Trujillo v. LaCrosse

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedMarch 4, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-01674
StatusUnknown

This text of Trujillo v. LaCrosse (Trujillo v. LaCrosse) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Trujillo v. LaCrosse, (E.D. Wis. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

PHILLIP M. TRUJILLO,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 24-CV-1674-JPS

JA LACROSSE, SGT. REETZ, C.O. ARNOLD, C.O. NACK, C.O. ORDER DIEFENTHALER, and COOK JW,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Phillip M. Trujillo, an inmate confined at Manitowoc County Jail, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the Defendants violated his constitutional rights to adequate nutrition. ECF No. 1. This Order resolves Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and screens his complaint. 1. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applies to this case because Plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). The PLRA allows the Court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. Id. § 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). He must then pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On January 3, 2025, the Court ordered Plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $32.19. ECF No. 5. Plaintiff paid that fee on January 16, 2025. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. ECF No. 2. He must pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this Order. 2. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT 2.1 Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). 2.2 Plaintiff’s Allegations Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by giving him food that he was severely allergic to for a three-month period. ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff is severely allergic to pineapple. Id. Plaintiff told officers there was pineapple on his tray or in the main meal; officers continuously told Plaintiff to eat around it. Id. The jail was negligent to pineapple being served to Plaintiff despite knowing about his allergy. Id. As a result, Plaintiff was forced not to eat, and he lost an extreme amount of weight. Id. 2.3 Analysis The Court finds that Plaintiff may not proceed on an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim. A prisoner’s claim of unconstitutional conditions of confinement is analyzed under the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 832, 834 (1994). A prisoner is entitled to live in conditions that do not amount to “punishment.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Detainees are entitled to be confined under humane conditions that provide for their “basic human needs.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). “The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane ones[.]” Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 1996). To establish a constitutional violation with respect to an inmate’s living conditions, he must be able to demonstrate both: (1) the conditions were objectively so adverse that they deprived him “of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” and (2) the defendants acted with deliberate indifference with respect to the conditions. Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 773 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). “Life’s necessities include shelter, heat, clothing, sanitation, and hygiene items.” Woods v. Schmeltz, No. 14‐CV‐1336, 2014 WL 7005094, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 2014) (citing Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006)); see also Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840, 842–43 (7th Cir. 2013). Depending on the “amount and duration of the deprivation,” denying a prisoner adequate nutrition can violate the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights. Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 1999). Courts have found that instances of more “minor” deprivations did not meet the “objective seriousness” prong. See Dickerson v. Milwaukee County, No. 23-CV-1442-BHL, 2024 WL 233376 (E.D.

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Related

Bell v. Wolfish
441 U.S. 520 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Rhodes v. Chapman
452 U.S. 337 (Supreme Court, 1981)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
668 F.3d 896 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Orrin S. Reed v. Daniel McBride
178 F.3d 849 (Seventh Circuit, 1999)
Berrell Freeman v. Gerald A. Berge
441 F.3d 543 (Seventh Circuit, 2006)
Richard Budd v. Edward Motley
711 F.3d 840 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Townsend v. Fuchs
522 F.3d 765 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)

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Trujillo v. LaCrosse, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/trujillo-v-lacrosse-wied-2025.