Turbovets Incorporated v. Patriot Claims LLC, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: April 21, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-04733
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

8 Turbovets Incorporated, No. CV-25-04733-PHX-JJT

9 Plaintiff, ORDER

10 v.

11 Patriot Claims LLC, et al.,

12 Defendants. 13 14 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Application for Order to Show Cause and Motion for 15 Temporary Restraining Order (With Notice) and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 13), and 16 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) (Doc. 18). For the reasons below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion 18 for Preliminary Injunction and grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 Plaintiff, a Texas corporation, develops technology that assists “military veterans in 21 managing and submitting disability and benefits claims.” (Doc. 13 at 20 ¶ 3.) Plaintiff’s 22 principal technology operations are in Phoenix, Arizona. (Id. ¶ 5.) While researching and 23 developing that technology, Plaintiff has operated in “confidential ‘stealth mode’ to protect 24 its trade secrets, designs, and intellectual property from public disclosure.” (Id. ¶ 6.) 25 Plaintiff filed a trademark application for the marks “TURBOVETS” and “TURBOVET” 26 and a copyright registration for its platform user interface. (Id. ¶¶ 9–10.) While operating 27 in “stealth mode,” Plaintiff maintains “strict confidentiality with third parties” and “[a]ny 28 1 limited discussions with potential collaborators or partners were conducted under Non- 2 Disclosure Agreements (NDAs).” (Id. ¶¶ 12–13.) 3 In October 2025, Plaintiff discovered that Defendant Patriot Claims LLC, a Texas 4 Corporation, “released a Google Chrome browser extension titled ‘TurboVets by 5 VetClaims.AI.” (Id. ¶ 15.) The browser extension uses Plaintiff’s mark “TURBOVETS” 6 and featured a platform user interface like Plaintiff’s. (Id. ¶¶ 17–18.) 7 Plaintiff sued Defendants asserting claims for, inter alia, trademark and copyright 8 infringement and misappropriation of trade secrets. (See Doc. 1-1.) Plaintiff now moves 9 for a primarily injunction to prohibit Defendants from “using Plaintiff’s TURBOVETS 10 mark . . . [p]ublishing, promoting, or distributing the Chrome extension titled ‘TurboVets 11 by VetClaims.AI’; [d]isplaying, copying, or using Plaintiff’s copyrighted and proprietary 12 materials; and [e]ngaging in any act likely to cause confusion as to the affiliation or 13 sponsorship of Defendants’ product.” (Doc. 13 at 17.) 14 In response, Defendants argue that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them 15 and, therefore, lacks authority to issue the requested injunctive relief. (Doc. 19 at 5.) 16 Defendants separately move to dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) under a similar 17 theory (Doc. 18 at 5–12). Plaintiff opposed Defendant’s Motion, asserting that Defendants 18 engaged unknown third parties to obtain Plaintiff’s proprietary information through 19 executing an NDA and targeted Arizona through online advertising. (Doc. 33 at 3–4.) Both 20 motions have been fully briefed. 21 The Court held an Evidentiary Hearing on April 7, 2026. The parties presented the 22 testimony of one witness each by declaration, Mr. Loomis for Plaintiff (Doc. 13 at 20–23; 23 Doc. 25-1) and Mr. Lukas Simianer, CEO of Patriot Claims LLC, for Defendants (Doc. 24 18-1). The Court heard the testimony of both Mr. Loomis and Mr. Simianer during cross- 25 examination and re-direct at the Evidentiary Hearing and, after significantly narrowing the 26 issues as announced through its findings and conclusions made on the record, took 27 Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction under advisement. 28 . . . 1 After the Evidentiary Hearing, Defendants notified the Court that Plaintiff filed a 2 substantially similar lawsuit on April 17, 2026, in the United States District Court for the 3 Eastern District of Texas. (See Doc. 51.) According to Defendants, Plaintiff acknowledged 4 to Defendants that “it intends to transfer this case to the Eastern District of Texas,” but 5 Defendants contend that venue is improper because Defendants reside within the Western 6 District of Texas. (Id. at 3.) As of the time of this Order, Plaintiff has not filed a responsive 7 filing to Defendants’ notice. 8 II. LEGAL STANDARD 9 In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show that “(1) [it is] 10 likely to succeed on the merits, (2) [it is] likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 11 preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in [its] favor, and (4) an injunction is in 12 the public interest.” Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing 13 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 9 (2008)). As a threshold matter, though, 14 a district court must have personal jurisdiction over the party against whom an injunction 15 is sought. Zepeda v. U.S. I.N.S., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Ruhrgas AG 16 v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) (“Personal jurisdiction, too, is an essential 17 element of the jurisdiction of a district court, without which the court is powerless to 18 proceed to an adjudication.”) (citation modified). The party bringing the action has the 19 burden of establishing that personal jurisdiction exists in answering a motion to dismiss or 20 in requesting a preliminary injunction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 21 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); In re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 22 741 (9th Cir. 2013). 23 To establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, a plaintiff must 24 show that the forum state’s long-arm statute confers jurisdiction over the defendant and 25 that the exercise of jurisdiction comports with constitutional principles of due process. 26 Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 269 (9th Cir. 1995). Arizona’s 27 long-arm statute allows the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the same extent as the 28 1 United States Constitution and principles of due process. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a); 2 Cybersell v. Cybersell, 130 F.3d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 1997). 3 Due process requires that a nonresident defendant have sufficient minimum contacts 4 with the forum state so that “maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of 5 fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) 6 (citation modified). Personal jurisdiction can be either general or specific. Here, Plaintiff 7 does not dispute that Defendants are not subject to the general personal jurisdiction of 8 Arizona (Doc. 25 at 2), so the Court focuses on the specific personal jurisdiction analysis 9 that “arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state giving rise to the subject 10 litigation.” Birder v. Jockey’s Guild, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1008 (C.D. Cal. 2006) 11 Whether a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum turns on three 12 elements. Morrill v. Scott Fin. Corp., 873 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2017). First, the 13 defendant “must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with 14 the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself 15 of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and 16 protections of its laws.” Id. Second, “the claim must be one which arises out of or relates 17 to the defendant’s forum-related activities.” Id. And third, “the exercise of jurisdiction must 18 comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.” Id. The plaintiff 19 bears the burden of satisfying the first two elements while the defendant bears the burden 20 of negating the third. Id. All three elements are required for jurisdiction to lie. Id. The focus 21 of this analysis is “on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” 22 Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., 135 F.4th 739, 750 (9th Cir. 2025). 23 “The burden of proof for establishing personal jurisdiction depends on the ‘mode of 24 determination’ employed by the district court in deciding the issue.” Carpenter v. Sikorsky 25 Aircraft Corp., 101 F. Supp. 3d 911, 922 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. 26 Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977)). When, as here, a district court 27 must decide personal jurisdiction after an evidentiary hearing is held, “a plaintiff must 28 prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 To meet the first element of the minimum effects test, the plaintiff must show the 3 defendant “either (1) purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities 4 in the forum, or (2) purposefully directed his activities towards the forum.” Pebble Beach 5 Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation modified). When, as here, a 6 plaintiff’s claims sound in tort, courts apply the purposeful direction test. Adobe Sys. Inc. 7 v. Blue Source Grp., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 3d 945, 960 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (applying effects test 8 to copyright and trademark infringement claims); see Tracer Rsch. Corp. v. Nat’l Env’t 9 Servs. Co., 42 F.3d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The misappropriation of trade secrets . . . 10 is a tort claim.”). 11 To determine whether the defendant’s actions constitute purposeful direction, courts 12 apply the “effects” test that was developed in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984) 13 that requires that the nonresident defendant: “(1) committed an intentional act, (2) 14 expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to 15 be suffered in the forum state.” Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1206. “The proper question is not 16 where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s 17 conduct connects [it] to the forum in a meaningful way.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 18 290 (2014). In other words, the relationship between the defendant, the forum state, and 19 the litigation “must arise out of contacts that the defendant himself creates with the forum 20 State” and not just “the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Id. at 284. 21 Plaintiff argues that personal jurisdiction over Defendants exist under three theories: 22 (1) Defendants provided “direction, encouragement, and orchestration” to unknown agents 23 who, in turn, negotiated with Plaintiff and caused the execution of an NDA “that contains 24 a mandatory Arizona forum-selection clause” (Doc. 25 at 2–3); (2) Defendants advertise 25 and sell the browser extension and other services in Arizona (id. at 3–4); and (3) Defendants 26 employ six people in Arizona (id. at 5). The Court already set forth its reasons for 27 determining that the first two theories fail to establish personal jurisdiction at the 28 Evidentiary Hearing (Hr’g Tr. at 97:4–18), and now turns to the third theory. 1 A. Intentional Act 2 “[A]n intentional act is ‘an external manifestation of the actor’s intent to perform an 3 actual, physical act in the real world.’” Adobe Sys. Inc., 125 F. Supp. 3d at 960 (citing 4 Wash. Shoe Co. v. A–Z Sporting Goods, Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 2012). Here, 5 Defendants do not dispute that the act of employing people is an intentional one, so Plaintiff 6 satisfies the first Calder requirement. 7 B. Express Aiming Towards Forum State 8 “The express aiming analysis depends, to a significant degree, on the specific type 9 of tort or other wrongful conduct at issue.” Id. (citation modified). This inquiry “requires 10 something more than a foreign act with foreseeable effects in the forum state.” Id. (citation 11 modified). “Where a defendant knows—as opposed to being able to foresee—that an 12 intentional act will impact another state, then the expressly aimed requirement is satisfied.” 13 Id. at 960–61 (citation modified). Contacts supporting purposeful direction “must be the 14 defendant’s own choice and not random, isolated, or fortuitous.” Ford Motor Co. v. 15 Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 359 (2021). 16 Here, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ employment of six personnel in Arizona 17 constitutes “intentional outreach to Arizona.” (Doc. 25 at 5.) Each of these employees work 18 remotely. (See Docs. 25-2–25-6; H’rg Tr. 65:22–66:5, 73:15–23, 76:1–10, 76:23.) In a 19 post-COVID pandemic world, the remote-worker business model is increasingly 20 commonplace. Several district courts have analyzed whether this modern employment 21 structure establishes minimum contacts through a purposeful availment lens, often in cases 22 involving an employment-related dispute. Those courts found that an employer’s act of 23 employing someone who works remotely in a state, without more, does not establish 24 jurisdiction over the employer there. See Kikendall v. Bid My Listing, Inc., No. C25-1237- 25 JCC, 2025 WL 3771419, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2025) (“Plaintiff’s home-based 26 remote work location is not sufficient to trigger personal jurisdiction over an employer’s 27 board members—not without more.”); Fields v. Sickle Cell Disease Ass’n of Am., Inc., 376 28 F. Supp. 3d 647, 651 (E.D.N.C. 2018), aff’d, 770 F. App’x 77 (4th Cir. 2019) (no minimum 1 contacts with a forum state from where a remote independent contractor chose to work); 2 Perry v. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders of United States, No. CV TDC-20-0454, 2020 WL 3 5759766, at *5 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2020) (“In remote-work cases, however, a defendant’s 4 mere knowledge that an employee happens to reside in the forum state and conduct some 5 work from home does not constitute purposeful availment.”); LoadStop’s Parks v. 6 LoadStop, Inc., No. CV H-23-4570, 2024 WL 4452946, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2024) 7 (no minimum contacts where the defendant employed remote residents but did not recruit, 8 travel to, or sought to have work conducted specifically in the forum state); Waseem v. 9 Stability AI, Inc., No. 2:24CV36, 2024 WL 4580401, at *6 (E.D. Va. Oct. 10, 2024), 10 adopted, 2024 WL 5168098 (E.D. Va. Dec. 19, 2024) (no minimum contacts where the 11 plaintiff’s physical location was irrelevant to recruitment, hiring, and employment terms). 12 While this Court is presently concerned with the purposeful direction test, these cases are 13 nonetheless informative of the general trends that courts follow when addressing the 14 jurisdictional contours of remote employment. 15 Here, the narrow question before the Court is whether Defendants’ act of employing 16 people who work remotely from Arizona is an act that was expressly aimed at Arizona. In 17 this particular case, it is not. Mr. Simianer testified that Defendants do not employ 18 Arizonans based on their residence here. Rather, Defendants’ employees work remotely in 19 all fifty states and abroad; their physical location is simply irrelevant. (Hr’g Tr. at 65:22– 20 66:5, 73:20–23, 76:1–10, 76:23.) Mr. Simianer could not even recall whether the 21 employees whose LinkedIn profile suggested that they lived in Arizona were still 22 physically located here at the time of the Evidentiary Hearing. (Hr’g Tr. at 73:15–23, 76:1– 23 10). Further, Mr. Simianer testified that sales leads are assigned in a “round robin” style 24 across all sales employees, so the work that an employee may conduct is not location 25 specific. (Hr’g Tr. at 71:1–18.) While Mr. Simianer acknowledged that Defendants’ sales 26 personnel may inform veterans of the free browser extension, there is no evidence that the 27 sales personnel located in Arizona did so, or that sales personnel elsewhere target Arizona- 28 based veterans to recommend the browser extension. Based on the evidence and testimony, 1 the Court finds that Defendants’ contact with Arizona by virtue of employing six remote 2 employees here is the kind of “random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts [that] are 3 insufficient to create the requisite connection with the forum.” Morrill, 873 F.3d at 1142. 4 Plaintiff having failed to satisfy the second Calder requirement, the Court need not 5 resolve whether the third was met. Plaintiff does not meet its burden to demonstrate that 6 the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Accordingly, the Court must deny 7 Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction. See Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 727. 8 C. Dismissal 9 The remaining issue before the Court is whether Plaintiff alleges sufficient 10 jurisdictional facts to avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(2). Plaintiff alleges nothing more 11 than conclusory facts that Defendants engaged an unknown third-party agent to obtain 12 Plaintiff’s materials and released the browser extension online (see FAC ¶¶ 5–7, 31–33, 13 51–55), which are insufficient to withstand Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. See, e.g., In re 14 Boon Glob. Ltd., 923 F.3d 643, 654 (9th Cir. 2019) (Conclusory allegations . . . are 15 insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. Something more is needed.”). Dismissal for 16 want of personal jurisdiction is appropriate here. 17 D. Transfer 18 While personal jurisdiction does not lie in this Court, it may lie elsewhere. “In an 19 effort to cure jurisdictional defects, 28 U.S.C. § 1631 allows for the transfer of civil actions 20 among federal courts.” Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th Cir. 2006). Under 21 Section 1631, a district court that lacks jurisdiction over an action may transfer it “if it is 22 in the interest of justice . . . to any other such court in which the action or appeal could 23 have been brought at the time it was filed[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1631. “Because the statute’s 24 language is mandatory, federal courts should consider transfer without motion by the 25 parties.” Cruz-Aguilera v. I.N.S., 245 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 26 Transfer is appropriate “if three conditions are met: (1) the transferring court lacks 27 jurisdiction; (2) the transferee court could have exercised jurisdiction at the time the action 28 was filed; and (3) the transfer is in the interest of justice.” Id. 1 Personal jurisdiction lies in Texas where both parties are residents, but it is unclear which district is the proper venue. Defendants contend that the Western district is proper || because they reside there. (Doc. 51 at 3.) See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). Plaintiff, on the other hand, filed a parallel action in the Eastern district alleging that a substantial part of the || events or omissions giving rise to its claims occurred there. (Doc. 51-1 4 23.) See 28 U.S.C. 6|| § 1391(b)(2). Both bases are sufficient to render a venue proper under Section 1391(b). 7\| Because the second element of Section 1631 is not clearly established, the Court declines 8 || to transfer this matter and dismisses it without prejudice. 9 IT IS ORDERED denying Plaintiff's Application for Order to Show Cause and || Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (With Notice) and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 13). 12 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss First 13 || Amended Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) (Doc. 18). 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to close this matter. 15 Dated this 21st day of April, 2026. CN

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