Trezise v. Highway Commission

96 P.2d 637, 150 Kan. 845, 1939 Kan. LEXIS 217
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedDecember 9, 1939
DocketNo. 34,453
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 96 P.2d 637 (Trezise v. Highway Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Trezise v. Highway Commission, 96 P.2d 637, 150 Kan. 845, 1939 Kan. LEXIS 217 (kan 1939).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Thiele, J.:

Plaintiff brought an action to recover damages sustained by reason of an alleged defect in a bridge on a state highway. The trial court sustained a demurrer to his evidence, and he appeals.

As far as it is now necessary to notice, plaintiff’s petition alleged that about 2 o’clock a. m. on July 18, 1937, he was driving his automobile south on highway 63 at a point where a highway bridge crossed Bartlett creek one-half mile northwest of Emmett, Kan.; that not exceeding thirty minutes prior to the time plaintiff reached the bridge it had collapsed and fallen into the creek; that plaintiff approaching the bridge was not aware of the fact the bridge had fallen until he had reached a point not exceeding five feet north of the bridge; that he was driving in a careful and prudent manner at a rate of speed not to exceed forty miles per hour and was catapulted through space and down to the floor of the collapsed bridge, damaging the automobile and permanently injuring the plaintiff. It was [846]*846further alleged that the injuries and damages sustained by plaintiff were due to the negligence, carelessness and omissions of defendant in that (a) the bridge was worn, rusted and unsafe for ordinary public travel; (6) that a truss rod connecting the top truss rod and the lower steel work of the bridge was completely broken and dangling in the air; (c) that the end truss beam was rusted, bent and broken; (d) that bolts connecting the joint of the top truss beam and end truss beam or batter post were not in place and were gone; (e) holes for bolts were rusted out and broken; (/) truss rods were rusted loose, bent and unfit, and the structure was not anchored to the abutments; (g) the timber in the bridge was old, rotten and broken; (h) bolts and rivets were rusted, loose and weak; (i) there was a broken shoe resting on the northwest corner of the abutment, and (;) the tie block was old and broken. It was further alleged generally that the defendant had more than five days’ notice and specifically that the patrolman Kennedy had more than five days’ actual notice of the defective condition of the bridge. There was also appropriate allegation of notice of claim to the highway commission. We need not detail plaintiff’s claim of injury and damage, for that is not presently involved.

Defendant’s answer denied-generally all allegations of the petition not admitted, and denied specifically existence of any defect in the bridge. Defendant admitted, among other things, the highway was a part of the state system of roads and that notice of plaintiff’s claim had been filed, and denied specifically the damage was caused by reason of a highway defect. It was alleged that the damages of which plaintiff complained were directly and proximately caused by the negligence of one Carl Eichman, who carelessly and negligently drove his automobile into the guardrails and batter post on the northwest corner of the bridge, causing the bridge to fall, and through no fault of defendant. At the trial the defendant demurred for the assigned reason the evidence failed to show the requisite five days’ notice and “wholly fails to show the giving of notice of any particular defect which produced a dangerous condition in said bridge,” and that the evidence failed to show “any defect or combination of defects that caused any bridge failure,” and that the evidence failed to show any proximate cause. The trial court’s ruling sustaining this demurrer is assigned as error.

In considering whether the trial court erred, we shall review the evidence, bearing in mind two often stated rules. One is that in con[847]*847sidering a demurrer, the court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the party adducing it, all inferences being resolved in his favor (Fodor v. Interstate Transfer Lines, 149 Kan. 174, 86 P. 2d 574; Morrison v. Bandt, 149 Kan. 200, 86 Pac. 480); the other that the evidence of the party adducing it shall be considered as true, that unfavorable parts shall be disregarded, contradictions and differences between direct and cross-examination shall not be weighed, and if there is any evidence which sustains plaintiff’s case, the demurrer must be overruled (Parker v. City of Wichita, 150 Kan. 249, 250, 92 P. 2d 86, and cases cited).

The real question is, Did plaintiff’s evidence make a prima facie case showing there was a defect in the highway and that the state highway commission had notice of it? It may be remarked that plaintiff, apparently anticipating the defense that the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damage was that the bridge was caused to fall by reason of Eichman’s driving into the batter post and guardrails, offered the evidence of Eichman and a passenger in his car that the car had not struck the bridge in any manner; that the Eichman car was proceeding south at about twenty miles an hour and just as he drove on the bridge it collapsed and the car and its occupants fell with the bridge. Not a great while thereafter and while the Eichman car and its occupants were on the collapsed bridge, the plaintiff’s car came along, reached the fallen bridge, jumped over the Eichman car and stopped on the floor of the collapsed bridge. Plaintiff personally testified he was proceeding south in his car at about thirty miles an hour; he came under a nearby railroad underpass and as he made a swing in the road he saw the banisters of the bridge in the glare of his lights and noticed nothing wrong until he got to where his lights would show the floor of the bridge and there was a black hole; it was too late to stop, and he went off into space and his car landed half way down across the bridge. By one witness the plaintiff showed that three or four years before the bridge collapsed a complaint was made to one of the highway commissioners that the bridge was unsafe for heavy travel. An additional floor and perhaps some other work was done and use of the bridge continued. About a year before the accident witness’ truck had slid crosswise of the bridge and struck one of the side pieces of the bridge, but he had not told any employee of the highway commission about it. By another witness it was shown that four to six months prior to the accident he had noticed a broken rod with a turnbuckle on it that was broken, [848]*848part of it hanging down under the bridge, and that he talked with Kennedy, the highway patrolman; that he and Kennedy looked at the bridge, he had hold of the rod; they talked about what the rod was for, what damage it would do to the bridge, what support it gave to the bridge and why it was not fixed, and Kennedy said he did not think it made any difference, they were going to build a new bridge. Another witness testified to seeing a broken truss rod hanging down, saw the middle post of the bridge, saw where something ha'd hit it and that it was twisted. Other witnesses, testified to substantially the same thing, and that the bridge was about forty-five to fifty years old. Still another witness stated that in 1934 or 1935 a truck ran into the bridge, and at that time it shifted about two inches to the north. The above witnesses and others testified to conditions observed by them after the bridge had fallen; that the batter post (sometimes called the end truss beam) which had been on the northwest corner of the bridge was rusted through in places; the stringers of the bridge at the north end were rotten; that there was a broken tie rod at the south end of the bridge.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
96 P.2d 637, 150 Kan. 845, 1939 Kan. LEXIS 217, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/trezise-v-highway-commission-kan-1939.