Turka v. South Carolina Public Service Authority

CourtDistrict Court, D. South Carolina
DecidedFebruary 25, 2020
Docket2:19-cv-01102
StatusUnknown

This text of Turka v. South Carolina Public Service Authority (Turka v. South Carolina Public Service Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Turka v. South Carolina Public Service Authority, (D.S.C. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DIVISION Murray C. Turka, on behalf of himself ) and all others similarly situated, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) Civil Action No.: 2:19-1102-RMG ) Vv. ) ) ORDER AND OPINION South Carolina Public Service Authority ) and Lonnie N. Carter, ) ) Defendants. ) ao) Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. (Dkt. No. 13.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied. I. Background This is a securities fraud putative class action arising out of the abandoned construction of two 1,117-megawat AP1000 nuclear reactors at the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Generating Station in Jenkinsville, South Carolina (the “Nuclear Project”).! The Nuclear Project was a joint venture between state-owned utility, South Carolina Public Service Authority (“Santee Cooper”), owning 45%, and SCANA Corporation’s (““SCANA”) primary subsidiary, SCE&G, owning 55%. They agreed to the joint venture in 2008 and applied for a tax credit under the Energy Policy Act, which would provide an approximately $2.2 billion credit if the Nuclear Project were completed by January 1, 2021. (Dkt. No. 1 €§ 3, 4.)

' The facts described are as alleged in the complaint and taken in a light most favorable to the non-movant.

To fund the Nuclear Project, Santee Cooper marketed and sold small denomination corporate bonds (the “Mini-Bonds”) exclusively to its electricity customers and other South Carolina residents. Santee Cooper and SCANA began construction of the Nuclear Project in early 2013. On July 31, 2017, they publicly announced that they were abandoning construction due to cost. Approximately one year later, Moody’s Investment Services downgraded Santee Cooper’s credit rating. (/d. §§ 1, 8, 9.) Plaintiff Murray Turka brings this action on behalf of those that purchased or acquired the Mini-Bonds between May 1, 2014 and July 31, 2017. (/d. § 98, Dkt. No. 21 at 6.) He brings two causes of action: violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and of Rule 10b-5 by Santee Cooper and Lonnie Carter, its President and Chief Executive Officer during the class period; and violation of Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act by Carter. (Dkt. No. 1 §§ 17, 104-114.) The basis of these claims is that Santee Cooper and Carter made or approved false or misleading statements to the Mini-Bond holders in Official Statements. (/d. § 106.) Specifically, the Mini-Bond holders purchased the security pursuant to the offering documents’ Official Statements, which outlined generic “Risk Factors” typically associated with nuclear plant construction and development. (/d. {§ 94-97.) The Official Statements, issued on May 1 of 2014, 2015 and 2016, provided: Nuclear Construction — Risk Factors. The construction of large generating plants such as Summer Nuclear Units 2 and 3 involves significant financial risk. Delays or cost overruns may be incurred as a result of risks such as (a) inconsistent quality of equipment, materials and labor, (b) work stoppages, (c) regulatory matters, (d) unforeseen engineering problems, (e) unanticipated increases in the cost of materials and labor, (f) performance by engineering, procurement, or construction contractors, and (g) increases in the cost of debt. Moreover, no nuclear plants have been constructed in the United States using advanced designs

such as the Westinghouse AP1000 reactor. Therefore, estimating the cost of construction of any new nuclear plant is inherently uncertain. To mitigate risk, SCE&G, acting for itself and as agent for the Authority, provides project oversight for Summer Nuclear Units 2 and 3 through its New Nuclear Deployment (‘““NND”) business unit. The Authority provides dedicated on-site personnel to monitor and assist NND with the daily oversight of the project. The managerial framework of the NND group is comprised of in-house nuclear industry veterans who lead various internal departments with expertise in: nuclear Operations, engineering, construction, maintenance, quality assurance and nuclear regulations. (id. § 95.) But, as Plaintiff alleges, at the time that Santee Cooper issued these Official Statements, it knew that the “significant financial risk” was no longer a hypothetical because the Nuclear Project was already behind construction schedule as a result of mismanagement. (/d. §] 95-96.) To substantiate that allegation—that Santee Cooper and Carter knew that the Official Statements contained material misrepresentations—Plaintiff points to Santee Cooper’s internal communications and its communications with SCANA, obtained pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. These communications also serve as Plaintiff's examples of material information that Santee Cooper omitted from the Official Statements. For instance, in 2013— prior to when Plaintiff purchased his Mini-Bond in 2014—Carter communicated with Kevin Marsh, the President of SCE&G and later CEO of SCANA, that chronically delayed deliveries had already become a “major source of concern and risk for this project for a long time.” (/d. 22.) Carter expressed that this inability to meet contractual commitments already, in 2013, “places the project’s future in danger.” (/d.) By September 2013, the repeated “unsuccessful attempts to resolve its manufacturing problem” already indicated “unrecoverable stress on the milestone schedule approved by the SC Public Service Commission.” (/d. { 23.) Similarly, in

2014, Carter and Marsh memorialized the contractors’ pattern of “poor performance” in a letter to Nuclear Project designer Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, highlighting that the repeated delays had an “effect on the expected completion date and cost of the project.” (ld. q 24.) These acknowledgements that the Nuclear Project was missing operations deadlines continued into the class period, after Plaintiff purchased his own Mini-Bond. For instance, in October 2015, the Bechtel Corporation—an engineering, construction and project management company that was commissioned to assess the Nuclear Project’s progress—presented its finding to Santee Cooper and SCANA’s executive committee that there were “significant issues” threatening the project’s “successful completion.” (/d. ¥ 43.) As a result, Betchel Corporation determined that Unit 2 of the Nuclear Project would not be in operation until “18-26 months beyond the current June 2019 commercial operation date” and Unit 3 would not be completed until “24-32 months beyond the current June 2020 commercial operation date.” (/d. 4 45.) Later, in March 2016, Santee Cooper stated in a memorandum that in “2015, only 3.7% direct craft progress (0.31% per month) was earned toward completion of the combined units. With 81% of the work to go, the monthly construction progress must increase to around 2.5% if contract dates are to be achieved. Failure to realize a significant and sustained increase on this metric over the next six months will invariably result in more project delay.” Ud. § 63.) Also in March 2016, a Santee Cooper memorandum estimated an “approximately $35 million” in costs per month of delay, noting that it has “significant impact upon the Owners.” (/d. J 61.) On the basis of these and other communications, Plaintiff alleges that Santee Cooper and Carter were aware that the Official Statements mischaracterized the Nuclear Project’s profile and, therefore, were aware that they were marketing and selling a security that carried a different

risk than what the Mini-Bond holders were lead to understand from the offering documents. As a result, Plaintiff alleges, the Mini-Bond holders were injured by receiving artificially deflated interest payments on the security. (/d. § 108-109.) Il. Legal Standards A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6) Rule 12(b)(6) of the

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Bluebook (online)
Turka v. South Carolina Public Service Authority, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/turka-v-south-carolina-public-service-authority-scd-2020.