Trust Co. of Ga. v. Howard

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Trust Co. of Ga. v. Howard

204 S.E.2d 499, 130 Ga. App. 725, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1241

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedJanuary 31, 1974

Docket48592

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 204 S.E.2d 499 (Trust Co. of Ga. v. Howard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Trust Co. of Ga. v. Howard, 204 S.E.2d 499, 130 Ga. App. 725, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1241 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974).

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Opinions

Stolz, Judge.

Defendant appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court of Putnam County overruling its motion for directed verdict and for judgment n. o. v. in a negligence case in which the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.

[726]*726Defendant contends that as a matter of law the pleadings and evidence demand a judgment in its favor. Paragraph 5 of the complaint alleged that "the said 1960 Chevrolet automobile owned by the defendant at the time of said collision was kept, used and maintained by him as a family car for the use, pleasure and enjoyment of the members of his family, and at the time of said collision Betty Norton, at the request of the defendant’s wife, had driven to Red’s Drive-In in defendant’s automobile to buy refreshments for the defendant’s family.” This paragraph was admitted by the defendant.

Succinctly stated, the evidence showed that Peter J. Rice owned two automobiles. The vehicles were used interchangeably by him and his wife. On the date in question, Mrs. Rice, Beth Rice ( a 15-year-old daughter), Betty Norton (now Bearden) and two of Beth’s other friends were making costumes at the Rice home when they ran out of material. Mrs. Rice "asked Betty [Norton] if she would take the car and drive so that they could get whatever it was that [was] needed.” Betty Norton was the only one of the girls present who had a driver’s license. She was not a member of the Rice family or household. The collision causing the plaintiffs injuries occurred while Miss Norton was driving the Rice vehicle on the errand. Beth Rice and the other two young girls were in the car at the time, but did not testify at the trial. Mrs. Bearden (nee Betty Norton) testified that Beth Rice did not in any way tell her where to go, how to go, or how to operate or control the car; that she had control of the automobile and was not subject to any supervision or control or direction; and that she had full responsibility for it.

The suit originally named only Peter J. Rice as defendant. At his death, the Trust Company of Georgia, as executor of Mr. Rice’s estate, was made the party defendant. At the close of the evidence the defendant moved for a directed verdict on the ground that there had been no showing that there was any legal liability upon the defendant under the family purpose doctrine or any agency as far as the named parties are concerned. The trial judge overruled the motion. Defendant then filed a written motion for judgment n.o.v. on the same grounds, which the trial judge overruled. Held:

The trial judge was in error. There was no evidence that at any time Mr. Rice ever authorized Mrs. Rice to allow other persons to drive the automobile — even on family business so as to make the family purpose doctrine applicable. The fact that the vehicle [727]*727may have been a "family purpose vehicle” when used by members of the family or household, would not necessarily make it one when used by a third party — not a member of the family or household. "The fact that an automobile owner gives a family member possession and permission and consent to operate an automobile for family purposes does not alone imply that the owner authorized the family member to delegate to another his authority to operate the automobile outside his presence, direction and control. See 5A Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice 82, § 3121; 8 AmJur2d 149, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 594. When there are no particular facts sufficient to show that an automobile owner has authorized a family member to authorize another person to drive the automobile, the owner is not liable under the family purpose rule for injuries caused by the negligent operation of the automobile by the third person outside the presencé and control of the family member.” Pritchett v. Williams, 115 Ga. App. 8, 10 (153 SE2d 639).

Argued September 6, 1973 Decided January 31, 1974. Harris, Russell & Watkins, Joseph H. Davis, for appellant. Milton F. Gardner, Hugh P. Thompson, for appellee.

Judgment reversed.

Bell, C. J., Hall, P. J., Eberhardt, P. J., and Clark, J., concur. Pannell, Deen, Quillian and Evans, JJ., dissent.

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Stolz, Judge.

Defendant appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court of Putnam County overruling its motion for directed verdict and for judgment n. o. v. in a negligence case in which the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.

[726]*726Defendant contends that as a matter of law the pleadings and evidence demand a judgment in its favor. Paragraph 5 of the complaint alleged that "the said 1960 Chevrolet automobile owned by the defendant at the time of said collision was kept, used and maintained by him as a family car for the use, pleasure and enjoyment of the members of his family, and at the time of said collision Betty Norton, at the request of the defendant’s wife, had driven to Red’s Drive-In in defendant’s automobile to buy refreshments for the defendant’s family.” This paragraph was admitted by the defendant.

Succinctly stated, the evidence showed that Peter J. Rice owned two automobiles. The vehicles were used interchangeably by him and his wife. On the date in question, Mrs. Rice, Beth Rice ( a 15-year-old daughter), Betty Norton (now Bearden) and two of Beth’s other friends were making costumes at the Rice home when they ran out of material. Mrs. Rice "asked Betty [Norton] if she would take the car and drive so that they could get whatever it was that [was] needed.” Betty Norton was the only one of the girls present who had a driver’s license. She was not a member of the Rice family or household. The collision causing the plaintiffs injuries occurred while Miss Norton was driving the Rice vehicle on the errand. Beth Rice and the other two young girls were in the car at the time, but did not testify at the trial. Mrs. Bearden (nee Betty Norton) testified that Beth Rice did not in any way tell her where to go, how to go, or how to operate or control the car; that she had control of the automobile and was not subject to any supervision or control or direction; and that she had full responsibility for it.

The suit originally named only Peter J. Rice as defendant. At his death, the Trust Company of Georgia, as executor of Mr. Rice’s estate, was made the party defendant. At the close of the evidence the defendant moved for a directed verdict on the ground that there had been no showing that there was any legal liability upon the defendant under the family purpose doctrine or any agency as far as the named parties are concerned. The trial judge overruled the motion. Defendant then filed a written motion for judgment n.o.v. on the same grounds, which the trial judge overruled. Held:

The trial judge was in error. There was no evidence that at any time Mr. Rice ever authorized Mrs. Rice to allow other persons to drive the automobile — even on family business so as to make the family purpose doctrine applicable. The fact that the vehicle [727]*727may have been a "family purpose vehicle” when used by members of the family or household, would not necessarily make it one when used by a third party — not a member of the family or household. "The fact that an automobile owner gives a family member possession and permission and consent to operate an automobile for family purposes does not alone imply that the owner authorized the family member to delegate to another his authority to operate the automobile outside his presence, direction and control. See 5A Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice 82, § 3121; 8 AmJur2d 149, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 594. When there are no particular facts sufficient to show that an automobile owner has authorized a family member to authorize another person to drive the automobile, the owner is not liable under the family purpose rule for injuries caused by the negligent operation of the automobile by the third person outside the presencé and control of the family member.” Pritchett v. Williams, 115 Ga. App. 8, 10 (153 SE2d 639).

Argued September 6, 1973 Decided January 31, 1974. Harris, Russell & Watkins, Joseph H. Davis, for appellant. Milton F. Gardner, Hugh P. Thompson, for appellee.

Judgment reversed.

Bell, C. J., Hall, P. J., Eberhardt, P. J., and Clark, J., concur. Pannell, Deen, Quillian and Evans, JJ., dissent.

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204 S.E.2d 499, 130 Ga. App. 725, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1241, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/trust-co-of-ga-v-howard-gactapp-1974.

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