Tringali v. Mass Dept of Transit. Asst. CV-12-14-PB 11/13/12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Leisha Tringali
v. Case No. 12-cv-124-PB Opinion No. 2012 DNH 190
Massachusetts Department of Transitional Assistance, et a l .
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Leisha Tringali, appearing pro se, brings suit for
declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages against the
Massachusetts Department of Transitional Assistance ("DTA"); the
Massachusetts Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement
Agency ("CSE"); the Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles
("Massachusetts RMV"); and Doug Comfort, an employee of the CSE.
The suit arises from the defendants' alleged failure to afford
Tringali notice and a hearing before attempting to enforce a
child support order against her. Tringali seeks relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for procedural due process violations. She also
states an intention to assert state law claims, arising out of
the same nucleus of facts, though she does not identify those
state claims in her complaint. Presently before the court is the defendants' motion to
dismiss Tringali's complaint. Defendants assert that Tringali's
claims against the state agencies and her claims against Doug
Comfort in his official capacity are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. Comfort also argues that Tringali has not pleaded a
plausible claim that he proximately caused her alleged injuries.
For the reasons set forth below, I grant the defendants' motion
and dismiss Tringali's complaint.
I. BACKGROUND1
Tringali and her former husband, Matthew Tringali, obtained
a Judgment of Divorce on August 20, 1996, in Middlesex County
Family and Probate Court (the "Divorce Action"). The original
judgment was modified on September 29, 1998, to specify that
Matthew and Leisha Tringali would have joint legal and physical
custody over their child.
On April 12, 2000, Matthew's father, Peter Tringali, filed
a separate action against Matthew seeking temporary guardianship
(the "Guardianship Action"). Tringali does not explain what was
at issue in this action. Nor does she state whether she was
1 The facts are taken from the plaintiff's complaint (Doc. No. 1), and her brief in opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 9-1) .
2 named as a defendant. She does allege, however, both that a
temporary guardianship was granted for a period expiring on July
11, 2000, and that Leisha Tringali thereafter lost temporary
custody of her child.
On August 9, 2001, Peter Tringali filed a motion for child
support in the Divorce Action but he withdrew the motion on
September 10, 2001. A few days later, a representative of the
CSE filed a complaint seeking to modify the divorce judgment.
The complaint named Leisha Eshbach rather than Leisha Tringali
as the respondent even though Leisha Tringali has never used the
name Eshbach. A summons was then issued in the name of Leisha
Eshbach. The record does not disclose whether the summons was
served. At some point thereafter, a temporary order of support
and assignment of income (the "Support Order") was entered
against Leisha Eshbach. Between March 2003 and some unspecified
date in 2006, the CSE used the Support Order to obtain
approximately $14,000 from Leisha Tringali by levying several
different accounts in her name.
On December 5, 2003, a judge named Peter Tringali permanent
guardian with custody of the Tringalis' child. No support was
ordered at that time.
3 On June 13, 2011, the New Hampshire Department of Motor
Vehicles denied Trinagli's request to renew her New Hampshire
driver's license. After investigating the matter, Tringali
determined that her Massachusetts license had been suspended
because of overdue child support obligations. Tringali was not
given notice of the fact that her license had been suspended,
nor was she given a hearing on the issue.
On October 13, 2011, Tringali sent Doug Comfort a demand
letter demanding, among other things, that any monies obtained
from her be returned and that the suspension of her driving
privileges should be lifted.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), the court's review is generally limited to the matters
asserted in the complaint. See Curran v. Cousins, 509 F.3d 36,
44 (1st Cir. 2007). I must "accept as true the well-pleaded
factual allegations of the complaint, draw all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor and determine
whether the complaint, so read, sets forth facts sufficient to
justify recovery on any cognizable theory." Martin v. Applied
4 Cellular Tech., 284 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2002) . The plaintiff
must make factual allegations sufficient to "state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially
plausible when it pleads "factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not
akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. C t . 1937, 1949 (2009)
(citations omitted).
Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
those drafted by lawyers and are to be liberally construed in
favor of the pro se party. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1979); Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir.
1997). The Supreme Court's decision in Twombly "did not alter
the courts' treatment of pro se filings; accordingly, we
continue to construe pro se filings liberally when evaluating
them under Iqbal." Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342, 342 n.7
(9th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases from the Second, Third, Fifth,
Seventh, and. Tenth Circuits stating that pro se complaints must
be construed liberally after Iqbal). See also Dutil v. Murphy,
5 550 F.3d 154, 158 (1st Cir. 2008) (construing pro se litigant's
claim liberally post-Twombly); Goldblatt v. Geiger, No. 10-CV-
537-PB, 2012 WL 1107718, *4 (D.N.H. Apr. 2, 2012) (construing
pro se litigant's claim liberally post-Iqbal). I apply these
standards in reviewing the motion to dismiss.
III. ANALYSIS
Defendants argue that Tringali's claims against the agency
defendants and her official capacity claims against Comfort are
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Comfort also argues that
Tringali's claims against him must be dismissed because Tringali
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Tringali v. Mass Dept of Transit. Asst. CV-12-14-PB 11/13/12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Leisha Tringali
v. Case No. 12-cv-124-PB Opinion No. 2012 DNH 190
Massachusetts Department of Transitional Assistance, et a l .
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Leisha Tringali, appearing pro se, brings suit for
declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages against the
Massachusetts Department of Transitional Assistance ("DTA"); the
Massachusetts Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement
Agency ("CSE"); the Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles
("Massachusetts RMV"); and Doug Comfort, an employee of the CSE.
The suit arises from the defendants' alleged failure to afford
Tringali notice and a hearing before attempting to enforce a
child support order against her. Tringali seeks relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for procedural due process violations. She also
states an intention to assert state law claims, arising out of
the same nucleus of facts, though she does not identify those
state claims in her complaint. Presently before the court is the defendants' motion to
dismiss Tringali's complaint. Defendants assert that Tringali's
claims against the state agencies and her claims against Doug
Comfort in his official capacity are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. Comfort also argues that Tringali has not pleaded a
plausible claim that he proximately caused her alleged injuries.
For the reasons set forth below, I grant the defendants' motion
and dismiss Tringali's complaint.
I. BACKGROUND1
Tringali and her former husband, Matthew Tringali, obtained
a Judgment of Divorce on August 20, 1996, in Middlesex County
Family and Probate Court (the "Divorce Action"). The original
judgment was modified on September 29, 1998, to specify that
Matthew and Leisha Tringali would have joint legal and physical
custody over their child.
On April 12, 2000, Matthew's father, Peter Tringali, filed
a separate action against Matthew seeking temporary guardianship
(the "Guardianship Action"). Tringali does not explain what was
at issue in this action. Nor does she state whether she was
1 The facts are taken from the plaintiff's complaint (Doc. No. 1), and her brief in opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 9-1) .
2 named as a defendant. She does allege, however, both that a
temporary guardianship was granted for a period expiring on July
11, 2000, and that Leisha Tringali thereafter lost temporary
custody of her child.
On August 9, 2001, Peter Tringali filed a motion for child
support in the Divorce Action but he withdrew the motion on
September 10, 2001. A few days later, a representative of the
CSE filed a complaint seeking to modify the divorce judgment.
The complaint named Leisha Eshbach rather than Leisha Tringali
as the respondent even though Leisha Tringali has never used the
name Eshbach. A summons was then issued in the name of Leisha
Eshbach. The record does not disclose whether the summons was
served. At some point thereafter, a temporary order of support
and assignment of income (the "Support Order") was entered
against Leisha Eshbach. Between March 2003 and some unspecified
date in 2006, the CSE used the Support Order to obtain
approximately $14,000 from Leisha Tringali by levying several
different accounts in her name.
On December 5, 2003, a judge named Peter Tringali permanent
guardian with custody of the Tringalis' child. No support was
ordered at that time.
3 On June 13, 2011, the New Hampshire Department of Motor
Vehicles denied Trinagli's request to renew her New Hampshire
driver's license. After investigating the matter, Tringali
determined that her Massachusetts license had been suspended
because of overdue child support obligations. Tringali was not
given notice of the fact that her license had been suspended,
nor was she given a hearing on the issue.
On October 13, 2011, Tringali sent Doug Comfort a demand
letter demanding, among other things, that any monies obtained
from her be returned and that the suspension of her driving
privileges should be lifted.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), the court's review is generally limited to the matters
asserted in the complaint. See Curran v. Cousins, 509 F.3d 36,
44 (1st Cir. 2007). I must "accept as true the well-pleaded
factual allegations of the complaint, draw all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor and determine
whether the complaint, so read, sets forth facts sufficient to
justify recovery on any cognizable theory." Martin v. Applied
4 Cellular Tech., 284 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2002) . The plaintiff
must make factual allegations sufficient to "state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially
plausible when it pleads "factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not
akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. C t . 1937, 1949 (2009)
(citations omitted).
Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
those drafted by lawyers and are to be liberally construed in
favor of the pro se party. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1979); Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir.
1997). The Supreme Court's decision in Twombly "did not alter
the courts' treatment of pro se filings; accordingly, we
continue to construe pro se filings liberally when evaluating
them under Iqbal." Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342, 342 n.7
(9th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases from the Second, Third, Fifth,
Seventh, and. Tenth Circuits stating that pro se complaints must
be construed liberally after Iqbal). See also Dutil v. Murphy,
5 550 F.3d 154, 158 (1st Cir. 2008) (construing pro se litigant's
claim liberally post-Twombly); Goldblatt v. Geiger, No. 10-CV-
537-PB, 2012 WL 1107718, *4 (D.N.H. Apr. 2, 2012) (construing
pro se litigant's claim liberally post-Iqbal). I apply these
standards in reviewing the motion to dismiss.
III. ANALYSIS
Defendants argue that Tringali's claims against the agency
defendants and her official capacity claims against Comfort are
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Comfort also argues that
Tringali's claims against him must be dismissed because Tringali
has failed to sufficiently allege that he caused any of her
alleged injuries. I address each argument in turn.
A. Eleventh Amendment
The Supreme Court has long held that "an unconsenting State
is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own
citizens as well as by citizens of another state." Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). This immunity extends to
"arms of the state," see, e.g., Irizarry-Mora v. Univ. of P.R.,
647 F.3d 9, *12 (1st Cir. 2011) (explaining the "arm-of-the
state" doctrine, which courts use to determine whether a
particular public agency shares the state's sovereign
6 immunity); Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth.,
991 F.2d 935, 939 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Only the state itself and
'arms' of the state receive immunity."), and state officers to
the extent they are sued in an official capacity, and the
plaintiff is seeking damages and other forms of retrospective
relief. See Poirier v. Massachusetts Dept, of Correction, 558
F.3d 92, 97 (1st Cir. 2009).
In the present case, Tringali does not take issue with
defendants' contention that the state agency defendants are
"arms of the state." Nor does she challenge the basic rule that
a state actor is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment for damage claims and other forms of retrospective
relief to the extent he has been sued in his official capacity.
Instead, she argues that the defendants waived their Eleventh
Amendment immunity by accepting federal funds under Title IV,
Chapters A and D of the Social Security Act. See Social
Security Act, Title IV-A, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617; Social Security
Act, Title IV-D, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669b.
As the Supreme Court has explained, a court "will give
effect to a [s]tate's waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity only
where stated by the most express language or by such
overwhelming implication from the text as will leave no room for
7 any other reasonable construction." VIBO Corp. v. Conway, 669
F.3d 675, 691 (2002) (quoting Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v.
Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1990)). It necessarily follows,
therefore, that a state does not waive sovereign immunity merely
by accepting federal funds. See Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246-47 (1974).
In Edelman, the Supreme Court rejected a claim that a state
constructively consented to suit in federal court by accepting
federal funds pursuant to the Social Security Act. 415 U.S. at
574. Although Tringali bases her waiver argument on different
sections of the Act, she has failed to distinguish Edelman
because she has not identified any language in Chapters A and D
of Title IV that would have alerted recipients of federal funds
under these chapters that they would waive their Eleventh
Amendment immunity by accepting such funds. Accordingly, I
reject Tringali's argument that the defendants waived their
Eleventh Amendment immunity merely by accepting federal funds
pursuant to the Social Security Act.
B. Causation
The Eleventh Amendment does not bar Tringali's damage
claims against Comfort to the extent she has sued him in his
individual capacity. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991) . Nor does it bar her claims to the extent she is seeking
declaratory and prospective injunctive relief against
him. See Asociacion De Subscripcion Conjunta Del Seguro De
Responsabilidad Obligatorio v. Flores Galarza, 484 F.3d 1, 24
(1st Cir. 2007). Nevertheless, Comfort argues that Tringali's
claims must be dismissed because she fails to show that he was
the proximate cause of the constitutional violations she
alleges. I agree.
In order to satisfy the pleading standard under Twombly
and Iqbal, "an adequate complaint must include not only a
plausible claim but also a plausible defendant." Penaibert-Rosa
v. Fortuno-Burset, 631 F.3d 592, 594 (1st Cir. 2011); Sanchez v.
Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, *48 (1st Cir. 2009). The
plaintiff's complaint must include sufficient facts so that the
court can conclude that the named defendant is responsible for
the alleged misconduct. Sanchez, 590 F.3d at 48; Iqbal, 129 S.
C t . at 1949. An allegation that is "threadbare or speculative"
will fail to cross the line between possible and
plausible. PenaIbert-Rosa, 631 F.3d at 595 (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 557 n.5).
My task in determining whether Tringali has pleaded
sufficient facts "to state a plausible claim against a
9 particular defendant is 'context specific.'" Sanchez, 590 F.3d
at 48 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. C t . at 1950). I apply "common law
tort principles when conducting 'inquiries into causation under
§ 1983.'" Id. (quoting Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882
F.2d 553, 561 (1st Cir. 1989)j_. Following this approach, I
agree with Comfort that Tringali has failed to plead a claim
either that he caused any of her alleged injuries or that he has
the power to implement the relief she seeks.
Any inference that Comfort is responsible for the alleged
violations is mere speculation. Tringali claims that Comfort is
a CSE employee, but fails to provide a job title for Comfort
that suggests he is in a position to either violate her rights
or remedy a violation. Additionally, Tringali alleges
violations that span more than ten years, but does not allege
the dates of Comfort's employment with the CSE. Tringali states
that she sent a demand letter to Comfort in which she requested,
among other relief, a copy of the signed child support judgment
against her and termination of the suspension of her driver's
license. She asserts that Comfort never responded to her letter
and that he "knowingly and willingly allowed the plaintiff to
continue to be harmed" by the agency's efforts to enforce a
child support order and failed to provide her with a remedy.
10 (Doc. 9-1). Tringali does not explain, however, why she
believes that Comfort has the authority to satisfy any of her
requests. C f . Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988)
(stating that to determine the causation issue in an Eighth
Amendment claim against a prison official, the court must
examine the defendants' individual duties and discretion to
determine whether he was in a position to cause or remedy the
alleged violation). Without pleading facts that are sufficient
to demonstrate the plausibility of her belief that Comfort
caused the harm she alleges, her claim against him necessarily
fails.
IV. CONCLUSION
I grant the defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 8)
Tringali's claims for monetary, injunctive, and declaratory
relief against the agency defendants because they have not
waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit. I grant the
motion to dismiss her official capacity claims against Doug
Comfort for monetary relief because he has not waived the
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Although the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar either Tringali's claims for prospective
injunctive relief against Comfort or her individual capacity
damage claims against him, I dismiss these claims as well
11 because she has not pleaded sufficient facts to show either that
Comfort proximately caused the violations she alleges or that he
has the power to implement an order granting her the relief she
seeks.
The clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly and
close the case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/Paul Barbadoro Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge
November 13, 2012
cc: Leisha Tringali, pro se James A. Sweeney, Esq.