1 2 FILED IN THE 3 EASTER U N . S D . I S D T I R S I T C R T I C O T F C W O A U S R H T I NGTON Nov 17, 2025 4 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 TRAVIS BLAKE, individually, No. 2:25-CV-00253-RLP
8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT BLAKE MALO’S MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS
10 KIWI AIR, LLC dba Hells Canyon Helicopters, a Washington Limited 11 Liability Company, and BLAKE MALO, individually, 12 Defendants. 13 14 Before the Court is Defendant Blake Malo’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 6. 15 Oral argument was held on the motion on November 14, 2025. Robert L. Bowman 16 appeared on behalf of Mr. Malo. Rachel Min Luke appeared on behalf of Plaintiff 17 Travis Blake. For the reasons discussed below, Mr. Malo’s Motion to Dismiss is 18 denied. 19 // 20 1 BACKGROUND 2 Defendant Kiwi Air LLC is a helicopter operations and maintenance
3 company with its principal place of business in Clarkston, Washington. ECF Nos. 4 1 at 2; 7, ¶¶6-9; 9-1 at 14 (noting Kiwi Air’s helipad and hanger are located in 5 Clarkston). Kiwi Air operates many helicopter trips out of Clarkston. ECF Nos. 9-1
6 at 6-17; 9-2, ¶4. Kiwi Air is owned by Mr. Malo, who performs general 7 management functions and serves as Director of Operations, a pilot, and a 8 mechanic. ECF No. 7, ¶¶4-5. Mr. Malo resides in Portland, Oregon, but 9 periodically travels to Clarkston for work. Id., ¶6. Mr. Malo estimates he works in
10 Washington approximately one week per month, although some months he does 11 not travel to Washington. Id.; see also ECF No. 9-2, ¶4 (noting Mr. Malo resides in 12 an apartment in Kiwi Air’s hangar in Clarkston when he travels).
13 In 2024, Kiwi Air entered into a contract with the South Dakota Department 14 of Game, Fish, & Parks to use a helicopter to capture elk in South Dakota’s Black 15 Hills. ECF No. 9-1 at 19-24. Mr. Malo signed the contract on behalf of Kiwi Air. 16 Id. at 24.
17 Plaintiff Travis Blake periodically worked for Kiwi Air as a contractor/ 18 crewmember,1 and previously worked on wildlife capture projects out of 19
20 1The parties alternatively characterize Mr. Blake as a contractor or an 1 Washington. Id., ¶12; ECF No. 9-2, ¶5. Mr. Blake is a Montana resident. ECF No. 2 1 at 2. In early 2024, Mr. Blake inquired with Kiwi Air about work on a wildlife
3 project, and in late 2024 Mr. Blake accepted an offer from Mr. Malo to be a gunner 4 for the South Dakota project. ECF Nos. 7, ¶17; 9-2, ¶6-7. As a gunner, Mr. Blake’s 5 job was to fire a tranquilizer gun from the helicopter to immobilize the elk. ECF
6 Nos. 7, ¶16; 9-2, ¶11. 7 To perform the contract, Mr. Malo traveled from his home in Oregon to 8 Clarkston, where he collected the helicopter for the project. ECF No. 7, ¶18. Mr. 9 Malo then drove the helicopter from Clarkston to Montana, where he picked up
10 Mr. Blake, and thence to South Dakota. ECF No. 7, ¶¶18-20. In Montana and 11 South Dakota, Mr. Malo instructed Mr. Blake about his job duties and on 12 helicopter safety procedures. ECF Nos. 7, ¶¶21-25; 9-2, ¶ ¶10-12. According to
13 Mr. Blake, Mr. Malo instructed him to shoot while standing on the helicopter skid. 14 ECF No. 9-2, ¶¶11-12. Mr. Blake alleges that Mr. Malo directed him to wear a 15 safety harness attached via a tether to an anchor strap belt looped around a bar in 16 the helicopter while shooting. Id. According to Mr. Malo, he instructed Mr. Blake
17 to always remain seated in the helicopter with his seatbelt fastened. ECF No. 7, 18 ¶24. 19
20 employee. See ECF Nos. 7, ¶12; 9-2, ¶9. 1 On February 27, 2025, Mr. Blake attached his safety harness to the anchor 2 strap on a bar in the helicopter. ECF Nos. 7, ¶26; 9-2, 14. Mr. Blake alleges the
3 anchor strap was already present on the bar when he began his duties as a gunner, 4 and that Mr. Malo directed him to attach his harness to the strap on the bar. ECF 5 No. 9-2, ¶¶12-14. During that day’s operations, the bar on which the anchor strap
6 was attached failed, and Mr. Blake fell out of the helicopter while standing on the 7 skid. ECF No. 1 at 9-12. 8 Mr. Blake filed the Complaint initiating this action against Kiwi Air, LLC 9 and Mr. Malo on July 15, 2025. ECF No. 1. He asserts state law claims for product
10 liability and negligence stemming from Defendants’ allegedly improper design and 11 installation of the anchor point, negligent maintenance, and failure to provide 12 adequate warnings. Id. at 16-21.
13 LEGAL STANDARD 14 Rule 12(b)(2) governs the dismissal of an action based on lack of personal 15 jurisdiction. When a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal 16 jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction is
17 appropriate. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 799 (9th 18 Cir. 2004). Where the motion is based on written materials, “the plaintiff need only 19 made a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts.” Id. at 800 (internal quotation
20 marks omitted). A prima facie showing means the plaintiff has produced 1 admissible evidence which, if believed, is sufficient to establish the existence of 2 personal jurisdiction. Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995).
3 Although the plaintiff cannot “simply rest on the bare allegations of its complaint 4 and must come forward with facts, by affidavit or otherwise, supporting personal 5 jurisdiction, uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken as true.”
6 Amba Marketing Sys., Inc. v. Jobar Int’l, Inc., 551 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir. 1977). If 7 any conflict exists between the parties’ evidence, the court must resolve it in the 8 plaintiff’s favor. AT&T v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th 9 Cir. 1996).
10 “The power of a federal court entertaining a case based on diversity of 11 citizenship to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant turns on 12 two independent considerations: (1) whether an applicable state rule or statute
13 potentially confers personal jurisdiction over the defendant; and (2) whether 14 assertion of such jurisdiction accords with constitutional principles of due 15 process.” Easterday v. Tyson Free Meats, Inc., 2023 WL 3272404, at *2 (E.D. 16 Wash. Apr. 12, 2023) (citing Data Disc Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d
17 1280, 1286 (9th Cir. 1977)). 18 Washington’s long-arm statute, RCW 4.28.185, extends personal jurisdiction 19 to the broadest reach that the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution
20 permits. Downing v. Losvar, 21 Wn. App. 2d 635, 654, 507 P.3d 894 (2022). 1 “Because Washington’s long-arm jurisdictional statute is coextensive with federal 2 due process requirements, the jurisdictional analysis under state law and federal
3 due process are the same.” Easterday, 2023 WL 3272404, at *2. 4 DISCUSSION 5 Mr. Malo contends the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him, as Mr.
6 Blake’s claims concern a helicopter accident which occurred in South Dakota and 7 in no way involves Mr. Malo’s contacts with Washington. Mr. Blake contends his 8 claims relate to and arise out of Mr. Malo and Kiwi Air’s business activities in 9 Washington.
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1 2 FILED IN THE 3 EASTER U N . S D . I S D T I R S I T C R T I C O T F C W O A U S R H T I NGTON Nov 17, 2025 4 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 TRAVIS BLAKE, individually, No. 2:25-CV-00253-RLP
8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT BLAKE MALO’S MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS
10 KIWI AIR, LLC dba Hells Canyon Helicopters, a Washington Limited 11 Liability Company, and BLAKE MALO, individually, 12 Defendants. 13 14 Before the Court is Defendant Blake Malo’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 6. 15 Oral argument was held on the motion on November 14, 2025. Robert L. Bowman 16 appeared on behalf of Mr. Malo. Rachel Min Luke appeared on behalf of Plaintiff 17 Travis Blake. For the reasons discussed below, Mr. Malo’s Motion to Dismiss is 18 denied. 19 // 20 1 BACKGROUND 2 Defendant Kiwi Air LLC is a helicopter operations and maintenance
3 company with its principal place of business in Clarkston, Washington. ECF Nos. 4 1 at 2; 7, ¶¶6-9; 9-1 at 14 (noting Kiwi Air’s helipad and hanger are located in 5 Clarkston). Kiwi Air operates many helicopter trips out of Clarkston. ECF Nos. 9-1
6 at 6-17; 9-2, ¶4. Kiwi Air is owned by Mr. Malo, who performs general 7 management functions and serves as Director of Operations, a pilot, and a 8 mechanic. ECF No. 7, ¶¶4-5. Mr. Malo resides in Portland, Oregon, but 9 periodically travels to Clarkston for work. Id., ¶6. Mr. Malo estimates he works in
10 Washington approximately one week per month, although some months he does 11 not travel to Washington. Id.; see also ECF No. 9-2, ¶4 (noting Mr. Malo resides in 12 an apartment in Kiwi Air’s hangar in Clarkston when he travels).
13 In 2024, Kiwi Air entered into a contract with the South Dakota Department 14 of Game, Fish, & Parks to use a helicopter to capture elk in South Dakota’s Black 15 Hills. ECF No. 9-1 at 19-24. Mr. Malo signed the contract on behalf of Kiwi Air. 16 Id. at 24.
17 Plaintiff Travis Blake periodically worked for Kiwi Air as a contractor/ 18 crewmember,1 and previously worked on wildlife capture projects out of 19
20 1The parties alternatively characterize Mr. Blake as a contractor or an 1 Washington. Id., ¶12; ECF No. 9-2, ¶5. Mr. Blake is a Montana resident. ECF No. 2 1 at 2. In early 2024, Mr. Blake inquired with Kiwi Air about work on a wildlife
3 project, and in late 2024 Mr. Blake accepted an offer from Mr. Malo to be a gunner 4 for the South Dakota project. ECF Nos. 7, ¶17; 9-2, ¶6-7. As a gunner, Mr. Blake’s 5 job was to fire a tranquilizer gun from the helicopter to immobilize the elk. ECF
6 Nos. 7, ¶16; 9-2, ¶11. 7 To perform the contract, Mr. Malo traveled from his home in Oregon to 8 Clarkston, where he collected the helicopter for the project. ECF No. 7, ¶18. Mr. 9 Malo then drove the helicopter from Clarkston to Montana, where he picked up
10 Mr. Blake, and thence to South Dakota. ECF No. 7, ¶¶18-20. In Montana and 11 South Dakota, Mr. Malo instructed Mr. Blake about his job duties and on 12 helicopter safety procedures. ECF Nos. 7, ¶¶21-25; 9-2, ¶ ¶10-12. According to
13 Mr. Blake, Mr. Malo instructed him to shoot while standing on the helicopter skid. 14 ECF No. 9-2, ¶¶11-12. Mr. Blake alleges that Mr. Malo directed him to wear a 15 safety harness attached via a tether to an anchor strap belt looped around a bar in 16 the helicopter while shooting. Id. According to Mr. Malo, he instructed Mr. Blake
17 to always remain seated in the helicopter with his seatbelt fastened. ECF No. 7, 18 ¶24. 19
20 employee. See ECF Nos. 7, ¶12; 9-2, ¶9. 1 On February 27, 2025, Mr. Blake attached his safety harness to the anchor 2 strap on a bar in the helicopter. ECF Nos. 7, ¶26; 9-2, 14. Mr. Blake alleges the
3 anchor strap was already present on the bar when he began his duties as a gunner, 4 and that Mr. Malo directed him to attach his harness to the strap on the bar. ECF 5 No. 9-2, ¶¶12-14. During that day’s operations, the bar on which the anchor strap
6 was attached failed, and Mr. Blake fell out of the helicopter while standing on the 7 skid. ECF No. 1 at 9-12. 8 Mr. Blake filed the Complaint initiating this action against Kiwi Air, LLC 9 and Mr. Malo on July 15, 2025. ECF No. 1. He asserts state law claims for product
10 liability and negligence stemming from Defendants’ allegedly improper design and 11 installation of the anchor point, negligent maintenance, and failure to provide 12 adequate warnings. Id. at 16-21.
13 LEGAL STANDARD 14 Rule 12(b)(2) governs the dismissal of an action based on lack of personal 15 jurisdiction. When a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal 16 jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction is
17 appropriate. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 799 (9th 18 Cir. 2004). Where the motion is based on written materials, “the plaintiff need only 19 made a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts.” Id. at 800 (internal quotation
20 marks omitted). A prima facie showing means the plaintiff has produced 1 admissible evidence which, if believed, is sufficient to establish the existence of 2 personal jurisdiction. Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995).
3 Although the plaintiff cannot “simply rest on the bare allegations of its complaint 4 and must come forward with facts, by affidavit or otherwise, supporting personal 5 jurisdiction, uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken as true.”
6 Amba Marketing Sys., Inc. v. Jobar Int’l, Inc., 551 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir. 1977). If 7 any conflict exists between the parties’ evidence, the court must resolve it in the 8 plaintiff’s favor. AT&T v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th 9 Cir. 1996).
10 “The power of a federal court entertaining a case based on diversity of 11 citizenship to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant turns on 12 two independent considerations: (1) whether an applicable state rule or statute
13 potentially confers personal jurisdiction over the defendant; and (2) whether 14 assertion of such jurisdiction accords with constitutional principles of due 15 process.” Easterday v. Tyson Free Meats, Inc., 2023 WL 3272404, at *2 (E.D. 16 Wash. Apr. 12, 2023) (citing Data Disc Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d
17 1280, 1286 (9th Cir. 1977)). 18 Washington’s long-arm statute, RCW 4.28.185, extends personal jurisdiction 19 to the broadest reach that the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution
20 permits. Downing v. Losvar, 21 Wn. App. 2d 635, 654, 507 P.3d 894 (2022). 1 “Because Washington’s long-arm jurisdictional statute is coextensive with federal 2 due process requirements, the jurisdictional analysis under state law and federal
3 due process are the same.” Easterday, 2023 WL 3272404, at *2. 4 DISCUSSION 5 Mr. Malo contends the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him, as Mr.
6 Blake’s claims concern a helicopter accident which occurred in South Dakota and 7 in no way involves Mr. Malo’s contacts with Washington. Mr. Blake contends his 8 claims relate to and arise out of Mr. Malo and Kiwi Air’s business activities in 9 Washington.
10 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a 11 defendant’s liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a 12 forum with which he has established no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations.
13 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (1985). 14 “Unless a defendant’s contacts with a forum are so substantial, continuous, and 15 systematic that the defendant can be deemed to be ‘present’ in that forum for all 16 purposes, a forum may exercise only ‘specific’ jurisdiction—that is, jurisdiction
17 based on the relationship between the defendant’s forum contacts and the 18 plaintiff’s claim.” Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 19 433 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2006).
20 1 For a court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant, that 2 defendant must have at least “minimum contacts” with the relevant forum such that
3 the exercise of jurisdiction “does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 4 substantial justice.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (quoting International Shoe Co. 5 v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154 (1945)).
6 The Ninth Circuit has established a three-prong test for analyzing a claim of 7 specific personal jurisdiction: 8 (1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform 9 some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and 10 protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s 11 forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial 12 justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.
13 Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the 14 first two prongs of the test, and if met, the burden shifts to the defendant to 15 demonstrate why the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable. Id. 16 Purposeful Direction or Availment 17 For claims sounding in tort, purposeful direction analysis is generally 18 proper, Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., 135 F.4th 739, 751 (9th Cir. 2025), while 19 purposeful availment analysis generally applies to contract claims. 20 Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. However, there is no hard and fast rule 1 preventing purposeful availment analysis from being applied to a tort claim, and 2 both tests may be applied in all cases to determine whether sufficient minimum
3 contacts exist. Davis v. Cranfield Aerospace Sols., Ltd., 71 F.4th 1154, 1162 (9th 4 Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 826 (2024). 5 “To establish purposeful availment, [courts] look at a defendant’s ‘entire
6 course of dealing’ with the forum state – ‘not solely the particular contract or 7 tortious conduct giving rise to [a plaintiff’s] claim.’” Id. at 1162 (quoting Glob. 8 Commodities Trading Grp., Inc. v. Beneficio de Arroz Choloma, S.A., 972 F.3d 9 1101, 1108 (9th Cir. 2020)). Purposeful availment exists where the defendant
10 “purposefully avails [himself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the 11 forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws,” and in return 12 “submit[s] to the burdens of litigation” in the state. Id. (quoting Schwarzenegger,
13 374 F.3d at 802). “The contacts must be the defendant’s own choice and not 14 random, isolated, or fortuitous.” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 15 592 U.S. 351, 359, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). 16 Here, Mr. Malo’s contacts with Washington demonstrate he attempted to
17 gain the benefits and protections of, and submitted to litigation in, this state. Mr. 18 Malo chose to headquarter his business in Washington. He chooses to maintain and 19 fly helicopters out of Clarkston. He makes frequent and systemic trips to
20 Washington to conduct business, including to initiate the elk capture project which 1 forms the basis for this case. These contacts are not random, isolated, or fortuitous, 2 and all indicate a desire to avail himself of Washington’s benefits and protections.
3 Therefore, Mr. Blake has demonstrated the purposeful availment test is satisfied 4 and that Mr. Malo has sufficient minimum contacts with Washington for the Court 5 to have personal jurisdiction over him.
6 Arising Out of or Relating to the Forum Contacts 7 A lawsuit “arises out of” a defendant’s contacts with the forum state if a 8 direct nexus exists between those contacts and the cause of action. Fireman’s Fund 9 Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Bank of Cooperatives, 103 F.3d 888, 894 (9th Cir. 1996).
10 However, personal jurisdiction can also be demonstrated where a claim “relates to” 11 a defendant’s forum contacts, even absent causation. Impossible Foods Inc. v. 12 Impossible X LLC, 80 F.4th 1079, 1097 (9th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct.
13 2561 (2024). This is especially so where a defendant has continuous and extensive 14 contacts with the forum state, and thus “will more reasonably anticipate being 15 subject to personal jurisdiction for causes of action that do not directly arise from 16 those contacts, but that nonetheless ‘relate to’ them.” Id. at 1091 (quoting Ford
17 Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 364). 18 All of Mr. Blake’s claims relate to Mr. Malo’s business activities in 19 Washington – the design, maintenance, and operation of Washington based
20 helicopters. But-for causation stemming from these contacts is unnecessary in light 1 of the contacts’ continuous and extensive nature. The wildlife capture project at 2 issue here began in Washington, the helicopters were maintained in Washington,
3 and Mr. Malo secured Mr. Blake’s services on behalf of his Washington company. 4 Therefore, Mr. Blake’s claims relate to Mr. Malo’s contacts with Washington. 5 Fair Play and Substantial Justice
6 The Ninth Circuit has articulated seven factors for courts to evaluate the 7 reasonableness of exercising personal jurisdiction: 8 (1) the extent of the defendant’s purposeful interjection into the forum state’s affairs; (2) the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum; (3) 9 the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant’s state; (4) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most efficient 10 judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiff’s interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of 11 an alternative forum.
12 Briskin, 135 F.4th at 761 (quoting Herbal Brands, Inc. v. Photoplaza, Inc., 72 13 F.4th 1085, 1096 (9th Cir. 2023)). 14 Here, it would not be unfair to subject Mr. Malo to personal jurisdiction in 15 Washington. 16 First, Mr. Malo has clearly interjected himself into Washington’s affairs, as 17 he owns and operates a helicopter business in the state. Second, there would be no 18 burden on Mr. Malo to defend in Washington. Not only does Mr. Malo regularly 19 travel to Washington for work, but as this Court has uncontroverted jurisdiction 20 over Kiwi Air, Mr. Malo will be forced to defend his company in Washington 1 regardless. Third, there is no clear conflict with the sovereignty of Oregon. Fourth, 2 Washington has a clear interest in adjudicating this dispute, as Washington has an
3 interest in assuring the safety of helicopters in the state. Fifth, the most efficient 4 judicial resolution of the controversy would be to retain jurisdiction. This Court 5 has jurisdiction over Kiwi Air and the lawsuit will proceed in this forum regardless
6 of whether Mr. Malo is dismissed. Dismissing Mr. Malo could potentially result in 7 bifurcation of the case and duplication of efforts should Mr. Blake file suit against 8 him in another forum. 9 Concerning factors six and seven, Washington is not an important forum for
10 Mr. Blake’s relief, nor is it the only forum available to him. South Dakota presents 11 a valid alternative forum for Mr. Blake’s claims. As both Washington and South 12 Dakota are out-of-state forums for Mr. Blake, it is not clear why Washington
13 would be important to his interest in the resolution of his claims. However, the fact 14 Washington is not the only forum, or even an important forum, for Mr. Blake’s 15 claims does not make it unreasonable for the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction 16 over Mr. Malo.
17 Factors one through five all show it would be reasonable for the Court to 18 exercise personal jurisdiction over Mr. Malo. As all three prongs of the Ninth 19 Circuit’s test for personal jurisdiction have been met, the Court finds Mr. Blake has
20 1|| alleged facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. Mr. Malo’s Motion to 2|| Dismiss is denied. 3 IT IS ORDERED: 4 1. Defendant Blake Malo’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 6, is DENIED. 5 The District Court Executive is hereby directed to enter this Order and 6|| furnish copies to all counsel. 7 DATED November 17, 2025.
9 ~~ REBECCA L.PENNELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT BLAKE MALO’S TION, TOA TDICAATCS * 19