Turnbow v. Keller

Oregon Supreme Court

Turnbow v. Keller

19 P.2d 1089, 12 P.2d 558, 142 Or. 200, 1933 Ore. LEXIS 213

CourtOregon Supreme Court

DecidedFebruary 9, 1933

StatusPublished

Cited by13 cases

This text of 19 P.2d 1089 (Turnbow v. Keller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Turnbow v. Keller, 19 P.2d 1089, 12 P.2d 558, 142 Or. 200, 1933 Ore. LEXIS 213 (Or. 1933).

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Opinions

BEAN, C. J.

Bespondents move to dismiss the appeal in this canse for the reason that the transcript was not filed within thirty days after the undertaking on appeal was approved and the appeal was abandoned; and also that the appellants have elected to perform part of the decree prior to the appeal.

An undertaking was filed April 25, 1932. The respondents, under the provisions of section 7-503, subdivision 2, had five days within which to except to the sufficiency of the sureties. Subdivision 4 of that section provides that from the expiration of the time allowed to except to the sureties in the undertaking the appeal shall be deemed perfected. Five days from April 25, 1932, the appeal became perfected, or on May 1, 1932.

Section 7-507 provides that upon the appeal being perfected the appellant shall, within thirty days thereafter, file the transcript with the clerk of the appellate court. The transcript was filed in this case on May 31, which was within the thirty days allowed by law.

Counsel for appellants call attention to the fact that according to the computation of respondents the thirty days would end on May 30, 1932, which was a holiday. Therefore the transcript could be filed on May 31, 1932. The transcript was filed within the statutory period of thirty days.

The respondents show that an interlocutory decree was entered giving the defendants ninety days in which to pay the plaintiffs the amount due on a contract for a deed, claiming that the appellants paid $50 within *202 the ninety days “to apply on the judgment under said interlocutory decree”. This is contradicted by the appellants. According to the statement of respondents payment was made before the final decree was entered. There could be no acquiescence in the decree until the same was rendered and entered.

Lida M. O’Bryon, of Portland (G. Evert Baker, of Portland, on the brief), for appellants. Louis E. Schmitt, of Portland (C. W. Noyes, of Tigard, on the brief), for respondents.

The motion to dismiss the appeal is not maintainable on either ground mentioned.

Motion denied.

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BEAN, C. J.

Bespondents move to dismiss the appeal in this canse for the reason that the transcript was not filed within thirty days after the undertaking on appeal was approved and the appeal was abandoned; and also that the appellants have elected to perform part of the decree prior to the appeal.

An undertaking was filed April 25, 1932. The respondents, under the provisions of section 7-503, subdivision 2, had five days within which to except to the sufficiency of the sureties. Subdivision 4 of that section provides that from the expiration of the time allowed to except to the sureties in the undertaking the appeal shall be deemed perfected. Five days from April 25, 1932, the appeal became perfected, or on May 1, 1932.

Section 7-507 provides that upon the appeal being perfected the appellant shall, within thirty days thereafter, file the transcript with the clerk of the appellate court. The transcript was filed in this case on May 31, which was within the thirty days allowed by law.

Counsel for appellants call attention to the fact that according to the computation of respondents the thirty days would end on May 30, 1932, which was a holiday. Therefore the transcript could be filed on May 31, 1932. The transcript was filed within the statutory period of thirty days.

The respondents show that an interlocutory decree was entered giving the defendants ninety days in which to pay the plaintiffs the amount due on a contract for a deed, claiming that the appellants paid $50 within *202 the ninety days “to apply on the judgment under said interlocutory decree”. This is contradicted by the appellants. According to the statement of respondents payment was made before the final decree was entered. There could be no acquiescence in the decree until the same was rendered and entered.

Lida M. O’Bryon, of Portland (G. Evert Baker, of Portland, on the brief), for appellants. Louis E. Schmitt, of Portland (C. W. Noyes, of Tigard, on the brief), for respondents.

The motion to dismiss the appeal is not maintainable on either ground mentioned.

Motion denied.

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Bluebook (online)

19 P.2d 1089, 12 P.2d 558, 142 Or. 200, 1933 Ore. LEXIS 213, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/turnbow-v-keller-or-1933.

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