Turner v. City of Atlanta

Supreme Court of Georgia

Turner v. City of Atlanta

357 S.E.2d 802, 257 Ga. 306, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 832

CourtSupreme Court of Georgia

DecidedJuly 16, 1987

Docket44233

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 357 S.E.2d 802 (Turner v. City of Atlanta) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Turner v. City of Atlanta, 357 S.E.2d 802, 257 Ga. 306, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 832 (Ga. 1987).

Pincite

Opinions

Weltner, Justice.

Turner’s commercial property was rezoned to office-institutional use by the city’s adoption of a comprehensive development plan. The actual use of the property as a motel remained unchanged. Turner attempted to have the zoning changed back to a commercial classification. He claimed that the city’s failure to provide personal notice of a proposed change in zoning was violative of its own procedures and violative of due process as well. He also attacked the constitutionality of the ordinance on the ground that, by rendering his property unmarketable, it took his property without just and adequate compensation. The city denied his rezoning request and the trial court affirmed the denial, finding the ordinance constitutional.

1. The trial court found that the city complied with its notice procedure relative to the adoption of the comprehensive zoning ordinance, and that the procedure was constitutionally sufficient. We agree. The city was not required under the applicable ordinance to give personal notice for a comprehensive zoning plan. The constitutional claim is controlled by Willingham v. White, 229 Ga. 75 (189 SE2d 442) (1972) and Wilson v. City of Snellville, 256 Ga. 734, 735 (352 SE2d 759) (1987).

2. The trial court concluded that Turner did not show that he would suffer a significant detriment under the standards set forth in Gradous v. Bd. of Commrs., 256 Ga. 469, 470 (349 SE2d 707) (1986). This, too, we affirm. “The findings indicated no detriment to appellant except for the fact that the property would be more valuable if rezoned.” Gradous, 256 Ga. at 472. “It is not sufficient to show that a more profitable use could be made of the property.” Aver a v. City of Brunswick, 242 Ga. 73, 75 (247 SE2d 868) (1978). Furthermore, the present zoning comports with the comprehensive development plan. [307]*307See Moore v. Maloney, 253 Ga. 504, 506 (2) (321 SE2d 335) (1984).

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Gregory, J., who concurs in the judgment only, and Smith and Bell, JJ., who dissent.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Weltner, Justice.

Turner’s commercial property was rezoned to office-institutional use by the city’s adoption of a comprehensive development plan. The actual use of the property as a motel remained unchanged. Turner attempted to have the zoning changed back to a commercial classification. He claimed that the city’s failure to provide personal notice of a proposed change in zoning was violative of its own procedures and violative of due process as well. He also attacked the constitutionality of the ordinance on the ground that, by rendering his property unmarketable, it took his property without just and adequate compensation. The city denied his rezoning request and the trial court affirmed the denial, finding the ordinance constitutional.

1. The trial court found that the city complied with its notice procedure relative to the adoption of the comprehensive zoning ordinance, and that the procedure was constitutionally sufficient. We agree. The city was not required under the applicable ordinance to give personal notice for a comprehensive zoning plan. The constitutional claim is controlled by Willingham v. White, 229 Ga. 75 (189 SE2d 442) (1972) and Wilson v. City of Snellville, 256 Ga. 734, 735 (352 SE2d 759) (1987).

2. The trial court concluded that Turner did not show that he would suffer a significant detriment under the standards set forth in Gradous v. Bd. of Commrs., 256 Ga. 469, 470 (349 SE2d 707) (1986). This, too, we affirm. “The findings indicated no detriment to appellant except for the fact that the property would be more valuable if rezoned.” Gradous, 256 Ga. at 472. “It is not sufficient to show that a more profitable use could be made of the property.” Aver a v. City of Brunswick, 242 Ga. 73, 75 (247 SE2d 868) (1978). Furthermore, the present zoning comports with the comprehensive development plan. [307]*307See Moore v. Maloney, 253 Ga. 504, 506 (2) (321 SE2d 335) (1984).

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Gregory, J., who concurs in the judgment only, and Smith and Bell, JJ., who dissent.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

357 S.E.2d 802, 257 Ga. 306, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 832, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/turner-v-city-of-atlanta-ga-1987.

Opinions

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack