Troy v. Equifax Information Services LLC

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8

James T roy, ) No. CV-20-01447-PHX-SPL ) 9 ) 10 Plaintiff, ) ORDER vs. ) ) 11 ) Equifax Information Services LLC, et ) 12 al., ) 13 ) ) 14 Defendants. )

15 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 63) and 16 Defendant Trans Union’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 65). Both Motions are 17 fully briefed and ready for review.1 (Docs. 63, 65, 67, 69, 71, 74). For the reasons below, 18 this Court grants Defendant Trans Union’s Motion as to all of Plaintiff’s claims and denies 19 Plaintiff’s Motion. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 This case arises out of alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 22 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. On July 22, 2020, Plaintiff James Troy filed a Complaint against 23 Defendants Equifax Information Services LLC (“Equifax”), Trans Union LLC (“Trans 24 Union”), and Jefferson Capital Systems LLC (“Jefferson Capital”). (Doc. 1). Equifax and 25 Trans Union are two of the “Big Three” credit reporting agencies (“CRAs”), along with 26

27 1 Because it would not assist in resolution of the instant issues, the Court finds the pending motions are suitable for decision without oral argument. See LRCiv. 7.2(f); Fed. 28 R. Civ. P. 78(b); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). 1 Experian. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2201 (2021). CRAs 2 “compile[] personal and financial information about individual consumers to create 3 consumer reports” and then sell those reports “for use by entities such as banks, landlords, 4 and car dealerships that request information about the creditworthiness of individual 5 consumers.” Id. Jefferson Capital is a debt collection agency that furnishes data to CRAs. 6 Equifax and Jefferson Capital have since been dismissed from the case, leaving Trans 7 Union as the only remaining defendant. (Docs. 34 & 54). 8 Plaintiff’s allegations concern his Trans Union credit file which showed Plaintiff’s 9 Jefferson Capital account—relating to an outstanding debt Plaintiff owed Verizon—with a 10 notation of “acct info disputed by consumr.” (Doc. 1 at 3). The notation can be traced back 11 to January 23, 2020, when the parties agree that Plaintiff’s credit repair company notified 12 Jefferson Capital directly that Plaintiff disputed his account. (Docs. 66 at 5 & 70 at 6). In 13 response, Jefferson Capital reported a dispute notation on Plaintiff’s account. (Id.). Finally, 14 Trans Union included the dispute notation in Plaintiff’s credit file on the Jefferson Capital 15 System tradeline. (Doc. 66-1 at 15). 16 In March 2020, Plaintiff sent a letter to Trans Union claiming that he no longer 17 disputed his Jefferson Capital account and asking Trans Union to remove the notation of 18 “accounts in dispute.” (Docs. 66 at 6 & 70 at 6). While the parties dispute the exact course 19 of events that followed, it is clear that Trans Union forwarded Plaintiff’s consumer 20 dispute—Plaintiff’s “dispute” of the dispute notation—to Jefferson Capital, requesting that 21 Jefferson Capital conduct its own investigation. (Doc. 1 at 3). Jefferson Capital verified to 22 Trans Union that its reporting of the Jefferson Capital tradeline was correct. (Id.). Trans 23 Union then “failed or refused to remove the notation of ‘accounts in dispute.’” (Id. at 4). 24 After Trans Union failed to remove the dispute notation, Plaintiff filed the 25 Complaint, alleging that Trans Union negligently (Count V) and willfully (Count VI) 26 violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(b) and 1681i by issuing credit reports containing 27 inaccuracies—that is, issuing credit reports that indicated Plaintiff disputed the Jefferson 28 Capital account when he no longer did—and by failing to conduct a reasonable 1 reinvestigation into the matter after the inaccuracy was reported. (Id. at 9–11). 2 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 3 A. Summary Judgment Standard 4 Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine 5 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden 7 of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 8 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party can satisfy this burden by demonstrating that 9 the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential 10 to that party’s case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322– 11 23. When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the factual 12 record and draw all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 13 Leisek v. Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2002). 14 B. The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. 15 “Congress enacted [the] FCRA in 1970 to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, 16 promote efficiency in the banking system, and protect consumer privacy.” Safeco Ins. Co. 17 of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52 (2007). In pursuing these goals, the FCRA “regulates the 18 creation and the use of consumer reports by [CRAs] for certain specified purposes, 19 including credit transactions, insurance, licensing, consumer-initiated business 20 transactions, and employment.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 334–35 (2016) 21 (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted). “[T]he statute imposes on [CRAs] a 22 panoply of procedural obligations and creates a private right of action for consumers to 23 enforce compliance.” Gomez v. EOS CCA, No. CV-18-02740-PHX-JAT (DMF), 2020 WL 24 3271749, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 17, 2020) (citing Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 25 1113–14 (9th Cir. 2017)). Two specific FCRA provisions are relevant in this case: 26 § 1681e(b) and § 1681i. 27 FCRA § 1681e(b) requires CRAs to “follow reasonable procedures to assure 28 maximum possible accuracy” of the information they place in an individual’s consumer 1 report. If the accuracy or completeness of reported information is disputed by the 2 consumer, FCRA § 1681i(a)(1)(A) requires the CRA to “conduct a reasonable 3 reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed information is inaccurate and record the 4 current status of the disputed information, or delete the item [of information] from the 5 file. . . .” The reinvestigation must take place within thirty days of when the CRA receives 6 notice of the dispute whether by direct notification from the consumer or indirect 7 notification through a reseller, unless the exception for additional information applies. 8 § 1681i(a)(1)(A). 9 III. ANALYSIS 10 The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment. (Docs. 63 & 65). Trans 11 Union seeks summary judgment as to all claims asserted by Plaintiff while Plaintiff seeks 12 partial summary judgment on the issue of Trans Union’s liability only. The below analysis 13 focuses on Trans Union’s Motion. Because this Court finds in Trans Union’s favor, it need 14 not address Plaintiff’s Motion. 15 A. Defendant Trans Union’s Motion for Summary Judgment 16 In its Motion, Trans Union asserts numerous arguments, including some which were 17 previously rejected by this Court in relation to Trans Union’s Motion for Judgment on the 18 Pleadings. (Doc. 60). The Court will focus, however, only on Trans Union’s standing 19 argument. Trans Union argues that Plaintiff has failed to meet the first two elements of 20 standing: injury-in-fact and causation. (Doc. 65 at 23). Specifically, Trans Union asserts 21 that Plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence to show that he suffered a concrete injury and to 22 show that any such injury was likely caused by Trans Union. (Id.). According to Trans 23 Union, Plaintiff lacks evidence to support his claims that he was denied credit, charged 24 higher interest rates, and suffered emotional distress. (Id. at 12–13). And even if he did 25 suffer those harms, Trans Union argues Plaintiff has failed to show that those injuries were 26 caused by its failure to remove the dispute notation from Plaintiff’s credit file. (Id.). 27 Article III of the Constitution “confines the federal judicial power to the resolution 28 of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” TransUnion, 141 S.Ct. at 2203. “For there to be a case or 1 controversy under Article III, the plaintiff must have a ‘personal stake’ in the case—in 2 other words, standing.” Id. (citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997)). To show 3 standing, “a plaintiff must show (i) that he suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, 4 particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the 5 defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” Id. (citing 6 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). If plaintiff fails in making this 7 showing, “there is no case or controversy for the federal court to resolve” and the plaintiff’s 8 claims must be dismissed. Id. (citation omitted). 9 Here, Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 10 (“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing [the elements of 11 standing].”). “Since they are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable 12 part of the plaintiff’s case, each element must be supported in the same way as any other 13 matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of 14 evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Id. (citations omitted). Unlike 15 at the pleading stage—where “general factual allegations of injury” may suffice—the 16 summary judgment stage requires plaintiff to respond not with mere allegations, but by 17 setting forth, by affidavit or other evidence, “specific facts . . . which for purposes of the 18 summary judgment motion will be taken to be true.” Id. (citation omitted). 19 In TransUnion, the Supreme Court held that “Congress’s creation of a statutory 20 prohibition or obligation and a cause of action does not relieve courts of their responsibility 21 to independently decide whether a plaintiff has suffered a concrete harm under Article III.” 22 TransUnion, 141 S.Ct. at 2205 (emphasis added). In other words, a plaintiff does not 23 automatically establish standing by merely showing that the defendant violated a statute. 24 Id. (citing Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341). Instead, “Article III standing requires a concrete injury 25 even in the context of a statutory violation.” Id. As to the concrete injury requirement, the 26 Court recognized that traditional “tangible” harms—such as physical harms, monetary 27 harms, and harms to one’s constitutional rights—“readily qualify” as concrete injuries-in- 28 fact for standing purposes. Id. at 2204 (citing Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341). Certain “intangible” 1 harms qualify as well, including reputational harms, disclosure of private information, and 2 intrusion upon seclusion. Id. 3 The TransUnion Court ultimately found that a significant number of the plaintiff 4 class members failed to show that they suffered a concrete harm that resulted from the 5 defendant’s alleged FCRA violations. Id. at 2212. In rejecting their claims of reputational 6 harm, the Court held that inaccuracies in a consumer’s internal credit file cause no concrete 7 harm unless the file was transmitted or disclosed to a third party—thereby causing 8 reputational harm. Id. at 2209–10. The Court also rejected the argument that the 9 inaccuracies themselves harmed plaintiff class members by increasing the risk of future 10 harm; the Court reasoned that such claimed injury was “too speculative to support Article 11 III standing” and that the plaintiffs failed to “demonstrate a sufficient likelihood” that the 12 inaccurate credit reports would be requested by, provided to, or otherwise released to third 13 parties. Id. at 2212. 14 Here, Plaintiff attempts to distinguish his case from TransUnion by pointing to 15 several harms that he suffered because of Trans Union’s failure to remove the dispute 16 notation from his credit file. (Docs. 69 at 15–17 & 71 at 10–11). Specifically, Plaintiff 17 alleges that he suffered monetary harm, physical harm, and reputational harm. (Doc. 71 at 18 11). Trans Union argues that Plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence to prove these harms or to 19 prove that they were caused by Trans Union’s actions or inactions. (Doc. 65 at 12–13). The 20 Court will address each alleged harm in turn. 21 First, as to monetary harm, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied credit and charged 22 higher interest rates by various creditors. As evidence, Plaintiff refers the Court to his own 23 deposition testimony. (Doc. 71 at 10). For example, Plaintiff testified that he was denied 24 “[c]redit, money, anything, house, apartment, cars, everything” and that these denials were, 25 in part, the fault of Trans Union. (Doc. 66-3 at 122). Plaintiff goes on to mention banks— 26 Wells Fargo, Linden Mortgage, and “another bank that I can’t remember”2—which he 27 2 Trans Union appears to have identified this other bank as Southwest Stage Funding 28 (Doc. 65 at 12, 14–15), though Plaintiff himself never specifically refers to Southwest 1 claims denied him mortgage loans. (Id. at 122, 146). Plaintiff’s deposition testimony and 2 interrogatory responses also assert that he was charged higher interest rates on three loans 3 with American Finance and on an auto loan with Desert Finance. (Id. at 29, 132, 139). 4 Aside from Plaintiff’s own deposition testimony, however, Plaintiff fails to offer 5 any other evidence that the above-mentioned denials of credit or heightened interest rates 6 actually occurred, let alone evidence that they were caused by or even related to Trans 7 Union’s failure to remove the dispute notation on Plaintiff’s credit report. Plaintiff does 8 not offer any documents, testimony, or other evidence from any of the creditors showing 9 the details of or reasons for their respective denials or interest-rate determinations. In fact, 10 Plaintiff fails to even mention the creditors by name in his briefing,3 instead continually 11 opting for vague, broad assertions—supported only by Plaintiff’s equally vague deposition 12 testimony—that Plaintiff was “being turned down for anything” by creditors. (Docs. 69 at 13 10 & 66-3 at 122). Plaintiff’s refusal to delve into any specifics related to the various 14 creditors is particularly glaring given that the absence of damages or harm was put directly 15 in issue by Trans Union. If Plaintiff was truly denied credit and given heightened interest 16 rates because of Trans Union’s allegedly inaccurate credit report, one would think that 17 Plaintiff would be the first to provide the Court with the details—who, what, where, why, 18 and how. Instead, Plaintiff expects this Court to not only take him at his word that these 19 credit denials and high interest rates occurred, but that they were the result of Trans Union’s 20 failure to remove a small dispute notation from Plaintiff’s credit file. The Court will not do 21 so. 22 Moreover, Trans Union offers specific evidence undermining Plaintiff’s assertions 23 Stage Funding by name in his briefing, statements of fact, deposition testimony, or 24 anywhere else in the record. 25 3 In Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 69 at 10) and Reply (Doc. 71 at 10), Plaintiff states that he was turned down for mortgages by Linden Mortgage “and other places” as a result 26 of his Trans Union credit report. Nowhere else in Plaintiff’s briefing are any other creditors 27 mentioned by name. Instead, the Court was made aware of the other creditors—Wells Fargo, American Finance, Desert Finance, and Southwest Stage Funding—only by Trans 28 Union’s briefing and by sifting through Plaintiff’s deposition testimony on its own. 1 as to each creditor. For example, as to Wells Fargo, Trans Union offers the bank’s denial 2 letter (Doc. 66-4 at 1–7) which “clearly states that its decision was based upon a credit 3 report from Equifax,” not Trans Union. (Doc. 65 at 13). And as to Desert Finance’s high 4 interest rate on Plaintiff’s auto loan, Trans Union points to Plaintiff’s deposition testimony 5 (Doc. 66-3 at 137), which indicates that his Desert Finance account was opened more than 6 two years before the dispute notation was added to Plaintiff’s Trans Union credit file. (Doc. 7 65 at 13). This shows that the dispute notation had nothing to do with Desert Finance’s 8 interest rate decision. Trans Union offers similar evidence undermining or even outright 9 invalidating Plaintiff’s claims as to the American Finance interest rates and the Southwest 10 Stage Funding credit denial. (See Doc. 65 at 14). Tellingly, Plaintiff offers no evidence of 11 its own to refute any of Trans Union’s evidence and instead simply refers the Court back 12 to Plaintiff’s deposition testimony. (Doc. 69 at 10–11). Plaintiff has fallen well short of 13 providing sufficient, summary-judgment evidence to show that he was monetarily harmed 14 by Trans Union’s actions or inactions. 15 Next, as to physical harm, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered from emotional 16 distress—including stress, lack of sleep, and loss of appetite—“as a result in part of [Trans 17 Union]’s refusal to correct its reporting of his account.” (Docs. 69 at 10–11 & 71 at 11). 18 Plaintiff also alleges he suffered “humiliation and embarrassment” after he was denied 19 credit. (Docs. 69 at 10 & 71 at 10). To support this alleged harm, Plaintiff again cites only 20 to his own deposition testimony and nowhere else. This Court recognizes, however, that in 21 some cases deposition testimony alone is enough to support emotional distress damages. 22 As Plaintiff points out (Doc. 69 at 10–11), Ninth Circuit law does not require substantial 23 or even objective evidence to support emotional distress damages—a plaintiff’s testimony 24 alone may suffice. The Ninth Circuit made this clear in Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson 25 Consumer Products, Inc.: 26 While objective evidence requirements may exist in other circuits, such a requirement is not imposed by case law in . . . 27 the Ninth Circuit, or the Supreme Court. See Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 762 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding 28 emotional damages based solely on testimony); Johnson v. Hale, 13 F.3d 1351, 1352 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that 1 emotional damages may be awarded based on testimony alone or appropriate inference from circumstances); Carey v. Piphus, 2 435 U.S. 247, 264 n.20 (1978) (noting that emotional distress damages are “essentially subjective” and may be proven by 3 reference to injured party's conduct and observations by others). 4 5 212 F.3d 493, 513 (9th Cir. 2000). However, as this District has recognized, there remain 6 some minimal evidentiary requirements that must still be met. “To survive summary 7 judgment on an emotional distress claim under the FCRA, Plaintiff must ‘submit evidence 8 that reasonably and sufficiently explains the circumstances of his injury and does not resort 9 to mere conclusory statements.’” Centuori v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 10 1002, 1010 (D. Ariz. 2006) (citation omitted). “[A] plaintiff must support a claim for 11 damages based on emotional distress with something more than his or her own conclusory 12 allegations.” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Instead, a plaintiff must offer 13 “sufficient evidence of the entire context in which the [FCRA violation] occurred, what the 14 emotional injuries were, and how they were caused by the [FCRA violation].” Id. 15 Here, Plaintiff has failed to offer anything more than conclusory statements of his 16 emotional distress injuries; Plaintiff does nothing to “reasonably and sufficiently explain[] 17 the circumstances of his injury.” See Id. As discussed above, Plaintiff offers no evidence 18 showing that the credit denials or high interest rates—which, in turn, Plaintiff asserts 19 caused his emotional distress—were the result of Trans Union’s allegedly inaccurate credit 20 report. And as discussed below, Plaintiff offers no evidence that Trans Union’s allegedly 21 inaccurate credit report was transferred to or obtained by the third-party creditors in the 22 first place. It is true that Ninth Circuit law allows Plaintiff to prove emotional distress with 23 his own testimony alone, but only to the extent that the emotional distress can actually be 24 traced to Trans Union’s actions or inactions. Because Plaintiff has failed to evidence the 25 latter, his emotional distress testimony alone is insufficient to prove he suffered a concrete 26 injury caused by Trans Union. 27 Finally, as to reputational harm, Plaintiff asserts that the alleged inaccuracies in his 28 credit report “[did] not reflect [his] character and reputation regarding his creditworthiness 1 and his responsibly handling financial obligations.” (Docs. 69 at 16 & 71 at 11). He alleges 2 that he suffered “humiliation and embarrassment” when he was turned down by various 3 creditors. (Docs. 69 at 10 & 71 at 10). However, Plaintiff’s allegations of reputational harm 4 are undermined by Plaintiff’s lack of evidence showing that a Trans Union credit report 5 containing the allegedly inaccurate dispute notation was actually transmitted to a third 6 party. Without such evidence, Plaintiff has failed to show a concrete injury occurred. As 7 the Supreme Court explained in TransUnion, 8 [t]he standing inquiry . . . distinguishes between (i) credit files that consumer reporting agencies maintain internally and (ii) 9 the consumer credit reports that consumer reporting agencies disseminate to third-party creditors. The mere presence of an 10 inaccuracy in an internal credit file, if it is not disclosed to a third party, causes no concrete harm. In cases such as these 11 where allegedly inaccurate or misleading information sits in a company database, the plaintiffs’ harm is roughly the same, 12 legally speaking, as if someone wrote a defamatory letter and then stored it in her desk drawer. A letter that is not sent does 13 not harm anyone, no matter how insulting the letter is. So too here. 14 15 TransUnion, 141 S.Ct. at 2210. At the summary judgment stage, the Court cannot merely 16 accept as true Plaintiff’s assertion that third-party transmission occurred; Plaintiff must 17 instead come forward with “proof sufficient to create a material issue of fact.” See Baker 18 v. Trans Union LLC, No. CV 07-8032-PCT-JAT, 2009 WL 4042909, at *5–6 (D. Ariz. 19 Nov. 19, 2009) (“At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court had to accept as true [the 20 plaintiff]’s allegations that Trans Union provided Chase with an incomplete or misleading 21 credit report. At the summary judgment stage, [the plaintiff] must produce proof sufficient 22 to create a material issue of fact as to whether Trans Union actually provided an inaccurate 23 credit report to Chase.”). 24 Trans Union raised this issue—the lack of evidence showing third-party 25 transmission—twice in the parties’ briefing, once in its Response to Plaintiff’s Motion 26 (Doc. 67 at 10) and again in its own Motion (Doc. 65 at 11). Despite having at least these 27 two opportunities to respond, Plaintiff failed to point the Court to any evidence refuting 28 Trans Union’s argument. Instead, Plaintiff offered only a Credit Karma report showing that 1 seven “credit inquiries” were made between February 18, 2020 and November 14, 2020. 2 (Doc. 71 at 5 & Doc. 69 at 6–7). Upon reviewing the credit inquiries (Doc. 70-2 at 6–7), 3 three can immediately be ruled out, as they occurred after the alleged inaccuracy was 4 removed from Plaintiff’s Trans Union credit file on August 20, 2020. (Doc. 66-1 at 6). This 5 leaves the first four credit inquiries (February 18, June 2, August 3, and August 12) as 6 possible instances in which a third-party creditor could have received Plaintiff’s allegedly 7 inaccurate credit report. The Court finds this evidence insufficient, however, because 8 Plaintiff has failed to provide the Court with any detail as to what a creditor receives upon 9 a “credit inquiry.” Much of the Credit Karma report is redacted, and the “Credit Inquiries” 10 section offers very little in the way of detail. Further, while the section titled “How to Read 11 Your Credit Report” (Doc. 70-2 at 8–9) outlines what the “Credit Inquiries” section means, 12 it does not explain what a third-party creditor sees when it conducts a credit inquiry. At the 13 least, Plaintiff could have done some of this explaining himself in his briefing. Instead, 14 Plaintiff made no effort to explain what a Credit Karma credit inquiry entails or includes. 15 (Docs. 69 at 7 & 71 at 5). 16 If that weren’t enough, Defendant contends—and Plaintiff does not refute—that 17 Credit Karma is not a CRA, but merely a “tri-merge report” and a “consumer-facing 18 platform for personal financial management.” (Docs. 67 at 10–11 & 74 at 6–7). Defendant 19 cites to caselaw distinguishing the two and to at least one case, Zotta v. Nations Credit 20 Financial Services Corp., in which the Eastern District of Missouri found that the 21 plaintiff’s FCRA claim failed “where there was ‘no evidence that an Experian credit 22 report—as opposed to a tri-merge report, which Experian did not issue—was seen by a 23 third party.’” (Doc. 67 at 10–11 (citing Zotta v. Nations Credit Fin. Servs. Corp., 297 F. 24 Supp. 2d 1196, 1205 (E.D. Mo. 2003))). Similarly, this Court cannot find—based on a 25 Credit Karma report alone—that a Trans Union credit report containing the alleged 26 inaccuracy was actually transferred to a third-party creditor, let alone that the third-party 27 creditor then made a credit or interest-rate decision based upon that inaccuracy. Thus, 28 Plaintiff has failed to show sufficient, summary-judgment evidence that he was 1 | reputationally harmed by Trans Union’s actions or inactions. 2 Summary judgment in favor of Trans Union is appropriate because it has 3 | demonstrated that Plaintiff failed to make a showing sufficient to establish that he suffered 4} aconcrete injury caused by Trans Union—essential elements of standing on which Plaintiff 5| bears the burden of proving. While Plaintiff alleges that Trans Union violated the FCRA 6 | by failing to use reasonable procedures to ensure the accuracy of its credit reports and by failing to adequately reinvestigate Plaintiff's credit report after being notified of an 8 | inaccuracy, Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his allegations that 9 | he was injured as a result. Plaintiff has also failed to show that any harms he did suffer 10 | were caused by Trans Union’s allegedly inaccurate credit file. As a result, Plaintiff's FCRA 11 | claims lack standing and must be dismissed. 12 IV. CONCLUSION 13 The Court grants summary judgment to Defendant Trans Union as to all of 14| Plaintiffs FCRA claims. It follows that Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 15 | (Doc. 63) as to Defendant Trans Union’s liability is denied. Accordingly, 16 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 63) 17 | is denied. 18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 19 | (Doc. 65) is granted. 20 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment and terminate this action accordingly. 22 Dated this 17th day of December, 2021. 23 24 25 LES 26 27 28