Tri-States Construction Co. v. Worthen

274 S.W.2d 352, 224 Ark. 418, 1955 Ark. LEXIS 413
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedJanuary 10, 1955
Docket5-548
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 274 S.W.2d 352 (Tri-States Construction Co. v. Worthen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tri-States Construction Co. v. Worthen, 274 S.W.2d 352, 224 Ark. 418, 1955 Ark. LEXIS 413 (Ark. 1955).

Opinion

Ed. F. MoFaddin, Justice.

This is a Workmen Compensation claim: the Commission disallowed the claim; the Circuit Court reversed the Commission; and the case is here on appeal. Appellee, Elhert H. Worthen, was employed by appellant, Tri-States Construction Company, when he collapsed, while on the job, at about 3:00 P. M. on May 29, 1951. He suffered a cerebral hemorrhage, and is now totally and permanently disabled.

The Commission found that Worthen’s collapse was not the result of his work, but was the result of a preexisting diseased condition. 1 If there is substantial evidence to sustain the Commission’s factual findings, then its decision has the force and effect of a jury verdict. Hughes v. Tapley, 206 Ark. 739, 17 S. W. 2d 429; Fordyce Lbr. Co. v. Shelton, 206 Ark. 1134, 179 S. W. 2d 464; and Sturgis Bros. v. Mays, 208 Ark. 1017, 188 S. W. 2d 629. But the Circuit Court, in a written opinion, reached the conclusion that there was no substantial evidence to sustain the Commission in denying compensation to Worth-en. Our study convinces us that the Circuit Court was correct.

In a long line of cases we have held that when the worker collapses because of excessive work load or unusual strain, he is entitled to compensation, even though he had a pre-existing weakness which contributed to his collapse.' One such case is Triebsch v. Athletic Mining & Smelting Co., 218 Ark. 379, 237 S. W. 2d 26; and we quote from that in extenso:

‘ ‘ But on the accidental injury phase of the case, the uncontradicted evidence shows that the claimant suffered an accidental injury within the purview of our cases such as: Herron Lumber Co. v. Neal, 205 Ark. 1093, 172 S. W. 252; McGregor v. Arrington, 206 Ark. 921, 175 S. W. 2d 210; Harding Glass Co. v. Albertson, 208 Ark. 866, 187 S. W. 2d 961; Sturgis Bros. v. Mays, 208 Ark. 1017, 188 S. W. 2d 629; Murch-Jarvis Co. v. Townsend, 209 Ark. 956, 193 S. W. 2d 310; and Batesville White Lime Co. v. Bell, 212 Ark. 23, 205 S. W. 2d 31.

“In Herron Lumber Co. v. Neal, supra, the worker had a gastric ulcer which ruptured while he was performing a task that required extra energy. We held that the worker suffered an accidental injury within the purview of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, and quoted from 71 C. J. 607:

“ ‘Injury from strain or over-exertion due to a physical condition pre-disposing the employee to injury is an injury within the terms of the various workmen’s compensation acts . . .’

“In McGregor v. Arrington, supra, the worker was a carpenter. He had an impaired heart, and, in trying to move a plank, lie over-exerted himself and suffered a collapse and died. We allowed compensation, saying that the decedent’s-death resulted from an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment.

“In Harding Glass Co. v. Albertson, supra, the worker also had an impaired heart; and while at work suffered a heat prostration and died. In allowing compensation, we quoted from Schneider on Workmen’s Compensation Text, Vol. 4, 1328, p. 543:

“ ‘It may be stated generally that if the conditions of the employment, whether due to over-exertion, excessive héat, excessive inhalation of dust and fumes, shock, excitement, nervous strain or trauma, tend to increase an employee’s blood pressure sufficiently to cause a cerebral hemorrhage, such result constitutes a compensable accident, within the intent of most compensation acts, though the employee may have been suffering from a pre-existing diseased condition which pre-disposed him to such result, or where such result would have occurred in time due to the natural progress of such pre-existing condition.'- i . . The majority of the American Courts follow the English rule as set out in the case of Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes (1910), A. C. 242: ‘An accident arises out of the employment when the required exertion producing the accident is too great for the" man undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or condition of health. ’

. ‘ ‘ In Sturgis Bros. v. Mays, supra, the worker, in the course of his employment, overtaxed his previously weakened heart and died. In allowing compensation, we quoted a leading case:

“ ‘Nor is it a defense that the workman'had some pre-disposing physical weakness but for which he would not have broken down. If the employment was the cause of the collapse, in the sense that but for the work he was doing it would not have occurred when it did, the injury arises out of the employment.’

- “In Murch-Jarvis Co. v. Townsend, supra, the worker became disabled from inhaling fumes and dust in-the course of Ms work in a smelter room. We held such disability to be ‘ an accidental injury within the meaning of our Workmen’s Compensation Law’, saying:

“ ‘There are numerous cases from other jurisdictions holding that a disease, or an aggravation thereof, resulting from inhalation of dust particles or fumes may constitute an accident, or injury, within the meaning of the particular act involved.’

“In Batesville White Lime Co. v. Bell, supra, the inhalation of dust particles caused heart trouble, we held such to he an accidental injury, saying:

“ ‘Now there is nothing in the proof in this case to justify a conclusion that the injury to appellee’s heart by breathing the excessive amount of dust was one which appellee might have reasonably expected or anticipated. Certainly it was accidental as far as he was concerned; and there is much authority for a holding that an injury, not necessarily the result of one impact alone, hut caused by a continuation of irritation upon some part of the body by foreign substances may properly he said to he accidental.’ ”

Then, in Triebsch v. Athletic Mining & Smelting Co., supra, we applied the rule of the quoted cases to the facts, there existing, and announced our conclusion in this language:

‘ ‘ Therefore, to summarize: we have in the case, at bar undisputed facts which are similar in essential respects to those which existed in the six cases hereinbefore discussed, in each of which compensation was awarded. These facts are: a pre-existing ailment, an increased and overtaxing effort to accomplish the work load under, the conditions existing, and a collapsed worker resulting therefrom. These make a case of accidental injury within the purview of the Workmen’s Compensation Law.”' (Italics our own.)

With our previous-cases as the guide, we come to the facts in the casé at bar.

I. A Pre-existing Ailment. Elbert Worthen was 47 years of age in May, 1951. He had been working for Tri-States Construction Company for 12 or 13 years; and all the evidence reflects that the owner of the Tri-States Company, Mr. Elias, and the Company director, Dr. Cullen, had been most solicitous for Worthen’s welfare and had shown him every consideration.

On June 2, 1949, Worthen, at the direction of Mr. Elias, went to Dr. Cullen’s office, who found Worthen complaining of a pain in the pit of his stomach. Dr. Cullen found that he was suffering with high blood pressure (160/120), had some damage to his kidneys, and had disease of the heart, arteries and kidneys. Dr.

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Bluebook (online)
274 S.W.2d 352, 224 Ark. 418, 1955 Ark. LEXIS 413, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tri-states-construction-co-v-worthen-ark-1955.