Trujillo v. LaCrosse

District Court, E.D. Wisconsin·Decided April 24, 2025·No. 2:24-cv-01674·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

PHILLIP M. TRUJILLO,

Plaintiff, Case No. 24-CV-1674-JPS v.

JA LACROSSE, SGT. REETZ, C.O. ORDER ARNOLD, C.O. NACK, C.O. DIEFENTHALER, and COOK JW,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Phillip M. Trujillo, an inmate confined at Manitowoc County Jail, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the Defendants violated his constitutional rights to adequate nutrition. ECF No. 1. On March 4, 2025, the Court screened the complaint, found that it failed to state a claim, and allowed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint on or before March 26, 2025. ECF No. 7. On March 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for an extension of time to file an amended complaint. ECF No. 8. On March 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. ECF No. 9. The Court will therefore deny Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time as moot because the amended complaint was timely. The remainder of this Order screens Plaintiff’s amended complaint. 1. FEDERAL SCREENING STANDARD Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). 2. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants JA LaCrosse (“LaCrosse”), Sgt. Reetz (“Reetz”), C.O. Arnold (“Arnold”), C.O. Nack (“Nack”), C.O. Diefenthaler (“Diefenthaler”), and Cook JW (“JW”). ECF No. 9 at 1. On June 8, 2024, Plaintiff received a lunch tray from Reetz that contained pineapple. Id. at 2. Plaintiff picked up his handset to let Diefenthaler know that he was severely allergic to pineapple and that he needed another tray. Id. Diefenthaler told Plaintiff there was nothing she could do and to eat around it. Id. Plaintiff talked to Reetz about it but was told the same thing. Id. Plaintiff admits he responded inappropriately and that he was sent to the hole for throwing his food tray. Id. at 2–3. Plaintiff never received anything else to eat. Id. at 3. Plaintiff continued to receive food trays with pineapple for the next three months. Id. On August 3, 2024, Plaintiff was the only inmate to receive pineapple on his food tray and he believes JW put the food there to retaliate against him. Id. Plaintiff asked to speak to the Sergeant, but Palmer said he was busy. Palmer did not provide Plaintiff a replacement meal. Id. When Plaintiff attempted to speak to the Sergeant, Nack confronted Plaintiff and accused him of lying. Nack told Plaintiff she did not understand why Plaintiff could not eat around the food. Id. The jail administrator, LaCrosse, knew about the situation and turned a blind eye to Plaintiff’s requests for help. Id. at 4. Plaintiff is extremely allergic to pineapple and even the smallest amount can cause his airway to swell. Id. As a result, Plaintiff could not eat around the pineapple because the tray could have been contaminated. The jail serves a lot of mixed fruit with pineapple and Plaintiff missed one to two meals per day because Defendants have failed to accommodate his serious food allergy. Id. Plaintiff has experienced weight loss, anxiety, depression, irritable bowel syndrome, constipation, severe stomach cramps, agitation to his ulcers, vitamin deficiency, and lethargy due to Defendants’ actions. Id. 3. ANALYSIS The Court finds that Plaintiff may proceed on a Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against LaCrosse, Reetz, Arnold, Nack, Diefenthaler, and JW.1 The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment “imposes duties on prison officials to ‘provide humane conditions of confinement’ and ‘ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.’” Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). The same principles apply to pre-trial detainees. Hardeman v. Curren, 933 F.3d 816, 821–22 (7th Cir. 2019). Because pre-trial detention is not punitive, however, conditions of confinement claims brought by pre-trial detainees arise under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and not the Eighth Amendment. Id. The standards governing conditions-of-confinement claims differ depending on whether they are brought under the Fourteenth or Eighth Amendment. See Kemp v. Fulton County, 27 F.4th 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2022). While Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims contain only an objective component, id. (citing Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 823), Eighth Amendment claims contain an additional “subjective” element, requiring

1The Court notes that the prior screening order analyzed Plaintiff’s claims under the Eighth Amendment.

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