Tuggle v. Barksdale

641 F. Supp. 34, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22630
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Tennessee
DecidedFebruary 13, 1985
Docket83-2237-MA
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 641 F. Supp. 34 (Tuggle v. Barksdale) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tuggle v. Barksdale, 641 F. Supp. 34, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22630 (W.D. Tenn. 1985).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION

McRAE, Chief Judge.

The three plaintiffs in this cause are convicted criminals who were incarcerated in the Shelby County Justice Complex. The complaint charges violations of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by deprivation of the right of inmates to access to the courts. The plaintiffs are recognized as *36 “jailhouse lawyers” by other inmates, the jail administrators and themselves. 1 The complaint alleges as one cause of action that the defendants denied them access to the courts for their own individual petitions, appeals or new litigation. As another cause of action the plaintiffs assert that defendants have deprived the plaintiff “jailhouse lawyers of the right to assist inmates, thus deprived inmates of the right to receive assistance” from the plaintiffs.

The Court conducted a series of hearings on the issues raised by the pleadings and proof. In some measure, the series of hearings was caused by the shake-up of the staff at the jail. After initial hearings the defendant Sheriff Barksdale replaced the defendant Lomax as Chief Jailer, the defendant Aycock tendered his resignation as Chief Counselor in the jail, and a counselor was fired and later reinstated.

Furthermore the plaintiffs and other inmates filed numerous requests and petitions and complaints between hearings. At one point the “jailhouse lawyers” at the jail attempted to get their way by going on a hunger strike.

Fortunately during the series of hearings, two attorneys appeared at the behest of the plaintiff DeBerry to assist the plaintiff DeBerry and the other plaintiffs with the presentation of the case. Those attorneys were Bill Anderson and Robert M. Brannon, Jr. Although DeBerry would not relinquish full control, they were helpful to the plaintiffs and the Court because they knew the proper procedural and legal approaches and were available to take some necessary discovery for the plaintiffs.

Before addressing the specific issues, the Court must recognize certain controlling holdings of the appellate courts in this area of the law.

Prisoners have a fundamental right to access to the court that requires that they have either adequate law libraries or that legal assistance be provided, and indigent prisoners are entitled to have basic writing materials furnished, Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). In the absence of alternative means for an indigent inmate to obtain legal counsel, prison rules against one inmate’s assisting another in the preparation of legal papers will deny the indigent inmate access to the courts, Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969). But one inmate does not have the standing to assert the separate constitutional right of another inmate to access to the courts, Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2915, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1107, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961). Unfortunately at times during the hearings the plaintiffs appeared to be of the persuasion that they had a constitutional right to be “jailhouse lawyers,” whereas the right exists for the one who is in need of assistance and cannot provide the necessary means of obtaining that access to the court. However, the proof in this case reflects that the deprivations by the jail staff to the plaintiffs in their efforts in their own matters before the court overlap with the same problems faced by inmates who need jailhouse lawyer assistance for access to the courts. Therefore the Court concludes that there is subject matter jurisdiction. Furthermore, clearly the law would forbid retaliation by jail officials against “jailhouse lawyers” for assisting indigent inmates.

The Court will now address the respective issues raised by the proof.

LEGAL ROOM

In an earlier case pertaining to the rights of inmates in the Shelby County Jail, this Court found that requests of the inmates to see the medic, another inmate for legal assistance and other services were not *37 properly conveyed. The Court ordered that a workable system of written requests be handled through the counselors’ office.

In the present relatively new jail facility space was provided for a legal room for inmates to use to work on their own legal petitions or writs and where an inmate who needed assistance could request to go in order to see a “jailhouse lawyer.” It was intended that this meeting be initiated with a request to see a “jailhouse lawyer” by a written request slip to be processed by the counselor’s office.

The legal room was sometimes equiped with a telephone which was to be used for calls to lawyers and others involved in legal proceedings. The proof shows that from time to time the inmates abused these privileges and the telephone was removed.

The proof shows that the request slips to go to the legal room were handled grossly negligently and ignored by the counselors, thereby depriving numerous inmates of their constitutional right to access to the courts. Undoubtedly this was the cause of the resignation of the chief counselor and the firing of another counselor. Therefore the plaintiffs prevailed on this issue by exposing this gross neglect of duty. The Court hereby decrees that a workable system of requests to see “jailhouse lawyers” will be established and maintained.

Other deficiencies in the activities and operation of the legal room will be discussed in other specific issue topics.

TELEPHONES

The proof showed that the manner in which the use of the telephones by inmates was permitted created serious problems with regard to the rights of the inmates.

At some time in the past, the practice was adopted of taking telephones to the various PODs in the jail so that the inmates might use the telephone to call lawyers, family members or other persons. This was not ordered by the Court. It was a much enjoyed privilege by the inmates, who gradually have transformed it to a right.

One problem that arose during the hearings was the proof that signs had been posted throughout the jail that all telephone calls were being monitored. This was not restricted to any type of call; therefore it included calls to lawyers, the court clerks or family members, where the right to privacy should be honored. During the hearing, the Court expressed such grave concern that this was constitutionally impermissible that the practice was discontinued and the signs were removed.

Another problem was developed by the proof in that a high ranking official of the jail testified that negotiations were being conducted with a telephone company so that local inmate calls would go through telephone company operators on a basis whereby each call would be a collect call to the person being called with a charge of seventy cents per call.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Brown v. Carpenter
889 F. Supp. 1028 (W.D. Tennessee, 1995)
Turiano v. Schnarrs
904 F. Supp. 400 (M.D. Pennsylvania, 1995)
Harrison v. Seay
856 F. Supp. 1275 (W.D. Tennessee, 1994)
Free v. State
874 P.2d 571 (Idaho Court of Appeals, 1993)
Fillmore v. Ordonez
829 F. Supp. 1544 (D. Kansas, 1993)
In Re Grimes
208 Cal. App. 3d 1175 (California Court of Appeal, 1989)
Wooden v. Norris
637 F. Supp. 543 (M.D. Tennessee, 1986)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
641 F. Supp. 34, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22630, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tuggle-v-barksdale-tnwd-1985.