Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 19, 2026 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court DANIA PATRICIA TURCIOS- ORTIZ; M.D.Z.T, a minor,
Petitioners,
v. No. 25-9536 (Petition for Review) TODD BLANCHE, United States Attorney General, *
Respondent. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT ** _________________________________
Before McHUGH, CARSON, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Petitioners Dania Turcios-Ortiz and her minor son M.D.Z.T, both
citizens and natives of Honduras, entered the United States unlawfully in
* On April 2, 2026, Todd Blanche became Attorney General of the
United States. Consequently, he has been substituted for Pamela J. Bondi as Respondent per Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).
** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 2
March 2021. 1 A year later, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
initiated removal proceedings against them under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Ms. Turcios-Ortiz conceded removability but applied for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against
Torture (CAT). On May 3, 2024, an immigration judge (IJ) denied all relief.
In an oral ruling, the IJ determined Ms. Turcios-Ortiz was statutorily
ineligible for withholding of removal under the serious nonpolitical crime
bar in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii), and not entitled to relief under CAT
because she failed to show likelihood of torture if removed to Honduras, 8
C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed
Ms. Turcios-Ortiz’s appeal, and she now seeks review in this court.
Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), we deny the petition for
review.
1 M.D.Z.T is a derivative beneficiary on Ms. Turcios-Ortiz’s applications, meaning his eligibility for relief turns on her application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.21(a). On November 21, 2022, M.D.Z.T also filed his own application. RIII.74–87. Because the son’s claims here are based on Ms. Turcios-Ortiz’s claims, we use “Ms. Turcios-Ortiz” in our discussion to refer to both petitioners.
2 Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 3
I
A2
On October 25, 2016, Ms. Turcios-Ortiz and Marlon Abel Zuniga
(Marlon), her then-partner and the father of her three children, attended a
late-night vigil at a local church. Marlon went home to retrieve a coat, and
while there, a neighbor shot him over a supposed land dispute. Ms. Turcios-
Ortiz learned about the shooting within minutes and rushed home to find
Marlon laying in the front yard. Assisted by neighbors, she took Marlon to
a hospital four hours away. Marlon’s father reported the shooting to the
police, but nobody was ever arrested for the crime.
Marlon sustained serious injuries from the shooting. He required
bedrest for about six months after his release from the hospital. During this
period, Marlon began to abuse cocaine and “rock or crack.” RI.116–17, 307.
He became addicted to drugs and worked very little. Ms. Turcios-Ortiz
started working at a restaurant to support the family.
2 We take the facts from the BIA order on review and, because that
order was issued by a single member of the BIA and its factual recitation is sparse, from the underlying IJ decision, Ms. Turcios-Ortiz’s credible testimony, see RI.60 (the IJ finding the respondent credible), and uncontroverted parts of the administrative record. No party disputes the historical facts recited here.
3 Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 4
Initially, Ms. Turcios-Ortiz did not understand how Marlon was
paying for his drugs. Then, in July 2019, gang members approached her at
the restaurant where she worked. Ms. Turcios-Ortiz did not know the gang
members, but they addressed her by name and informed her Marlon had
been obtaining drugs from the gang on credit. 3 The gang members told Ms.
Turcios-Ortiz that Marlon owed a large debt to the gang, and she needed to
repay it. They refused to accept cash payment for Marlon’s debt; instead,
they told Ms. Turcios-Ortiz she had to deliver drugs for the gang. The gang
members threatened to hurt her children if she refused. Marlon also
pressured Ms. Turcios-Ortiz to comply with the gang’s demand.
In August 2019, Ms. Turcios-Ortiz began delivering drugs for the
gang. She made deliveries two to three times per week for at least six
months. The gang members told Ms. Turcios-Ortiz that they would “attack”
her children if she stopped. RI.122. She never received money or any other
payment for making the deliveries.
3 The agency variously refers to the individuals who pressured Ms. Turcios-Ortiz to transport drugs as drug dealers, gang members, and criminals. See RI.4 (BIA decision referring to the individuals as “gang members”); RI.63 (IJ decision referring to the individuals as “drug dealers or gang members” and “criminals”). As we will discuss, Ms. Turcios-Ortiz “never knew” exactly which gang these men were affiliated with nor does the record specify. RI.63.
4 Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 5
At the end of 2020, Marlon abandoned Ms. Turcios-Ortiz and their
children. Ms. Turcios-Ortiz decided this was her opportunity to stop
working for the gang. She told the gang members she would no longer
transport drugs for them because it was “illegal” and “putting [her] life at
risk.” RI.124. And after six months, Ms. Turcios-Ortiz believed she had paid
off Marlon’s debt. The gang members refused to release her and threatened
to hurt her and her family if she did not continue working for them. Ms.
Turcios-Ortiz never reported these threats to the police in Honduras. She
feared the police “conspired with . . . the gangs.” RI.127.
Then, using the COVID-19 pandemic as an excuse, Ms. Turcios-Ortiz
told gang members she needed to take a break from delivering drugs. For
about three months in early 2021, Ms. Turcios-Ortiz remained in her home
and worked at the restaurant, but she did not make any deliveries for the
gang. Ms. Turcios-Ortiz continued to receive threats during this period, but
she was not harmed.
Around this same time, Ms. Turcios-Ortiz made plans to flee
Honduras for the United States. She only had the means to take one child
with her. She brought her youngest son M.D.Z.T, then seven years old,
because he suffered from serious health problems. Ms. Turcios-Ortiz’s other
two children remained in Honduras. Before she left Honduras, Ms. Turcios-
5 Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 6
Ortiz told her family not to let her children leave the house without an adult
for fear they would be harmed.
On March 27, 2021, Ms. Turcios-Ortiz and M.D.Z.T entered the
United States unlawfully. Since then, the gang members have not contacted
her, but family members in Honduras have been targeted at least twice. At
the end of 2022, individuals tried to abduct Ms. Turcios-Ortiz’s eldest son
Anderson. When Ms. Turcios-Ortiz’s father intervened, he was beaten. In
late 2023, Anderson and Ms. Turcios-Ortiz’s sister experienced a hit and
run. A few days later, someone left a note at the home of Ms. Turcios-Ortiz’s
parents stating, “the problems were going to continue” for her family
because she had fled Honduras. RI.134–35. Ms. Turcios-Ortiz believes the
same gang members who she worked for are now targeting her family.
B
On March 16, 2022, Ms. Turcios-Ortiz received a Notice to Appear
charging her with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). She
conceded removability but applied for asylum, id. § 1158, withholding of
removal, id. § 1231(b)(3), and protection under CAT, 8 C.F.R §§ 1208.16(c),
1208.17. About two years later, in April 2024, the IJ held a merits hearing,
6 Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 7
where Ms. Turcios-Ortiz appeared with counsel. Ms. Turcios-Ortiz testified
and submitted evidence. 4
On May 3, 2024, the IJ issued an oral decision denying all relief. 5 The
IJ found Ms. Turcios-Ortiz credible, observing her testimony was “detailed
and consistent.” RI.60. Still, the IJ found none of her claims availing. First,
Ms. Turcios-Ortiz was statutorily ineligible for withholding of removal
under the serious nonpolitical crime bar in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii). Ms.
Turcios-Ortiz testified “she assisted drug dealers in Honduras with
transporting drugs . . . two to three times per week for at least six months”
the IJ said. RI.62. This conduct “would clearly be considered drug
trafficking,” the IJ found, and “drug trafficking is a serious nonpolitical
crime.” RI.63. Under these circumstances, the IJ concluded Ms. Turcios-
Ortiz’s “own testimony is sufficient” to warrant application of the statutory
4 As relevant to Ms. Turcios-Ortiz’s CAT claim, she submitted the U.S.
Department of State’s Honduras 2023 Human Rights Report describing country conditions, and the IJ admitted this report as Exhibit 9. As we will discuss, Exhibit 9 is not in the administrative record. Ms. Turcios-Ortiz also submitted additional supporting documentation, including her declaration; a sworn statement from her sister; a proposed expert affidavit on gang violence in Honduras; a proposed expert affidavit on violence against women in Honduras; a photograph of her father after he was beaten at the end of 2022; and multiple reports and articles on country conditions in Honduras.
5 The IJ denied Ms. Turcios-Ortiz’s application for asylum as untimely. Ms. Turcios-Ortiz did not challenge that ruling before the BIA, and she does not raise it here. 7 Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 8
bar in § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii). RI.62. Next, the IJ determined Ms. Turcios-Ortiz
was ineligible for CAT protection. The IJ “accept[ed] that [Ms. Turcios-
Ortiz] is afraid of returning to Honduras[.]” RI.63. And in the IJ’s view, the
U.S. Department of State’s Honduras 2023 Human Rights Report (the
Report) shows “the gang problem in Honduras is serious” and gangs
“commit acts of violence that cause severe pain and suffering.” RI.63.
Relying in part on the Report, however, the IJ found “there is evidence that
[Ms. Turcios-Ortiz] can relocate to another part of the country where she is
not likely to be tortured.” RI.65. The IJ also found that, shortly before
coming to the United States, Ms. Turcios-Ortiz “refused to deliver more
drugs” for the gang for approximately three months, and while “the gangs
threatened her” during this period, she was never harmed. RI.65.
Accordingly, in the IJ’s view, Ms. Turcios-Ortiz failed to establish “she
would more likely than not be tortured by gang members or other private
actors that the government would be unable or unwilling to control if she
returned to Honduras.” RI.63–64; see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (requiring
applicants for CAT relief to “establish that it is more likely than not that he
or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal”).
Ms. Turcios-Ortiz appealed to the BIA. As to her withholding of
removal claim, Ms. Turcios-Ortiz argued the IJ erred in applying the serious
nonpolitical crime bar under § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii) because she was “coerced”
8 Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 9
into drug trafficking by the gangs in order to repay Marlon’s debt. RI.16. As
to her CAT claim, Ms. Turcios-Ortiz insisted she had satisfied her burden
to show likelihood of torture upon return to Honduras, and the IJ’s contrary
determination was not supported by the record. On March 6, 2025, a single
member of the BIA affirmed the IJ’s ruling in a two-page order and
dismissed the appeal. This timely petition for review followed.
II
“Congress has carefully circumscribed judicial review of BIA
decisions.” Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 365 (2021). We review the
BIA’s legal determinations de novo and its findings of fact for substantial
evidence. Xue v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2017). Under the
substantial-evidence standard, the agency’s “findings of fact are conclusive
unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573,
584 (2020) (explaining § 1252(b)(4)(B) refers to the substantial-evidence
standard). Substantial evidence review is “highly deferential.” Nasrallah,
590 U.S. at 583.
Where, as here, a single member of the BIA decides the appeal and
issues a brief order under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(5), we have described some
rules for our appellate review. “[W]e will not affirm on grounds raised in
the IJ decision unless they are relied upon by the BIA in its affirmance.”
9 Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 10
Uanreroro v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir. 2006). But “when
seeking to understand the grounds provided by the BIA, we are not
precluded from consulting the IJ’s more complete explanation of those same
grounds.” Id.; see id. (explaining “[a]s long as the BIA decision contains a
discernible substantive discussion . . . our review extends no further, unless
[the BIA] explicitly incorporates or references an expanded version of the
same reasoning below”). Looking to the IJ’s ruling is particularly
“appropriate where the BIA incorporates by reference the IJ’s rationale or
repeats a condensed version of its reasons while also relying on the IJ’s
more complete discussion.” Id. That is the situation here, where the BIA’s
brief order affirming the IJ’s decision under § 1003.1(e)(5) expressly relies
on and incorporates “the reasons stated by the Immigration Judge[.]” RI.4.
III
Ms. Turcios-Ortiz makes several arguments in her petition for review.
She contends, first, the BIA erred in concluding she is statutorily ineligible
for withholding of removal under the serious nonpolitical crime bar. See 8
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii). She concedes she delivered illegal drugs in
Honduras before entering the United States but argues the statutory bar
should not apply because her conduct was coerced by the gang. Second, she
challenges the BIA’s conclusion that she is ineligible for CAT protection.
Ms. Turcios-Ortiz insists she carried her burden to show that, if removed to
10 Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 11
Honduras, it is more likely than not that she will be tortured. Relatedly,
she argues for the first time on appeal that the IJ failed to use the correct
legal standard when analyzing the evidence supporting her CAT claim. We
consider, and reject, each argument in turn.
IV
A
We begin with Ms. Turcios-Ortiz’s claim that the agency wrongfully
denied her application for withholding of removal under the serious
nonpolitical crime bar in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii). To be eligible for
withholding of removal, an applicant must establish her “life or freedom
would be threatened in [the country of removal] because of [her] race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.” Id. § 1231(b)(3)(A). A person is ineligible for withholding of
removal if, as relevant here, “there are serious reasons to believe that the
alien committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States
before the alien arrived in the United States.” Id. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii). Before
we consider the merits, we must set out the standard of review for an
agency’s decision to deny withholding of removal under the serious
11 Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 12
nonpolitical crime bar in § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii). We have not previously
considered this question.
Ms. Turcios-Ortiz asserts the “[t]he proper standard of review is de
novo.” Op. Br. at 21. She does not meaningfully develop this argument, but
points to cases under the REAL ID Act of 2005 recognizing that “whether
the BIA applied the correct legal standard in making its determination”
that a “crime was indeed particularly serious” is an issue reviewed de novo.
Op. Br. at 21 (quoting Brue v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir.
2006) and citing N-A-M v. Holder, 587 F.3d 1052, 1055 n.2 (10th Cir. 2009)).
The government says our review is for substantial evidence because
“[w]hether an alien has committed a serious nonpolitical crime is a factual
issue.” Resp. Br. at 14 (citing INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483–84
(1992) and Villalobos Sura v. Garland, 8 F.4th 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2021)).
The government is correct.
As the Eighth Circuit has explained, “[t]he evaluation of a serious
nonpolitical crime is conducted on a case-by-case basis considering the facts
and circumstances presented.” Barahona v. Garland, 993 F.3d 1024, 1028
(8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Matter of E-A-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 1, 3 (BIA 2012)).
Determinations under § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii) are primarily factual questions
subject to the substantial evidence standard in § 1252(b)(4)(B). That is the
12 Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 13
consensus among our sister circuits that have addressed the issue. 6 See
Herrera-Elias v. Garland, 96 F.4th 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2024) (“The IJ’s
finding that there are serious reasons to believe [petitioner] committed a
serious nonpolitical crime is a finding of fact we review under the
substantial evidence test.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Villalobos
Sura v. Garland, 8 F.4th 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2021) (same); Morgan v.
Garland, 120 F.4th 913, 921, 923–25 (1st Cir. 2024) (same); Urbina-Mejia
v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 369–70 (6th Cir. 2010) (same); Khouzam v.
6 The Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have applied the substantial evidence standard in this context in unpublished decisions. See Marroquin-Retana v. Attorney General, 675 F. App’x 216, 218–19 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“review[ing] the agency’s decision for substantial evidence” and finding “the Government submitted substantial evidence that [petitioner] had committed attempted manslaughter”); Nguyen v. Holder, 593 F. App’x 246, 246 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“We conclude that substantial evidence supports the finding that ‘there are serious reasons to believe that [petitioner] committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States before [he] arrived in the United States.’” (quoting § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii))); Saldana v. U.S. Attorney General, 431 F. App’x 801, 802–03 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“Substantial record evidence supports the IJ’s and BIA’s finding that [petitioner] was ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal [under § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii)].”). The Fifth Circuit does not appear to have passed on the issue in the withholding of removal context but has relied on the substantial evidence standard when considering the serious nonpolitical crime bar in the asylum context. See Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899, 905 (5th Cir. 2002) (“The finding of the [BIA] that [petitioner] committed a serious nonpolitical crime that barred him from receiving asylum is a finding of fact that we review under the substantial evidence test.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
13 Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 14
Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 165–66 (2d Cir.), as amended (Apr. 12, 2004) (same).
We now take the same approach.
Applying the substantial evidence standard, we discern no error.
Before the IJ, Ms. Turcios-Ortiz testified she transported drugs for gang
members in Honduras two to three times per week for at least six months.
The IJ found “the conduct [Ms. Turcios-Ortiz] testified to would clearly be
considered drug trafficking and that drug trafficking is a serious
nonpolitical crime.” RI.63. The IJ also explained the serious-reasons-to-
believe standard in § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii) “is equivalent to [] probable cause”
and found Ms. Turcios-Ortiz’s “own testimony is sufficient to meet this
standard.” RI.62. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s serious nonpolitical crime bar
determination based on Ms. Turcios-Ortiz’s “own admissions” that she
“knowingly transported drugs for a criminal organization in Honduras.”
RI.4.
The agency’s approach—applying a probable cause standard when
evaluating the phrase “serious reasons to believe” in § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii)—
was in line with agency practice and the views of other circuits that have
interpreted the same statutory language. See Matter of E-A-, 26 I. & N. Dec.
at 3 (“We interpret ‘serious reasons for believing’ to be equivalent to
14 Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 15
probable cause, as have the circuit courts that have considered this
question.”); Go v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We interpret
serious reasons to believe as being tantamount to probable cause.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Morgan, 120 F.4th at 924 n.6 (noting
“all other circuits that have taken up the question” of applying a probable-
cause standard to conduct the “serious reasons to believe” inquiry “have
either confirmed its lawfulness or held that it is a minimum standard under
the statute”). 7
Probable cause “is not a high bar[.]” Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S.
320, 338 (2014). In the criminal context, we have understood probable cause
as “something more than a bare suspicion but less than a preponderance of
the evidence at hand.” United States v. Johnson, 43 F.4th 1100, 1107 (10th
Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). It requires “a substantial
probability that a crime has been committed and that a specific individual
committed the crime.” Wolford v. Lasater, 78 F.3d 484, 489 (10th Cir. 1996).
7 No party takes issue with the agency’s use of the probable-cause standard. Given the parties’ arguments, we do not consider the matter further in this case. The First Circuit took a similar approach in Morgan v. Garland, relying on a “probable-cause standard as a means of effectuating the statutory ‘serious reasons to believe’ directive” but declining “to pass on” the lawfulness of that standard because no party challenged the agency’s application of it. 120 F.4th at 924, 924 n.6. 15 Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 16
Applying the probable-cause standard, it is unsurprising courts have
denied withholding of removal under the serious nonpolitical crime bar if
“the petitioner admitted the alleged crime or there was corroborating
information supporting the alleged crime.” Barahona, 993 F.3d at 1028; see
Go, 640 F.3d at 1052–53 (serious reasons to believe standard satisfied based
on petitioner’s own “admi[ssions] under oath” that he committed the alleged
drug crimes); Khouzam, 361 F.3d at 166 (serious reasons to believe standard
satisfied based on police investigative reports and a warrant indicating
petitioner’s fingerprints were found at the crime scene and he had sustained
injuries that were consistent with the alleged crime); Zheng v. Holder, 698
F.3d 710, 713–14 (8th Cir. 2012) (serious reasons to believe standard
satisfied based on petitioner’s testimony about committing the crime);
Herrera-Elias, 96 F.4th at 1044–45 (serious reasons to believe standard
satisfied based on petitioner’s admission “that he knowingly transported
drugs and guns for the MS-13 gangsters on multiple occasions”); Urbina-
Mejia, 597 F.3d at 369 (serious reasons to believe standard satisfied based
on petitioner’s “own testimony about his actions while a member of the
gang”).
So too here. Ms. Turcios-Ortiz testified she engaged in drug
trafficking in Honduras before she entered the United States. The IJ and
BIA found probable cause was satisfied based on this testimony. We thus
16 Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 17
have no trouble concluding substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
determination that Ms. Turcios-Ortiz is ineligible for withholding of
removal under the serious nonpolitical crime bar.
Ms. Turcios-Ortiz does not meaningfully resist this conclusion.
Instead, she contends the bar should not apply because she engaged in drug
trafficking under duress. The BIA rejected this argument, explaining Ms.
Turcios-Ortiz cites no authority “that suggests that there is a recognized
duress exception to the serious nonpolitical crime bar.” RI.4. In her petition
for review, Ms. Turcios-Ortiz again has offered no authority to support her
position, and as far as we can tell, none exists.
The text of the statute provides no duress exception. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii). On its face, the serious nonpolitical crime bar is
mandatory. Ms. Turcios-Ortiz does not explain how we can endorse her
argument in light of the plain statutory text.
The case law addressing the issue also does not favor Ms. Turcios-
Ortiz’s position. Recently, in Matter of D-G-B-L-, the BIA rejected the
duress argument advanced by Ms. Turcios-Ortiz, though in a related
context. See 29 I. & N. Dec. 392, 396–98 (BIA 2026). There, the BIA
considered whether a duress exception exists to the serious nonpolitical
crime bar to asylum in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii). See id. at 392, 393–98.
17 Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 18
That statute uses nearly identical language to the provision before us,
stating a noncitizen is ineligible for asylum if “there are serious reasons for
believing that the alien has committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside
the United States prior to the arrival of the alien in the United States.” 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii); see generally Morgan, 120 F.4th at 924–26
(applying the same analysis to determine whether an applicant committed
a serious nonpolitical crime barring eligibility for asylum under 8 U.S.C. §
1158(b)(2)(A)(iii) and withholding of removal under id. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii)).
Construing the statute, the BIA held “the serious nonpolitical crime bar to
asylum and withholding of removal does not include a duress exception.”
Matter of D-G-B-L, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 397. The BIA further reasoned, “[t]he
absence of language regarding a voluntariness requirement provides strong
evidence that the serious nonpolitical crime bar should be applied to any
alien who has committed a qualifying crime, regardless of duress.” Id. at
395. The agency’s interpretation of the statute aligns with our own reading
of the plain text, so we find it instructive. See Loper Bright Enters. v.
Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412 (2024).
Finding no support in immigration law, Ms. Turcios-Ortiz draws on
federal criminal law, where duress can be an affirmative defense. She points
to United States v. Jurado-Lopez, 338 F. Supp. 2d 246, 251–52 (D. Mass.
2004), which she says “may be persuasive authority in the ‘serious non-
18 Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 19
political crime’ context.” Op. Br. at 23. There, a district court granted a
downward departure under the United States Sentencing Guidelines
because the crime occurred after life-threatening attacks against the
defendant’s family. Jurado-Lopez, 338 F. Supp. 2d at 248, 254. But Jurado-
Lopez has no application here. Of course, as a general matter, “pending
criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.”
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369 (2010). But Ms. Turcios-Ortiz offers
no persuasive argument to conclude federal criminal law meaningfully
informs the analysis of the serious nonpolitical crime bar. 8
Finally, and in the alternative, Ms. Turcios-Ortiz argues the IJ
“categorically rejected” and “failed to consider” her evidence of duress. Op.
Br. at 27. Ms. Turcios-Ortiz does not meaningfully develop this argument
in her opening brief. See Harsco Corp. v. Renner, 475 F.3d 1179, 1190 (10th
8 Ms. Turcios-Ortiz’s reliance on case law discussing what constitutes
a “particularly serious crime” for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) is not helpful. See Op. Br. at 22, 25 (quoting In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 342 (BIA 2007) and N-A-M, 587 F.3d at 1055). That is a different statutory context, and Ms. Turcios-Ortiz has not explained how it informs the inquiry here, especially since the cases she cites do not even involve duress. Similarly, she seems to suggest duress is relevant to the application of other statutory bars. But she fails to develop this argument or explain how it applies to withholding of removal under the serious nonpolitical crime bar in § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii). See United States v. Munoz, 812 F.3d 809, 821 n.12 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding appellant waived his argument “by failing to develop” it).
19 Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 20
Cir. 2007) (“[A] party waives those arguments that its opening brief
inadequately addresses.”). In any event, her assertion is unavailing. In
determining whether Ms. Turcios-Ortiz had committed a “serious
nonpolitical crime,” the IJ specifically said it “consider[ed] the facts and
circumstances presented” in her case. RI.62. The record confirms as much.
And the BIA explicitly adopted and incorporated the IJ’s reasoning.
Accordingly, we conclude substantial evidence supports the agency’s
decision that Ms. Turcios-Ortiz is ineligible for withholding of removal
under the serious nonpolitical crime bar.
V
We next consider Ms. Turcios-Ortiz’s contention that the agency’s
denial of CAT relief is not supported by substantial evidence. We must also
reject this argument.
“CAT prohibits removal of a noncitizen to a country where the
noncitizen likely would be tortured.” Nasrallah, 590 U.S. at 580. “The
burden of proof is on the applicant . . . to establish that it is more likely
than not that . . . she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country
of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); Matter of H-L-S-A-, 28 I. & N. Dec.
228, 239 (BIA 2021) (explaining an applicant for CAT protection “must
establish that each link in a hypothetical chain of events is more likely than
20 Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 21
not to happen” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Relief from removal
under [] CAT is mandatory if the applicant proves” likelihood of torture.
Garcia-Botello v. Bondi, 168 F.4th 1245, 1257 (10th Cir. 2026).
CAT’s implementing regulations define “[t]orture” as “any act by
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person . . . by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or
acquiescence of, a public official acting in an official capacity[.]” 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.18(a)(1). In assessing a claim for relief under CAT, the agency must
consider “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture,” including
“[e]vidence of past torture,” “[e]vidence that the applicant could relocate to
a part of the country of removal where . . . she is not likely to be tortured,”
“[e]vidence of gross, flagrant[,] or mass violations of human rights,” and
“[o]ther relevant information regarding conditions in the country of
removal.” Id. § 1208.16(c)(3)(i)–(iv).
“[W]here the BIA determines a petitioner is not eligible for relief, we
review the decision to determine whether the record on the whole provides
substantial support for that determination.” Igiebor v. Barr, 981 F.3d 1123,
1131 (10th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the
substantial evidence standard, “we cannot reverse the determination of the
BIA unless the record compels us to conclude that it was wrong.” Neri-
21 Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 22
Garcia v. Holder, 696 F.3d 1003, 1008 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Applying these standards, we discern no reversible error. Ms. Turcios-
Ortiz’s main argument for reversal is “substantial evidence does not
support” the agency’s finding that she “could reasonably relocate within
Honduras” to avoid torture. 9 Op. Br. at 29–31 (capitalization altered)
(quoting RI.4). According to Ms. Turcios-Ortiz, the agency’s relocation
finding is based on its mischaracterization of the Report, which was
introduced into evidence at the merits hearing but is not found in the
administrative record. Properly construed, Ms. Turcios-Ortiz explains, the
Report shows the “omnipresence of gang and [drug] trafficker violence
9 The IJ said, at the conclusion of its oral ruling:
[E]ven if the court accepted that [Ms. Turcios-Ortiz] was at risk for torture in her old neighborhood, the court would find it insufficient to show that she could not avoid the risk of torture by relocating to another part of Honduras. For that reason, the court finds the respondent not eligible for protection under the Convention against Torture and denies the application.
RI.65. Likewise, the BIA explained in affirming the IJ’s denial of CAT relief, “the [IJ] concluded that [Ms. Turcios-Ortiz] could reasonably relocate within Honduras to avoid being tortured by the gang members she fears if she returns to Honduras[.]” RI.4.
22 Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 23
across Honduras,” which means relocation within Honduras would be
impossible. Op. Br. at 33.
For its part, the government concedes the Report is missing from the
record and admits the IJ “mischaracterized” the Report “because [contrary
to the IJ’s finding, the Report] does not state that crime is higher in urban
areas.” Resp. Br. at 21 n.7. But in the government’s view, “whether crime is
higher in ‘urban area[s] or rural area[s]’” is irrelevant because Ms. Turcios-
Ortiz fails to demonstrate that relocation is unreasonable on the basis of
the existing administrative record. Resp. Br. at 21 n.7. Ultimately, says the
government, “the agency reasonably found Ms. [Turcios-Ortiz’s] fear of
torture speculative and not supported by the record evidence.” Resp. Br. at
22. The government has the better argument.
At the outset, we acknowledge the Report is not in the administrative
record. And we are mandated to resolve the petition for review “only on the
administrative record.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) (requiring “the court of
appeals shall decide the petition only on the administrative record on which
the order of removal is based”). Here, substantial evidence in the
administrative record supports the agency’s determination that
Ms. Turcios-Ortiz is not eligible for CAT relief. As to whether she could
relocate to a part of Honduras where she is not likely to be tortured, Ms.
Turcios-Ortiz admitted she does not know exactly which gang she worked
23 Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 24
for or what geographic areas they controlled. As to whether relocation was
even necessary, the IJ found the gangs did not harm Ms. Turcios-Ortiz for
a three-month period in 2021 “[e]ven when she refused to deliver more
drugs” but remained in Honduras. RI.65. Relatedly, the IJ reasoned that
“the incidents that have happened to [Ms. Turcios-Ortiz’s] family since she
left Honduras . . . do[] not establish that she would more likely than not be
tortured or killed in Honduras upon her return.” RI.65. The BIA expressly
incorporated all “the reasons stated by the [IJ]” to affirm the denial of CAT
relief. RI.4. Ms. Turcios-Ortiz does not challenge these findings in her
petition for review. Nor did she meaningfully challenge these findings
before the BIA. In its order dismissing the appeal, the BIA observed that,
as to CAT relief, Ms. Turcios-Ortiz “generally argues that her testimony
shows that relocation is not possible because gangs in Honduras are
widespread and interconnected but does not further elaborate on this
contention or cite to record evidence in support of this claim.” RI.4.
Accordingly, we conclude the agency’s decision that Ms. Turcios-Ortiz did
not meet her burden to show likelihood of torture is readily supported by
“the record on the whole” which “provides substantial support for that
24 Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 25
determination.” Igiebor, 981 F.3d at 1131 (internal quotation marks
omitted). 10
C
Finally, we consider Ms. Turcios-Ortiz’s related contention that
remand is required because the agency, in denying CAT relief, failed to
apply “the correct legal standard for torture as defined by 8 C.F.R. §
1208.18(a)(1),” and thus incorrectly assessed whether she had met her
burden to show likelihood of torture. Op. Br. at 36. She argues, “the IJ’s
discussion of torture . . . did not mention any legal standard for torture or
how that standard was applied to the uncontested facts.” Op. Br. at 36. The
government maintains this argument is “not exhausted” because
10 Ms. Turcios-Ortiz suggests remand is required under SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). In Chenery, the Supreme Court held agency action “cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be sustained.” Id. at 95. There is no Chenery problem here. Our disposition is based on the complete reasoning specifically identified by the agency to support its likelihood of torture determination. See Elzour v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1143, 1150 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[O]ur review is confined to the reasoning given by the [agency], and we will not independently search the record for alternative bases to affirm.”) (citing Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. at 95). In any event, remand on the CAT claim would be “futile” on the record before us. Zapata-Chacon v. Garland, 51 F.4th 1191, 1196 (10th Cir. 2022) (clarifying remand is not mandatory when “governing law would require the agency to reach a necessary result” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)); see generally NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766 n.6 (1969) (plurality opinion) (noting remand is not required where it “would be an idle and useless formality” and “Chenery does not require that we convert judicial review of agency action into a ping-pong game”). 25 Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 26
Ms. Turcios-Ortiz failed to raise it before the BIA. Resp. Br. at 22 (citing
Garcia-Carbajal v. Holder, 625 F.3d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. 2010), abrogated
in part on other grounds by Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411
(2023)). We agree with the government.
We “may review a final order of removal only if . . . [the petitioner]
has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the [petitioner] as
of right[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). “It is a fundamental principle of
administrative law that an agency must have the opportunity to rule on a
challenger’s arguments before the challenger may bring those arguments to
court.” Garcia-Carbajal, 625 F.3d at 1237. This principle “bears special
force in the immigration context, where Congress has reduced it to a
statutory command.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)). “We enforce the
exhaustion requirement by declining to consider the unexhausted issue.”
Miguel-Pena v. Garland, 94 F.4th 1145, 1155 (10th Cir. 2024) (explaining
“[i]ssue exhaustion is both ‘a statutory command’ under § 1252(d)(1) and
part of the ‘fundamental principle of administrative law’”) (quoting Garcia-
Carbajal, 625 F.3d at 1237); see also Igiebor, 981 F.3d at 1134 (explaining
petitioner never made an argument in his brief on appeal to the BIA so the
issue “is unexhausted and beyond this court’s review”).
Before the BIA, Ms. Turcios-Ortiz correctly cited 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.18(a)(1) for the definition of torture. But she never argued the IJ
26 Appellate Case: 25-9536 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 27
failed to apply this standard. Ms. Turcios-Ortiz’s argument is thus
unexhausted, so we cannot consider it.
We DENY Ms. Turcios-Ortiz’s petition for review. 11
Entered for the Court
Veronica S. Rossman Circuit Judge
11 We dismiss as moot Ms. Turcios-Ortiz’s motion for a supplemental
briefing schedule to address Matter of D-G-B-L-, 29 I. & N. Dec. 392. 27