Troy Capital, LLC v. Patenaude & Felix APC

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * *

7 TROY CAPITAL LLC, Case No. 2:20-CV-205 JCM (DJA)

8 Plaintiff(s), ORDER

9 v.

10 PATENAUDE & FELIX APC, et al.,

11 Defendant(s).

12 13 Presently before the court is defendants Patenaude & Felix APC (“P&F”), Raymond A. 14 Patenaude, Michael D. Kahn, Angie Hong Hoar, Kristopher C. Childers, and Ryan Johnson’s 15 (collectively, “defendants”) motion to vacate order, (ECF No. 33), and to allow additional time 16 to file response. (ECF No. 39). Plaintiff Troy Capital, LLC responded, (ECF No. 43), to which 17 defendants replied, (ECF No. 47). 18 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides that a court may relieve a party from 19 judgment on the basis of (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, (2) newly 20 discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to 21 move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an 22 opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 23 discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it 24 prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25 60(b). 26 A motion for reconsideration “should not be granted, absent highly unusual 27 circumstances.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 28 (9th Cir. 2009). In order to succeed on a motion to reconsider, a party must set forth facts or law ofastrongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision. See Kern-Tulare 2| Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F. Supp. 656, 665 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987). 4 Defendants’ counsel admits that it failed to calendar its response to plaintiff's motion for 5 | partial summary judgment. (ECF No. 39). This court ruled on the merits of plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment nearly seven weeks after defendants’ response deadline had passed. (ECF No. 33). However, defendants have sufficiently disclosed a “highly unusual 8 | circumstance”: in addition to COVID-19 related closures—which would be insufficient on their 9 | own—defendant’s counsels experienced separate and unexpected medical emergencies. (ECF 10} No. 39). 11 Having addressed the factors in Pioneer, defendants have persuaded this court to grant their motion. Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 13 | 380, 395 (1993) (considering “the danger of prejudice to the . . . [opposing party], the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including 15 whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith”). 17 Accordingly, the order granting in part and denying in part plaintiff's motion for partial 18 | summary judgment, (ECF No. 33), is vacated. Defendants shall have 7 days to respond to 19 | plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. (ECF No. 13). Thereafter, plaintiff shall have 7 20 | days to reply. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 DATED August 24, 2020. 23 Btw 0. Ataltan UN ITED,STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 25 26 27 28

es C. Mahan District Judge _2-