Troy Capital, LLC v. Patenaude & Felix APC

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedMarch 28, 2022
Docket2:20-cv-00205
StatusUnknown

This text of Troy Capital, LLC v. Patenaude & Felix APC (Troy Capital, LLC v. Patenaude & Felix APC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Troy Capital, LLC v. Patenaude & Felix APC, (D. Nev. 2022).

Opinion

2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 * * * 5 Troy Capital, LLC, Case No. 2:20-cv-00205-JCM-DJA 6 Plaintiff, 7 Order v. 8 Patenaude & Felix APC, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 And related counterclaims. 11 12 13 This is a legal malpractice action arising out of a debt collection agreement between 14 Plaintiff Troy Capital, LLC and Defendants Patenaude & Felix APC; Raymond A. Patenaude; 15 Michael D. Kahn; and Angie Hong Hoar (collectively, “P&F”). Troy Capital claims that P&F 16 committed malpractice by failing to maintain debt accounts which Troy hired P&F to maintain, 17 resulting in the accounts becoming uncollectable. P&F asserted counterclaims against Troy 18 Capital, Rance Willey, and Troy Dupuis (collectively, “Troy”), claiming that Troy misrepresented 19 the nature of the accounts such that it was nearly impossible for P&F to collect on the accounts. 20 P&F filed a motion to compel, arguing that Troy has withheld certain responsive information to 21 interrogatories and requests for production. (ECF No. 107). Troy also filed a motion to compel, 22 arguing that P&F refused to supplement or provide responsive documents to its discovery 23 requests. (ECF No. 110). 24 Because the Court finds that P&F is entitled to further responses to certain of its discovery 25 requests, it grants P&F’s motion to compel in part and denies it in part. (ECF No. 107). Because 26 the Court finds that Troy has not explained why P&F’s responses to its discovery requests are 27 deficient, it denies Troy’s motion to compel. (ECF No. 110). The Court finds these matters 1 I. Standard. 2 If a party resists discovery, the requesting party may file a motion to compel. See Fed. R. 3 Civ. P. 37(a)(1), (a)(3)(B)(iii)-(iv) (“A party seeking discovery may move for an order 4 compelling an answer, [or] production ... if ... (iii) a party fails to answer an interrogatory 5 submitted under Rule 33; or (iv) a party fails to produce documents ... as requested under Rule 6 34.”). The motion must include a threshold showing that the requested information falls within 7 the scope of discovery under Rule 26. See Sanhueza v. Lincoln Technical Institute, Inc., No. 8 2:13-cv-2251-JAD-VCF, 2014 WL 6485797, at *2 (D. Nev. Nov. 18, 2014) (citing Hofer v. Mack 9 Trucks, Inc., 981 F.2d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1992)). To be discoverable under Federal Rule of Civil 10 Procedure 26(b)(1), information must be: (1) relevant to any party’s claim or defense; and 11 (2) proportional to the needs of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The party opposing discovery 12 has the burden of showing that the discovery is, among other things, irrelevant, overly broad, or 13 unduly burdensome. See Fosbre v. Las Vegas Sands Corp., No. 2:10-cv-00765-APG-GWF, 2016 14 WL 54202, at *4 (D. Nev. Jan. 5, 2016) (citing Graham v. Casey’s General Stores, 206 F.R.D. 15 251, 253-54 (S.D. Ind. 2000)). To meet this burden, the objecting party must specifically detail 16 the reasons why each request is objectionable. See Fosbre, 2016 WL 54202, at *4. 17 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C) further limits discovery and allows the Court 18 to restrict discovery where it is “outside the scope of Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 26(b)(2)(C)(3). In deciding whether to restrict discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 26(b)(2)(C), the Court “should consider the totality of the circumstances, weighing the value of 21 the material sought against the burden of providing it, and taking into account society’s interest in 22 furthering the truth-seeking function in the particular case before the court.” Caballero v. Bodega 23 Latina Corp., No. 2:17-cv-00236-JAD-VCF, 2017 WL 3174931, at *3 (D. Nev. July 25, 2017) 24 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 gives the Court broad discretion to 25 “tailor discovery narrowly and to dictate the sequence of discovery.” See id. (internal citations 26 and quotations omitted). 27 1 II. Discussion. 2 A. The Court grants in part and denies in part P&F’s motion to compel. 3 Interrogatory No. 21: State the material terms of your agreement(s) to purchase of the 4 Collection Accounts1, including the date(s) when the accounts were 5 purchased, the seller(s) of the accounts, and the amount(s) paid to purchase the accounts. 6 7 P&F argues that in later stipulating to an extension of deadlines, Troy “agreed to produce 8 any information in their possession regarding the purchase agreements…with the focus being the 9 approximately 234 files which were the subject of Plaintiff’s earlier Motion for Summary 10 Judgment.” (ECF No. 107 at 14); (ECF No. 84 at 7); (ECF No. 85). Troy does not address the 11 stipulation in response, but argues that only the accounts at issue in the litigation are relevant 12 while the agreements P&F request “relate to thousands of accounts.” (ECF No. 114 at 2, 5). 13 Troy adds that it has already produced “the information it has reflecting the history of each of the 14 disputed accounts…the identity of the seller, the date of purchase, the price paid for each account, 15 and documents generated by attorneys who handled the California accounts before they were 16 placed with P&F for handling.” (Id.). In reply, P&F does not address these arguments. 17 The Court grants P&F’s motion to compel a response to this interrogatory but limits the 18 interrogatory to accounts at issue in this litigation. It appears that Troy already agreed to provide 19 these purchase agreements after the parties agreed on a protective order, as memorialized in the 20 parties’ stipulation. And Troy appears to concede the relevance of purchase agreements for 21 accounts at issue in the litigation. While Troy claims to have already produced “the information 22 it has,” this does not clarify for the Court whether Troy has supplemented its response to this 23 interrogatory. Because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e)(1) requires supplement, the Court 24 25 1 “Collection Accounts” is defined in P&F’s interrogatories as “the underlying legal collection 26 files that you placed with Patenaude & Felix APC between approximately August 2016 to 27 December 2018, as alleged in your Complaint at paragraphs 29 through 36” (ECF No. 107-2 at 5). These lines of Troy’s complaint provide that “Plaintiff delivered hundreds of files, debts, and 1 thus grants P&F’s motion to compel a response to this interrogatory. The Court limits this 2 interrogatory, however, only to the accounts at issue in this litigation. 3 Request for production No. 10: 4 Any and all documents that pertain to your purchase of the Collection Accounts, including, without limitation, any written 5 purchase agreement(s) you entered in connection with the purchase. 6 7 P&F argues that Troy’s objection to this request for production—that certain of the 8 documents are privileged and irrelevant—fail. (ECF No. 107 at 17). P&F argues that Troy put 9 the documents at issue by arguing that P&F wrongfully managed the accounts and thus, any 10 privilege—if one applies at all—is waived and the documents are relevant to P&F’s defense. 11 (Id.).

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Gaylon Hofer v. Mack Trucks, Inc.
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