Trust Co. of America v. Chicago, P. & St. L. Ry. Co. of Illinois

199 F. 593, 1912 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1226
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Illinois
DecidedSeptember 27, 1912
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 199 F. 593 (Trust Co. of America v. Chicago, P. & St. L. Ry. Co. of Illinois) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Trust Co. of America v. Chicago, P. & St. L. Ry. Co. of Illinois, 199 F. 593, 1912 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1226 (S.D. Ill. 1912).

Opinion

SANBORN, District Judge

(after stating the facts as above). [1] A technical question of jurisdiction was raised in the former Circuit Court by demurrer, and later by answer to the effect that the receivers’ injunction petition was not ancillary to the foreclosure suit, because the subject-matter of the petition is wholly unrelated to the subject-matter of the bill. The demurrer was overruled by the Circuit Court, upon the authority of Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 144, 28 Sup. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 932, 14 Ann. Cas. 764, holding that a federal question is raised in suits like this, and Compton v. Jessup, 68 Fed. 263,15 C. C. A. 397, Blake v. Pine Mountain Coal Co., 76 Fed. 624, 22, C. C. A. 430, and like cases, holding that petitions similar to this are ancillary to the main suit, and hence within the jurisdiction. We are entirely satisfied that the jurisdiction was properly sustained.

The Chicago, Peoria & St. Eouis Railroad was operated at a loss during the fiscal years of 1908 and 1909, and on June 30, 1909, the total deficit was $202,071.60. A foreclosure suit was at once begun, and this intervening petition was filed in that suit. Compliance with the two-cent maximum passenger rate act of Illinois by the road was in part responsible for the deficit. Receivers were appointed, who operated the road under the same conditions up to October 13, 1909, when they filed this petition, alleging that the maximum passenger rate act, as applied to this railroad, was confiscatory, and constituted a taking of its property without due process of law. A temporary injunction was issued, prohibiting the enforcement of the statute as to this road, and the receivers thereupon put in force a three-cent rate, with one-cent coupons, as provided in the in junctional order.

The question now before us is whether the evidence shows the Illinois rate to be confiscatory, as applied to this particular railroad, in respect to passenger returns.

[2] Earnings from the state passenger business, including mail, express, and similar returns from the running of passenger trains, are readily found. Expenses directly chargeable to such business may also be figured with reasonable certainty. But the “common expenses,” so called, like maintenance of the line, the equipment. [604]*604traffic, and general expenses, and their proper distribution, between freight and passenger business, present' much difficulty. The master, following the great weight of the expert testimony, as_ well as the decisions of the courts, has adopted and applied what is known as the “revenue train mile” basis in the distribution of these common expenses between the freight business, state and interstate, and the passenger. On such basis the road was not earning a fair return from its state passenger business up to the time of the receivership, and the master concludes that the injunction should be made permanent, and the receivers allowed to charge three cents a mile for passenger service.

The revenue train mile basis of apportionment, as between freight business and passenger business, is applied to expenses hot directly apportionable (called “common expenses”) by the following method: The ninth annual report of the company shows the train mileage for 1909 of passenger trains, 446,540; freight trains, 532,962; mixed trains, 790; and special trains, 338. All but the last were revenue producing trains. Excluding the special trains, whose character is not shown, the total train mileage was 980,292. Of the mixed trains, one-fourth of the mileage was allowed to' passenger service; the balance, to freight. The total passenger miles would therefore be 446,-737.5; and the freight, 533,554.5 — total, 980,292; and the passenger percentage 45.57. The year 1909 is taken, instead of the year 1908 (June 30 to June 30), because showing a nearer recovery from the panic of 1907, and thus being closer to normal conditions. Thus, taking the common expense of superintendence for the year, which was $7,891.59, the passenger proportion would be $3,596.19. The master’s figures for this item are $3,610.50, a difference of $4.31. This .method of apportionment was applied to all the common expenses, in order to ascertain what part were passenger expenses, with the modifications referred to in Exhibit 2, shown on another page.

Next it was necessary to find the proportion of state and interstate passenger expense. This was done by finding the state and interstate revenues. It was found that the state passenger returns for 1909 were $261,339.26; interstate, $48,217.58; mail, express, and miscellaneous income earned by passenger trains, undivided as between state and interstate, $54,974.46 — -being a total of $364,531.40. By applying the revenue train mile basis to all common expenses for 1909, and allocating all direct passenger expenses, it was found that both these kinds of expense, including the proper share of taxes and hire of e'quipment, amounted to $350,914.45, which was the expense of producing the $364,531.40; also that the state passenger expense was $326,326.75. It was then found that the state passenger revenue represented 71.69 per cent, of the total passenger revenue; the interstate, 13.23 per cent.; and express, mail, and miscellaneous, 15.08 per cent. It was also shown by testimony for the receivers that it costs about 15 per cent, more to handle the state passenger business than it does the interstate, because of the shorter haul of state passengers and other reasons. By applying the additional 15 per centum to the operating expense, it was found that 2.75 per cent, of such [605]*605expense, or $8,973.99, should be added to the state passenger expense; the final result being that the state passenger business for 1909 earned a net return of $794.80, or less than 1 per centum. This method is approved in Chicago, etc., Co. v. Tompkins, 176 U. S. 179, 20 Sup. Ct. 336, 44 L. Ed. 417, Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418, 42 L. Ed. 819, and Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission (D C.) 196 Fed. 800, 824.

[3] In order to find what the road was fairly entitled to earn on its passenger business in 1909, the total value of the railroad in that year was found to be $5,510,961. These figures were agreed to by both sides, and are supported by the testimony. To obtain the proportion of the passenger value, state, interstate, and mail and express, the total revenue of $1,554,600.37 was taken, and the total passenger revenue found to be 23.45 per cent, of this, making the valuation of the passenger proportion $1,292,329.35. 71.69 per cent, of this, or $926,464.46, represents the state passenger valuation. This should fairly earn 6 per cent., or $55,587.87. On this basis, the earnings for 1909 were about $55,000 too small. That this is the proper rule, see Smyth v. Ames, supra, and Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Love (C. C.) 177 Fed. 493 (the Oklahoma case).

The plan or formula of division or allocation of expense for each fiscal year adopted by the master, and recommended by the testimony of substantially all the witnesses except Mr. Hillman, is as follows:

A. To the revenue freight train mileage 75 per cent, of the mixed train mileage is added, and to the revenue passenger train mileage 25 per cent, of the mixed train mileage is added, and the common expenses are apportioned on the percentage thus obtained.

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Bluebook (online)
199 F. 593, 1912 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1226, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/trust-co-of-america-v-chicago-p-st-l-ry-co-of-illinois-ilsd-1912.