This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A25-0392
Travis Clay Andersen, petitioner, Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Filed December 1, 2025 Affirmed Smith, Tracy M., Judge
Carver County District Court File No. 10-CR-06-1119
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chelsie M. Willett, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mark Metz, Carver County Attorney, Kevin A. Hill, Senior Assistant County Attorney, Chaska, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Travis Clay Andersen challenges the denial of his petition for
postconviction relief. He argues that the district court erred by (1) determining that the
petition was time-barred; (2) determining that, in any event, he is not entitled to relief on the merits; and (3) alternatively, not granting him an evidentiary hearing on his petition.
We conclude that Andersen’s petition was time-barred, and we therefore need not address
his remaining arguments. We affirm.
FACTS
On April 10, 2007—the day that this matter was set for trial—Andersen entered an
Alford plea 1 to misdemeanor fifth-degree assault in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
609.224, subdivision 1 (2005). In exchange for the plea, respondent State of Minnesota
agreed to dismiss one count of terroristic threats in the same file, as well as a trespassing
charge in an unrelated file.
During the plea hearing, the district court was set to address the plea in addition to
several other unrelated matters against Andersen in other files. The district court began by
making clear that it was first addressing the plea here. During a colloquy with Andersen,
defense counsel addressed the constitutional rights that Andersen would waive by
accepting a plea agreement and Andersen waived those rights. Andersen also affirmed that
he believed that there was a substantial likelihood that the jury would find him guilty based
on the state’s evidence—specifically, the testimony of the alleged victim, L.G.
After defense counsel completed her examination of Andersen, the prosecutor asked
Andersen whether he had gone through the police reports and all the allegations against
him relating to the “incident with [L.G.].” Andersen stated that he had not, which prompted
1 An Alford plea allows a defendant to plead guilty while maintaining innocence of the charged offense. State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 760-61 (Minn. 1977) (discussing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 238 (1970)).
2 the prosecutor to ask Andersen whether he was “aware of the incident with [L.G.] that
occurred on October 27, 2006.” Andersen stated that he was aware of it. The prosecutor
then asked whether Andersen understood that the state planned to call L.G. and other
witnesses to testify that Andersen had threatened L.G. and, as a result, could have caused
him fear, and Andersen agreed that he understood. Finally, Andersen again agreed that, if
he had a trial, the jury “would find [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based upon the
State’s evidence.”
The district court accepted Andersen’s guilty plea, convicted him of fifth-degree
assault, and sentenced him to a stay of imposition. Andersen was discharged from
probation on November 14, 2008.
On August 13, 2024, Andersen filed a petition for postconviction relief, requesting
withdrawal of his plea. Andersen claimed that his plea was involuntary and unintelligent
due to ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to review the evidence
with him or discuss the case with him before he entered his Alford plea, rendering his plea
constitutionally invalid.
The district court denied postconviction relief. It ruled that the petition was time-
barred and that, even if it were not, the record conclusively establishes that Andersen
received effective assistance of counsel and that his plea was constitutionally valid. In
addressing the time bar, the district court determined that Andersen “was aware of any
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel when he entered the plea” in 2007 and that, even
if he did not learn of the basis for his postconviction claim until he received the transcript
of the plea hearing in 2012, he still had not presented any “legitimate arguments outlining
3 an injustice that caused him to miss the primary deadline by such a substantial period of
time.” As to the merits of his claim, the district court concluded that Andersen failed to
demonstrate that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness or that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors,
Andersen would not have pleaded guilty. It noted that Andersen acknowledged that he was
aware of the incident with the victim, that witnesses would testify to Andersen’s
threatening the victim, and that the threats could have caused the victim fear. It further
noted that Andersen went through a thorough waiver of rights and that the plea agreement
advantaged Andersen because he avoided a felony conviction.
Andersen appeals.
DECISION
Andersen argues that the district court erred by concluding that his petition for
postconviction relief was time-barred because he satisfied the interests-of-justice exception
to the two-year statute of limitations for petitioning for postconviction relief. In addition,
he argues that his petition should have been granted on the merits because he demonstrated
a manifest injustice warranting plea withdrawal based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
Andersen asks that we reverse the district court’s decision and remand with instructions to
vacate his conviction or, at a minimum, remand for an evidentiary hearing on his
postconviction claim. Because we conclude that the district court properly ruled that
Andersen’s petition is time-barred, we begin and end our analysis with that issue.
Andersen petitioned for postconviction relief pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section
590.01 (2024). Appellate courts review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to
4 summarily deny a postconviction petition. Paul v. State, 20 N.W.3d 48, 54 (Minn. 2025)
(citing Munt v. State, 984 N.W.2d 242, 249 (Minn. 2023)). A district court “abuses its
discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic
and the facts in the record.” Riley v. State, 792 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Minn. 2011). Appellate
courts review legal conclusions de novo and findings of fact for clear error. Paul, 20
N.W.3d at 54.
“No petition for postconviction relief may be filed more than two years after . . . the
entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed.” Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 4(a)(1). An exception to this two-year statute of limitations applies when
“the petitioner establishes to the satisfaction of the court that the petition is not frivolous
and is in the interests of justice.” Id., subd.
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This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A25-0392
Travis Clay Andersen, petitioner, Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Filed December 1, 2025 Affirmed Smith, Tracy M., Judge
Carver County District Court File No. 10-CR-06-1119
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chelsie M. Willett, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mark Metz, Carver County Attorney, Kevin A. Hill, Senior Assistant County Attorney, Chaska, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Travis Clay Andersen challenges the denial of his petition for
postconviction relief. He argues that the district court erred by (1) determining that the
petition was time-barred; (2) determining that, in any event, he is not entitled to relief on the merits; and (3) alternatively, not granting him an evidentiary hearing on his petition.
We conclude that Andersen’s petition was time-barred, and we therefore need not address
his remaining arguments. We affirm.
FACTS
On April 10, 2007—the day that this matter was set for trial—Andersen entered an
Alford plea 1 to misdemeanor fifth-degree assault in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
609.224, subdivision 1 (2005). In exchange for the plea, respondent State of Minnesota
agreed to dismiss one count of terroristic threats in the same file, as well as a trespassing
charge in an unrelated file.
During the plea hearing, the district court was set to address the plea in addition to
several other unrelated matters against Andersen in other files. The district court began by
making clear that it was first addressing the plea here. During a colloquy with Andersen,
defense counsel addressed the constitutional rights that Andersen would waive by
accepting a plea agreement and Andersen waived those rights. Andersen also affirmed that
he believed that there was a substantial likelihood that the jury would find him guilty based
on the state’s evidence—specifically, the testimony of the alleged victim, L.G.
After defense counsel completed her examination of Andersen, the prosecutor asked
Andersen whether he had gone through the police reports and all the allegations against
him relating to the “incident with [L.G.].” Andersen stated that he had not, which prompted
1 An Alford plea allows a defendant to plead guilty while maintaining innocence of the charged offense. State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 760-61 (Minn. 1977) (discussing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 238 (1970)).
2 the prosecutor to ask Andersen whether he was “aware of the incident with [L.G.] that
occurred on October 27, 2006.” Andersen stated that he was aware of it. The prosecutor
then asked whether Andersen understood that the state planned to call L.G. and other
witnesses to testify that Andersen had threatened L.G. and, as a result, could have caused
him fear, and Andersen agreed that he understood. Finally, Andersen again agreed that, if
he had a trial, the jury “would find [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based upon the
State’s evidence.”
The district court accepted Andersen’s guilty plea, convicted him of fifth-degree
assault, and sentenced him to a stay of imposition. Andersen was discharged from
probation on November 14, 2008.
On August 13, 2024, Andersen filed a petition for postconviction relief, requesting
withdrawal of his plea. Andersen claimed that his plea was involuntary and unintelligent
due to ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to review the evidence
with him or discuss the case with him before he entered his Alford plea, rendering his plea
constitutionally invalid.
The district court denied postconviction relief. It ruled that the petition was time-
barred and that, even if it were not, the record conclusively establishes that Andersen
received effective assistance of counsel and that his plea was constitutionally valid. In
addressing the time bar, the district court determined that Andersen “was aware of any
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel when he entered the plea” in 2007 and that, even
if he did not learn of the basis for his postconviction claim until he received the transcript
of the plea hearing in 2012, he still had not presented any “legitimate arguments outlining
3 an injustice that caused him to miss the primary deadline by such a substantial period of
time.” As to the merits of his claim, the district court concluded that Andersen failed to
demonstrate that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness or that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors,
Andersen would not have pleaded guilty. It noted that Andersen acknowledged that he was
aware of the incident with the victim, that witnesses would testify to Andersen’s
threatening the victim, and that the threats could have caused the victim fear. It further
noted that Andersen went through a thorough waiver of rights and that the plea agreement
advantaged Andersen because he avoided a felony conviction.
Andersen appeals.
DECISION
Andersen argues that the district court erred by concluding that his petition for
postconviction relief was time-barred because he satisfied the interests-of-justice exception
to the two-year statute of limitations for petitioning for postconviction relief. In addition,
he argues that his petition should have been granted on the merits because he demonstrated
a manifest injustice warranting plea withdrawal based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
Andersen asks that we reverse the district court’s decision and remand with instructions to
vacate his conviction or, at a minimum, remand for an evidentiary hearing on his
postconviction claim. Because we conclude that the district court properly ruled that
Andersen’s petition is time-barred, we begin and end our analysis with that issue.
Andersen petitioned for postconviction relief pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section
590.01 (2024). Appellate courts review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to
4 summarily deny a postconviction petition. Paul v. State, 20 N.W.3d 48, 54 (Minn. 2025)
(citing Munt v. State, 984 N.W.2d 242, 249 (Minn. 2023)). A district court “abuses its
discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic
and the facts in the record.” Riley v. State, 792 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Minn. 2011). Appellate
courts review legal conclusions de novo and findings of fact for clear error. Paul, 20
N.W.3d at 54.
“No petition for postconviction relief may be filed more than two years after . . . the
entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed.” Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 4(a)(1). An exception to this two-year statute of limitations applies when
“the petitioner establishes to the satisfaction of the court that the petition is not frivolous
and is in the interests of justice.” Id., subd. 4(b)(5). A petitioner invoking the interests-of-
justice exception must file the petition within two years of the date that the claim arose.
Id., subd. 4(c). A claim arises under the exception when the petitioner knew or should have
known that they had a claim. Sanchez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 550, 559-60 (Minn. 2012).
“The interests-of-justice exception is ‘triggered by an injustice that caused the petitioner
to miss the primary deadline in subdivision 4(a)’ and ‘not the substantive claims in the
petition.’” Caldwell v. State, 976 N.W.2d 131, 141 (Minn. 2022) (quoting Sanchez, 816
N.W.2d at 557). Unless a statutory exception applies, Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b), a
petition filed outside the statute of limitations may be summarily denied, Colbert v. State,
870 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 2015).
Andersen does not dispute that his petition for relief was filed more than two years
after the imposition of his sentence. Instead, he claims that the interests-of-justice
5 exception to the statute of limitations applies. Andersen contends that he timely invoked
the interests-of-justice exception because he filed his petition within two years of
discovering that he had a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Andersen’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is primarily grounded on his
assertion that his lawyer did not review the police reports in this case with him before he
entered an Alford plea. He asserts that he learned of this claim in 2023 when he first
received the police reports. This argument is unavailing.
The transcript of Andersen’s guilty plea hearing demonstrates that Andersen
indisputably knew or should have known of this ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
earlier. Andersen stated during his 2007 plea hearing that he had not seen the police reports,
so he knew of the alleged claim at that time. Moreover, as the district court observed,
Andersen received the transcript of his plea hearing in 2012—which would have reminded
him that he did not review the police reports before entering his plea—but he still did not
bring a petition until 2024. Andersen therefore asserted his ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim—based on his lawyer’s alleged failure to show him the police reports—more
than two years after his sentence and more than two years after any time that he knew or
reasonably should have known about the claim.
Andersen also argues in his supplemental brief that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel based on grounds apart from not receiving the police reports before
his plea. These grounds include that his attorney failed to investigate the charged offense,
did not explain the charges to him, told him to answer “yes” to everything she asked at the
plea hearing, and did not adequately explain the terms of the plea agreement, leaving him
6 unprepared and generally confused about the charge to which he was pleading guilty.
Again, Andersen knew or should have known of these alleged issues at the time of the plea.
Moreover, Andersen has alleged no facts that demonstrate an injustice that caused him to
miss the primary deadline under the postconviction statute. See Caldwell, 976 N.W.2d at
141. Instead, he has alleged that there was injustice based on his counsel’s performance
before and during the original proceeding—performance that Andersen was or should have
been aware of at the time.
Finally, Andersen suggests that, because he did not bring a direct appeal and has
filed no previous postconviction petition, this petition represents his first attempt at a
substantive review of his conviction and therefore should be considered. He also argues
that the petition should be considered because his claim is not dismissible out of hand as
procedurally barred. See State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976) (precluding
review of claims that were known but not raised on direct appeal). But neither argument
explains why either the primary limitations period or the limitations period for the interests-
of-justice exception is satisfied.
We thus conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in summarily
denying Andersen’s petition for postconviction relief as time-barred.
Affirmed.