Turboven Company v. Smith

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: December 11, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-3616
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TURBOVEN COMPANY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 1:24-cv-03616 (TNM)

BRADLEY T. SMITH, in his official capacity as Director of the U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Turboven Company incorporated two subsidiaries to run power plants in Venezuela.

The Venezuelan government later took control of those subsidiaries and forced them to power a

government-run crypto mining facility. Turboven, its officers, and its owner now fear that the

Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) might place them on the

Specially Designated Nationals (“SDN”) list and sanction them for doing business with the

Venezuelan government. They sue OFAC and its Director, asking the Court to declare that they

are not violating sanctions law and to enjoin OFAC from placing them on the SDN list. Because

the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit, it will dismiss it.

I.

Turboven Company started in the Cayman Islands as a joint venture between U.S. 1 and

Venezuelan energy companies. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 12. Looking to provide power to the

Venezuelan cities of Maracay and Cagua, Turboven incorporated a subsidiary in each city.

1 The U.S. company was later bought out by Gregorian International, incorporated in Barbados. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 7, 12, 19. Id. ¶ 13. For more than two decades, these subsidiaries operated as “private, independent power

producers in Venezuela,” serving private clients through a private energy grid. Id. ¶¶ 13, 15, 20.

One of those clients was a firm named MCELD, which used Turboven-generated power “to

engage in private crypto mining.” Id. ¶ 21.

According to its Complaint, Turboven’s trouble with the Venezuelan government began

in October 2023, when government agencies raided MCELD’s facilities and halted its mining

operations. Id. ¶ 22. The raid prompted Turboven to suspend electrical service to MCELD’s

facilities “for commercial and safety reasons.” Id. ¶ 24. The next month, government agents

broke into Turboven Maracay’s facilities, stole information on Turboven’s customers and

operations, locked all personnel in the facilities, and presented Turboven with a court order

seizing control of MCELD. Id. ¶¶ 25–27. Under duress, Turboven agreed to restore power to

MCELD’s facilities. Id. ¶ 28.

But the saga was far from over. In late 2023, Venezuela’s crypto agency notified

Turboven that it intended to operate MCELD under the company’s existing contract with

Turboven Cagua. Id. ¶ 30. In response, Turboven again suspended service to MCELD. Id. ¶ 31.

This launched a political drama that culminated in the Venezuelan government forcibly taking

over Turboven Maracay and Cagua and operating the power plants under Turboven’s guise. Id.

¶¶ 32–46.

Although Turboven no longer controls Turboven Maracay or Cagua, it is concerned that

OFAC might find it liable for the Venezuelan government’s actions and place it on the SDN list.

Id. ¶ 53. The company, its officers, and its owner Gregorian International—collectively,

Turboven—ask the Court to declare that “none of [them] are participating in, nor are they in any

way involved with, the illegal activities” of Turboven Maracay and Cagua under the Venezuelan

2 government’s control. Id. at 14–15. Turboven also seeks an injunction “[p]rohibiting

Defendants from placing Plaintiffs Turboven and Gregorian on OFAC’s SDN list.” Id. at 15.

OFAC moves to dismiss Turboven’s Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and that

motion is now ripe. See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 21; Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 23;

Reply, ECF No. 25.

II.

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of

Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Turboven “bears the burden of invoking the court’s subject

matter jurisdiction, including establishing the elements of standing.” Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d

11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015). In evaluating subject matter jurisdiction, the Court may consider

materials outside the pleadings but must “accept all of the factual allegations in the complaint as

true.” Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253–54 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (cleaned

up). If the Court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the case.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

III.

Turboven’s suit is a jurisdictional nonstarter for two reasons. First, no statute grants the

Court subject matter jurisdiction over Turboven’s claims. And second, Turboven lacks standing

to bring those claims, in any event. The Court addresses each jurisdictional defect in turn.

A.

To invoke the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, Turboven must identify a statute that

confers it. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377 (stating that federal courts “possess only that power

authorized by Constitution and statute”). Turboven proffers three candidates: the Mandamus

3 Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361; the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201; and the federal question

statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Compl. ¶ 10. None does the trick.

Start with the Mandamus Act—which grants district courts jurisdiction over “any action

in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency

thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361. The Court may award

mandamus relief only if “(1) the plaintiff has a clear right to relief; (2) the defendant has a clear

duty to act; and (3) there is no other adequate remedy available to [the] plaintiff.” Muthana v.

Pompeo, 985 F.3d 893, 910 (D.C. Cir. 2021). “These three threshold requirements are

jurisdictional; unless all are met, [the] [C]ourt must dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.”

Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see also Lovitky v. Trump, 949

F.3d 753, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“[M]andamus jurisdiction under § 1361 merges with the merits.”

(cleaned up)).

Turboven falls short of that standard. It asks the Court to bar OFAC from placing

Turboven on the SDN list. Compl. at 15. But far from alleging that OFAC has a “clear duty to

act,” Turboven requests that OFAC refrain from action authorized by statute and executive order.

See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (authorizing the President, in declared national emergencies, to

“prevent or prohibit [] any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal,

transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or

privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or

a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the

jurisdiction of the United States”); see also Exec. Order No. 13,827, 83 Fed. Reg. 12,469, 12,469

(Mar. 19, 2018) (prohibiting U.S. persons and entities from engaging in “transactions related

to . . . any digital currency” issued by “any person owned or controlled by . . . the Government of

4 Venezuela” and authorizing “[t]he Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary

of State, . . . to employ all powers granted to the President by [the International Emergency

Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”)] as may be necessary to implement this order”); id.

(authorizing the Treasury Secretary to “redelegate any of these functions to other officers and

executive departments and agencies of the United States Government.”). These authorities

evince OFAC’s ample discretion over whom it places on the SDN list. See 31 C.F.R. § 501.807

(outlining the process for seeking “administrative reconsideration” of one’s placement on the

SDN list); see also Karadzic v. Gacki, 602 F. Supp. 3d 103, 115 (D.D.C. 2022) (“Congress

granted wide latitude over sanctions to [OFAC]; it is not for the courts to say otherwise.”).

That discretion defeats Turboven’s quest for mandamus relief—which “lies only to

compel ministerial, as opposed to discretionary, duties.” Leopold v. Manger, 102 F.4th 491, 497

(D.C. Cir. 2024); see also Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 63 (2004) (“The

mandamus remedy was normally limited to . . . the ordering of a precise, definite act about which

an official had no discretion whatever.” (cleaned up)); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)

137, 170 (1803) (stating that mandamus is unavailable where “executive discretion is to be

exercised”). In short, this is not the stuff of which mandamus suits are made, and nothing in the

Complaint suggests otherwise. The Court thus has no mandamus jurisdiction. Am. Hosp. Ass’n,

812 F.3d at 189.

Next, “[i]t is a well-established rule that the Declaratory Judgment Act is not an

independent source of federal jurisdiction.” Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2011)

(cleaned up); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671–72 (1950). The Act

“presupposes the existence of a judicially remediable right” and thus “will not fill a gap in

5 subject matter jurisdiction.” Lovitky, 949 F.3d at 758–59 (cleaned up); 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).

Turboven must find jurisdiction elsewhere.

The federal question statute likewise cannot fill Turboven’s jurisdictional hole. The

Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 when “federal law creates the cause of action

asserted” or when a federal issue lies at the heart of a state-law claim. D.C. Ass’n of Chartered

Pub. Sch. v. District of Columbia, 930 F.3d 487, 491 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Gunn v. Minton,

568 U.S. 251, 257 (2013)). Turboven points to no federal statute or constitutional provision

other than the Mandamus Act. This means that its “request for an injunction based on the

general federal question statute is essentially a request for a writ of mandamus.” Lovitky, 949

F.3d at 759. Without a viable mandamus claim or any other cause of action, “the federal

question statute alone [cannot] serve as the source of federal jurisdiction.” Id.

Turboven has little to say in response. In fact, it does not address OFAC’s jurisdictional

arguments, effectively conceding that the Court lacks jurisdiction. See Resp. at 6–9; Wannall v.

Honeywell, Inc., 775 F.3d 425, 428 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[I]f a party files an opposition to a motion

and therein addresses only some of the movant’s arguments, the court may treat the unaddressed

arguments as conceded.”). Turboven instead asks the Court to construe the Complaint “to

articulate a claim under the [Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)] for OFAC’s violations of

the [statutory] framework”—and alternatively asks to amend its Complaint. Resp. at 6–7.

But Turboven cannot move to amend its Complaint via “a bare request in an opposition

to a motion to dismiss.” Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs. Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 130 (D.C. Cir. 2012)

(cleaned up). What Turboven could have done is amend its Complaint as a matter of course after

receiving OFAC’s Motion to Dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). Turboven also could

have moved to amend its Complaint through the procedure outlined in this Court’s local rules,

6 which would have required attaching “a copy of the proposed pleading as amended.” LCvR

15.1. Because Turboven’s request to amend “neither included a proposed amended complaint

nor otherwise indicated [it] would be able to plead sufficient facts to state a plausible [APA]

claim,” the Court need not humor it. Rollins, 703 F.3d at 130–31. All told, Turboven has

provided no statute that would bestow jurisdiction over this suit.

B.

While the absence of a statutory grant of jurisdiction dooms Turboven’s case, the lack of

standing puts a nail in the coffin. See Am. Libr. Ass’n v. FCC, 401 F.3d 489, 492 (D.C. Cir.

2005) (“Article III standing is a prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction . . . .”). To establish

standing, Turboven “must show (i) that [it] suffered an injury in fact that is concrete,

particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by [OFAC]; and

(iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,

594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021). Here, “where [Turboven] seeks prospective declaratory and

injunctive relief, [it] must establish an ongoing or future injury that is certainly impending . . . .”

Williams v. Lew, 819 F.3d 466, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (cleaned up); see also Clapper v. Amnesty

Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (“[W]e have repeatedly reiterated that threatened injury

must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact, and that allegations of possible future

injury are not sufficient.” (cleaned up)).

Turboven does not clear that bar. It fears that OFAC will place it on the SDN list

because Turboven’s subsidiaries have been hijacked by the Venezuelan government. Compl.

¶ 53; Resp. at 7–8. It seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to avoid “being found in violation of

U.S. law” and “being placed on the SDN list.” Compl. ¶¶ 58, 59, 63. The problem for Turboven

is that it has not shown that any OFAC action—let alone placing Turboven on the SDN list—is

7 “certainly impending.” See Williams, 819 F.3d at 472; Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409. Indeed,

Turboven undermines its own case by emphasizing the “opacity of the procedures and

investigations undertaken by OFAC prior to listing an entity [on] the SDN list.” See Compl.

¶ 54. That failure to show a “certainly impending” injury is fatal to Turboven’s bid for standing.

See Williams, 819 F.3d at 472. 2

IV.

The Court lacks jurisdiction over Turboven’s suit in at least two ways. It therefore must

dismiss it without prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A separate Order will follow.

2025.12.11 13:43:49 -05'00' Dated: December 11, 2025 TREVOR N. McFADDEN United States District Judge

2 OFAC also argues that there is no jurisdiction because sovereign immunity bars Turboven’s suit. See Mot. to Dismiss at 8–10. The Court does not address that argument given the other two jurisdictional defects. Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Schiff, 23 F.4th 1028, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (stating that “the court may take up jurisdictional issues in any order, and need not reach other grounds where one is dispositive” (cleaned up)).