Trump v. Twitter, Inc

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: January 4, 2023
• Docket: 3:21-cv-08378
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 DONALD J. TRUMP, et al., Case No. 3:21-cv-08378-JD

8 Plaintiffs, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE v. 9

10 TWITTER INC., et al., Defendants. 11

12 Plaintiffs Naomi Wolf, former President Donald J. Trump, four other individuals, and the 13 American Conservative Union, sued Twitter on behalf of themselves and a putative class of 14 Twitter users for being “de-platformed” and “censored.” Dkt. No. 21 ¶¶ 8, 18. Plaintiffs alleged 15 First Amendment claims in connection with a state action theory of liability. The Court dismissed 16 the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) with leave to amend. Dkt. No. 165. 17 Plaintiffs elected not to amend, and judgment was entered against them. Dkt. No. 168. 18 Plaintiffs filed an appeal in the Ninth Circuit. Dkt. No. 169. Although the appeal is 19 pending, Wolf has asked the Court for an “indicative ruling” under Federal Rule of Civil 20 Procedure 62.1 on whether the Court would set aside the judgment under Rule 60(b)(2) in light of 21 newly discovered evidence. Dkt. No. 176. 22 Wolf’s request raises a question of mootness as a threshold matter. To start, the Rule 62.1 23 motion is procedurally sound. “The filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional 24 significance -- it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its 25 control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer 26 Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per curiam). But even when an appeal is pending, a party may 27 seek relief from a final judgment or order by filing a Rule 60(b) motion in the district court with a 1 considering the motion; (2) deny the motion; or (3) state either that it would grant the motion if the 2 || court of appeals remands for that purpose or that the motion raises a substantial issue.” Fed. R. 3 || Civ. P. 62.1(a). 4 The salient question is whether Wolf’s claims are moot in light of recent, well-publicized 5 changes in Twitter’s operations and policies. “[I]t 1s familiar law that a federal court always has 6 jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.” United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002). 7 “An actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint 8 || is filed.” Bernhardt v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 871 (9th Cir. 2002). A matter is moot 9 || if at any time during the course of litigation, the plaintiff ceases to be threatened with or suffer “an 10 || actual injury [that is] traceable to the defendant,” and that is “likely to be redressed by a favorable 11 || judicial decision.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (internal quotation and citation 12 omitted). 5 13 Publicly available information suggests that circumstances may have changed with respect S 14 || to Wolf’s claims and Twitter’s current practices. Consequently, Wolf is directed to show cause in 3 15 writing why her claims present a live controversy, and whether her request for an injunction, a 16 || which is the main remedy she seeks, is tenable. A response is due by January 23, 2023.

= 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 || Dated: January 4, 2023 19 20 JAMES/PDONATO 21 United Btates District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28