Troy T. Smith v. Snohomish County et al.

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedDecember 3, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-00657
StatusUnknown

This text of Troy T. Smith v. Snohomish County et al. (Troy T. Smith v. Snohomish County et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Troy T. Smith v. Snohomish County et al., (W.D. Wash. 2025).

Opinion

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5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 TROY T. SMITH, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-00657-TL 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER ON SERVICE-RELATED MOTIONS 12 SNOHOMISH COUNTY et al., 13 Defendants. 14

15 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Troy T. Smith’s Motion for Extension of time 16 to serve Defendants (Dkt. No. 47) and Defendant Snohomish County’s (“the County”) Cross- 17 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Serve (Dkt. No. 52). Having reviewed the motions, Plaintiff’s 18 response to the County’s Cross Motion (Dkt. No. 54), and the relevant record, the Court GRANTS 19 Plaintiff’s motion and DENIES the County’s motion. 20 I. BACKGROUND1 21 On April 11, 2025, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against the County, the 22 City of Everett (“the City”), and 50 J. Doe Defendants. Dkt. No. 1. On July 8, 2025, Plaintiff 23 1 This section does not discuss motion practice that is irrelevant to the instant motion. See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 15, 37, 38, 24 44 (Plaintiff’s motions); Dkt. No. 29 (County’s motion). 1 moved to amend his complaint (Dkt. No. 4), and on July 10, 2025, the Court granted the motion 2 (Dkt. No. 6). Plaintiff, however, never filed an amended complaint, and his original pleading 3 remains the operative complaint in this case. On July 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed an affidavit of 4 service, signed by a process server, indicating that a summons had been served at “City of

5 Everett of Snohomish County, prosecutor office,” on July 7, 2025. Dkt. No. 5 at 1–2. On July 17, 6 2025, counsel for the County entered an appearance (Dkt. No. 7), and on July 25, 2025, counsel 7 for the City entered an appearance (Dkt. No. 13). 8 On July 24, 2025, the County filed a Motion for a More Definitive Statement pursuant to 9 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). Dkt. No. 11. On August 29, 2025, the Court denied the 10 motion. Dkt. No. 24. After the Court denied the Rule 12(e) motion, the City and County filed 11 answers to the complaint, the City on September 8, 2025 (Dkt. No. 27), and the County on 12 September 9, 2025 (Dkt. No. 28). Both Defendants pleaded the affirmative defense of 13 insufficient service of process. See Dkt. No. 27 at 6 ¶ 6 (City); Dkt. No. 28 at 6 ¶ 6 (County). 14 On October 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for an extension, seeking an

15 additional 45 days to serve process. Dkt. No. 47. On October 30, 2025, the County filed an 16 opposition to Plaintiff’s motion. Dkt. No. 52. The County’s opposition included a cross-motion 17 to dismiss for insufficient service of process. See id. at 2–4.2 18 II. LEGAL STANDARD 19 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 20 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff— 21 22 2 Plaintiff’s petition to the Ninth Circuit for mandamus relief (Dkt. No. 55) does not automatically stay this case or divest this Court of jurisdiction. Woodson v. Surgitek, Inc., 57 F.3d 1406, 1416 (9th Cir. 1995). For one thing, “the 23 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for an automatic stay of district court proceedings while a petition for writ of mandamus is pending.” Id. For another, the originating case of Plaintiff’s petition is No. C24-288, not 24 this one. 1 must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made 2 within a specified time.” The Court also has broad discretion to extend the time to serve process, 3 considering such factors such as the length of delay, “‘prejudice to the defendant, actual notice of 4 a lawsuit, and eventual service.’” See Efaw v. Williams, 473 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007)

5 (quoting Troxell v. Fedders of N. Am., Inc., 160 F.3d 381, 383 (7th Cir. 1998)) (examining 6 district court’s unexplained denial of motion to dismiss based on insufficient service); see also 7 Mann v. Am. Airlines, 324 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that courts may extend time 8 for service even after the deadline has expired). Moreover, “if the plaintiff shows good cause for 9 the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 4(m). 11 III. DISCUSSION 12 A. The County’s Cross-Motion to Dismiss 13 The County’s motion must be denied. Such disposition is required by two provisions of 14 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12. First, under Rule 12(g)(2), “Except as provided in Rule

15 12(h)(2) or (3), a party that makes a motion under this rule must not make another motion under 16 this rule raising a defense or objection that was available to the party but omitted from its earlier 17 motion.”3 Second, under Rule 12(h)(1)(B)(i), “a party waives any defense listed in Rule 18 12(b)(2)–(5) by . . . failing to . . . make it by motion under this rule.” “[A] party who makes a 19 Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement may not thereafter assert by motion a Rule 12(b) 20 defense that was available at the time of the initial motion.” Clark v. Assocs. Com. Corp., 149 21 F.R.D. 629, 632 (D. Kan. 1993); see also 2 Moore’s Federal Practice – Civil § 12.21 (“Rule 22 12(g)’s consolidation requirement applies not only to Rule 12(b) defenses, but also to a motion 23

24 3 Rule 12(h)(2) and (3) refer to defenses that are not at issue or applicable here. 1 for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) and to a motion to strike under Rule 12(f).”). 2 Here, on July 24, 2025, the County filed a Rule 12(e) motion for a more definitive 3 statement. Dkt. No. 11. In their motion, County asserted, “On July 8, 2025 Plaintiff filed a Proof 4 of Service . . . , stating under oath that Snohomish County and the City of Everett were served on

5 July 7.” Id. at 2 (citing Dkt. No. 6). This is the only mention of service in the motion, however, 6 and it falls short of asserting that service was insufficient. The County thus: (1) filed a Rule 12 7 motion; that (2) did not assert the defense of insufficient service of process. Under Rule 12(g)(2) 8 and (h)(1)(B)(i), then, the County waived such a defense and cannot now assert it in a successive 9 Rule 12 motion.4 10 B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension 11 Plaintiff’s motion consists of a caption and a perfunctory request: “[T]he Defence [sic] of 12 Snohomish County wants to be properly served so i [sic] ask for this time to do so.” Dkt. No. 47 13 at 1. As an initial matter, the Court recognizes Plaintiff’s motion to be an implicit admission that, 14 notwithstanding his earlier affidavit of service (Dkt. No. 5), Defendants have not, in fact, been

15 properly served. More substantively, the Court agrees with the County that “Plaintiff’s 16 motion . . . offers nothing in the way of factual justification or explanation for his failure to 17 properly serve Snohomish County in this case . . . .” Dkt. No. 52 at 3. Put differently, Plaintiff 18 has not shown good cause for his failure to serve. 19 Absent a showing of good cause, extending the time to serve is within the Court’s 20 discretion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).

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Woodson v. Surgitek, Inc.
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587 F.3d 1188 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)

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Troy T. Smith v. Snohomish County et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/troy-t-smith-v-snohomish-county-et-al-wawd-2025.