Trans-Atlantic Co. v. United States

67 Cust. Ct. 296, 1971 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2256
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedOctober 28, 1971
DocketC.D. 4288
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 67 Cust. Ct. 296 (Trans-Atlantic Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Trans-Atlantic Co. v. United States, 67 Cust. Ct. 296, 1971 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2256 (cusc 1971).

Opinions

Rosenstein, Judge:

The merchandise involved herein, invoiced as “Wrought Steel Single Action Template Spring Hinges”, was assessed with duty at 17 per centum ad valorem under TSTJS item 647.03, as amended by the Tariff Schedules Technical Amendments Act of 1965, Pub. L. 82-241, 79 Stat. 933, which provides in pertinent part:

Hinges; and fittings and mountings not specially provided for, suitable for furniture, doors, windows, blinds, staircases, luggage, vehicle coach work, caskets, cabinets, and similar uses; all the foregoing, of base metal, whether or not coated or plated with precious metal:
Hot coated or plated with precious metal:
Of iron or steel, or aluminum, or of zinc:
% # * ifc *
647.03 Other_ 17% ad val.

Plaintiff claims that the articles are properly dutiable at 10 per centum ad valorem under TSTJS item 646.95, as modified by the Geneva (1967) Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, T.D. 68-9, which provides:

646.95 Door closers, and parts thereof, of base metal _ 10% ad val.

Exhibit 1, a sample of the imported merchandise, consists of a boxed pair of single action spring hinges, a pintle (short steel bar) for setting or adjusting tension, and screws.

The record in Trans-Atlantic Company v. United States, protest 67/68753, involving double action spring hinges and the same issues of fact and law, which was dismissed after the submission had been vacated, was incorporated herein. The same witness appeared for plaintiff in both proceedings. Defendant called two witnesses in the current matter, one of whom had testified with another witness in the incorporated case.

The record establishes that the function of the hinge is to hang, or hold, the door in place, and that of the spring, which is located in the barrel of the hinge, is to close the door automatically. (The spring compresses when the door is opened and expands when the door is re[298]*298leased.) If the spring were removed, the hinge would continue to function, but the door would have to be closed manually, or, alternatively, a hydraulic door closer installed if automatic closure were desired. The spring hinges provide a means of “cheaply hanging and providing door closing facilities to a door * * *” (R. 85).

Plaintiff concedes that the spring hinges are a kind of hinge, but claims that they are also door closers and, whether the latter be considered a primary or secondary feature, are more specifically provided for as such under item 646.95.

Defendant contends that the spring is merely an auxiliary feature which does not take the subject articles beyond the ambit of the provision for hinges.

Resolution of the issue requires a determination of the meaning of the eo nomine provision for “hinges” as this term is used in item 647.03 of the tariff schedules.

In the absence of commercial designation, which is not here involved, words used in the tariff statute are to be constituted in accordance with their common meaning. Marshall Field & Co. v. United States, 45 CCPA 72, C.A.D. 676 (1958). Common meaning is a matter of law to be determined by the court which may rely upon its own understanding of the terms used and consult the works of standard lexicographers and scientific authorities, in addition to reviewing testimony, which is advisory only, of witnesses. United States v. O. Brager-Larsen, 36 CCPA 1, C.A.D. 388 (1948); United States v. John B. Stetson Co., 21 CCPA 3, T.D. 46319 (1933).

The articles at bar comport with the dictionary definitions of “hinge”, as follows:

Andéis Mecha/nical Dictionary, 1942:
The hook or joint on which a door, gate or lid, etc., turns.
Fv/nh <& Wagnails New Standard Dictionary of the English Language, 1942:
1. A device for so connecting two pieces, as a box and its lid, that one may be turned upon the other: usually made of metal, and in many forms. (Includes illustration (No. 6) of a spring hinge.)
Webster’s New International Dictionary, Second Edition, 1957:
1. The hook with its eye, or the joint, or flexible piece, on which a door, gate, lid, etc., turns or swings.

Knight’s American Mechanical Dictionary, 1872, volume 2, pages 1103-1104:

A means of connecting a door, casement, or leaf, with its frame or an object, so that it will swing thereon.
* * * ❖ ❖ *
[299]*299Hinges are known by purposes, as,— * * *
Or by some structural peculiarity or shape, as,— * * * Spring-hinge * * *

The rule governing designations of an eo nomine character is set forth in Nootka Packing Co. et al. v. United States, 22 CCPA 464, 470, T.D. 47464 (1935):

The clear weight of the authorities on the subject is that an eo nomine statutory designation of an article, without limitations or a shown contrary legislative intent, judicial decision, or administrative practice to the contrary, and without proof of commercial designation, will include all forms of said article.

We find, on the record herein, and after viewing the sample of the imported merchandise, which is itself a potent witness, that the articles at bar are hinges within the ordinary understanding of that term, and that the spring is an added feature which improves their capability but does not change their basic characteristics or identity as a species of hinge within the ambit of item 647.03.

Improvement in the design of an article having an eo nomine classification which enables it to perform an additional function does not militate against its continuing to be a form of the named article. Under the tariff acts, articles are classifiable on the basis of their primary design, construction and function, even though they are capable of performing other auxiliary or incidental operations. Schick X-Ray Co., Inc. v. United States, 64 Cust. Ct. 430, C.D. 4013 (1970); Giddings & Lewis Machine Tool Co. et al. v. United States, 61 Cust. Ct. 284, C.D. 3612, 292 F. Supp. 394 (1968).

In this case we are guided by United Carr Fastener Corporation v. United States (Northern Screw Corp., Party in Interest), 54 CCPA 89, C.A.D. 913 (1967), involving “Tee Nuts”, which were claimed to be something more than a “nut” and, therefore, outside the scope of the eo nomine provision for nuts in paragraph 330, Tariff Act of 1930. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s holding that the subject article was a species of nut and quoted from its opinion, as follows (Id. v. Id., 56 Cust. Ct. 347, 352-353, C.D. 2648 (1966)):

In the instant case, the testimony indicates that the “Tee Nut” came into vogue as a labor and timesaving device in joining objects together, replacing an older, obsolete method of doing the same thing.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Hampco Apparel, Inc. v. United States
12 Ct. Int'l Trade 92 (Court of International Trade, 1988)
Trans-Atlantic Co. v. United States
471 F.2d 1397 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1973)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
67 Cust. Ct. 296, 1971 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2256, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/trans-atlantic-co-v-united-states-cusc-1971.