Transportes Juan Chavez, S.A. De C v. v. Maribel Deharo, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Hipolito Deharo, Yvette Del Rio and Pedro Deharo

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston)
• Decided: April 7, 2026
• Docket: 01-24-00611-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued April 7, 2026.

In the

Court of Appeals for the

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00611-CV ——————————— TRANSPORTES JUAN CHAVEZ, S.A. DE C.V., Appellant v. MARIBEL DEHARO, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF HIPOLITO DEHARO, YVETTE DEL RIO, AND PEDRO DEHARO, Appellees

On Appeal from the 11th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2021-73523

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Transportes Juan Chavez, S.A. de C.V. (Transportes Mexico), a

Mexican corporation with its principal place of business in the Mexican state of

San Luis Potosí, takes this interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of its special appearance. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(7) (authorizing

interlocutory appeal of order denying special appearance). Transportes Mexico

contends that the trial court lacks personal jurisdiction over it and thus erred in

denying its special appearance.

Because the evidence in the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the

trial court’s ruling, shows that Transportes Mexico was not the alter ego of a Texas

affiliate and restricted its operations mostly or entirely to Mexico, we conclude that

the trial court does not have general jurisdiction over it. We decide further that the

trial court does not have specific jurisdiction over Transportes Mexico. The

evidence in the record, considered in the light most favorable to the trial court’s

ruling, does not show a substantial connection between the operative facts and

Transportes Mexico’s Texas contacts that were its own choice—i.e., that, on the

basis of its chosen contacts, Transportes Mexico could reasonably anticipate being

called into a Texas court with respect to the plaintiffs’ claims. Finally, we conclude

that the plaintiffs’ assertion that Transportes Mexico conspired with Texas

residents is insufficient to affirm the trial court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.

We thus reverse the trial court’s order denying Transportes Mexico’s special

appearance and render judgment dismissing for lack of jurisdiction the claims

against Transportes Mexico brought by appellees Maribel Deharo (Maribel),

2 individually and as representative of the Estate of Hipolito Deharo, Yvette Del Rio,

and Pedro Deharo (collectively, the Deharos).

Background

Maribel resides in Liberty County, Texas. Hipolito Deharo (Hipolito),

deceased, is her late husband. Maribel and Hipolito were injured in a bus accident

that occurred in San Luis Potosí, Mexico, on December 21, 2019. Maribel alleges

that Hipolito was alive for the two hours that it took for emergency medical

personnel to arrive at the scene of the accident but succumbed to his injuries some

hours later.

A. Original Petition

In connection with the 2019 bus accident, on November 9, 2021, Maribel,

individually and as the representative of Hipolito’s estate, brought claims in Harris

County, Texas against defendants Transportes Chavez, Inc. (Transportes Texas),

Juan Chavez, Maria Rodriguez, and 100 John Does. Transportes Texas is a Texas

corporation with its alleged principal place of business in Texas. Maribel alleged

that Chavez and Rodriguez own Transportes Texas, and that Transportes Texas

owns and operates a bus terminal in Harris County, Texas.

Maribel pleaded that she and Hipolito purchased tickets for the bus from

Transportes Texas in Harris County. They boarded the bus at Transportes Texas’s

3 Harris County terminal. The bus accident in San Luis Potosí occurred when the bus

began swerving and ultimately rolled over.

B. Amended Petition

On December 13, 2021, Maribel amended her pleading. In the amended

petition, Maribel and Hipolito’s children were added as plaintiffs and Transportes

Mexico and Chavez International, LLC (Chavez LLC) were added as defendants.

The plaintiffs pleaded that Mexican authorities had identified Transportes Mexico

as the owner of the bus involved in the accident and that Chavez LLC was the

lessor of the bus.

The plaintiffs alleged that Transportes Mexico and Chavez LLC are

commercial motor vehicle operators or owners pursuant to Federal Motor Carrier

Safety Administration (FMCSA) regulations and common carriers as defined by

law. They claimed that Transportes Mexico and Chavez LLC committed negligent

acts that were proximate causes of the bus accident, including: hiring, retaining,

and failing to adequately train or supervise the bus’s driver, and failing to follow

and enforce safety rules and regulations including the FMCSA regulations. With

regard to Transportes Mexico specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that it:

• failed to comply with applicable FMCSA regulations;

• failed to disclose it was operating in violation of applicable FMCSA regulations;

• failed to adequately supervise or train the bus driver; 4 • hired and retained, and entrusted the bus, to a driver Transportes Mexico knew or should have known was reckless, incompetent, or both;

• entrusted the bus to a driver Transportes Mexico knew or should have known was fatigued;

• failed to follow federal regulations regarding driver qualification records;

• failed to inspect and monitor the driver’s on-duty records;

• failed to properly inspect, maintain, and repair the bus;

• failed to enforce its own safety rules, policies, and procedures;

• failed to manage and supervise its operations in compliance with applicable laws and regulations; and

• conspired with other defendants to operate a commercial motor vehicle passenger bus line in violation of applicable FMCSA regulations.

The plaintiffs claimed that Transportes Mexico and Chavez LLC are the

alter egos of Chavez and, in the alternative, that Chavez and Rodriguez created,

owned, and controlled Transportes Mexico and Chavez LLC for unlawful

purposes.

C. Special Appearance

Appellant Transportes Mexico filed a special appearance on January 3,

2024. Transportes Mexico alleged that it is a Mexican company that does business

exclusively in Mexico. Transportes Mexico stated that it operates solely through its

drivers in Mexico and does not operate in Texas or elsewhere in the United States.

Transportes Mexico noted that Transportes Texas and Chavez LLC are both United

5 States corporations that do business in Texas and that both had answered and

appeared in the litigation.

Transportes Mexico alleged that, while it has a contractual relationship with

Transportes Texas and Chavez LLC, those entities “are operated as distinct entities

with each [of the] companies’ respective operations restricted to their given

country of incorporation.” Transportes Mexico claimed further that it “does not do

business in Texas in any meaningful way connected to the accident at issue.”

1. Corporate entities and Juan Chavez

According to Transportes Mexico, Transportes Mexico is a corporation

organized under the laws of Mexico that owns and operates a passenger bus service

and several passenger buses. Each of Transportes Mexico, Transportes Texas, and

Chavez LLC “is fundamentally a bus company, and each employs [its] own

respective drivers, maintains [its] own insurance, and conducts business

exclusively in [its] own respective countr[y].” Chavez is a shareholder of

Transportes Mexico and was also a shareholder of Transportes Texas at the time of

the bus accident. Chavez owned Chavez LLC at the time of the subject accident,

but Chavez LLC was dissolved in December 2022.

2. Transportes Mexico, Transportes Texas, and Chavez LLC operations

According to Transportes Mexico, it operates solely on the Mexican side of

the Texas–Mexico border. Transportes Mexico drivers are not licensed to operate

6 in Texas. Transportes Mexico “is solely responsible for the use of the subject buses

and its employees while operating those within the Mexican interior.”

Transportes Mexico alleged that Transportes Texas or Chavez LLC is

“solely responsible for the operation of buses, transportation of passengers, and

their employed drivers when operating in Texas.” Transportes Texas and Chavez

LLC’s drivers do not travel into or operate in Mexico. “For buses used in the

United States, either [Chavez LLC or Transportes Texas] was responsible for

inspecting any that it operated regardless of whether it was rented from

[Transportes Mexico] or owned by one of those Texas-based companies.”

3. Transportes Mexico, Transportes Texas, and Chavez LLC operations at Texas–Mexico border

According to Transportes Mexico, Transportes Mexico “transports

passengers exclusively within the Mexican interior to the Texas–Mexico border

where the Mexican driver hands off the bus to an American driver employed by

[Transportes Texas] and the American driver the[n] drives the passengers into the

United States.” Transportes Mexico drivers “de-board buses owned by or operated

by [Transportes Mexico] on the Mexican side of the Texas/Mexico [border] and do

not enter the State of Texas or United States.” After Transportes Mexico drivers

de-board on the Mexican side of the Texas–Mexico border, “drivers employed by

either [Transportes Texas or Chavez LLC] board the bus and drive it and the

passengers into the State of Texas.”

7 Transportes Mexico stated that: “At no time do [Transportes Mexico] drivers

travel into Texas or the United States for the purposes of carriage of individuals or

any other business purpose.” At the Texas–Mexico border, “unless required by

Customs or immigration to exit temporarily[,] passengers remain on the bus[,] only

the driver is exchanged in Mexico and the bus may travel into the [United States]

under the exclusive operative control by [Transportes Texas and Chavez LLC].”

Something similar “occurs in reverse upon the return trip to Mexico at which time

the interchange occurs, and [Transportes Mexico] regains custody, control and

operation of the bus in the Mexican interior, utilizing only its employed drivers.”

Alternatively, “passengers may deboard the bus owed by [Transportes Mexico] and

get on board a bus owned and operated by [Transportes Texas or Chavez LLC] for

entry into the United States.” Transportes Mexico drivers “retrieve buses used by

[Transportes Texas or Chavez LLC] at the Texas/Mexico [border] for use of the

buses in Mexico by [Transportes Mexico] drivers.” Transportes Mexico claimed

that, under Transportes Mexico’s “agreement with [Transportes Texas and Chavez

LLC], [Transportes Mexico]’s duties and responsibilities terminate at the

Texas/Mexico border upon which time [Transportes Texas or Chavez LLC] would

take control of the subject bus per that agreement.”1

1 Transportes Mexico references a single “interline” agreement with Transportes Texas and Chavez LLC, whereas the plaintiffs allege that multiple interline and lease agreements existed between Transportes Mexico and Transportes Texas and 8 Transportes Mexico alleged that, “[w]hen operations of a bus changes from

one company to another, it is denoted by a sign or sticker on the bus.” A bus

operated by Transportes Mexico in Mexico will have attached to it a sign or sticker

“indicating such.” A bus operated by Transportes Texas or Chavez LLC in the

United States will have attached to it a sign or sticker “indicating such.”

4. Insurance

According to Transportes Mexico, buses that Transportes Texas or Chavez

LLC operates in the United States are insured by those companies in the United

States, and buses that Transportes Mexico operates are insured for travel in Mexico

by Mexican insurers. “Buses operated in the United States by [Transportes Texas

or Chavez LLC] are registered in the United States by those companies and insured

for travel in the United States by United States-based insurers.” “No United-States

insurer insures a bus for its use in Mexico, and no Mexico-based insurer insures a

bus for its use in the United States.”

5. Revenue

According to Transportes Mexico, “[r]evenue from the passenger tickets

sold by [Transportes Texas and Chavez LLC] is kept and maintained exclusively

by [Transportes Texas and Chavez LLC]; it is not shared with [Transportes

Mexico].” Similarly, “revenues from passenger tickets sold by [Transportes

Chavez LLC. The record on appeal does not include any of the alleged agreements.

9 Mexico] are kept and maintained exclusively by that Mexican corporation and not

shared with” Transportes Texas and Chavez LLC.

6. December 21, 2019 accident

According to Transportes Mexico, at the time of the bus accident at issue,

Maribel and Hipolito “were traveling in the Mexican interior on a bus owned and

operated by [Transportes Mexico]” and driven by a Transportes Mexico driver.

Transportes Mexico “received the bus and its passengers from [Transportes Texas]

on the Mexican side of the border, and no [Transportes Mexico] operator . . .

entered Texas.” Thus, Transportes Mexico claimed, “neither [Transportes Texas

nor Chavez LLC] had custody or control over the subject bus at the time of the

accident at issue.”

Transportes Mexico stated that, at the time of the accident, the bus at issue

was registered in Mexico and “marked as being operated by [Transportes

Mexico].” Chavez LLC had “rented the bus involved in the [accident] from

[Transportes Mexico] for use by [Chavez LLC] in the United States.” Transportes

Texas had “rented the bus involved in the [accident] from [Transportes Mexico]

for use by [Transportes Texas] in the United States by [Transportes Texas]

drivers.”

10 7. Other potential contacts with Texas

According to Transportes Mexico, Transportes Mexico does not have an

office, registered agent, telephone directory listing, commercial listing, or bank

account in Texas. Nor does it have any operations, facilities, or “yard” in Texas.

Transportes Mexico is not registered with the Texas Secretary of State, and does not

employ any Texas residents, recruit Texas residents to work for Transportes

Mexico, advertise in “local Texas media,” or own or lease any real property in

Texas. Transportes Mexico has never sued anyone in Texas.

D. Response to Special Appearance

From the record on appeal, it appears that the Deharos did not request or

conduct any jurisdictional discovery following Transportes Mexico’s special

appearance. In their response to Transportes Mexico’s special appearance, the

plaintiffs argued that Transportes Mexico had understated its contacts with the

United States and its relationship with affiliates Transportes Texas and Chavez

LLC.

According to the plaintiffs, at the time of the accident, Chavez and

Rodriguez owned and operated multiple entities in the United States and Mexico.

Chavez has dual United States and Mexican citizenship, is involved in the

11 management of both Transportes Texas and Transportes Mexico, and is paid a

salary by both Transportes Texas and Transportes Mexico.

The plaintiffs alleged that Transportes Texas is a Texas corporation with its

principal place of business in Harris County, Texas. Transportes Texas has been in

business since 1992 and incorporated since 2000. Rodriguez owns 51% of

Transportes Texas and Chavez owns 49%.

The plaintiffs alleged that Transportes Mexico is a Mexican corporation

owned by Chavez alone or in combination with Rodriguez.2 Chavez is involved in

hiring drivers for Transportes Mexico, was involved in hiring the driver who was

operating the bus at the time of the accident at issue, and “retained” the driver as a

Transportes Mexico driver after the accident. Chavez travels to Mexico once a

month for five to seven days to manage Transportes Mexico.

The plaintiffs alleged that Chavez LLC was a Texas LLC that Chavez

formed on January 21, 2015. Chavez was the sole owner of Chavez LLC and

voluntarily terminated Chavez LLC on December 1, 2022. Chavez LLC, Chavez

International, Inc. (Chavez Inc.), or both had their own bus facility and Department

of Transportation registration. Chavez LLC, Chavez Inc., or both were “involved

in the ownership, leasing, and maintenance” of the bus at issue.

2 The record on appeal contains inconsistent evidence of the ownership of Transportes Mexico. In their most recent deposition testimony, Chavez and Rodriguez agreed that Chavez was the sole owner of Transportes Mexico at the time of the accident.

12 The plaintiffs alleged that Chavez Inc. was a Texas corporation solely

owned by Chavez with its principal place of business in Harris County. Chavez

Inc. was also voluntarily terminated in December 2022.

The plaintiffs alleged that International Charter Services, Inc. (ICS) was

formed by Rodriguez in 2004 and also owned buses for charters, travel, and

leasing. ICS provided services similar to those provided by Transportes Texas.

Chavez did not have an interest in ICS, which was eventually voluntarily

terminated.

The plaintiffs alleged that Chavez and Rodriguez admitted that they “owned

commercial transportation companies prior to the [accident] which have been

involved in lawsuits where personal injuries are alleged.”

2. Transportes Mexico, Transportes Texas, and Chavez LLC operations

According to the plaintiffs, at the time of the accident, Transportes Texas

provided bus transportation on just one route: from Houston, Texas, to the

Mexican cities of San Luis Potosí and Rio Verde, both of which are located in the

Mexican state of San Luis Potosí. Transportes Texas’s Houston facility serves as

Transportes Texas’s office, Transportes Texas’s bus terminal, Transportes Texas’s

bus storage location, and Chavez’s residence. Buses owned, operated, and leased

by Transportes Mexico, Transportes Texas, and Chavez LLC are stored at the

13 facility and, according to the plaintiffs, all of those entities use the facility as their

terminal.3

The plaintiffs alleged that, at the time of the accident, Transportes Mexico

owned eight buses, Transportes Texas owned eight to twelve buses, and Chavez

LLC owned one bus. The companies leased buses from each other as needed.

Regardless of which entity owned or leased a given bus, under an interline

agreement the bus would operate under Transportes Texas’s DOT registration in

Texas and Transportes Mexico’s registration in Mexico. According to the

plaintiffs, each of the buses has Transportes Mexico and Transportes Texas’s

names on it and both United States and Mexico license plates.4

The plaintiffs alleged that, under interline agreements among the companies,

drivers for the United States entities drive only in the United States and drivers for

the Mexican entities drive only in Mexico. Passengers buying tickets in the United

3 The plaintiffs cited three exhibits as support for their claim that Transportes Mexico uses Transportes Texas’s Houston facility as a terminal—exhibits 12, 21, and 22. But the version of their response to Transportes Mexico’s special appearance that is in the appellate record does not include exhibits 21 and 22. Exhibit 12 is a declaration from Chavez that does not reference any use of Transportes Texas’s Houston facility by Transportes Mexico. Chavez states in his declaration that Transportes Mexico operates solely in Mexico and does not own or lease any real property in Texas. 4 The plaintiffs’ support for this assertion is deposition testimony by Chavez in response to the question: “You don’t tell them it’s a different actual company that’s taking them to their destination. You just tell them there’s a different insurance company involved. Correct?” Chavez responded, through an interpreter: “Well, they see that the front has two license plates, two names. So they see that the bus goes to both places.”

14 States are not told that, in Mexico, the bus will be operated by a Mexican driver

who is not required to operate in a manner that complies with FMCSA.

The plaintiffs alleged that Transportes Texas acts as Transportes Mexico’s

agent in booking a service to be performed by Transportes Mexico. The plaintiffs

claimed that, under interline agreements, Transportes Mexico benefited from:

(1) leasing its buses to the other entities; (2) generating revenue from tickets sold

in Mexico for travel from Mexico to the U.S.; (3) not having to comply with the

FMCSA, and thus being able to cut corners on maintenance and training; (4) being

able to shield itself from liability; and (5) being able to perform maintenance on all

buses in Mexico at lower cost. The plaintiffs claimed further that Transportes

Mexico drivers are “permitted, encouraged, and trained to flee the scene” of any

accident to avoid being taken into custody5—impeding any investigation into the

cause of the accident.

5 In the testimony the plaintiffs cite as support for this assertion, Chavez, through an interpreter, characterized his understanding of the requirements of Mexican law, including Mexican “insurance law.” Chavez claimed that, under Mexican law, a driver involved in an accident must first help anyone injured but, then, must leave the scene to avoid being taken into police custody “because later on the insurance can have a hard time getting them out on bail.” He testified that Transportes Mexico drivers are thus trained “[f]irst to help the people” and then to leave before the police arrive. Neither party cites any legal authority supporting Chavez’s understanding of Mexican law.

15 3. December 21, 2019 accident

According to the plaintiffs, Maribel and Hipolito purchased their bus tickets

from Transportes Texas in Harris County on December 9, 2019. The bus at issue

was owned by Transportes Mexico, but leased to Chavez LLC (or Transportes

Texas) and operated by Transportes Texas. A Transportes Texas employee named

Quinn drove the bus from Houston to the Texas–Mexico border in Laredo, Texas.

At the border, a Transportes Mexico employee named Felipe Martinez took over as

driver. Martinez fled the scene of the accident and could not be found for two

weeks.

E. Trial Court Order

On August 12, 2024, the trial court denied Transportes Mexico’s special

appearance. This appeal followed.

Special Appearance

In its appeal, Transportes Mexico argues that: (1) any finding of specific

jurisdiction over Transportes Mexico was not supported by legally sufficient

evidence, (2) any implicit finding of general jurisdiction over Transportes Mexico

was erroneous, (3) legally and factually insufficient evidence supports any finding

that Transportes Mexico and Transportes Texas are alter egos, and (4) the Deharos’

conspiracy allegation is conclusory.

16 A. Standard of Review

Whether a trial court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant

is a question of law that we review de novo. LG Chem Am., Inc. v. Morgan, 670

S.W.3d 341, 346 (Tex. 2023); Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Bell, 549 S.W.3d

550, 558 (Tex. 2018). When, as here, the trial court did not issue findings of fact

and conclusions of law, all relevant facts that are necessary to support the ruling

and supported by evidence are implied. Bell, 549 S.W.3d at 558. We presume that

the trial court resolved all factual disputes in favor of its ruling. Spir Star AG v.

Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868, 871-72 (Tex. 2010). When, as here, the appellate record

includes the reporter’s record, the appellant may challenge the legal and factual

sufficiency of the evidence supporting implied findings in the same manner as if

they were jury findings or express findings by the trial court. Shields Ltd. P’ship v.

Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 480 (Tex. 2017).

We review any challenged factual findings using the same standards that we

use to review jury findings. Wash. DC Party Shuttle, LLC v. IGuide Tours, LLC,

406 S.W.3d 723, 729 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). When

reviewing a finding for legal sufficiency, we consider the evidence in the light

most favorable to the finding and indulge every reasonable inference that supports

the challenged finding. Id. We credit favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder

could, and we disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not.

17 Id. Evidence is legally insufficient to support the implied finding only if: (1) the

record bears no evidence of a vital fact, (2) the court is barred by rules of law or of

evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3)

the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (4) the

evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of a vital fact. Bradberry, 526

S.W.3d at 480.

When we review the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting an

implied finding, we consider all the evidence and will set aside the finding only if

it is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly

wrong and unjust. Wash. DC Party Shuttle, 406 S.W.3d at 729. If the evidence

supports the implied fact finding, we must uphold the trial court’s judgment on any

legal theory supported by the evidence. Id.

B. Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction

Texas courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant

if (1) the Texas long-arm statute authorizes it and (2) doing so comports with

federal and state due-process guarantees. Goldstein v. Sabatino, 690 S.W.3d 287,

294 (Tex. 2024) (citing Bell, 549 S.W.3d at 558). The long-arm statute permits

Texas courts to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant that “does

business” in Texas. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795

(Tex. 2002) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 17.042). Under the long-arm

18 statute, a nonresident does business in Texas if, “[i]n addition to other acts that

may constitute doing business,” the nonresident (1) contracts by mail or otherwise

with a Texas resident and either party is to perform the contract in whole or in part

in Texas; (2) commits a tort in whole or in part in Texas; or (3) recruits Texas

residents, directly or through an intermediary located in Texas, for employment

inside or outside of Texas. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 17.042.

Personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is constitutional if: (1) the

defendant has established minimum contacts with the forum state and (2) the

exercise of jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice. BMC, 83 S.W.3d at 795 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,

326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). A defendant establishes minimum contacts with a

forum state if it purposefully avails itself of the privileges and benefits of

conducting business within the forum state. Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v.

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-76 (1985)). “Because of the unique and onerous

burden placed on a party called upon to defend a suit in a foreign legal system, the

minimum contacts analysis is particularly important when the defendant is from a

different country.” Id.

A defendant’s contacts with the forum may give rise to either general or

specific jurisdiction. Bell, 549 S.W.3d at 559. If the plaintiff’s claims are unrelated

to the defendant’s forum contacts, the court’s exercise of jurisdiction is an exercise

19 of “general jurisdiction,” and the minimum-contacts test is satisfied only if the

defendant’s affiliations with the state are so substantial, continuous, and systematic

as to make the defendant essentially at home in the state. TV Azteca, S.A.B. de C.V.

v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Tex. 2016).

Specific jurisdiction applies to defendants less closely connected with the

forum state, but only as to a narrower class of claims than general jurisdiction

would cover. BRP-Rotax GmbH & Co. v. Shaik, 716 S.W.3d 98, 104 (Tex. 2025)

(citing Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 592 U.S. 351,

359 (2021)). Under Ford, specific jurisdiction exists when, not only has the

defendant taken some act by which it purposefully availed itself of the privilege of

conducting activities within Texas, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its

laws, the plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or relate to” that Texas-focused activity.

Id. (citing Ford, 592 U.S. at 141; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958));

State v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 669 S.W.3d 399, 430 (Tex. 2023). An

affiliation must exist between the forum and the underlying controversy,

principally, an activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum state and is

therefore subject to the state’s regulation. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 669

S.W.3d at 430 (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773,

1780 (2017)). That relationship does not have to be causal. Id. at 430-31 (citing

Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1026). However, the jurisdictionally relevant activities must be

20 the defendant’s own choice and justify a conclusion that the nonresident defendant

could reasonably anticipate being called into a Texas court with respect to a

particular claim. Ford, 592 U.S. at 359, 364; BRP-Rotax, 716 S.W.3d at 104 (citing

Ford, 592 U.S. at 359; Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d

801, 806 (Tex. 2002)).

When personal jurisdiction is challenged, the plaintiff bears the initial

burden to plead sufficient allegations to bring the nonresident defendant within the

scope of Texas’s long-arm statute. Bell, 549 S.W.3d at 559. The trial court may

consider the plaintiff’s original pleadings as well as the plaintiff’s response to the

defendant’s special appearance in determining whether the plaintiff satisfied that

initial burden. Graves v. DJO, LLC, 636 S.W.3d 321, 325 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2021, pet. denied); PetroSaudi Oil Servs. Ltd. v. Hartley, 617 S.W.3d 116, 135

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.). In conducting our review, we

accept as true the plaintiff’s pleadings and allegations, and review the pleadings

and allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pulmosan Safety Equip.

Corp. v. Lamb, 273 S.W.3d 829, 835 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet.

denied). If the plaintiff fails to plead facts bringing the defendant within the reach

of the long-arm statute, the defendant need only prove that it does not live in Texas

to negate jurisdiction. Hartley, 617 S.W.3d at 135 (citing Kelly v. Gen. Interior

Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 658-59 (Tex. 2010)).

21 If the plaintiff meets its initial pleading burden, the burden shifts to the

defendant to negate all bases of personal jurisdiction alleged by the plaintiff. LG

Chem Am., Inc. v. Morgan, 663 S.W.3d 217, 230 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2020) (citing Bell, 549 S.W.3d at 559), aff’d, 670 S.W.3d 341 (Tex. 2023). The

defendant can negate jurisdiction on either a factual or a legal basis. Id. (citing

Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 659). Factually, the defendant can present evidence that it has

no contacts with Texas, effectively disproving the plaintiff’s allegations. Id. (citing

Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 659). The plaintiff can then respond with its own evidence

affirming its allegations and, if it does not present evidence establishing personal

jurisdiction, it risks dismissal of its suit. Id. (citing Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 659). The

defendant is then allowed to show that, even if the plaintiff’s alleged facts are true:

the evidence is legally insufficient to establish jurisdiction; the defendant’s

contacts with Texas do not constitute purposeful availment; for specific

jurisdiction, the claims do not arise from the contacts with Texas; or the exercise of

jurisdiction offends traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Id.

(citing Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 659).

If the defendant produces credible evidence negating all bases of

jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden to establish that the Texas court

has personal jurisdiction over the defendant as a matter of law. Hartley, 617

22 S.W.3d at 135; Riviera Operating Corp. v. Dawson, 29 S.W.3d 905, 908 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont 2000, pet. denied).

C. General Jurisdiction

In its second point of error, Transportes Mexico argues that any implicit

finding of general jurisdiction over Transportes Mexico was erroneous. In its third

point of error, Transportes Mexico argues that, to the extent that the trial court

concluded it had general jurisdiction over Transportes Mexico based on a finding

that Transportes Mexico and Transportes Texas are alter egos, legally and factually

insufficient evidence supports that finding.

1. Alter-ego allegation

The Deharos argue that Transportes Texas and Transportes Mexico are alter

egos because: (1) the corporations have the same owners and managers, Chavez

and Rodriguez; (2) Chavez owns and manages both Chavez LLC and Chavez Inc.;

(3) Chavez viewed Transportes Texas, Transportes Mexico, Chavez LLC, and

Chavez Inc. as a single enterprise or job; (4) Transportes Texas and Transportes

Mexico commingle possession and operation of their buses; (5) the inter-company

agreements are so complex that the defendants were unable in discovery to identify

who owns Transportes Mexico6 and the bus involved in the accident at issue;7 and

6 As noted above, from the record on appeal, it appears that the Deharos did not request or conduct any jurisdictional discovery following Transportes Mexico’s special appearance. In their written discovery responses, Chavez and Rodriguez 23 (6) bus maintenance and inspections were shared costs regardless of the bus owner.

The Deharos liken the facts at issue to those in Finegan v. Autotransportes Tufesa

S.A. de C.V., No. CV 07-693-TUC-FRZ, 2009 WL 331349 (D. Ariz. Feb. 11,

2009), in which an Arizona federal district court imputed the United States

contacts of a United States bus company to its Mexican affiliate bus company

based on a finding that the two companies were joint venturers.8

The applicable Texas law differs from the Arizona court’s interpretation of

federal law in Finegan. Under Texas law, the “[c]reation of affiliated corporations

to limit liability while pursuing common goals lies firmly within the law and is

commonplace.” SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444,

455 (Tex. 2008). Because Texas law presumes that two separate corporations are

stated that they were both owners of Transportes Mexico. In their deposition testimony, Chavez and Rodriguez ultimately agreed that Chavez was the sole owner of Transportes Mexico at the time of the accident. 7 In both his written discovery responses and deposition testimony, Chavez identified Transportes Mexico as the owner of the bus. 8 Other federal courts have held that a co-venturer’s contacts cannot automatically be imputed to other co-venturers to establish personal jurisdiction. See Gonzalez- Pozo v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 223CV00589 GMNBNW, 2023 WL 8111753, at *3 (D. Nev. Nov. 22, 2023) (noting holding in Finegan but also that “the existence of a joint venture does not necessarily mean a court may automatically impute the minimum contacts of one co-venturer to another” (citing Resnick v. Rowe, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1139 (D. Haw. 2003))). “For instance, courts in other circuits have specified that to impute one co-venturer[’s] contacts to another member of the joint venture, ‘the member’s activities in the forum must be related to the joint venture’s business and the other members or the association itself must have exercised substantial influence over the member’s decision to carry on those activities.’” Id. (quoting Dunn v. A/S Em. Z. Svitzer, 885 F. Supp. 980, 985 (S.D. Tex. 1995)).

24 indeed distinct entities, a party seeking to ascribe one corporation’s contacts with

Texas to another by disregarding their distinct corporate entities must prove that an

alter-ego relationship exists. Wash. DC Party Shuttle, 406 S.W.3d at 738-39; BMC

Software, 83 S.W.3d at 798-99.

Jurisdictional veil-piercing and substantive veil-piercing involve different

elements of proof. PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163,

174 (Tex. 2007). To “fuse” separate entities for jurisdictional purposes, a plaintiff

must prove that one entity controls the internal business operations and affairs of

the other. PHC-Minden, 235 S.W.3d at 175 (citing BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at

799). The degree of control “must be greater than that normally associated with

common ownership and directorship.” Id. at 175 (quoting BMC Software, 83

S.W.3d at 799). Factors to consider include whether the corporations have separate

headquarters, whether the corporations observe corporate formalities, the amount

of stock the alleged controlling corporation owns in the alleged controlled

corporation, and the degree of control the former exercises over the latter’s general

policy and administration. Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d

142, 157 (Tex. 2013) (citing PHC-Minden, 235 S.W.3d at 175). However, one

corporation will not be regarded as the alter ego of another “merely because of

stock ownership, a duplication of some or all of the directors or officers, or an

exercise of the control that stock ownership gives to stockholders.” PHC-Minden,

25 235 S.W.3d at 175 (quoting Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp. of Houston, 528 S.W.2d

571, 573 (Tex. 1975)). The evidence must show that “the two entities cease to be

separate so that the corporate fiction should be disregarded to prevent fraud or

injustice.” Id. (quoting BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 799).

A finding that Transportes Mexico entered into a joint venture with

Transportes Texas would be relevant to a determination of Transportes Mexico’s

liability for Transportes Texas’s conduct in Texas, but would not make such

conduct automatically imputable to Transportes Mexico for jurisdictional purposes.

See PHC-Minden, 235 S.W.3d at 174-75 (discussing factors relevant to “fusing”

entities for jurisdictional rather than liability purposes, including degree of control

greater than that normally associated with common ownership and directorship);

Gordon & Doner, P.A. v. Joros, 287 S.W.3d 325, 334 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2009, no pet.) (“Whether Gordon entered into a joint venture with Bailey or

otherwise retained joint responsibility for Bailey’s conduct in Texas is relevant

only to Gordon’s liability on the merits. It does not constitute purposeful availment

by any activities by Gordon in Texas so as to establish minimum contacts.” (citing

PHC-Minden, 235 S.W.3d at 174)); see also Waller Marine, Inc. v. Magie, 463

S.W.3d 614, 620-21 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (“Whether

the parties’ agreement created a partnership bears upon the question of liability for

26 the alleged breach, not upon the question of jurisdiction.” (citing PHC-Minden,

235 S.W.3d at 174-75; Gordon & Doner, 287 S.W.3d at 334)).

With reference to the factors we must consider under PHC-Minden, the

Deharos have alleged that Transportes Texas is headquartered and has its principal

place of business in Harris County, Texas, and that Transportes Mexico has its

principal place of business in San Luis Potosí, Mexico. The Deharos have not

alleged or shown that the companies have the same headquarters. Nor have they

alleged or shown that Transportes Texas or Transportes Mexico has an ownership

interest in or control over the other’s general policy or administration.9 The fact

that Transportes Texas operates and performs maintenance on Transportes Mexico

buses that travel into Texas and Transportes Mexico operates and performs

maintenance on Transportes Texas buses that travel into Mexico is a factor to be

weighed in assessing the extent to which the two bus companies observe corporate

formalities. However, the evidence also shows that the companies: (1) employed

separate managers and bus drivers and separately supervised the drivers,10

9 In the trial court and on appeal, the Deharos have maintained that Transportes Mexico is controlled by either Chavez alone or Chavez in combination with Rodriguez. 10 See BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 799-800 (Tex. 2002) (rejecting alter-ego claim based in part on weight of evidence allegedly showing that employees of one corporation controlled marketing and human resources for other).

27 (2) operated buses and ticket sales in separate geographic territories,11

(3) maintained separate insurance,12 (4) owned separate buses,13 (5) entered into

leases with respect to buses that are temporarily operated by the other company,14

and (6) maintained separate revenue streams from ticket sales.15 Viewing all the

evidence in the light most favorable to the Deharos, the Deharos have not met their

burden of establishing that Transportes Texas and Transportes Mexico ceased to be

separate to the extent that, under applicable Texas law, the corporate fiction should

be disregarded to prevent fraud or injustice. See PHC-Minden, 235 S.W.3d at 175.

11 See Transportes Zima Real S.A. de C.V. v. Benitez, No. 14-22-00388-CV, 2023 WL 2026767, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 16, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (rejecting alter-ego claim where “overwhelming weight of the evidence indicate[d] that Transportes is a Mexican corporation operating solely in Mexico, and Zima Real is a Texas limited liability company operating solely in Texas”). 12 See PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 176 (Tex. 2007) (rejecting alter-ego claim based in part on consideration of extent to which one corporation provided insurance for other). 13 See Foley v. Trinity Indus. Leasing Co., 314 S.W.3d 593, 606 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (rejecting alter-ego claim based in part on consideration of extent to which one corporation provided equipment for other). 14 See Costamare, Inc. v. Mamou, No. 01-23-00865-CV, 2025 WL 863779, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 20, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (rejecting alter-ego claim based in part on existence of inter-company contracts that did not give one company control over other). 15 See Costamare, 2025 WL 863779, at *10 (rejecting alter-ego claim based in part on fact that one company’s income did not simply pass through to other); Benitez, 2023 WL 2026767, at *6 (rejecting alter-ego claims based in part on fact that companies did not share revenue).

28 Our conclusion is consistent with our sister court’s holding, in Transportes

Zima Real S.A. de C.V. v. Benitez, No. 14-22-00388-CV, 2023 WL 2026767 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 16, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.), that the

plaintiffs did not meet their evidentiary burden in establishing an alleged alter-ego

relationship between a Mexican bus company and domestic bus company despite

evidence of an overlap in the companies’ management and ownership, that

employees of the Mexican company lived and worked in Texas, that the Mexican

company had registered property in Texas, and that the Mexican company

advertised itself and the domestic company as a single company. Id. at *5-7. The

court of appeals in Benitez noted that the weight of the evidence was that the

Mexican company operated solely in Mexico, the domestic company operated

solely in the United States, and the two companies observed corporate formalities.

Id. at *6. The same is true here.

2. Other allegations

Because we find that Transportes Texas and Transportes Mexico were not

alter egos, we do not impute Transportes Texas’s contacts with Texas to

Transportes Mexico. We thus consider whether Transportes Mexico’s contacts

with Texas are, on their own, sufficient to support the trial court’s exercise of

general jurisdiction over Transportes Mexico. The Deharos argued in the trial court

and argue again on appeal that Transportes Mexico’s relevant contacts with Texas

29 include: (1) Transportes Mexico is owned and controlled by Texas residents

Chavez and Rodriguez; (2) Transportes Mexico entered into contracts with

Transportes Texas and Chavez LLC; (3) Transportes Mexico buses routinely

traveled into Texas, bringing Mexicans to Texas and Texans to Mexico; and

(4) when they traveled into Texas, the Transportes Mexico buses were leased by

Transportes Texas or Chavez LLC, operated by a driver employed by Transportes

Texas or Chavez LLC, operated under Transportes Texas’s DOT registration, and

sometimes inspected and maintained in Texas.16

We disregard Chavez and Rodriguez’s Texas contacts because, even

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Deharos, the Deharos have

not shown that Chavez and Rodriguez were alter egos of Transportes Mexico. See

BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 799 (noting that alter-ego parent’s contacts can be

imputed to subsidiary for jurisdictional purposes, but that exercise of control that

stock ownership gives to stockholders is not enough to establish alter-ego

relationship). While the Deharos allege that Chavez alone, or Chavez and

16 The Deharos also assert that Transportes Mexico routinely used Transportes Texas’s terminal in Texas to sell tickets to Texas residents, store Transportes Mexico buses, and as a terminal. See Pulmosan Safety Equip. Corp. v. Lamb, 273 S.W.3d 829, 835 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (noting that, in determining jurisdictional pleas asserted by a defendant, we begin our review by taking plaintiff’s allegations as true). Transportes Mexico negated those assertions with evidence that it does not have an office, operations, or facilities— including a bus yard—in Texas. See LG Chem Am., Inc. v. Morgan, 663 S.W.3d 217, 230 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020) (noting that defendant can negate jurisdiction on factual basis), aff’d, 670 S.W.3d 341 (Tex. 2023).

30 Rodriguez together, controlled Transportes Mexico, they have neither alleged nor

shown a degree of control over Transportes Mexico that exceeds that which

Chavez and Rodriguez would have as its owners. See PHC-Minden, 235 S.W.3d at

175 (holding that, to “fuse” parent and subsidiary for jurisdictional purposes,

plaintiff must prove parent exercises greater control than that normally associated

with common ownership and directorship (citing BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at

799)). The evidence submitted by Transportes Mexico regarding the operations of

Transportes Mexico and its relationship to Transportes Texas negates any

argument by the Deharos that can be interpreted as an allegation that Transportes

Mexico and its ownership disregarded the corporate formalities that separate them.

And the mere fact that Transportes Mexico is owned by Texas residents is

insufficient support for a finding of general jurisdiction. Searcy v. Parex Res., Inc.,

496 S.W.3d 58, 78 (Tex. 2016) (“[A]n entity’s mere ownership in the forum state

is insufficient for that state to have general jurisdiction over the subsidiary

defendant.”).

The Deharos also have not shown that the alleged contracts between

Transportes Mexico and Transportes Texas and Chavez LLC constitute continuous

and systematic contacts making Transportes Mexico essentially “at home” in

Texas. Whether a nonresident’s contracts support a finding that the nonresident

invoked the benefits and protections of Texas law to the extent necessary to

31 support a finding of general jurisdiction depends on factors including the scope of

the contracts, their terms, and the circumstances surrounding their execution. See

Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 787, 792 (Tex.

2005) (noting that jurisdictional analysis includes factors such as whether contract

involves many contacts with forum over long period of time, and forum chosen in

any forum-selection clause); Coleman, 83 S.W.3d at 808 (holding that

nonresident’s contracts with Texas residents did not support finding of general

jurisdiction because nonresident did not sign or perform contracts in Texas);

Mateer v. Cabool Lease, Inc., No. 2-09-297-CV, 2010 WL 1509691, at *3 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth Apr. 15, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that nonresident

defendant’s leasing or selling milk trailers and trucks for decade to third-party

company that did business in Texas did not constitute continuous and systematic

contacts with Texas because transactions were executed outside Texas and third

party’s business activities in Texas had no jurisdictional relevance).

The record includes some testimony regarding the terms of what the parties

generally refer to as an “interline” or “interchange” agreement but no copy of the

agreement. See APPA Tech. Corp. v. Mitchell, 225 S.W.3d 812, 819 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2007, pet. denied) (reversing denial of special appearance based in part on

lack of evidence of purposeful availment, noting that, while plaintiff alleged that

nonresident defendant caused product to be sold in Texas by entering into

32 distribution agreement, “[t]he evidence in the record, however, does not include a

copy of the distribution agreement, any language from the agreement, or what the

distribution agreement mandated”). To the extent there are independent agreements

pursuant to which Transportes Mexico and Transportes Texas “lease buses owned

by the other company for operations as needed,” they are also not part of the

record.

From the evidence we do have of the terms of the interline agreement, it

appears to have been structured so that Transportes Mexico operates solely in

Mexico and Transportes Texas operates solely in Texas. See Coleman, 83 S.W.3d

at 808 (holding that, when nonresident defendant purposefully structures

transactions to avoid benefits and protections of forum’s laws, legal fiction of

consent that supports general jurisdiction no longer applies). As the interline

agreement is described in the testimony, it is very similar to the “interchange”

agreement between a Texas bus company and Mexican bus company described in

Benitez. See Benitez, 2023 WL 2026767, at *1 (in appeal from denial of Mexican

bus company’s special appearance, describing interchange agreement as including

arrangement pursuant to which driver employed by Mexican bus company would

carry passengers on buses owned by that company to Texas–Mexico border, at

which time driver employed by Texas bus company leasing buses would drive

buses to destinations within United States, with each company having exclusive

33 use, possession, and control over operations in its respective country). In Benitez,

the court of appeals concluded that insufficient evidence supported the trial court’s

implied findings that the Mexican and Texas bus companies were alter egos and

that the Mexican bus company’s contacts with Texas were sufficient to support the

exercise of general jurisdiction. 2023 WL 2026767, at *7. We reach the same

conclusion here because the uncontradicted evidence shows that each of

Transportes Mexico and Transportes Texas maintained separate operations on its

side of the Unites States-Mexico border.

We thus conclude that general jurisdiction does not exist over Transportes

Mexico and sustain Transportes Mexico’s second and third points of error.

D. Specific Jurisdiction

In its first point of error, Transportes Mexico contends that any finding of

specific jurisdiction over Transportes Mexico was not supported by legally

sufficient evidence. As discussed above, the Deharos argue that Transportes

Mexico’s relevant contacts with Texas include the following: Transportes Mexico

entered into contracts with Transportes Texas and Chavez LLC; Transportes

Mexico buses routinely traveled into Texas, bringing Mexicans to Texas and

Texans to Mexico; and, when they traveled into Texas, the Transportes Mexico

buses were leased by Transportes Texas or Chavez LLC, operated by a driver

employed by Transportes Texas or Chavez LLC, operated under Transportes

34 Texas’s DOT registration, and sometimes inspected and maintained in Texas. In

arguing that specific jurisdiction exists over Transportes Mexico, the Deharos note

further that Maribel and Hipolito purchased their tickets for the bus involved in the

accident from Transportes Texas in Harris County.

Transportes Mexico disputes that it purposefully availed itself of the benefits

of Texas law. For example, Transportes Mexico argues that it “acknowledges it

and Transportes [Texas] are involved in an interline agreement and that some

bus[es] are leased between the companies,” but that “substantial efforts were

undertaken to separate and isolate their respective activities, with Transportes

[Texas] operating in the United States, and Transportes [Mexico] in Mexico,

exclusively.” However, in arguing that legally insufficient evidence supports the

exercise of specific jurisdiction over Transportes Mexico, Transportes Mexico

focuses on the relatedness prong of the specific jurisdiction analysis.

Transportes Mexico contends that legally insufficient evidence supports the

trial court’s conclusion that a “substantial connection” exists between Transportes

Mexico’s Texas contacts and the operative facts of the litigation. Transportes

Mexico argues that the Deharos’ claims relate to the allegedly negligent operation

of the bus involved in the accident at issue and the training and supervision of its

driver, all of which occurred in Mexico. Transportes Mexico cites as support the

decisions in Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. 2007),

35 Benitez, and Transportes de Zima Real S.A. de C.V. v. Lizarraga, No. 14-13-

00933-CV, 2014 WL 3512858 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 15, 2014, no

pet.) (mem. op.). The Deharos, on the other hand, contend that the facts in those

cases are distinguishable from those at issue. The Deharos argue that, but for the

interline agreement, the bus would have been owned and operated by Transportes

Texas in compliance with FMCSA regulations throughout its journey. In addition,

the Deharos note that the driver was hired by Chavez, an owner of both

Transportes Mexico and Transportes Texas.17

The claims at issue in Moki Mac arose from a Texas resident’s death during

an Arizona hiking and rafting expedition that was booked in Texas and organized

by a Utah-based company that sent marketing materials to Texas. Moki Mac, 221

S.W.3d at 573. In making its specific jurisdiction determination, the supreme court

declined to apply a “but-for” relatedness test under which “a cause of action arises

from or relates to a defendant’s forum contacts when, but for those contacts, the

cause of action would never have arisen.” Id. at 580-81. Instead, it held that, “for a

nonresident defendant’s forum contacts to support an exercise of specific

jurisdiction, there must be a substantial connection between those contacts and the

operative facts of the litigation.” Id. at 585 (citing Guardian Royal Exch.

Assurance, Ltd. v. Eng. China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 229-33 (Tex. 1991); 17 As discussed above, we disregard Chavez’s Texas contacts because the Deharos have not shown that Chavez and Transportes Mexico were alter egos.

36 Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 329 (1980)); see also Ford, 592 U.S. at 352

(holding that required connection between plaintiff’s suit and defendant’s activities

does not need to be causal); LG Chem, 670 S.W.3d at 347 (noting that, “while a

plaintiff need not establish a strict causal relationship between the defendant’s

contacts and the plaintiff’s claim, neither is it the case that anything goes” (citing

Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1026) and that, to satisfy relatedness prong of minimum

contacts analysis in specific jurisdiction context, “the plaintiff must demonstrate a

‘substantial connection’ between the defendant’s contacts and the operative facts

of the litigation” (citing Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 585)). The operative facts on

which the supreme court focused in Moki Mac were those events that “[would] be

the focus of the trial, [would] consume most if not all of the litigation’s attention,

and [to which] the overwhelming majority of the evidence [would] be directed,”

namely, events that occurred in Arizona. Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 585.

The supreme court concluded that specific jurisdiction did not exist over the

Utah company because the injuries for which the plaintiffs sought recovery were

based on the Texas resident’s death in Arizona, and the relationship between the

operative facts of the litigation and the Utah company’s activities in Texas were

“too attenuated to satisfy specific jurisdiction’s due-process concerns.” Id. at 588.

In reaching its decision, the supreme court cited multiple decisions in which a

court had concluded that, even if a commercial transaction in the forum preceding

37 a travel-related injury outside the forum could be considered a but-for cause of the

injury, it was an insufficient basis for establishing personal jurisdiction. See, e.g.,

id. at 582-83 (citing Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, 339 F.2d 317, 321–22 (2d

Cir.1964) (holding in case in which plaintiffs had sued nonresident bus company

for injuries sustained in accident that sale of bus tickets in New York was

insufficient basis for personal jurisdiction because claims did not arise from sale of

tickets); Reich v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 409 F. Supp. 846, 852 (S.D. Tex. 1974)

(concluding that contract signed in Texas to build helicopter that crashed in Ghana,

killing two oil rig workers, was too tenuous a contact to say that tort arose from

it)).

Lizarraga and Benitez both involved facts similar to those at issue. In each, a

Mexican company that owned buses contracted with a Texas company that owned

buses to transport passengers between Mexico and the United States. See Benitez,

2023 WL 2026767, at *1; Lizarraga, 2014 WL 3512858, at *1. Pursuant to the bus

companies’ agreement, regardless of which company owned the bus making a

given trip across the border, a driver employed by the Mexican bus company

would drive the bus on the Mexican side of the border and a driver employed by

the Texas company would drive the bus on the United States side of the border.

See Benitez, 2023 WL 2026767, at *1; Lizarraga, 2014 WL 3512858, at *1. Each

appeal involved claims arising from a bus accident that occurred in Mexico,

38 seeking damages for injuries suffered by one or more passengers who purchased

their tickets in Mexico. See Benitez, 2023 WL 2026767, at *1; Lizarraga, 2014

WL 3512858, at *1, *3. In each case, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed the

trial court’s denial of the Mexican bus company’s special appearance on the

grounds that there was no substantial connection between the nonresident’s Texas

contacts and the operative facts of the litigation. See Benitez, 2023 WL 2026767, at

*3, *7; Lizarraga, 2014 WL 3512858, at *1.

The Deharos argue that Moki Mac is distinguishable because Transportes

Mexico’s relevant contacts with Texas are more extensive than the Utah

company’s, and that Benitez and Lizarraga are distinguishable because the

plaintiffs in those cases purchased their bus tickets in Mexico. They argue further

that Transportes Mexico was an undisclosed principal to the Texas transaction in

which Maribel and Hipolito purchased their bus tickets. The Deharos direct our

attention to Bernice Claire Row Tr. v. Throckmorton Land & Cattle Co., 979

S.W.2d 383 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1998, no pet.), in which the court of appeals

affirmed the denial of a special appearance by nonresident defendants based on

evidence that they were undisclosed principals in connection with a contract for the

pasturing of cattle that was executed in Texas, contemplated performance in Texas,

and listed a Texas county as the venue for any dispute arising from the contract.

39 In the context of specific jurisdiction, the “minimum-contacts analysis is

focused on the quality and nature of the defendant’s contacts, rather than their

number.” Searcy v. Parex Res., Inc., 496 S.W.3d 58, 67 (Tex. 2016) (quoting

Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., 278 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex.

2009)). The nonresident defendants’ connection to the pasturing contract at issue in

Throckmorton Land & Cattle supported the exercise of specific jurisdiction in that

case because the plaintiff’s claim was for breach of that contract. 979 S.W.2d at

384-85. Even assuming Transportes Mexico was an undisclosed principal to

Maribel and Hipolito’s purchase of their bus ticket, the Deharos’ claims are tort

claims based on allegedly negligent acts occurring in Mexico. Even if the ticket

purchase was a but-for cause of the Deharos’ injuries, under Moki Mac, which is

controlling precedent, that is insufficient on this record to show a substantial

connection between Transportes Mexico’s Texas contacts and the operative facts at

issue. See also Ford, 592 U.S. at 362 (holding that specific jurisdiction exists when

plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or relate to” defendant’s forum contacts, and thus

can exist even in absence of strict causal relationship, but noting “[t]hat does not

mean anything goes”); LG Chem, 670 S.W.3d at 347 (same, noting plaintiff must

demonstrate a substantial connection between defendant’s contacts and operative

facts of the litigation).18 The fact that the ticket purchase at issue occurred in Texas

18 Neither party argues that the United States Supreme Court’s 2021 holding in Ford 40 is thus not a basis on which to distinguish the facts at issue in this case from those

at issue in Benitez and Lizarraga, at least for the purpose of addressing specific

jurisdiction. See also Fight Sports LLC v. Schneider, No. 01-23-00897-CV, 2025

WL 2485681, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 29, 2025, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (in case involving alleged sexual assault of plaintiff by her martial arts

instructor, reversing denial of special appearance and holding that trial court did

not have specific jurisdiction over nonresident defendant who sponsored

instructor’s P-1 visa because, even though nonresident defendant’s purposeful

contacts with Texas may have been but-for causes of assault, plaintiff’s claims

arose out of instructor’s alleged misconduct and not nonresident defendant’s Texas

contacts (citing Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 157

(Tex. 2013))).

Here, as in Benitez and Lizarraga, there is no substantial connection between

the Mexican bus company’s Texas contacts and the operative facts. The Deharos’

alleged injuries arise from a bus accident in Mexico. The operative facts

underpinning the Deharos’ claim that their injuries resulted from Transportes

Mexico’s negligence concern the Mexican driver’s operation of the bus;

that specific jurisdiction can exist in the absence of a strict causal relationship if the plaintiff’s claims “relate to” the defendant’s forum contacts impacts Moki Mac’s application here. Cf. Austin v. Extruded Aluminum Corp., No. 01-24-00435- CV, 2026 WL 488796, at *15 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 19, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (Caughey, J., concurring) (“litigants and courts would benefit from clarity as to what exactly ‘relate to’ means, post-Ford”).

41 Transportes Mexico’s hiring, employment, training, and supervision of the driver;

Transportes Mexico’s maintenance of the bus;19 Transportes Mexico’s compliance

with laws and regulations governing its operations; and Transportes Mexico’s

enforcement of its own safety rules, policies, and procedures—i.e., conduct that

occurred largely if not entirely in Mexico. As discussed above, the record contains

evidence that Transportes Mexico had the following Texas contacts: (1) ownership

by one or more Texas residents; (2) contracting with Texas-based affiliates; and

(3) pursuant to such contracting, permitting buses owned by Transportes Mexico to

be operated and maintained in Texas by Texas-based affiliates to bring Mexicans

to Texas and Texans to Mexico. While one or more of those contacts may be a but-

for cause of the Deharos’ alleged injuries, there is no substantial connection

between those contacts and the operative facts. See Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 585.

As noted above, Transportes Mexico, like the appellate courts in Benitez and

Lizarraga, focuses on the relatedness prong of the specific jurisdiction analysis.

Because we conclude that there is no substantial connection between Transportes

Mexico’s Texas contacts and the operative facts, we do not need to consider

19 The Deharos allege that “most of the bus maintenance” was performed in Mexico, where it is “considerably cheaper.” But they also cite testimony by Chavez that the bus at issue was maintained at times in Texas and note that one of Transportes Mexico’s Texas-based affiliates hired a mechanic to perform maintenance on the bus in Texas in July 2019 after the bus was cited in Texas for violations “relating to lights and wheels.” The Deharos do not, however, appear to allege that Transportes Mexico was involved in the July 2019 maintenance work in Texas or that the bus accident resulted from that work.

42 whether Transportes Mexico purposefully availed itself of the benefits of doing

business in Texas. However, we note that the court of appeals in Benitez held that

the interchange agreement between the Mexican and Texas bus companies was

“insufficient evidence to establish that [the Mexican bus company] purposefully

availed itself of the privilege of conducting business activities in Texas.” 2023 WL

2026767, at *4.

E. Conspiracy

In its fourth point of error, Transportes Mexico argues that the Deharos’

conspiracy claim does not support the trial court’s denial of its special appearance.

In their pleading, the Deharos assert that Transportes Texas, Chavez, Rodriguez,

Chavez LLC, Transportes Mexico, and “John Does 1-100” engaged in a conspiracy

to operate a passenger bus business without complying with FMCSA regulations.

Transportes Mexico notes that the Deharos did not repeat the assertion in their

response to Transportes Mexico’s special appearance. Transportes Mexico argues

further that, in any case, the bare assertion of a conspiracy with Texas residents is

insufficient to support personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. We

agree. See Nat’l Indus. Sand Ass’n v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tex. 1995)

(“[W]e decline to recognize the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a

nonresident defendant based solely upon the effects or consequences of an alleged

conspiracy with a resident in the forum state.”); Fjell Tech. Group v. Unitech Int’l,

43 Inc., No. 14-14-00255-CV, 2015 WL 457805, at *7 n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] Feb. 3, 2015, pet. denied) (excluding conspiracy claim from

jurisdictional analysis because personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant

cannot be based solely upon effects or consequences of alleged civil conspiracy,

which is derivative tort).

We thus conclude that specific jurisdiction does not exist over Transportes

Mexico and sustain Transportes Mexico’s first and fourth points of error.

Conclusion

Because we have concluded that the trial court has neither general nor

specific jurisdiction over Transportes Mexico, we reverse the trial court’s order

denying Transportes Mexico’s special appearance and render judgment dismissing

for lack of jurisdiction the claims against Transportes Mexico brought by the

Deharos.

Amparo “Amy” Guerra Justice

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Caughey, and Dokupil.