Trey Phillip Greenleaf v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: December 18, 2025
• Docket: 07-24-00303-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-24-00303-CR

TREY PHILLIP GREENLEAF, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 47th District Court Potter County, Texas Trial Court No. 083631-A-CR, Honorable Dee Johnson, Presiding

December 18, 2025 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Trey Phillip Greenleaf, Appellant, was convicted of capital murder for causing the

death of Kendra Jo Vela and her unborn baby.1 The trial court sentenced him to life

without parole. Appellant raises five issues in this appeal. We affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 19.02(b)(1), 19.03(a)(7)(A). BACKGROUND

The evidence showed that Appellant and Vela had a tumultuous romantic and

sexual relationship. At the time of the offense, Vela had recently learned that she was

pregnant, which Appellant also knew, as they had exchanged multiple text messages

regarding the pregnancy. One night in February of 2023, Vela and Appellant met up in

an Amarillo hotel room and a fight ensued. Appellant initially told investigators that he

saw a gun, but later stated that he saw Vela reach for the holster on her hip where she

usually carried a gun. Appellant then drew his own gun, which he kept in his pocket, and

shot Vela in the head two times. Appellant quickly left the hotel room and drove away in

Vela’s vehicle. Vela died from the gunshot wounds and her unborn baby died due to lack

of blood flow and oxygen.

Vela’s friend Jennifer Velasquez discovered Vela’s body. Velasquez had visited

Vela at the hotel earlier that night and had left to make a drug delivery for Vela while Vela

waited for Appellant to arrive. When Velasquez first returned to the hotel room, she found

that it was latched from the inside and she heard scuffling sounds. Appellant answered

the door and Velasquez asked for her purse. Appellant gave Velasquez the purse and

she left without entering the hotel room. Velasquez called and sent text messages to

Vela later, but Vela did not respond. Velasquez then returned to the hotel room to check

on Vela and found her body on the bed. Velasquez reported the death to the police.

When Appellant was arrested later that day, he admitted shooting Vela but claimed that

he did so in self-defense. Evidence indicated that Vela was shot while lying down on the

hotel room bed. Her gun was found beneath the bedding of the other bed.

2 ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Intent to Cause Death

By his first issue, Appellant argues that the evidence presented could not lead a

reasonable juror to infer that he formed a separate intent to kill Vela’s unborn baby.

Appellant claims that there was no evidence indicating that he intended to target the

embryo.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all evidence in the light

most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Dunham v. State, 666 S.W.3d 477,

482 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). We “defer to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations

because the jury is the ‘sole judge’ of witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given

testimony.” Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting Garcia

v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)).

We compare the evidence to the elements as defined by a hypothetically correct

jury charge. Metcalf v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). All evidence,

both direct and circumstantial, whether properly or improperly admitted, is considered.

Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). It is not necessary for

each fact to point directly and independently to defendant’s guilt if the cumulative force of

all incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Jenkins v. State,

493 S.W.3d 583, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

3 A person commits capital murder if he intentionally or knowingly commits murder

and murders more than one person during the same criminal transaction. TEX. PENAL

CODE §§ 19.02(b)(1), 19.03(a)(7)(A). The Penal Code definition of a “person” includes

“an individual,” which means “a human being who is alive, including an unborn child at

every stage of gestation from fertilization until birth.” Id. §§ 1.07(a)(26), (38); Lawrence

v. State, 240 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). To support a conviction for capital

murder under section 19.03(a)(7)(A), the State was required to establish discrete, specific

intent to kill with regard to each death. Ex parte Norris, 390 S.W.3d 338, 340 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2012).

A person acts intentionally with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his

conscious objective or desire to cause the result. TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(a). A person

acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct

is reasonably certain to cause the result. Id. § 6.03(b). A jury may infer intent or

knowledge from any facts that tend to prove its existence, including acts, words, and

conduct of the accused and the method of committing the crime. Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d

61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

“Lay people understand maternal death can cause fetal death.” In re C.M.M., 503

S.W.3d 692, 702 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). A jury may infer

that a defendant intends the natural consequences of his acts. Herrera v. State, 526

S.W.3d 800, 810 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d). A jury also may

reasonably infer that a defendant who kills a woman the defendant knows to be pregnant

is aware that killing the woman is reasonably certain to result in the death of the woman’s

unborn child. See Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (jury 4 could reasonably infer defendant who strangled and stabbed pregnant woman knew his

conduct was reasonably certain to cause unborn child’s death); Bonilla-Rubio v. State,

No. 02-23-00200-CR, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 7139, at *13 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 3,

2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (jury could reasonably infer that

defendant was aware that shooting pregnant woman three times in her neck and leaving

her to die was reasonably certain to cause unborn baby’s death); Eguia v. State, 288

S.W.3d 1, 9–10 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (evidence sufficient to

sustain capital-murder conviction where defendant stabbed visibly pregnant woman in

her neck, causing death of woman and her unborn baby).

The evidence at trial established that Appellant knew that Vela was pregnant at

the time he shot her twice in the head at close range, then fled from the scene. The jury

could reasonably infer from the evidence that Appellant was aware that shooting Vela in

the head was reasonably certain to cause the unborn baby’s death. Viewed in the light

most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is sufficient to support the mens rea element

of Appellant’s capital murder conviction. We overrule Appellant’s first issue.

Issue 2: Culpable Mental State

In his second issue, Appellant contends that the jury charge did not limit the

culpable mental states to the result of conduct, erroneously allowing the jury to convict

him based on whether he engaged in the nature of the conduct. Article 36.14 of the Texas

Code of Criminal Procedure mandates that the trial court shall deliver to the jury “a written

charge distinctly setting forth the law applicable to the case . . . .” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

art. 36.14. A jury charge includes both an abstract statement of the law and an application

5 paragraph. Ramirez v. State, 336 S.W.3d 846, 851 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, pet. ref’d).

The abstract portion of the charge is intended to help the jury understand the meaning of

concepts and terms used in the application paragraph of the charge. Arteaga v. State,

521 S.W.3d 329, 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). The application paragraph identifies the

factual circumstances under which the jury should convict or acquit. Vasquez v. State,

389 S.W.3d 361, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

We employ a two-step process when reviewing claimed jury-charge error. See

Cortez v. State, 469 S.W.3d 593, 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); see also Almanza v. State,

686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). First, we determine whether charge error

occurred. Price v. State, 457 S.W.3d 437, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). If so, we then

analyze the error for harm, with the standard of review for harm being dependent on

whether error was preserved for appeal. Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2012). Where error was preserved by objection, any error that is not harmless

constitutes reversible error. Price, 457 S.W.3d at 440. In cases like this one, in which

Appellant made no objection to the complained-of language at trial, we consider whether

any error caused egregious harm. Id.

Appellant’s complaint arises from this language in the abstract portion of the

charge:

A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.

A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts

6 knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

The application paragraph correctly instructed the jury that, in order to find Appellant

guilty, jurors had to believe he “intentionally or knowingly cause[d] the death” of both Vela

and her baby, reading:

Now bearing in mind the foregoing instructions, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 5th day of February, 2023, in Potter County, Texas, [Appellant] did then and there, intentionally or knowingly cause the death of an individual, namely KENDRA JO VELA, by shooting her with a firearm and did then and there, intentionally or knowingly cause the death of another individual, the unborn child of KENDRA JO VELA, by shooting KENDRA JO VELA with a firearm in the same criminal transaction . . . then you will find [Appellant] guilty as charged in the indictment.

“Capital murder is a result-of-conduct offense; the crime is defined in terms of one’s

objective to produce, or a substantial certainty of producing, a specified result, i.e., the

death of the named decedent.” Louis v. State, 393 S.W.3d 246, 251 (Tex. Crim. App.

2012). Where a particular culpable mental state applies, the trial court “errs when it fails

to limit the language in regard to the applicable culpable mental states to the appropriate

conduct element.” Price, 457 S.W.3d at 443.

The State acknowledges that the inclusion of the definitions of intentionally and

knowingly in nature of conduct terms was erroneous based on current precedent.2 It

asserts, however, that any error was not egregiously harmful. Jury charge error is

egregiously harmful if the error affects the very basis of the case, deprives the defendant

2 The State notes that the Court of Criminal Appeals may reconsider the issue in a pending case

out of this Court, Jaimes v. State, PD-0135-25 & PD-0136-25 (appealing 708 S.W.3d 279 (Tex. App.— Amarillo 2024)).

7 of a valuable right, vitally affects the defensive theory, or makes a case for conviction

clearly and significantly more persuasive. Taylor v. State, 332 S.W.3d 483, 490 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2011). The harm must be actual, not just theoretical. See id at 489–90. In

determining whether this difficult standard has been met, we review the entirety of the

record, including (1) the entirety of the charge, (2) the state of the evidence, (3) arguments

of counsel, and (4) any other relevant information revealed by the record. Villarreal v.

State, 453 S.W.3d 429, 433 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171.

The first of the four factors, the entirety of the charge, weighs against finding

egregious harm. As set forth above, the application paragraph, which is the “heart and

soul” of the jury charge, correctly instructed the jury regarding “the factual circumstances

under which the jury should convict or acquit.” Vasquez, 389 S.W.3d at 366. “Error in

the abstract paragraph of a jury charge does not constitute egregious harm when the

application paragraph correctly instructs the jury.” Alkayyali v. State, 713 S.W.3d 780,

790 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (plurality op.) (citing Medina v State, 7 S.W.3d 633, 640 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1999)).

The second factor, the state of the evidence, also weighs against finding egregious

harm. The jury heard evidence that Vela was shot in the head twice before Appellant fled

the scene. It is unlikely to believe that a jury would have found Appellant intended to

shoot Vela but also failed to find that Appellant thereby intended to cause, or knew that it

would cause, the death of Vela and her baby. See Medina, 7 S.W.3d at 640) (explaining

that “for knowing murders, the distinction between result of conduct and nature of conduct

blurs because awareness of the result of the conduct necessarily entails awareness of

8 the nature of the conduct as well . . . . To be aware that his conduct is reasonably certain

to result in death, the actor must also be aware of the lethal nature of his conduct . . . .”).

The third factor we consider is the arguments of counsel. Appellant’s theory of the

case was that his use of deadly force was an act of self-defense. As Appellant’s counsel

argued in closing, Appellant claimed that he and Vela were arguing, then “she went for

her gun, he got his out first, and he shot her.” Appellant further suggested that an

unknown individual shot Vela a third time after Appellant left her. Neither approach made

a distinction between the nature of conduct and the result of conduct. Instead, the focus

was on whether Appellant reasonably believed deadly force was necessary when he shot

Vela. We conclude that the third factor does not support a finding of egregious harm.

The fourth factor requires us to consider other relevant information revealed by the

record. We identify none pertinent to this issue and therefore consider this factor neutral.

We conclude the record does not reveal actual harm suffered by Appellant.

Because the error in the charge was not so egregious as to deprive Appellant of a fair

and impartial trial, we overrule his second issue.

Issue 3: Mens Rea Requirement

In his third issue, Appellant asserts that the jury charge did not make clear that, to

convict Appellant, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally and

knowingly killed Vela and intentionally and knowingly killed her unborn baby. Appellant

did not raise any objection to the charge on this basis at trial. We apply the same standard

of review as set forth in our analysis of Appellant’s second issue, above.

9 We must first determine whether the charge was erroneous. Cortez, 469 S.W.3d

at 598. The charge provides, “Our law provides that a person commits the offense of

Murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual. Our law provides

that a person commits capital murder when such person, murders more than one person

in the same criminal transaction.” These definitions are sufficiently clear to enable the

jury to apply the definition of one term for use in another paragraph. Further, the

application paragraph makes clear that the jury had to consider intent for each murder. It

provided that a finding of guilt required finding that Appellant “intentionally or knowingly

cause[d] the death of an individual, namely KENDRA JO VELA . . . and . . . intentionally

or knowingly cause[d] the death of another individual, the unborn child of KENDRA JO

VELA . . . .” Absent any evidence to the contrary, we presume that the jury understood

and followed the court’s charge. Miles v. State, 204 S.W.3d 822, 827–28 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2006). Thus, we presume that the jury found Appellant guilty of capital murder

pursuant to the application paragraph, which required that he intentionally or knowingly

killed Vela and intentionally or knowingly killed her unborn baby. Because we find no

error in the charge, the harm analysis is not necessary. We overrule Appellant’s third

issue.

Issue 4: “Without Justification”

The trial court denied Appellant’s request that the charge read, “Our law provides

a person commits the offense of murder if, without justification,” the person commits an

offense under section 19.02(b) of the Penal Code. Appellant claims, by his fourth issue,

that he was harmed by the jury charge because it did not include the phrase “without

justification” in the definition of murder. 10 The court’s instruction tracks the language of the Texas Penal Code provision for

murder. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(1) (“A person commits an offense if the person

intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual . . . .”). “A jury charge which

tracks the language of a particular statute is a proper charge on the statutory issue.”

Riddle v. State, 888 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc).

The trial court then addressed Appellant’s justification claim by further instructing

the jury on self-defense, which was the only justification at issue. See Alonzo v. State,

353 S.W.3d 778, 781 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (justification is umbrella term for category

of defenses under Chapter 9 of Penal Code). The instruction provides:

Under our law, a person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree that he reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other person’s use or attempted use of unlawful force. The use of force is not justified in response to verbal provocation alone.

A person is justified in using deadly force against another if he would be justified in using force against the other in the first place, as set out above, and when he reasonably believes that such deadly force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other person’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force.

Appellant has not cited to any authority, and we are not aware of any, requiring

that the trial court address a justification claim in the manner advocated by Appellant.

Because we find no error in the court’s charge as given, we overrule Appellant’s fourth

Issue 5: Constitutionality of Statute

In his final issue, Appellant challenges the constitutionality of section 1.07(a)(26)

of the Texas Penal Code, which defines an “individual” as “a human being who is alive, 11 including an unborn child at every stage of gestation from fertilization until birth.” TEX.

PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(26). Appellant asserts that treating Vela’s five-to-six-week-old

embryo as an “individual” under the law violates the Due Process, Supremacy, and

Establishment Clauses of the United States Constitution.

Even constitutional complaints are waived if not first raised in trial court. Jimenez

v. State, 32 S.W.3d 233, 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). A challenge to the constitutionality

of a statute must be preserved in the trial court and may not be raised for the first time on

appeal. See Karenev v. State, 281 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (preservation

of facial challenge); Reynolds v. State, 423 S.W.3d 377, 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)

(preservation of as-applied challenge).

As Appellant acknowledges, no objection was made in the trial court regarding this

complaint.3 We therefore conclude that Appellant failed to preserve his fifth issue for

appellate review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1). Accordingly, issue five is overruled.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled each of Appellant’s five issues on appeal, we affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

Judy C. Parker Justice

Do not publish.

3 Appellant cites Rabb v. State, 730 S.W.2d 751, 752 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), for the proposition

that he may raise the constitutionality issue for the first time on appeal. However, the rule stated in Rabb was overruled in Karenev, 281 S.W.3d at 434.