Tripathy v. Lockwood

District Court, W.D. New York·Decided September 29, 2021·No. 6:19-cv-06614·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SANJAY TRIPATRY, Plaintiff, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Vv. 19-CV-6614-FPG-MJP CAPTAIN LOCKWOOD, et al., Defendants.

APPEARANCES For Plaintiff: Sanjay Tripathy #18R1673 Fishkill Correctional Facility 18 Strack Drive Box # 1245 Beacon, New York 12508 For Defendant: Matthew D. Brown N.Y.S. Office of the Attorney General 144 Exchange Boulevard Suite 200 Rochester, NY 14614 INTRODUCTION Pedersen, M.J. Pro se plaintiff Sanjay Tripathy (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Captain Lockwood, Reverend Harris, Superintendent Susan R. Kickbush, and the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision of New York State (“‘(DOCCS”) (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging a violation of his right to freely practice his religion. (Am. Compl. at 3, ECF

No. 4.)! Defendant Andrea N. Schneider, Acting Superintendent, was added as a defendant after Defendant Kickbush retired. (Decision and Order (“D&O”) at 1-2, dated Dec. 18, 2020, ECF No. 29.) Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiffs motion seeking leave to amend his amended complaint. (ECF No. 86.) Defendants did not oppose this motion. After reviewing the motion papers, the undersigned recommends that the District Court deny Plaintiffs motion. STANDARD OF LAW The Honorable Frank P. Geraci referred this motion for Report and Recommendation on September 29, 2021. (ECF No. 93.) BACKGROUND Plaintiff initially commenced this action against seventeen Defendants alleging the following: (1) a First Amendment Free Exercise of Religion claim; (2) a Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claim (“RLUIPA”); (3) an Equal Protection claim; (4) a Due Process claim; and (5) an Eighth Amendment claim. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff now seeks leave to file a second amended complaint to assert his RLUIPA claim against Defendants Lockwood, Harris, Kickbush, and Schnieder, and, separately, to assert his First Amendment (Free Exercise Clause) claim against Defendant DOCCS. (PI.’s Not. of Mot., filed Aug. 4, 2021, ECF No. 86.)

1 Plaintiff commenced this action against several other Defendants, but all claims have been dismissed as to them.

DISCUSSION As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiffs motion for leave to amend does not comply with this District’s Local Rules of Civil Procedure, in that Plaintiff did not submit to the Court a proposed amended pleading. See L. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (“A movant seeking to amend or supplement a pleading must attach an unsigned copy of the proposed amended pleading as an exhibit to the motion. The proposed amended pleading must be a complete pleading superseding the original pleading in all respects.”). While the Court could deny the motion for leave to amend based on this failure, it will not do so in light of Plaintiffs pro se status. However, Plaintiff is cautioned that all future filings in this case are expected to comply with the Local Rules. Findings of Fact Regarding Plaintiffs Request for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) and Local Rule 16, the undersigned held a scheduling conference on November 18, 2020, during which Plaintiff appeared and participated. (Minute entry for proceedings before the undersigned, ECF No. 21.) The undersigned thereafter issued a scheduling order containing the parties’ agreed-upon deadlines for the progression of discovery and eventual resolution of this matter. (Scheduling Order at 1, Nov. 18, 2020, ECF No. 22.) The scheduling order provided that “[a]ll motions to... amend the pleadings shall be filed on or before December 15, 2020.” (/d., emphasis in original.) The Clerk of the Court mailed the scheduling order to Plaintiff on November 19, 2020.

Thereafter, the undersigned held a case management conference on February 25, 2021, in which both parties participated. (ECF No. 48.) The next day, the undersigned issued an amended scheduling order, which specifically provided that “[t]he deadline for motions to join other parties and to amend the pleadings has passed.” (Am. Scheduling Order at 1, dated Apr. 26, 2021, ECF No. 62.) Plaintiff did not object to the contents of the Amended Scheduling Order, which was mailed to him on April 26, 2021. (ECF No. 62.) Plaintiff has never sought to extend the deadline to amend the pleadings. Legal Conclusions Regarding Plaintiff's Request for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. “A district court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant leave to amend[.]” Gurary v. Winehouse, 235 F.3d 792, 801 (2d Cir. 2000). Two provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure guide the Court’s analysis of a motion for leave to amend where the deadline for such motions, as set forth in a scheduling order, has passed. The first is Rule 15(a)(2), which provides that once the time for leave to amend as of right has expired, “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The second is Rule 16(b)(4), which provides that a “schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). “Where, as here, a scheduling order governs amendments to the complaint, ... the lenient standard under Rule 15(a), which provides leave to amend shall be freely given, must be balanced against the requirement under Rule 16(b) that the Court’s

scheduling order shall not be modified except upon a showing of good cause.” Holmes v. Grubman, 568 F.3d 329, 334-35 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotations and citations omitted). “In determining whether a movant has satisfied the ‘good cause’ standard under Rule 16(b), ‘the primary consideration is whether the moving party can demonstrate diligence.” Charter Comme'ns, Inc. v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Brotherhood. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, 338 F. Supp. 3d 242, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Kassner v. 2nd Avenue Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 244 (2d Cir. 2007)). Further, “where the substance of the proposed amendment was known to the movant [earlier in the proceedings], but the movant nevertheless failed to act, courts have denied leave to amend under Rule 16.” Valentin v. City of Rochester, No. 11-CV- 6238CJS, 2016 WL 5661729, *6 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016) (citations omitted). Thus, a party who inexcusably delays after determining that he wishes to allege new claims, whether by discovering new evidence or otherwise, will not satisfy the good cause standard. See, e.g., Werking v. Andrews, 526 Fed. Appx. 94, 96 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order) (“despite having sufficient notice of the relevant facts..., [plaintiff] inexplicably failed to file his motion to amend for another two months[;]...[plaintiffs] actions hardly evince diligence”); Lowry v. Eastman Kodak Co., 14 Fed. Appx. 27, 30 (2d Cir.

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Related

Holmes v. Grubman
568 F.3d 329 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Thomas v. Arn
474 U.S. 140 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Werking v. Andrews
526 F. App'x 94 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Kassner v. 2nd Avenue Delicatessen Inc.
496 F.3d 229 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Lowry v. Eastman Kodak Co.
14 F. App'x 27 (Second Circuit, 2001)