Turner v. Jung CA6

Opinion

Filed 8/31/26 Turner v. Jung CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

CARMELITA TURNER, H053605 (Monterey County

Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 25DV000150)

v.

BUMSIK JUNG,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appellant Bumsik Jung challenges a domestic violence restraining order issued against him. Jung argues that the trial court abused its discretion by issuing the order and that he did not consent to a court commissioner acting as a temporary judge. For the reasons stated here, we will affirm the order.

I. BACKGROUND

Carmelita Turner requested a domestic violence restraining order against her sonin -law Jung, seeking protection for herself, her daughter (Jung’s wife), and her three grandsons (Jung’s stepsons). The parties all lived together in Turner’s home. According to Turner, Jung had a temper and would argue with her daughter and grandsons. He slammed doors and once threatened her daughter and grandsons with a knife. Turner asserted that Jung was unhappy that she owned the home rather than her daughter. Jung had asked Turner to move out of her home in 2021 and sought his own domestic violence restraining orders against her, her daughter, and her three grandsons. The trial court

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denied Jung’s request as to Turner, but did issue temporary orders requiring her daughter and grandsons to leave the residence.

Turner ultimately served Jung with an eviction notice, which angered him. He wrote to Turner stating he was being abused by his wife and stepsons and he did not want Turner to “make matters worse.” Turner then filed the request at issue here, stating that she feared for her life and the safety of her daughter and grandsons. She requested a protective order, a no-contact order, a stay-away order, and an order to move out, plus a batterer intervention program for Jung and reimbursement for hotel expenses stemming from the alleged abuse. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order against Jung pending an evidentiary hearing. According to the minute order from a show cause hearing on the temporary orders, neither party objected to the matter being heard by a commissioner sitting as a judge pro tempore.

The trial court consolidated the parties’ six related restraining order matters involving Turner and her family for a single evidentiary hearing. In connection with the evidentiary hearing, Jung filed three declarations incorporating 71 exhibits. The exhibits included multiple videos of Jung interacting with Turner or her daughter, Jung’s medical records, diary entries by Turner’s youngest grandson, and text messages between Jung and Turner. Jung argued the video evidence and medical documents demonstrated that he was the victim of physical and emotional abuse from Turner’s daughter and grandsons. Jung further stated, “I still have 50 more videos that I haven’t submitted yet. And I also have 300 more documents to prove it.” He also alleged based on one of his exhibits that Turner intentionally hid court documents from him by evicting him from her home and then purporting to serve the documents using that address as his home address.

After hearing the parties’ evidence, the trial court issued the requested three-year restraining order against Jung and denied Jung’s requests for orders against Turner and her family. According to the settled statement submitted by Jung, the trial court did not mark or consider the 71 exhibits he had submitted but it did view the video evidence.

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The trial court clarified in its certification that Turner testified she was afraid of Jung because she did not know what would upset him. He had demanded that she move out of her own home, glared at her, slammed doors, and once became upset because she laughed at a comment he made. Turner testified that Jung’s outbursts had been getting progressively worse and she felt she had to stay at a hotel when she filed her request. Jung testified that Turner had committed a crime by seeking to evict him from her home, mocked him, would not let him call the police, and “ganged up” on him with her daughter and grandsons. Although the court issued Turner’s requested injunctive orders, it denied her hotel reimbursement claim and declined to order Jung to complete a batterer intervention program. The minute order from the evidentiary hearing again stated that there was no objection made at the hearing to the commissioner hearing the case as a judge pro tempore.

II. DISCUSSION

A. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE ORDERS The Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.) allows a domestic violence restraining order to be issued when the affidavit or testimony of the applicant shows to the satisfaction of the court reasonable proof of past acts of abuse. (Fam. Code, § 6300.) Acts that destroy mental or emotional calm will support the issuance of a domestic violence restraining order. (Rodriguez v. Menjivar (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 816, 820.) We review the grant of a domestic violence restraining order for abuse of discretion and examine the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence. (Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1, 12 (Curcio).) In doing so, we accept as true all evidence supporting the trial court’s findings and do not determine credibility or reweigh the evidence. (Ibid.)

Representing himself on appeal as he did in the trial court, Jung argues that the trial court’s findings are not supported by the evidence and misidentify him as an aggressor rather than a victim. As a preliminary matter, we note that the California Rules

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of Court require every brief to support each point by argument and, if possible, citation of authority. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) In addition, every brief must support references to matters in the record by citation to the volume and page number of the record. (Id., rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) Arguments may be considered forfeited if they do not comply with those rules, which apply with equal force to self-represented litigants. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246–1247.) Jung’s briefing does not support his various arguments and assertions with any citations to authority or to the record. Although not required to do so given Jung’s unsupported arguments, we have reviewed the record and, as we will explain, we are not persuaded by his arguments.

The trial court heard testimony from both Turner and Jung at the evidentiary hearing. According to the court’s augmentation in its certification of the settled statement, Turner testified that she was afraid of Jung due to his outbursts. Jung argues the trial court ignored and discounted his “extensive evidentiary record” while accepting Turner’s reliance “largely on her subjective feelings and narrative descriptions.” He complains Turner “did not submit comparable physical evidence such as video recordings, photographs, or medical records to corroborate her claims.” The minute order from the evidentiary hearing does not state whether the court admitted or excluded Jung’s exhibits. In his settled statement, Jung stated the trial court did not mark or consider his exhibits and “effectively exclud[ed]” his case, while simultaneously acknowledging the trial court viewed his video evidence. Jung has not provided this court with a record which would permit a detailed review of those evidentiary rulings. We must therefore presume the unreported testimony would confirm the absence of error. (In re Marriage of Obrecht (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1, 8–9.)

Importantly, on appeal we may not reweigh the evidence or reject the trial court’s findings merely because Jung submitted a greater amount of documentary evidence. (Curcio, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 12.) Jung asserts that the video evidence was “so clear and so disturbing that any neutral observer would recognize him as a victim rather

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than a perpetrator.” We have reviewed the video evidence consisting of brief portions of recorded conversations between Jung and Turner and between Jung and his wife, and we conclude it does not show error. Jung argues that Turner pursued the domestic violence restraining order to create an advantage for her daughter in pending dissolution proceedings. But so long as there is substantial evidence to support the orders, Turner’s motivation to seek them is immaterial. Although Jung argues that the trial court failed to protect him as the true victim of domestic violence by denying his restraining order requests against Turner and her family, Jung did not appeal those rulings and they are not now before us.

Finally, we note that in his reply brief, Jung argues for the first time that he was unable to timely and properly respond to the restraining order request because Turner did not properly serve him with court documents. He notes an exhibit he filed in the trial court stating that Turner intentionally hid court papers by serving them at Jung’s home address—at the time the same address as Turner’s home—and then hiding the mail from him. Issues first raised in a reply are forfeited. (Tellez v. Rich Voss Trucking, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1066.) Even if we were to reach the issue, it is clear from the record that Jung attended and was heard during the proceedings. He accordingly forfeited any issue as to notice of the hearing in the trial court and on appeal. (Arambula v. Union Carbide Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 333, 342–343.) His contention that the trial court “actively assisted in concealing [Turner’s] mail theft and concealment” is not supported by the record he has provided.

B. NEITHER PARTY OBJECTED TO THE COMMISSIONER SERVING AS A TEMPORARY JUDGE Litigants may agree to have their matter heard by a temporary judge either by stipulating on the record or by affirmatively participating in the proceeding without objecting to the temporary judge before the proceeding is completed. (Elena S. v. Kroutik (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 570, 575 (Elena S.).) According to the minute orders from the

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show cause and evidentiary hearings, both Turner and Jung participated in this proceeding to its completion, and neither objected to the commissioner hearing the case as a judge pro tempore.

Jung argues he did not understand and was not properly advised in writing or through the court interpreter that a commissioner, rather than an elected or appointed judge, would hear and decide his case or that he could object to the commissioner. The commissioner was required only to inform the parties of her status at the start of the proceedings. (In re Marriage of Djulus (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1042, 1051.) Based on the relevant minute orders and in the absence of a reporter’s transcript or settled statement addressing the point, we must presume the parties were so advised. Nor does the record reveal an inadequacy in or any objections to the interpretation provided to Jung on the subject. (Elena S., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 576; People v. Aranda (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 230, 237.) Jung has not met his burden to show error. (Elena S., at p. 574.)

III. DISPOSITION

The domestic violence restraining order against Jung is affirmed. In the interest of justice, each party shall bear their own appellate costs.

____________________________________

Grover, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________

Lie, J.

____________________________

Wilson, J.

H053605 Turner v. Jung