Turnbow-Avery v. Postmaster General

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedMay 14, 2024
Docket1:23-cv-00571
StatusUnknown

This text of Turnbow-Avery v. Postmaster General (Turnbow-Avery v. Postmaster General) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Turnbow-Avery v. Postmaster General, (S.D. Ohio 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION

CAROLYN TURNBOW-AVERY, Case No. 1:23-cv-571 Plaintiff, Litkovitz, M.J.

vs.

LOUIS DEJOY, POSTMASTER ORDER GENERAL, Defendant.

Pro se plaintiff brings this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. On March 28, 2024, the Court conducted an informal discovery conference with the parties via telephone. Following that conference, the Court issued an Order (Doc. 37), which directed plaintiff to file a motion to compel. (Doc. 38). Defendant filed a response (Doc. 42), and plaintiff filed a reply in support of her motion (Doc. 49), as supplemented (Doc. 50). I. Background Plaintiff alleges that she was harassed on the basis of her sex, race, and color by her United States Postal Service (USPS) supervisor Jennifer Goddard. (Doc. 1 at PAGEID 4). Plaintiff reported this harassment to Managers of Distribution Operation at her facility, including Bakari Hicks, to no avail. (Id. at PAGEID 5). The situation came to a head in November 2021, when there was an altercation between plaintiff and Ms. Goddard over Ms. Goddard’s treatment of plaintiff’s daughter—also a USPS employee. (Id.). After the altercation, plaintiff was first given an emergency placement and later terminated. (Id. at PAGEID 6). Plaintiff alleges that Barry Goddard, a nonsupervisory USPS employee, engaged in more egregious behavior than plaintiff’s but was not disciplined. (Id. at PAGEID 8). Plaintiff brings claims of employment discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliatory discharge. (Id. at PAGEID 9-10). Plaintiff’s motion to compel pertains to her request for production of documents numbered 1, 2, 6, 7, 12, 18, and 19. Numbers 1 and 2 seek “discipline file/records” for Ms.

Goddard and Mr. Hicks. (Doc. 42-1 at PAGEID 227). Number 19 seeks the “discipline file/records” for Mr. Goddard. (Id. at PAGEID 235). Numbers 6 and 7 seek “EEO file/records” for Ms. Goddard and Mr. Hicks. (Id. at PAGEID 230). Number 12 requests “turnstile records from October 2021 to Present date (November 30, 2023)[.]” (Id. at PAGEID 232). Number 18 requests “Alana Robinson Assignment Orders Forms.” (Id. at PAGEID 234). II. Standard of review Rule 37 provides that “[a] party seeking discovery may move for an order compelling an answer, designation, production, or inspection” if a party fails to provide discovery responses. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3). “The proponent of a motion to compel discovery bears the initial burden of proving that the information sought is relevant.” Hunter v. Shield, No. 2:18-cv-1097,

2020 WL 6484055, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 4, 2020) (quoting Gruenbaum v. Werner Enters., Inc., 270 F.R.D. 298, 302 (S.D. Ohio 2010)). Upon this showing, “the burden shifts to the non- movant to show that to produce the information would be unduly burdensome.” Id. (quoting Prado v. Thomas, No. 3:16-cv-306, 2017 WL 5151377, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 19, 2017)). Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The Court must balance the need of a party to access the information necessary to establish its claim or defense with protection against “fishing expeditions.” In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litig., 845 F.3d 231, 236 (6th Cir. 2016); Surles ex rel. Johnson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 474 F.3d 288, 305 (6th Cir. 2007). The scope of discovery under the Federal Rules “is traditionally quite broad[,]” Lewis v. ACB Bus. Serv., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir. 1998), and Rule 26 acknowledges that “[i]nformation within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be

discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “The scope of discovery is . . . within the broad discretion of the trial court. . . .” Bush v. Dictaphone Corp., 161 F.3d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lewis, 135 F.3d at 402). III. Resolution A. Numbers 1, 2, 6, 7, and 19 Plaintiff argues that the discipline and EEO file/records for Ms. Goddard and Mr. Hicks are necessary to “prove a pattern of misconduct, a pattern of discrimination, character and credibility” and that “[s]imilar retaliatory or discriminatory conduct is evidence of pattern of inappropriate conduct engaged in by defendant.” (Doc. 38 at PAGEID 176-78). Plaintiff argues that the discipline file/records for Mr. Goddard are relevant to the determination of whether a

similarly situated employee outside of plaintiff’s protected group was treated more leniently for similar or more egregious conduct. In response, defendant acknowledges that such production is not “off-limits” but requests that plaintiff’s requests be narrowed “to disciplinary records that relate to Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s employment, or the issues raised in Plaintiff’s complaint (i.e., race, color, or sex-based discrimination, harassment, or retaliation under Title VII). . . .” (Doc. 42 at PAGEID 204, 206). In her reply memorandum, plaintiff argues that she believes the discipline file/records of Ms. Goddard and Mr. Hicks will demonstrate multiple instances in which they provided inconsistent or contradictory statements. Plaintiff also limits her request with respect to Mr. Goddard to between November 15, 2021 and his resignation in 2023. Plaintiff is entitled to the discipline and EEO file/records of Ms. Goddard and Mr. Hicks related to plaintiff, plaintiff’s employment, or the issues raised in plaintiff’s complaint (i.e., race,

color, or sex-based discrimination, harassment, or retaliation under Title VII). See Kaczmarek v. Res-Care, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-1959, 2014 WL 3408576, at *2 (N.D. Ohio July 10, 2014) (finding that a request for all disciplinary records was “too broad” because it covered “trivial” discipline and conduct “different” from the conduct at issue); Segarra v. Potter, No. CIV-02-1413, 2004 WL 3426438, at *7 (D. N.M. Apr. 5, 2004) (“[EEO] [c]omplaints based on other types of discrimination are neither relevant nor calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in this action.”). Defendant need only produce discipline and EEO file/records for Ms. Goddard and Mr. Hicks from the two years preceding and two years following plaintiff’s termination on December 15, 2021. See Goree v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 14-cv-2505, 2015 WL 11120732, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 5, 2015) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Autozone, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d

822, 831 (W.D. Tenn. 2003)) (“Courts typically will permit discovery in employment discrimination cases to cover a reasonable number of years before and after the alleged discrimination.”); Moore v. Abbott Lab’ys, No. 2:05-cv-1065, 2007 WL 4171627, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 20, 2007) (“[T]he most relevant evidence concerning employment decisions is evidence of other decisions made by the same or similar decision-makers concerning similarly- situated job applicants . . .

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