Trisko v. Commissioner
This text of 29 T.C. 515 (Trisko v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
OPINION.
The facts in the instant case are not in dispute. The question presented is whether under these facts petitioner may have the benefits provided by section 112 (n) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. This subsection and pertinent provisions of respondent’s regulations are set out in the margin hereof.2
It is apparent that the general purpose of this statute was to provide relief to individual taxpayers who felt it necessary or advisable to sell their homes and used the proceeds to purchase new or substitute homes. If all the proceeds of such a sale were used in the purchase of the new home, the transaction was to be considered in effect as a nontaxable exchange of the old home for the new.
In the instant case the respondent has determined that the petitioner is not entitled to the relief afforded by section 112 (n) because at the time he sold his old home and purchased the new home he was not residing in his old home but was leasing it to tenants and using it as income-producing real estate.
Petitioner points out that he built the house for use as a home, that he lived there with his family for many years, that he and his family left it only because of his temporary assignment to work abroad, that he at all times intended to return to the house and make it his home, that his primary purpose in leasing the house while he was abroad was to provide for its care and maintenance, that the negligible profit he derived from the rentals was a secondary consideration, and that he attempted to regain possession of the house for use as a home upon his return to this country, but because this was immediately impossible on account of Rent Control Regulations imposed by the Federal Government he was compelled to purchase another home at a time when his old home was occupied by tenants.
We have no doubt but that the situation presented, by the instant case is of the general type which Congress considered entitled to the relief provided for by section 112 (n). The narrow question is whether petitioner is precluded from such relief by reason of the words “used * * * as his principal residence” appearing in the statute.
That Congress did not intend that the relief afforded by this statute should be confined solely to cases where the old home is actually lived in by the taxpayer as a home at the time of sale is indicated by that part of the committee reports which reads as follows:
Whether or not property is used by the taxpayer as his residence, and whether or not property is used by the taxpayer as his principal residence (in the case of a taxpayer using more than one place of residence), depends upon all of the facts and circumstances in each individual ease, including the bona fides of the taxpayer. The term “residence” is used in contradistinction to property used in trade or business and property held for the production of income. Nevertheless, the mere fact that the taxpayer temporarily rents out either the old or the new residence may not, in the light of all of the facts and circumstances in the case, prevent the gain from being not recognized. For example, if the taxpayer purchases his new residence before he sells his old residence, the fact that he rents out the n'ew residence during the period before he vacates the old residence will not prevent the application of this subsection. [H. Rept. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), p. 109; S. Rept. No. 781 (Supp.), 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), P- 32.]
This is recognized by respondent in his regulations quoted above.
In our opinion “all of the facts and circumstances” in the instant case, “including the bona fides of the taxpayer,” indicate to our satisfaction that the property sold by the taxpayer was used by him as a residence “in contradistinction to property used in trade or business and property held for the production of income” in spite of the fact that “the taxpayer temporarily rent'[ed] out * * * the old * * * residence.”
Our decision, limited strictly to the facts here present, is in favor of petitioner upon the issue before us.
Decision will be entered for the petitioners.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
29 T.C. 515, 1957 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 11, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/trisko-v-commissioner-tax-1957.