Turner v. Splunk Inc

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedMarch 30, 2021
Docket3:20-cv-04941
StatusUnknown

This text of Turner v. Splunk Inc (Turner v. Splunk Inc) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Turner v. Splunk Inc, (N.D. Cal. 2021).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 TERRANCE TURNER, Case No. 20-cv-04941-JSC

8 Plaintiff, DISMISSAL ORDER v. 9 Re: Dkt. No. 26 10 SPLUNK INC., Defendant. 11

12 13 Plaintiff Terrance Turner, proceeding without an attorney, filed this civil action alleging a 14 multi-billion dollar fraud involving the government and Defendant Splunk Inc. Splunk moved 15 to dismiss Mr. Tuner’s complaint for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject matter 16 jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 24.) After Mr. Turner failed to respond to the motion to dismiss, the Court 17 issued an Order to Show Cause requiring him to do so and to show cause in writing as to why the 18 action should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.1 (Dkt. No. 26.) Mr. Turner failed to 19 respond to the Court’s Order and has not otherwise communicated with the Court. The Court thus 20 DISMISSES this action for failure to prosecute. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 41(b). 21 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), the court may dismiss an action for 22 failure to prosecute or to comply with a court order. See Hells Canyon Preservation Council v. 23 U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that a court may sua sponte 24 dismiss an action pursuant to Rule 41(b)). “A Rule 41(b) dismissal must be supported by a 25 showing of unreasonable delay.” Omstead v. Dell, Inc., 594 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2010) 26 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a Rule 41(b) dismissal is 27 1 appropriate, the court must weigh the following factors: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious 2 resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the 3 defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits and (5) the 4 availability of less drastic sanctions.” Id. (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 5 (9th Cir.1986)). Dismissal is appropriate “where at least four factors support dismissal . . . or 6 where at least three factors strongly support dismissal.” Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 7 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 8 Here, four of the five Henderson factors weigh in favor of dismissal. “The first two 9 factors—the public interest in expeditious resolution of litigation and the Court’s need to manage 10 its docket—relate to the “efficient administration of judicial business for the benefit of all litigants 11 with cases pending.” Nealey v. Transportacion Maritima Mexicana, S.A., 662 F.2d 1275, 1279 12 (9th Cir. 1980). By failing to respond to the Court’s Order and failing to respond to the motion to 13 dismiss Mr. Turner has delayed adjudication of this action. Non-compliance with procedural rules 14 and the Court’s orders wastes “valuable time that [the Court] could have devoted to other ... 15 criminal and civil cases on its docket.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 16 As for the third factor, while “the pendency of the lawsuit is not sufficiently prejudicial 17 itself to warrant dismissal,” the delay caused by Mr. Turner’s failure to prosecute this action 18 despite the Court’s order weighs in favor of dismissal. Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 19 983, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). 20 The fourth factor is the availability of less drastic sanctions. The Court already cautioned 21 Mr. Turner that failure to respond would result in dismissal of this action. (Dkt. No. 26.) Thus, 22 the Court has fulfilled its “obligation to warn the plaintiff that dismissal is imminent.” Oliva v. 23 Sullivan, 958 F.2d 272, 274 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Ferdick, 963 F.2d at 1262 (“A district court’s 24 warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in dismissal can satisfy the 25 ‘consideration of [less drastic sanctions] requirement.”). The fourth factor thus weighs in favor of 26 dismissal. 27 The last factor, which favors disposition on the merits, by definition weighs against 1 disposition of cases on the merits. Thus, this factor weighs against dismissal.”’). 2 In sum, four of the five relevant factors weigh strongly in favor of dismissing this action in 3 its entirety. See Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 643 (affirming dismissal where three factors favored 4 || dismissal, while two factors weighed against dismissal). The Court therefore DISMISSES this 5 action without prejudice. 6 The Clerk is directed to close the action. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 Dated: March 30, 2021 Sot 10 me ACQUELINE SCOTT CORL I United States Magistrate Judge 12

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Bluebook (online)
Turner v. Splunk Inc, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/turner-v-splunk-inc-cand-2021.