Valley Radiology, the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1).
Costs to appellants. No attorney fees on appeal.
JOHNSON, BOYLE and McDEVITT, JJ., concur.