Durbrow & Hearne Manufacturing Co. v. United States

9 Ct. Cust. 148, 1919 WL 21406, 1919 CCPA LEXIS 29
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedApril 15, 1919
DocketNo. 1957
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 9 Ct. Cust. 148 (Durbrow & Hearne Manufacturing Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Durbrow & Hearne Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 9 Ct. Cust. 148, 1919 WL 21406, 1919 CCPA LEXIS 29 (ccpa 1919).

Opinion

Barber, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Paragraph 441 of the tariff act of 1913 extends the favor of free entry to “sewing machines * * * whether imported in whole or in parts, including repair parts.” Paragraph 165 provides for a duty of 25 per cent ad valorem upon “embroidering machines” and the main question here is under which of these two paragraphs certain machines hereinafter described are to be classified.

The importer claims under paragraph 441 and alternatively under paragraph 167, providing for articles composed wholly or in chief value of steel or other metal, but in view of the conclusion we reach it becomes unnecessary to consider the alternative claim.

It seems that prior to 1909 neither sewing machines nor embroidering machines were eo nomine provided for in the tariff statutes. Theretofore they had apparently been classifiable under appropriate provisions as manufactures of metal. Paragraph 197 of the act of 1909 provided for a duty of 30 per cent ad valorem upon sewing machines and of 45 per cent ad valorem on embroidery machines and also that embroidery machines imported prior to January 1, 1911, should be given free entry. No eo nomine provision was made therein for parts of either of such machines.

The importations here came from Germany in April, 1916, and were entered at the port of New York in June of the same year. The entry paper refers to the merchandise as “ten cases sewing machines.” Upon the invoice they are described as follows: (a) “3 heads Adler sewing-machine class 8-8 for embroidering without arrangement for sewing”; (&) “2 heads Adler sewing machine class 8-9 with patent arrangement for sewing, embroidering, and darning”; (e) “2 heads [150]*150Adler sewing machine class 9-4, semiautomatic embroidery machine for padstitch, only for power”; (d) “3 heads Adler sewing machine class 9-2, semiautomatic embroidery machines for zigzag, only for power.”

The machines described as class 8-8 were classified as embroidering machines under paragraph 165 above mentioned. The printed record before us shows that class 8-9 was given free entry as sewing machines and, as we understand the entries upon the invoice, the same favor was accorded to the balance of the importation.

The only question is as to the proper classification of the 8-8 machines. The official exhibit which is before us is a sample of the 8-9 machine.

A member of the importing company who was called by the importer was the only witness before the board. In substance he testified that the only difference between the 8-8 and the 8-9 machines was that .the feed mechanism and presser foot were not on the 8-8 machine, but were on the 8-9; that the removal of these two attachments from an 8-9 machine immediately and with no other change converted it into an 8-8 machine; that the 8-9 was an ordinary sewing machine; that the 8-8 was ordered and imported without the presser foot and feed attachment as a matter of economy, enabling them to sell the machine more cheaply than they could if those parts were with it; that in the general conduct of importer's business they sold these two machines indifferently according to the demands of the trade, some users desiring the presser foot and feed apparatus, others not; that the 8-8 was really a part of a complete 8-9 machine; that the feed mechanism and presser foot were originally a part of the machine. He also gave the following testimony with reference to these parts:'

In the use for which this machine is generally sold it is unnecessary to have this feed mechanism or presser foot. When the work is done, the operator stretches the goods in a frame known as an embroidery frame, and as the feed mechanism and presser foot is not necessary, as a matter of economy the machines are imported without those parts. The operators do not need them. They move the goods around by hand.
Q. Is the stitch exactly the same? — A. Yes, sir; absolutely the same; the only difference is these parts were taken off because they are not used.

It is not suggested that this testimony does not state the facts.

The Board of General Appraisers held the 8-8 machines classifiable under paragraph 165 as embroidering machines upon the theory that inasmuch as in the condition imported they were suitable for embroidering only, they must be regarded as embroidering machines. As to whether they might not be regarded as parts of sewing machines, the board said nothing in its opinion.

The importer concedes here that the 8-8 machines were imported to be used in embroidering, but it contends that a sewing machine does not become an embroidering machine merely because of its [151]*151adaptability to embroidering, citing G. A. 7582 (T. D. 34607). This was a case involving the interpretation of paragraph 197 of the act of 1909. The machines there had been invoiced as embroidery machines, assessed as such under paragraph 197, but claimed to be dutiable by the importers as sewing machines. No precise description of the article is contained in the board’s opinion. It appeared that while the free-entry provision for embroidery machines of paragraph 197 was in force identical machines had been given free entry upon the representation of the importers that they were embroidery machines; that upon the expiration of the free-entry period the importers then claimed they should be classified as sewing machines. This the board refused to permit and sustained the classification. Discussing the question the board said:

Whether a sewing machine is an embroidery machine, or vice versa, must be determined by a knowledge of the character of the construction of its mechanism and of the primary purpose for which it was designed. It is a matter of common knowledge thatagreat number, if not all, of the various types of sewing machines, by the manipulation or adjustment of one or more of their attachments, may be rendered competent to perform fancy stitching or embroidered work. But such an extraordinary, éxceptional, or unusual use to which such a machine might possibly be made adaptable could hardly serve as a potent factor in determining its commercial or dutiable status. The fact remains that it is a machine primarily constructed and designed for sewing fabrics — a sewing machine — and any other use thereof is purely incidental and devised merely to meet some household, emergency. Such a sewing machine would be wholly inadequate to do the work for which the embroidery machine in trade and commerce is specially constructed and designed. As sewing machines are specially constructed and primarily intended to sew fabrics, so, also, is it the chief function of embroidery machines to stitch upon fabrics and other articles various forms of fancy and embroidered needlework.
The Standard Dictionary defines a sewing machine as “a machine for sewing; a machine for stitching ordinary fabrics.” And in Knight’s Mechanical Dictionary is given the following .definition of an embroidery machine:
A form of sewing machine in which the cloth is moved beneath the reciprocating needle bar according to the requirements of the tracing while the needles and hooks retain their respective relative positions above and below the fabrics.

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9 Ct. Cust. 148, 1919 WL 21406, 1919 CCPA LEXIS 29, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/durbrow-hearne-manufacturing-co-v-united-states-ccpa-1919.