Travelers Insurance v. St. Jude Hospital Complex Development Group, Inc.

154 F.R.D. 143, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4761
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Louisiana
DecidedApril 8, 1994
DocketCiv. A. Nos. 93-1199, 93-2414
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 154 F.R.D. 143 (Travelers Insurance v. St. Jude Hospital Complex Development Group, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Travelers Insurance v. St. Jude Hospital Complex Development Group, Inc., 154 F.R.D. 143, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4761 (E.D. La. 1994).

Opinion

ORDER AND REASONS

MENTZ, District Judge.

On January 25, 1994, the Court entered a memorandum opinion 843 F.Supp. 138, which shall be supplemented and amended as follows:

The Court finds that counsel for defendants have multiplied the proceedings in this case unreasonably and vexatiously by the filing of defendants’ motions to disqualify as detailed in its memorandum opinion of January 25, 1994, and as delineated in its Order and Reasons dated March 30, 1994 in The Travelers Insurance Company versus St. Jude Hospital of Kenner, La., Inc., et al., C.A. 90-1983 c/w 90-2601. In C.A. # 90-1983 one of three similar motions to disqualify was filed by defendants1 and/or their affil[144]*144iates. A copy of the Order and Reasons dated March 30, 1994 in C.A 90-1983 is attached to this order and reasons and is thereby incorporated herein.

The similar motions to disqualify were filed with this Court in C.A # 90-1983, The Travelers Insurance Company v. Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., C.A # 92-58, and The Travelers Insurance Company v. St. Jude Hospital of Kenner, La., Inc., C.A # 930173; Although counsel for defendants in these related cases was different than in the instant case, defendants and their counsel herein were clearly aware of the other motions and the import of their outcome on this case. Specifically, as discussed at length in the Court’s memorandum opinion dated January 25, 1994, defendants stated in their October 12, 1993 motion to continue:

These defendants stipulate that the determination of those motions [to disqualify in C.A #90-1983, #92-58, and #93-0173] would be dispositive of any complaints that the defendants would have in the instant case. Emphasis added.

Nonetheless, defendants proceeded to file these motions to disqualify on December 17 and 22, 1993, despite their knowledge of the Court’s denial of the related motions on November 19, 1993. Thus it appears by their own admission that to the great extent that defendants’ motions were repetitive of those in the three earlier and related motions to disqualify2, defendants multiplied these proceedings unreasonably and vexatiously.

In addition, to the extent defendants added new allegations to the previous motions to disqualify, their first affidavit was untimely, legally insufficient and woefully so3. Their supplemental affidavit was properly not allowed and, like the first affidavit, dismally failed to cite evidentiary support of personal rather than judicial bias. As discussed at length in the Court’s January 25, 1994 Memorandum Opinion at p. 7, et seq., the law is precise on this issue, and counsel did not even attempt to advance an argument for extension, modification or reversal of existing law. In sum, the Court finds that counsel for defendants multiplied the proceedings in this case unreasonably and vexatiously, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927.4

Travelers has filed with the Court an affidavit in support of award of attorneys’ fees and disbursements consisting of their counsel’s, Phelps Dunbar, invoices to Travelers for professional services rendered in connection with defendants’ motions to disqualify the trial judge. The aggregate amount of attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses incurred by Travelers in connection with the motion to disqualify totals three thousand two hundred eighty-five and no/100 dollars ($3,285.00). The Court finds the invoices to be proper and justified. Defendants’ counsel shall pay the sum of three thousand two hundred eighty-five and no/100 dollars ($3,285.00) to Travelers, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which by its terms applies exclusively to attorneys.

Travelers has also filed with the Court an affidavit in support of award of attorneys’ fees and disbursements pursuant to F.R.C.P. 56(g) consisting of Phelps Dunbar invoices to Travelers for professional services rendered in connection with defendants’ bad faith filing of the affidavit of Kenneth Fonte and Traveler’s motion to strike. The aggregate amount of attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses incurred by Travelers in connection with the motion to disqualify totals [145]*145one thousand four hundred sixty-eight and 75/100 dollars ($1,468.75). The Court finds the invoices to be proper and justified, and pursuant to F.R.C.P. 56(g) defendants shall pay the sum of one thousand four hundred sixty-eight and 75/100 dollars ($1,468.75) to Travelers accordingly.5

As to all other costs incurred by Travelers as the prevailing party in this litigation, the memorandum opinion of January 25, 1994 shall be amended to reflect that Travelers is awarded against all defendants all costs incurred by Travelers in this litigation, except as otherwise provided herein.

With respect to production of stock certificates of St. Jude Hospital Complex Development Group, Inc., defendants have still failed to produce pre-numbered in red ink certificates # 1, 2, 3, and 4, and renumbered in black ink certificate #2002.6

Thus, it is ordered by the Court that defendants produce these certificates by Friday, April 15, 1994 at 5:00 P.M. as well as an affidavit of John or Robert Liljeberg, as officers of St. Jude Hospital Complex Development Group, Inc. and/or the affiliated companies to whom Development Group stock was allegedly transferred, detailing the existence or not of a stock register or separate book of St. Jude Hospital Complex Development Group, Inc. and the reason for the delay or failure to produce pre-numbered in red ink certificates # 1, 2, 3, and 4 and renumbered in black certificate #2002. Failing this or an explanation satisfactory to the Court, the Court shall direct a hearing be held to determine whether defendants should be held in contempt and further that John and Robert Liljeberg attend the hearing in person.

On the subject of the Court’s continuing concern with the conflicting representations by defendants as to ownership of the movables, the Court shall defer action on this until the Court of Appeals renders its decision on the appeal of C.A. # 90-1983.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the order of January 25, 1994 is AMENDED to include:

1. The preliminary expert report of Vincent Messina of October 4,1993, is STRICKEN as untimely and paragraph 5 of Mr. Messina’s affidavit, which reads,

Because of the fact that the partnership was indebted to LEI in excess of the $978,-000 on May 29, 1990, the transfer of the 800 shares of stock which the partnership owned in Complex Development to LEI in payment of that indebtedness rendered the partnership solvent after the transaction,

and is based on Mr. Messina’s preliminary expert report, SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED by the Court.

2. The preliminary report of October 4, 1993, and the final report dated October 27, 1993, of defendants’ real estate appraisers James Turnbull and Carlos Pumilia are STRICKEN as untimely and incomplete and the paragraph of Mr. Pumilia’s affidavit which reads,

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154 F.R.D. 143, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4761, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/travelers-insurance-v-st-jude-hospital-complex-development-group-inc-laed-1994.