Sognier, Judge.
James S. Henderson instituted action against Trust Company Bank of Augusta N.A. to recover funds allegedly misappropriated from Henderson’s business by an employee and converted by the bank when it allowed the employee to endorse in blank checks made payable to the business, and cash them or deposit them to a personal checking account. The case was tried by a jury and at the close of the evidence, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of Henderson as to the checks cashed by the bank, in the amount of $5,239, and denied the bank’s motion for a directed verdict as to Henderson’s claim for attorney fees and liability for the proceeds of the checks deposited in the employee’s personal checking account. These issues were submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict for Henderson for $66,161, representing the amount of the deposited checks, plus interest, and [368]*368for attorney fees, which the parties stipulated were $12,500. The trial court entered judgment accordingly, and the bank appeals.
The record reveals that appellee owned and operated a Ramada Inn in Augusta, Georgia. In the fall of 1984, appellee hired Thomas Muia for the position of general manager of the inn. It was part of Muia’s responsibility as general manager to handle personnel, purchasing, and daily supervision of operations, including depositing operating revenues of the business into one of Ramada Inn’s two bank accounts: the regular account, or the special account used to pay such items as musician fees, liquor bills, and other hotel expenses which were not charged. He was specifically authorized by appellee to endorse all checks either with a rubber stamp provided for that purpose, or by running them through the hotel’s cash register, both of which provided a restrictive endorsement for deposit to the Ramada Inn’s accounts. Muia had authority to write checks on the special account, but not on the regular account. In connection with his banking duties, Muia was introduced by appellee to the personnel at appellant’s branch handling the Ramada Inn accounts and soon thereafter opened a personal checking account.
In February of 1985, Muia deposited to his personal account three checks made payable to Ramada Inn which he had endorsed by hand, in blank, both on behalf of the Ramada Inn and himself, and also containing his personal account number. Thereafter, from June through November, 1985, Muia made deposits to his personal account consisting of charge reimbursement checks from American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc., all made payable to Ramada Inn and all endorsed in blank on behalf of Ramada Inn by Muia. Some also bore Muia’s endorsement or account number. On one occasion, a teller questioned her supervisor regarding a Ramada Inn check Muia sought to deposit into his personal account, and was told it was proper. Other transactions typically were not questioned. One transaction was a “split deposit,” in which some cash was disbursed and the remainder deposited; one American Express check was cashed by Muia with the approval of appellant’s branch manager, rather than deposited to his personal account. The total amount of the checks either cashed or deposited was over $71,000.
1. Appellant contends the trial court erred by denying its motion for directed verdict with regard to its liability for the proceeds of the checks deposited to Muia’s personal account because OCGA § 7-1-352 (a) protects the bank from liability to appellant. OCGA § 7-1-352 (a) provides that “[w]henever any agent, administrator, executor, guardian, trustee, either express or implied, or other fiduciary, whether bona fide or mala fide, shall deposit any money in any bank to his credit as an individual, or as such agent, trustee, or other fiduciary, whether the name of the person or corporation for whom he is acting [369]*369or purporting to act be given or not, such bank shall be authorized to pay the amount of such deposit, or any part thereof, upon the order of such agent, administrator, executor, guardian, trustee, or other fiduciary, signed with the name in which such deposit was entered, without being accountable in any way to the principal, cestui que trust, or other person or corporation who may be entitled to or interested in the amount so deposited.” We do not agree that OCGA § 7-1-352 (a) is the statute which governs this case. As this court pointed out in Bank South v. Grand Lodge &c. for Ga., 174 Ga. App. 777, 780 (331 SE2d 629) (1985), the legislative history of OCGA § 7-1-352 (a), resting in common law adhered to by this State for almost a century, indicates that the statute means simply that “ ‘[w]hen a trustee [or agent or other fiduciary] deposits money in a bank, the bank has a right to assume that the money so deposited will be applied by the trustee [or agent or other fiduciary] to the proper purposes under the trust, and acting under this assumption it may lawfully pay the checks drawn by the person depositing the money, whether signed in his representative capacity or not.’ ” Had Muia deposited the checks in question in the case sub judice into the Ramada Inn special account (on which he had been authorized to write checks), and then proceeded unlawfully to enrich himself by writing checks on that account made payable to himself, we could agree with appellant that the bank would be protected by OCGA § 7-1-352 (a). However, such is not the case. The record indicates that appellee’s claim against the bank is based on the bank’s acceptance for deposit into Muia’s personal checking account of checks made payable to Ramada Inn.
Contrary to appellant’s argument, National Factor &c. Corp. v. State Bank of Cochran, 224 Ga. 535 (163 SE2d 817) (1968), is inapposite. Rather than supporting the claim made by the appellant, that case supports the distinction we draw here. In National Factor, the plaintiff sought to recover from the bank which paid checks drawn by one who had diverted the plaintiff’s funds to the embezzler’s account. Thus Code Ann. § 13-2042, the predecessor of OCGA § 7-1-352, was appropriately relied on there. The facts in National Factor, supra, are further distinguishable from those here as the embezzler there was the proprietor and operator of a closely held family business, and there was far less reason for the bank to be aware that anything untoward was taking place.
In the case at bar, Muia’s endorsements on the checks deposited into his personal account were “forged” because, with intent to defraud, he knowingly signed and presented the checks so as to give the appearance of authority from appellee, which he did not have. See OCGA § 16-9-2 (a).
By accepting the checks for deposit into Muia’s personal account, the bank converted appellee’s funds. OCGA § 11-3-419 (1) (c). OCGA [370]
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Sognier, Judge.
James S. Henderson instituted action against Trust Company Bank of Augusta N.A. to recover funds allegedly misappropriated from Henderson’s business by an employee and converted by the bank when it allowed the employee to endorse in blank checks made payable to the business, and cash them or deposit them to a personal checking account. The case was tried by a jury and at the close of the evidence, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of Henderson as to the checks cashed by the bank, in the amount of $5,239, and denied the bank’s motion for a directed verdict as to Henderson’s claim for attorney fees and liability for the proceeds of the checks deposited in the employee’s personal checking account. These issues were submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict for Henderson for $66,161, representing the amount of the deposited checks, plus interest, and [368]*368for attorney fees, which the parties stipulated were $12,500. The trial court entered judgment accordingly, and the bank appeals.
The record reveals that appellee owned and operated a Ramada Inn in Augusta, Georgia. In the fall of 1984, appellee hired Thomas Muia for the position of general manager of the inn. It was part of Muia’s responsibility as general manager to handle personnel, purchasing, and daily supervision of operations, including depositing operating revenues of the business into one of Ramada Inn’s two bank accounts: the regular account, or the special account used to pay such items as musician fees, liquor bills, and other hotel expenses which were not charged. He was specifically authorized by appellee to endorse all checks either with a rubber stamp provided for that purpose, or by running them through the hotel’s cash register, both of which provided a restrictive endorsement for deposit to the Ramada Inn’s accounts. Muia had authority to write checks on the special account, but not on the regular account. In connection with his banking duties, Muia was introduced by appellee to the personnel at appellant’s branch handling the Ramada Inn accounts and soon thereafter opened a personal checking account.
In February of 1985, Muia deposited to his personal account three checks made payable to Ramada Inn which he had endorsed by hand, in blank, both on behalf of the Ramada Inn and himself, and also containing his personal account number. Thereafter, from June through November, 1985, Muia made deposits to his personal account consisting of charge reimbursement checks from American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc., all made payable to Ramada Inn and all endorsed in blank on behalf of Ramada Inn by Muia. Some also bore Muia’s endorsement or account number. On one occasion, a teller questioned her supervisor regarding a Ramada Inn check Muia sought to deposit into his personal account, and was told it was proper. Other transactions typically were not questioned. One transaction was a “split deposit,” in which some cash was disbursed and the remainder deposited; one American Express check was cashed by Muia with the approval of appellant’s branch manager, rather than deposited to his personal account. The total amount of the checks either cashed or deposited was over $71,000.
1. Appellant contends the trial court erred by denying its motion for directed verdict with regard to its liability for the proceeds of the checks deposited to Muia’s personal account because OCGA § 7-1-352 (a) protects the bank from liability to appellant. OCGA § 7-1-352 (a) provides that “[w]henever any agent, administrator, executor, guardian, trustee, either express or implied, or other fiduciary, whether bona fide or mala fide, shall deposit any money in any bank to his credit as an individual, or as such agent, trustee, or other fiduciary, whether the name of the person or corporation for whom he is acting [369]*369or purporting to act be given or not, such bank shall be authorized to pay the amount of such deposit, or any part thereof, upon the order of such agent, administrator, executor, guardian, trustee, or other fiduciary, signed with the name in which such deposit was entered, without being accountable in any way to the principal, cestui que trust, or other person or corporation who may be entitled to or interested in the amount so deposited.” We do not agree that OCGA § 7-1-352 (a) is the statute which governs this case. As this court pointed out in Bank South v. Grand Lodge &c. for Ga., 174 Ga. App. 777, 780 (331 SE2d 629) (1985), the legislative history of OCGA § 7-1-352 (a), resting in common law adhered to by this State for almost a century, indicates that the statute means simply that “ ‘[w]hen a trustee [or agent or other fiduciary] deposits money in a bank, the bank has a right to assume that the money so deposited will be applied by the trustee [or agent or other fiduciary] to the proper purposes under the trust, and acting under this assumption it may lawfully pay the checks drawn by the person depositing the money, whether signed in his representative capacity or not.’ ” Had Muia deposited the checks in question in the case sub judice into the Ramada Inn special account (on which he had been authorized to write checks), and then proceeded unlawfully to enrich himself by writing checks on that account made payable to himself, we could agree with appellant that the bank would be protected by OCGA § 7-1-352 (a). However, such is not the case. The record indicates that appellee’s claim against the bank is based on the bank’s acceptance for deposit into Muia’s personal checking account of checks made payable to Ramada Inn.
Contrary to appellant’s argument, National Factor &c. Corp. v. State Bank of Cochran, 224 Ga. 535 (163 SE2d 817) (1968), is inapposite. Rather than supporting the claim made by the appellant, that case supports the distinction we draw here. In National Factor, the plaintiff sought to recover from the bank which paid checks drawn by one who had diverted the plaintiff’s funds to the embezzler’s account. Thus Code Ann. § 13-2042, the predecessor of OCGA § 7-1-352, was appropriately relied on there. The facts in National Factor, supra, are further distinguishable from those here as the embezzler there was the proprietor and operator of a closely held family business, and there was far less reason for the bank to be aware that anything untoward was taking place.
In the case at bar, Muia’s endorsements on the checks deposited into his personal account were “forged” because, with intent to defraud, he knowingly signed and presented the checks so as to give the appearance of authority from appellee, which he did not have. See OCGA § 16-9-2 (a).
By accepting the checks for deposit into Muia’s personal account, the bank converted appellee’s funds. OCGA § 11-3-419 (1) (c). OCGA [370]*370§ 11-3-419 (3) would provide an exception to the bank’s liability for conversion had the bank acted “in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards” applicable to the banking business. However, good faith and commercial reasonableness are separate requirements, both of which must be met to support the defense. While appellant may have acted in good faith, it was for the jury to decide whether its acceptance of the checks for deposit into Muia’s personal checking account was consistent with reasonable commercial standards. “ In E. L. Von Gohren v. Pacific National Bank of Washington, . . . the court held as a matter of law that a bank which accepted checks made payable to a corporation for deposit into the personal account of the bookkeeper could not have acted in a commercially reasonable manner.’ ” National Bank of Ga. v. Refrigerated Transport Co., 147 Ga. App. 240, 244 (248 SE2d 496) (1978). “In a case involving similar circumstances . . . this court held that ‘ “[t]he indorsements were irregular enough on their face to raise some question as to their validity; and certainly when the checks were offered for deposit into the . . . account of one not the payee, [the bank] had a duty to inquire to ascertain the authority of [the depositor] to indorse and deposit [the payee’s] checks. [The bank] could not escape its duty of inquiry by relying on the word of its customer, [the depositor], [Cits.].” ’ ” Thornton & Co. v. Gwinnett Bank &c. Co., 151 Ga. App. 641, 647 (260 SE2d 765) (1979).
In the case at bar, the endorsements were unusual for checks made out to the Ramada Inn, in that the customary rubber stamp, containing a restrictive endorsement, was not present, nor had the checks been run through the Ramada Inn’s cash register, which also provided a restrictive endorsement. This was an “irregularity” such as the jury could have concluded should have put the bank on notice and activated the bank’s duty to make inquiry, particularly because here, as in Thornton, supra, the checks were being deposited into the depositor’s personal account. In fact, this irregularity was brought to the bank’s attention when one of its tellers questioned the propriety of depositing a check made out to the Ramada Inn, and endorsed in blank by Muia, to Muia’s personal account. We do not hold that the bank could not, as a matter of law, have asserted the § 11-3-419 (3) defense, but that the matter was properly submitted to the jury. “On appeal, the evidence must be construed to uphold the jury’s verdict, and the sole question for determination is whether there is any evidence to authorize the verdict. [Cits.]” Gold Kist Peanuts v. Alberson, 178 Ga. App. 253, 254 (1) (342 SE2d 694) (1986). As the evidence would have authorized the jury to find that the bank did not act in a commercially reasonable manner, the bank is liable to appellee for conversion, and we affirm the jury’s verdict.
2. Appellant enumerates two errors which concern the trial [371]*371court’s instructions to the jury.
(a) Appellant argues the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury that “[i]f you should find that Mr. Muia was authorized by actual or apparent authority to endorse checks payable to Ramada Inn, the payment of these checks would not constitute payment over a forged endorsement.” However, as stated in Division 1 above, Muia’s testimony admitting he endorsed the American Express Travel checks so as to have them deposited in his personal account established that Muia’s endorsement of these checks was a forgery and thus, by accepting them and crediting the proceeds to Muia’s personal account, appellant committed conversion under OCGA § 11-3-419 (1) (c). See generally First Bank &c. Co. v. Insurance &c. Assn., 154 Ga. App. 697, 698 (1) (269 SE2d 527) (1980). Therefore, the charge requested by appellant was not applicable to the jury’s inquiry (that is, whether or not appellant was liable in conversion because it acted in good faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial standards under OCGA § 11-3-419 (3)), and the failure to so charge the jury was not error. See generally Atkinson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 182 Ga. App. 50 (2) (354 SE2d 866) (1987).
(b) Appellant also argues the trial court, by giving appellee’s request to charge number 10, erroneously required the jury to find that Muia had authority both to endorse the checks and to deposit them into his personal account before they could find Muia was acting under apparent authority. Aside from the fact that Muia’s actions in endorsing the checks constituted a forgery and thus his authority to endorse the checks was not in issue, appellant has misread the charge as given. The charge required the jury to find Muia had the authority both to endorse and to deposit the checks in order to find that “Muia had apparent authority to act as, he did." (Emphasis supplied.) The charge thus addressed evidentiary questions rather than questions of law under OCGA § 11-1-201 (43). Being predicated on some evidence adduced at trial, it follows that the trial court did not err by so charging. See generally B. J. Howard Corp. v. Skinner, Wilson & Strickland, 172 Ga. App. 180, 181 (2) (322 SE2d 306) (1984).
3. Appellant alleges the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support the jury’s verdict because appellant is entitled to a credit for bills and obligations of appellee allegedly paid by Muia from the funds he deposited in his personal account. We find no merit in this contention. Appellant concedes that the trial court correctly charged the jury that if it found that bills and obligations of appellee were paid by Muia, then appellant was entitled to set-off or credit against the amount claimed for any sums repaid by Mr. Muia. The jury apparently did not so find, and such a finding was not mandated, as claimed by appellant, despite the fact that Muia’s testimony was not directly contradicted. “ ‘The interest of a witness in the result of [372]*372the suit may always be considered in passing upon his credibility; and where there are circumstances inconsistent with the truth of his testimony, the jury are not obliged to believe him, even though he is not contradicted by any other witness.’ [Cit.]” Board of Trustees &c. v. Englade, 256 Ga. 458, 459 (2) (349 SE2d 703) (1986). That Muia had an interest in the outcome of this litigation is beyond question. First, he was a third-party defendant in the action below. Second, his interest in minimizing the bank’s liability certainly may be inferred from the fact that criminal charges relating to these same events were pending against him.
It was appellee’s testimony that his operation at the Ramada Inn in Augusta had an excellent credit rating, was not experiencing any difficulty paying bills, and that it was certainly not necessary for Muia to pay them out of his personal account. In addition, the record reflects that no Ramada Inn bills were paid by Muia from his personal account until he began the embezzlement, no approval was sought or obtained by Muia for payment of the bills paid from his personal account, nor did Muia mention payment of these bills in mitigation when he first admitted his crimes. These facts indicate circumstances which are inconsistent with the truth of Muia’s testimony which, coupled with Muia’s interest in the outcome of the litigation, authorized the jury to disbelieve his testimony.
4. In appellant’s final enumeration of error, it asserts the trial court erred by denying its motion for a directed verdict as to the issue of attorney fees. OCGA § 13-6-11 provides that “[t]he expenses of litigation generally shall not be allowed as a part of the damages; but where the plaintiff has specially pleaded and has made prayer therefor and where the defendant has acted in bad faith in making the contract, has been stubbornly litigious, or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense, the jury may allow them.” This section may be applied to suits in both contract and tort. Jones v. Spindel, 122 Ga. App. 390, 391 (3) (177 SE2d 187) (1970).
We agree with appellant that there is no issue of “bad faith” here. (See Division 1.) While issues of stubborn litigiousness are normally for the jury, if there is a bona fide controversy, there can be no stubborn litigiousness as a matter of law. Woodson v. Burton, 241 Ga. 130, 131-132 (4) (243 SE2d 885) (1978). While the record does reflect that with respect to the amounts cashed, rather than deposited into Muia’s account, appellant first admitted liability but then insisted on litigating this issue, the total amount of funds in this category was a minimal portion of the total liability — less than $5,300 out of a total amount of over $71,000 plus interest. Even assuming, arguendo, that appellant was unnecessarily litigious with respect to that one issue, we do not find it sufficient to support the award of attorney fees. We therefore affirm with direction that the $12,500 awarded as attorney [373]*373fees be written off.
Judgment affirmed with direction.
Deen, P. J., Banke, P. J., Pope, and Beasley, JJ., concur. McMurray, P. J., Carley, and Ben-ham, JJ., dissent. Birdsong, C. J., disqualified.